MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
May 14 2018, 11:20 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Donald E.C. Leicht Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Kokomo, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Caryn N. Szyper
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jacob White, May 14, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
34A02-1711-CR-2553
v. Appeal from the Howard Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable William C.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Menges, Jr., Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
34D01-1611-CM-1163
Pyle, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] Jacob White (“White”) appeals his conviction for Class B misdemeanor
possession of marijuana.1 On appeal, he argues that the trial court abused its
discretion when it admitted the marijuana he possessed into evidence because
that marijuana had been seized pursuant to an illegal search. Because we find
that the search was not illegal, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion, and we affirm White’s conviction.
[2] We affirm.
Issue
Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted
marijuana into evidence.
Facts
[3] On November 4, 2016, Howard County probation officer Keri Barnes
(“Probation Officer Barnes”) attempted to conduct a compliance check on her
probationer, Christopher Mosier (“Mosier”). She and other probation officers
and state troopers went to the address where Mosier had told her he lived. The
owner of the home, Mosier’s brother, Craig Mosier (“Craig”), answered the
door and let them in the house. As soon as Probation Officer Barnes walked
into the home, she smelled the odor of marijuana.
1
IND. CODE § 35-48-4-11(a)(1).
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[4] Probation Officer Barnes asked Craig who was “in the home,” and he
responded that White, his nephew, was there, but Mosier was not. (Tr. Vol. 2
at 5). Probation Officer Barnes asked for permission to search the home, and
Craig gave his permission. Probation Officer Barnes opened a door to her left
and saw White coming out of a bathroom. The bathroom was connected to
two bedrooms, including a bedroom where White had spent the night. When
Probation Officer Barnes searched that bathroom, she again smelled marijuana
and found a bag of marijuana “under the sink.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 6).
[5] Subsequently, the State charged White with Class B misdemeanor possession of
marijuana. At the bench trial, the State introduced into evidence the marijuana
Probation Officer Barnes had found in the bathroom. White objected to the
admission of the marijuana, arguing that it was the fruit of a warrantless, illegal
search. The trial court admitted the marijuana over White’s objection.
[6] At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found White guilty as charged and
sentenced him to one hundred eighty (180) days executed in the Howard
County Jail. White now appeals.
Decision
[7] On appeal, White argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it
admitted the marijuana Probation Officer Barnes had found into evidence.
Specifically, he argues that the search that produced the marijuana was illegal
because it violated his Fourth Amendment right to privacy and, thus, the
marijuana seized pursuant to the search was inadmissible.
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[8] The admission of evidence is generally left to the discretion of the trial court.
Hammond v. State, 82 N.E.3d 880, 884 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). We review
admissibility challenges for an abuse of that discretion and will reverse only
when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances before the court and the error affects the party’s substantial
rights. Id. “‘[W]hen an appellant’s challenge to such a ruling is predicated on
an argument that impugns the constitutionality of the search or seizure of the
evidence, it raises a question of law, and we consider that question de novo.’”
Id. (quoting Guilmette v. State, 14 N.E.3d 38, 40-41 (Ind. 2014)). Generally
speaking, evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful search must be excluded
at trial. Id.
[9] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects both privacy
and possessory interests by prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures.
D.Y. v. State, 28 N.E.3d 249, 254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). The Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement is a principal protection against
unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings. State v. Straub, 749 N.E.2d 593,
597 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Warrantless searches are “per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment,” subject to a “few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions.” Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 938 (2006). One such
exception is when the government obtains a valid consent to search. Browder v.
State, 77 N.E.3d 1209, 1217 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. The theory
underlying the consent exception is that, when an individual gives the State
permission to search either his person or property, the governmental intrusion is
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presumably reasonable. Primus v. State, 813 N.E.2d 370, 374 (Ind. Ct. App.
2004).
[10] Here, White argues that the search that produced the marijuana was illegal
because it was warrantless and the consent exception to the warrant
requirement did not apply. Specifically, he asserts that, even though Craig
consented to the search, he did not give “expanded consent to search for
marijuana.” (White’s Br. 11). In other words, White essentially argues that
Craig limited the scope of his consent to allow a search for Mosier but not a
search for marijuana.
[11] It is true that a consensual search allows a person to limit the search as he
chooses. Kubsch v. State, 784 N.E.2d 905, 918 (Ind. 2003). The scope of the
authority to search is strictly limited to the consent given, and a consensual
search is reasonable only if it is kept within the bounds of that consent. Chiszar
v. State, 936 N.E.2d 816, 826 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), reh’g denied, trans. denied.
The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth
Amendment is that of objective reasonableness. Id. In other words, “‘what
would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between
the officer and the suspect?’” Id. (quoting Pinkney v. State, 742 N.E.2d 956, 960
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied). Notably, these principles limit “‘where
police may look, not what they actually find.’” State v. Cunningham, 26 N.E.3d
21, 28 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Mcllquham v. State, 10 N.E.3d 506, 513 (Ind. 2014)).
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[12] We are not persuaded by White’s argument, because there is no evidence in the
record that Craig limited his consent to search his house. Probation Officer
Barnes testified that she asked for consent to search the house, and Craig gave
permission. A reasonable person could have understood the search of the
bathroom to be within the scope of that unqualified consent. Moreover,
Probation Officer Barnes did not need “expanded consent” merely because she
found marijuana while looking for Mosier. (White’s Br. 11). As stated above,
the scope of consent may limit “‘where police may look, not what they actually
find.’” Cunningham, 26 N.E.3d at 28 (quoting Mcllquham, 10 N.E.3d at 513).
Because a reasonable person could have understood the search of the bathroom
to be within the scope of Craig’s consent to search the house, it is not
determinative that Probation Officer Barnes found marijuana there rather than
Mosier.
[13] As Craig validly consented to the warrantless search, we conclude that it was
legal under the Fourth Amendment.2 See Browder, 77 N.E.3d at 217 (holding
that consent is an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement).
Notably, White has not provided an independent analysis of the legality of the
search under the Indiana Constitution, so we need not address that issue on
2
White asks several rhetorical questions in his brief under the guise of raising those issues as arguments.
Because he has not supported those rhetorical questions with citations to legal authority, we consider those
issues waived for failure to present a cogent argument. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring that an
appellant’s argument be supported by cogent argument and citations to relevant authority). He also
challenges the trial court’s conclusion that no one was allowed to object to the search of the house because it
was a probation search, but he has not clarified the relevance of this argument or cited to any legal authority
to support his objection. Accordingly, we find it also waived for failure to present a cogent argument. See id.
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appeal. Decker v. State, 19 N.E.3d 368 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (providing that
failure to present a cogent argument under the Indiana Constitution results in
waiver of the issue on appeal), trans. denied. Accordingly, we conclude that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the marijuana into
evidence.
[14] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Barnes, J., concur.
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