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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
LAMONT FULTON :
:
Appellant : No. 3275 EDA 2017
Appeal from the PCRA Order September 15, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0413241-2002
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 04, 2018
Appellant Lamont Fulton appeals from the Order entered in the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on September 15, 2017, denying as
untimely his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act.1 We
affirm.
A panel of this Court previously set forth the relevant facts and
procedural history on appeal from the Order entered on July 11, 2013, denying
his first PCRA petition as follows:
Following a bench trial, which was held on March 8, 2006,
Appellant was found guilty but mentally ill of first-degree murder
and guilty of possession of an instrument of crime (“PIC”). On May
8, 2006, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole on the murder
conviction and a concurrent term of two and one-half to five years
of incarceration for the PIC conviction. Appellant filed a direct
appeal to this Court, and in a memorandum filed on November 16,
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1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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2007, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence
Commonwealth v. Fulton, 1535 EDA 2006, 944 A.2d 791 (Pa.
Super. November 16, 2007) (unpublished memorandum).
Appellant did not pursue an appeal in the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court.
On August 11, 2008, Appellant filed a PCRA petition seeking
the reinstatement of his right to file a petition for allowance of
appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Counsel was
appointed, and on December 18, 2009, the PCRA court reinstated
Appellant’s right to seek allowance of appeal in the Supreme
Court. On August 11, 2010, the Supreme Court denied Appellant’s
petition. Commonwealth v. Fulton, 3 A.3d 670 (Pa. 2010).
On September 17, 2010, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA
petition. The PCRA court appointed counsel, and Appellant filed an
amended PCRA petition on May 9, 2012. On May 3, 2013,
pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, the PCRA [court] notified Appellant
of its intent to dismiss the PCRA petition without a hearing. The
PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition in an order filed
on July 11, 2013. On July 29, 2013, Appellant filed a timely
appeal.
Commonwealth v. Fulton, No. 2168 EDA 2013, unpublished
memorandum at 1-2 (Pa.Super. filed July 30, 2014).
In his prior appeal, Appellant averred trial counsel had been ineffective
for failing to pursue a claim of diminished capacity in light of his suffering from
a serious mental illness at the time of the offense. In finding no merit to this
claim and in affirming the PCRA court’s Order, this Court noted that:
[t]he record reveals that trial counsel pursued a diminished
capacity defense and provided supporting documentation in the
form of Appellant’s mental health evaluations, diagnoses,
opinions, and medical records. N.T., Trial, 3/8/06, at 108-110.
Moreover, trial counsel argued that, should the trial court find
Appellant guilty, in light of Appellant’s mental health issues which
are supported by the aforementioned documents, the conviction
should only be for third-degree murder due to Appellant’s mental
health. Id. at 160-164.
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Id. at 5-6. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Appellant’s Petition for
Allowance of Appeal on January 26, 2015. Commonwealth v. Fulton, 630
Pa. 740, 108 A.3d 34 (2015).
On February 3, 2015, Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition, his
second, pro se. Appellant thereafter filed amended and/or supplemental
petitions on February 15, 2015, August 26, 2015, September 15, 2015,
January 6, 2016, May 14, 2016, and October 26, 2016. After notifying
Appellant of its intent to dismiss the PCRA petition without a hearing pursuant
to Pa.R.Crim.P 907 on July 17, 2017,2 the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s
petition in its Order filed on September 15, 2017. This timely appeal followed.
When reviewing the denial of a PCRA petition, our standard of review is
limited to examining whether the PCRA court's determination is supported by
evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error. Commonwealth v.
Smallwood, 155 A.3d 1054, 1059 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citations omitted).
At the outset, we consider whether this appeal is properly before us.
The question of whether a petition is timely raises a question of law, and where
a petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and our
scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Callahan, 101 A.3d 118, 121
(Pa.Super. 2014).
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2Appellant filed responses to the Rule 907 Notice on July 24, 2017, July 26,
2017, July 28, 2017, August 17, 2017, August 23, 2017, and August 31,
2017.
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All PCRA petitions must be filed within one year of the date upon which
the judgment of sentence became final, unless one of the statutory exceptions
set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) applies. The petitioner bears the
burden of pleading and proving an applicable statutory exception. If the
petition is untimely and the petitioner has not pled and proven an exception,
the petition must be dismissed without a hearing because Pennsylvania courts
are without jurisdiction to consider the merits of the petition.
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 468 (Pa.Super. 2013). This is true
even where, as herein, the appellant challenges the legality of his sentence.
Commonwealth v. Fahy, 558 Pa. 313, 331, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (1999)
(holding that claims challenging the legality of sentence are subject to review
within PCRA, but must first satisfy the PCRA's time limits).
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) states:
(b) Time for filing petition.--
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or
subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the
date the judgment of sentence becomes final, unless the
petition alleges and the petitioner proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation of the
claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
or the Constitution or laws of the United States:
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by
the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme court of the United States or the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). In addition, any petition attempting to invoke one
of these exceptions “shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could
have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).
Herein, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for
allowance of appeal on August 11, 2010. Thus, Appellant’s judgment of
sentence became final on or about November 11, 2010, at which time the
ninety-day period in which he had to seek review in the United States Supreme
Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (“a judgment becomes final at
the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme
Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania or at the
expiration of time for seeking the review”). A timely petition had to be filed
by November 11, 2011; therefore, the instant PCRA petition filed in February
of 2015 is patently untimely, and the burden fell upon Appellant to plead and
prove that one of the enumerated exceptions to the one-year time-bar applied
to his case. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); Commonwealth v. Perrin, 947
A.2d 1284, 1286 (Pa.Super. 2008) (to invoke a statutory exception to the
PCRA time-bar, a petitioner must properly plead and prove all required
elements of the exception).
Appellant did not attempt to invoke any of the aforementioned
exceptions to the PCRA time bar in his February 3, 2015, PCRA petition, and
he does not present a clear statement of the questions involved in his
appellate brief. Indeed, his disorganized brief is comprised of rambling,
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repetitive and often incoherent statements through which he essentially
challenges the effectiveness of all prior counsel. In particular, he claims trial
counsel had been ineffective for advancing a diminished capacity defense
which contradicted his own claims he was innocent. As the PCRA court
correctly noted in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion:
Here, [Appellant] argued ineffective assistance of all prior
counsel. His main contention, however, was that trial counsel was
ineffective for advancing a diminished capacity defense that
contradicted [Appellant’s] own testimony that he was innocent.
PCRA petition, 2/18/15 [sic] at 21-44; see also Amended PCRA
petition, 9/18/15, Response to 907, 7/24/17, and Pro se
Correspondence, 7/26/17. In pleading his claim, [Appellant]
utterly failed to invoke an exception to the timeliness exception,
electing, instead, to address the alleged merits of his underlying
claims. Contrary to [Appellant’s] arguments, allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel are insufficient to overcome [an]
otherwise untimely PCRA claim. Commonwealth v. Lark, 746 A.2d
585, 589 (Pa. 2000). Additionally, a careful review of the record
reveals that his ineffectiveness claim regarding the diminished
capacity defense was raised by Ms. Elayne Bryn, who was his
counsel on his first PCRA petition.8 This claim was dismissed, the
dismissal affirmed by the Superior Court, and allocator denied by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. As this ineffectiveness claim
was previously litigated, [Appellant] was not eligible for relief. 42
Pa.Cons. Stat. § 9543(a)(3).
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8In her brief, Ms. Bryn argued the ineffectiveness of trial counsel’s
strategy:
[Appellant] was permitted to testify on his own
behalf, unmedicated without the benefit of a current
psychiatric evaluation of his then present mental state.
This trial strategy negated the availability of a
diminished capacity defense. . . Because counsel’s trial
strategy cannot be reasonable absent adequate
investigation of alternatives, trial counsel could not
make a reasonable strategic decision to present a
different defense in this present matter. Trial counsel
did not adequately investigate [Appellant’s] mental
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history, and therefore, counsel could not make a rational
decision to avoid a diminished capacity defense.
Amended PCRA, 5/4/12 at unnumbered 4-5 (citations omitted).
Trial Court Opinion, filed 11/21/17, at 3-4 (unnumbered).
To the extent Appellant attempts to invoke the newly recognized
constitutional right exception in his appellate brief, See Brief for Appellant at
8-13 (unnumbered), he has waived any such argument, as an exception to
the PCRA time bar must be pled in a PCRA petition and cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal. Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525
(Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 598 Pa. 786, 959 A.2d 927 (2008); see
also, Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)(providing that issues not raised before the lower court
are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal). Moreover, the
cases to which Appellant cites, McQuiggen v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 133
S.Ct. 1924, 185 L.Ed.2d 1019 (2013) and Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 132
S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012) pertain to federal habeas corpus law, not
PCRA petitions; thus, they are not dispositive of Appellant’s claims.
In McQuiggen, the United States Supreme Court held that in federal
habeas corpus proceedings, strict compliance with the one-year statute of
limitations imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) will not be required when the
petitioner advances a convincing claim of actual innocence. McQuiggen, 133
S.Ct. at 1928. Under McQuiggen, petitioners who assert a convincing actual
innocence claim may invoke the miscarriage of justice exception to overcome
the federal habeas corpus statute of limitations. Id. However, in
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Commonwealth v. Brown, 143 A.3d 418 (Pa.Super. 2016) this Court
addressed the applicability of McQuiggen to the timeliness provisions set
forth in the PCRA and declined to follow it on state-law grounds. Moreover,
Appellant failed to file the instant PCRA petition within 60 days of the date
McQuiggen was decided, May 28, 2013, as required by Section 9545(b)(2).
Similarly, Martinez recognizes that for purposes of federal habeas
corpus relief, “[i]nadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral
proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner's procedural default of a claim
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.” Martinez, supra at 1315.
Nevertheless, this Court has held while Martinez represented a significant
development in federal habeas corpus law, it was inapposite with respect to
the way Pennsylvania courts apply the plain language of the time bar set forth
in section 9545(b)(1) of the PCRA. Commonwealth v. Saunders, 60 A.3d
162, 165 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 621 Pa. 657, 72 A.3d 603 (2013),
cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 944, 187 L.Ed.2d 811, 82 USLW 3406 (2014).
In light of the foregoing, Appellant has filed a facially untimely PCRA
petition and has failed to plead and prove the applicability of any exception to
the PCRA time-bar. We, therefore, affirm the PCRA court’s Order.
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Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/4/18
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