IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA17-1000
Filed: 15 May 2018
Durham County, No. 16 CRS 51870
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
KAREEM STANLEY
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 13 February 2017 by Judge
Beecher R. Gray in Durham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals
19 April 2018.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Martin T.
McCracken, for the State.
Patterson Harkavy LLP, by Paul E. Smith, for defendant-appellant.
DAVIS, Judge.
This case presents the question of whether the Fourth Amendment permits
law enforcement officers to conduct a knock and talk at the back door of a residence
rather than at the clearly visible and unobstructed front door. Kareem Stanley
(“Defendant”) appeals from his convictions for trafficking in heroin by transportation;
trafficking in heroin by possession; possession with intent to manufacture, sell, or
deliver a Schedule I controlled substance; possession with intent to sell or deliver a
Schedule II controlled substance; and possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal,
STATE V. STANLEY
Opinion of the Court
he argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence of the
drugs seized from his person as a result of an illegal knock and talk. Because we
conclude that (1) the knock and talk was unconstitutional; and (2) the evidence
obtained by the officers would not have been discovered but for the knock and talk,
we reverse the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
Factual and Procedural Background
In 2015, Investigator Joseph Honeycutt was working for the Special
Operations Division of the Durham Police Department. In December 2015, a
confidential informant contacted the police department stating that he had
purchased heroin from a person at Apartment A at 1013 Simmons Street (“Apartment
A”) in Durham. The informant identified James Meager as the person from whom he
had bought heroin at Apartment A.
Investigator Honeycutt subsequently became aware that Apartment A
belonged to an individual named James Hazelton. Investigator Honeycutt also
learned that Meager did not actually live at the apartment.
Nevertheless, Investigator Honeycutt used the informant to conduct controlled
drug sales involving Meager at Apartment A on three separate occasions. On 8
December 2015, Investigator Honeycutt observed the informant walk up the
driveway to the back door of the apartment in order to purchase heroin from Meager.
On 16 December 2015, Investigator Honeycutt once again used the informant to buy
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heroin from Meager at the back door of Apartment A. Finally, on a third occasion,
Investigator Honeycutt observed the informant purchase heroin from the back door
of the apartment.
On 1 March 2016, Investigator Honeycutt, Investigator Thomas Thrall, and
four to five other members of the Durham Police Department approached Apartment
A in order to locate Meager and serve him with a warrant for his arrest. They were
dressed in protective vests with the word “Police” written across their chests. The
officers did not possess a warrant to search the apartment.
Upon the officers’ arrival at the apartment, they immediately walked down the
driveway that led to the back of the apartment, and Investigator Honeycutt knocked
on the back door. In response to an inquiry from a person inside Apartment A as to
who was knocking, Investigator Honeycutt responded: “Joey.”
Defendant, who had been staying with Hazelton as a houseguest at Apartment
A from January through March of 2016, answered the door, and Investigator
Honeycutt “immediately detected . . . the odor of marijuana.” He stepped into the
apartment and began conducting a protective sweep of the premises. One or two
other officers also entered Apartment A to assist him. During the protective sweep,
the officers located Hazelton and handcuffed him. A “crack pipe” was discovered on
the nightstand in one of the bedrooms of the residence. Investigator Honeycutt also
observed a handgun laying on a couch in the living room.
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Opinion of the Court
In the meantime, Investigator Thrall waited with several other officers outside
the back door. At some point, he directed Defendant to accompany him outside. After
Defendant complied with his request, Investigator Thrall told him to take his hands
out of his pockets and asked if he was carrying any weapons. Defendant denied
possessing any weapons but kept his hands in his pockets. Investigator Thrall asked
Defendant a second time to remove his hands from his pockets, and Defendant once
again failed to do so.
At that point, Investigator Thrall pulled Defendant’s hands out of his pockets,
placed them on his head, and informed Defendant that he was going to search him
for safety reasons. He then proceeded to conduct a pat-down of Defendant’s person.
While patting down Defendant’s right pants pocket, he felt a bulge. He asked
Defendant what was in the pocket, and Defendant responded that it was “some
Vaseline.” Investigator Thrall then patted down Defendant’s left pants pocket and
felt a larger bulge. He asked Defendant what was in that pocket, and Defendant
replied that it was cocaine.
At that point, Investigator Thrall handcuffed Defendant and reached into
Defendant’s pockets to retrieve the items contained therein. Inside Defendant’s left
pants pocket, Investigator Thrall discovered a “plastic baggy that contained some
small yellow baggies with a white substance that [he] believed . . . to be cocaine.” He
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Opinion of the Court
also found three smaller tan baggies that appeared to contain heroin. Investigator
Thrall retrieved a small bag of marijuana from Defendant’s right pants pocket.
After Defendant had been searched, Investigator Honeycutt returned to the
back door with Hazelton in handcuffs. He informed Investigator Thrall that he was
going to obtain a search warrant for the apartment. Investigator Thrall and the other
officers then waited outside Apartment A with Hazelton and Defendant, both of
whom remained handcuffed. Once a search warrant was obtained, the officers
searched the apartment and found a digital scale near the crack pipe on the
nightstand.
Defendant was arrested and charged with trafficking in heroin by
transportation; trafficking in heroin by possession; possession with intent to
manufacture, sell, or deliver a Schedule I controlled substance; possession with intent
to sell or deliver a Schedule II controlled substance; and possession of drug
paraphernalia. On 10 February 2017, Defendant filed a motion to suppress all of the
evidence that had been seized from his pockets on the ground that the seizure violated
his rights under the Fourth Amendment. A hearing was held before the Honorable
Beecher R. Gray in Durham County Superior Court on 13 February 2017, and the
trial court denied Defendant’s motion.
On that same day, Defendant pled guilty to all of the charged offenses but
expressly reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The trial
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Opinion of the Court
court consolidated all five offenses and sentenced Defendant to a term of 70 to 93
months imprisonment.
Analysis
Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress. Specifically, he argues that the officers violated his Fourth
Amendment rights by (1) unlawfully conducting a knock and talk at the back door of
Apartment A rather than the front door; (2) entering the apartment without the
existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances; and (3) conducting an illegal
pat-down search of his person.
“When a motion to suppress is denied, this Court employs a two-part standard
of review on appeal: The standard of review in evaluating the denial of a motion to
suppress is whether competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact and
whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law.” State v. Jackson, 368
N.C. 75, 78, 772 S.E.2d 847, 849 (2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
“Unchallenged findings of fact are deemed to be supported by competent evidence and
are binding on appeal. Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo and are subject to
full review.” State v. Warren, 242 N.C. App. 496, 498, 775 S.E.2d 362, 364 (2015)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted), aff’d per curiam, 368 N.C. 756, 782
S.E.2d 509 (2016).
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Opinion of the Court
In its written order denying Defendant’s motion to suppress, the trial court
made the following findings of fact:
1. On March 01, 2016, Investigator Honeycutt and other
members of the Special Operations Division of the
Durham Police Department conducted a knock and
talk at 1013 Simmons Street, Apartment A to locate
James Meagher [sic], for whom they had an
outstanding arrest warrant and who had been
identified by a confidential informant as the person the
informant had purchased cocaine from on at least three
(3) previous occasions from the back door of the
residence identified as Apartment A, 1013 Simmons
Street in Durham, including cocaine purchases on
December 08, 2015 and December 16, 2015.
2. Each time the confidential informant purchased
narcotics under the surveillance and supervision of the
investigators, the confidential informant went to the
back door at 1013 Simmons Street, Apartment A. The
back door of Apartment A is more hidden from public
view than the front door of Apartment A at 1013
Simmons Street.
3. On March 01, 2016, Investigator Honeycutt went
directly to the back door of 1013 Simmons Street,
Apartment A and knocked, identifying himself as Joey
Honeycutt.
4. Kareem Stanley (hereinafter “Defendant”) opened the
door.
5. As soon as the door was opened, Investigators could
smell a strong odor of marijuana coming from inside of
the residence. The police officers were wearing vests
which had the word “Police” across the front of each
vest. No weapons were drawn by police officers at any
time during this visit to 1013 Simmons Street,
Apartment A.
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Opinion of the Court
6. Officer Honeycutt and 1 or 2 other officers entered
1013 Simmons Street, Apartment A and conducted a
safety sweep based on the odor of marijuana and prior
drug sales occurring at 1013 Simmons Street,
Apartment A. This safety sweep lasted an estimated
one to one and one-half minutes in this small duplex
apartment. During the safety sweep, Officer
Honeycutt and other officers found a single individual
identified as James Hazleton [sic], observed in plain
view what appeared to be a crack pipe, and observed in
plain view a handgun. James Meagher [sic], the object
of an outstanding arrest warrant, was not in the
apartment. Following the completion of this safety
sweep, Officer Honeycutt departed 1013 Simmons
Street in order to obtain a search warrant for the
Apartment, the individuals found there, and any
automobile located there.
7. As officers entered Apartment A to begin the safety
sweep, the Defendant stepped out of the 1013 Simmons
Street Apartment A, upon request by officer Thomas
Thrall.
8. The Defendant had his hands in his pockets and was
asked twice by Investigator Thrall to take his hands
out of his pockets. Rather than comply with
Investigator Thrall’s request to remove his hands from
his pockets for officer safety, Defendant pushed his
hands deeper into his pockets.
9. After the Defendant did not comply with Investigator
Thrall’s requests[,] Investigator Thrall removed the
Defendant’s hands from his pockets and placed the
Defendant’s hands on top of his head, as he had been
trained to do.
10. Investigator Thrall verbally notified the Defendant
that he was about to conduct a pat down and then
conducted a Terry frisk to check whether any kind of
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Opinion of the Court
weapon was being concealed in the Defendant’s
pockets that could be used to harm Investigator Thrall
or one of the other investigators present.
11. Investigator Thrall patted down on the Defendant’s
right front pocket and felt a small bulge. The
Investigator asked about the bulge in Defendant’s
right front pocket and the Defendant responded
“Vaseline.” The bulge on the pat down of Defendant’s
right front pocket did not feel like Vaseline to
Investigator Thrall, but since the item did not feel like
a weapon when patted, Investigator Thrall moved on
to the Defendant’s left side front pocket.
12. Investigator Thrall patted down on the Defendant’s
left front pocket and felt an even larger bulge. When
asked about the larger bulge in his left pocket, the
Defendant said “cocaine.”
13. After the Defendant told Investigator Thrall the bulge
in his left front pocket was cocaine, the Defendant was
handcuffed and placed in custody. Defendant was not
questioned further, except for his identification, until
after Investigator Honeycutt’s search warrant was
served on the Defendant at 1220 p.m. on March 01,
2016; he was transported to the Durham Police
Department; and given Miranda warnings prior to
being interrogated.
Based on these findings of fact, the trial court determined that the officers did
not violate Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights by conducting the knock and talk,
entering the apartment, or conducting a pat-down search of Defendant’s person.
Therefore, the court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress.
As an initial matter, Defendant challenges the second sentence of Finding No.
2 to the extent it implies that (1) the front door was partially obstructed and not
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clearly visible from the street; and (2) the back door was not hidden from public view.
We agree with Defendant that photographs of the apartment contained in the record
on appeal reveal that the front door was, in fact, clearly visible from the street and
unobstructed whereas the back door could not be seen.
The remaining pertinent findings of fact made by the trial court are
unchallenged and, therefore, binding on appeal. See Warren, 242 N.C. App. at 498,
775 S.E.2d at 364 (holding that unchallenged findings in order denying motion to
suppress are deemed to be supported by competent evidence and binding on appeal).
We first address Defendant’s argument that the knock and talk conducted by
the officers constituted an unlawful search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.1
“A ‘knock and talk’ is a procedure by which police officers approach a residence and
knock on the door to question the occupant, often in an attempt to gain consent to
search when no probable cause exists to obtain a warrant.” State v. Marrero, __ N.C.
App. __, __, 789 S.E.2d 560, 564 (2016). Our appellate courts “have recognized the
right of police officers to conduct knock and talk investigations, so long as they do not
rise to the level of Fourth Amendment searches.” Id. at __, 789 S.E.2d at 564.
1 The State does not challenge the fact that Defendant possessed a reasonable expectation of
privacy in Apartment A for purposes of the Fourth Amendment based on his status as a houseguest
who had been living there for over a month. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-97, 109 L. Ed. 2d
85, 93 (1990) (holding that defendant’s “status as an overnight guest is alone enough to show that he
had an expectation of privacy in the home that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable”).
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Opinion of the Court
In Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 185 L. Ed. 2d 495 (2013), the United States
Supreme Court explained the permissible scope of a knock and talk as follows:
[T]he knocker on the front door is treated as an invitation
or license to attempt an entry, justifying ingress to the
home by solicitors, hawkers and peddlers of all
kinds. . . . This implicit license typically permits the
visitor to approach the home by the front path, knock
promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent
invitation to linger longer) leave. Complying with the
terms of that traditional invitation does not require fine-
grained legal knowledge; it is generally managed without
incident by the Nation’s Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters.
Thus, a police officer not armed with a warrant may
approach a home and knock, precisely because that is no
more than any private citizen might do.
Id. at 8, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 502 (internal citations, quotation marks, and footnote
omitted).
“[I]n North Carolina, law enforcement officers may approach a front door to
conduct ‘knock and talk’ investigations that do not rise to the level of a Fourth
Amendment search.” State v. Smith, __ N.C. App. __, __, 783 S.E.2d 504, 509 (2016)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). We recently addressed the legality of a knock
and talk conducted at the back door of a residence in State v. Huddy, __ N.C. App. __,
__, 799 S.E.2d 650, 654 (2017). In Huddy, an officer was patrolling an area that he
believed to be “at risk of home invasions” and observed a parked vehicle with the car
doors open at the end of a long driveway leading to the rear of the defendant’s home.
Id. at __, 799 S.E.2d at 653. The officer became suspicious and approached the front
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door of the house. He observed that the front door of the residence was covered in
cobwebs and walked to the back of the residence. Id. at __, 799 S.E.2d at 653.
The officer entered the backyard and “approached a storm door on the rear
porch, which was not visible from the street” in order to conduct a knock and talk.
Id. at __, 799 S.E.2d at 653. As he got closer to the storm door, the officer smelled
marijuana. He knocked on the back door and spoke to the defendant, who opened the
door. Based on the odor of marijuana at the storm door, the officer later obtained a
search warrant for the home. During a search of the residence, the officer ultimately
discovered a large quantity of marijuana. The defendant was charged with
possession of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver and moved to suppress the
evidence seized from the home. Id. at __, 799 S.E.2d at 653.
On appeal, we held that the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights had been
violated. In so ruling, we stated the following:
We begin with the knock and talk doctrine. Because
no search of the curtilage occurs when an officer is in a
place where the public is allowed to be, such as at the front
door of a house, officers are permitted to approach the front
door of a home, knock, and engage in consensual
conversation with the occupants. . . . Put another way, law
enforcement may do what occupants of a home implicitly
permit anyone to do, which is approach the home by the
front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and
then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave.
Importantly, law enforcement may not use a knock
and talk as a pretext to search the home’s curtilage. No
one is impliedly invited to enter the protected premises of
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Opinion of the Court
the home in order to do nothing but conduct a search.
Likewise, the knock and talk doctrine does not permit law
enforcement to approach any exterior door to a home. An
officer’s implied right to knock and talk extends only to the
entrance of the home that a reasonably respectful citizen
unfamiliar with the home would believe is the appropriate
door at which to knock. . . . This limitation is necessary to
prevent the knock and talk doctrine from swallowing the
core Fourth Amendment protection of a home’s curtilage.
Without this limitation, law enforcement freely could
wander around one’s home searching for exterior doors
and, in the process, search any area of a home’s curtilage
without a warrant.
Id. at __, 799 S.E.2d at 654 (internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted
and emphasis added).2
Huddy is consistent with prior decisions from this Court in which we have held
that knock and talks taking place at a home’s back door were unconstitutional. See,
e.g., State v. Gentile, 237 N.C. App. 304, 310, 766 S.E.2d 349, 353 (2014) (motion to
suppress properly granted where detectives briefly knocked on front door and then
attempted knock and talk at back door); State v. Pasour, 223 N.C. App. 175, 179, 741
S.E.2d 323, 326 (2012) (trial court erred in denying motion to suppress where officers
attempted knock and talk at back door after no one answered knock on front door).
In the present case, the officers knew that Meager did not live at Apartment A
but believed that they could either locate him at the apartment or learn more about
2We note that the trial court did not have the benefit of our decision in Huddy at the time it
denied Defendant’s motion to suppress as Huddy was decided approximately two months later.
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his whereabouts by conducting a general inquiry of the occupants. Therefore, they
elected to utilize a knock and talk. However, in order to pass constitutional muster,
the officers were required to conduct the knock and talk by going to the front door,
which they did not do. Rather than using the paved walkway that led directly to the
unobstructed front door of the apartment, the officers walked along a gravel driveway
into the backyard in order to knock on the back door, which was not visible from the
street. Such conduct would not have been reasonable for “solicitors, hawkers [or]
peddlers . . . .” See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 502 (citation and
quotation marks omitted). Thus, it was also unreasonable for law enforcement
officers.
The trial court determined that the officers had an implied license to approach
the back door of Apartment A because a confidential informant had been observed
purchasing drugs from Meager by utilizing the back door on three separate occasions.
However, the fact that the resident of a home may choose to allow certain individuals
to use a back or side door does not mean that similar permission is deemed to have
been given generally to members of the public. As we made clear in Huddy, “[a]n
officer’s implied right to knock and talk extends only to the entrance of the home that
a reasonably respectful citizen unfamiliar with the home would believe is the
appropriate door at which to knock.” Huddy, __ N.C. App. at __, 799 S.E.2d at 654
(citation and quotation marks omitted and emphasis added); see also id. at __, 799
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S.E.2d at 656-57 (Tyson, J., concurring) (“The home’s occupants, family, or frequent
invitees may use a closer side or back door or a door within a garage to enter the
home, rather than walk further to use a front door. Nonetheless, even a seldom-used
front door is the door uninvited members of the public are expected to use when they
arrive. . . . Even if the back door was the entrance primarily used by [the defendant]
or regular visitors, an uninvited visitor would not necessarily acquire any ‘implied
license’ to also use that door.” (internal citation omitted)).
We recognize that the existence of unusual circumstances in some cases may
allow officers to lawfully approach a door of a residence other than the front door in
order to conduct a knock and talk. See, e.g., State v. Grice, 367 N.C. 753, 754, 761,
767 S.E.2d 312, 314, 318 (2015) (holding that officers were “implicitly invited into the
curtilage to approach the home” where front door was “inaccessible, covered with
plastic, and obscured by furniture” and side door “appeared to be used as the main
entrance”), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 192 L. Ed. 2d 882 (2015). However, no such
unusual circumstances are presented here. As a result, the knock and talk was
unconstitutional.
Finally, it is clear from the record that absent the unlawful knock and talk at
Apartment A the officers would not have had any contact at all with Defendant much
less had occasion to conduct a pat-down search of his person resulting in the discovery
of the drugs in his pockets. Thus, because the knock and talk itself was unlawful the
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evidence of the drugs seized from him as a result was required to be suppressed. See
State v. Jackson, 199 N.C. App. 236, 244, 681 S.E.2d 492, 498 (2009) (holding that
drugs “discovered as a direct result of the illegal search . . . should have been
suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree”).
Therefore, the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order.3
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we reverse the trial court’s order denying
Defendant’s motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Judges INMAN and MURPHY concur.
3 In light of our holding, we need not reach the other arguments raised by Defendant.
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