MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be May 29 2018, 9:57 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
R. Patrick Magrath Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP Attorney General
Madison, Indiana
Chandra K. Hein
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Daryl Clifton Bradley, May 29, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
40A01-1710-CR-2310
v. Appeal from the Jennings Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Jon W. Webster,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
40C01-1703-F2-002
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Daryl Bradley appeals his conviction for possession of at least ten grams of
methamphetamine with intent to deliver. He argues that the trial court violated
Indiana Rule of Evidence 404(b) by admitting evidence that he had a prior
conviction for manufacturing meth. We affirm Bradley’s conviction without
resolving that issue, because even if the trial court erred by allowing the
evidence, the error was harmless in light of the strength of the State’s other
evidence.1
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On the afternoon of February 28, 2017, Bradley was driving in Butlerville when
an Indiana State Trooper pulled him over. The trooper had his dog sniff
Bradley’s car while he was waiting for the results of a license check, and the dog
alerted. A search of the car turned up five bags of meth, some of it blue. Some
of the bags had the letter “g” written on them with a black marker, and others
had a black dot. Bradley said that “g” meant that the bag contained one gram
and that the black dot “meant maybe half a gram.” Tr. Vol. II p. 139. On the
screen of a cell phone in the car the trooper saw text messages in which
“somebody was requesting a quarter of blueberries. There was a response that
1
Bradley also challenges his conviction on the ground that the State presented insufficient evidence. Given
our conclusion that the unchallenged evidence was strong enough to render harmless any 404(b) error, we
need not separately address the sufficiency argument.
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they didn’t have a quarter . . . and it was eventually settled for a ‘b’ for $300.”
Id. at 140. The trooper later “figured out the blueberries probably meant the
blue meth.” Id. at 141. Bradley admitted that the text messages referenced “a
drug deal.” Id. at 142.
[3] Bradley also consented to a search of his house, which was just down the street.
Three bags of meth were found in a nightstand in Bradley’s bedroom, and
fourteen bags were found under a trashcan liner. In addition, troopers found
packaging materials, bread ties, a digital scale, a black marker, and “a
handwritten piece of paper” that “looked like an itemized list of the
methamphetamine.” Id. at 149-50. The twenty-two bags found in the car and
the house contained a total of approximately nineteen grams of meth.
[4] The State charged Bradley with two counts of possession of at least ten grams of
meth: one charging intent to deliver, a Level 2 felony, and one charging simple
possession, a Level 4 felony. Before trial, Bradley filed a motion in limine
asking that the State be prohibited from mentioning that he had a prior
conviction for manufacturing meth and that he “is currently on parole” for that
conviction. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 44. The trial court granted the motion.
At trial, however, after Bradley testified that the meth in his possession was all
for personal use, the State asked for permission to question him about the prior
conviction, and the court allowed it. The jury found Bradley guilty as charged.
The trial court entered a conviction on the intent-to-deliver count only and
sentenced Bradley to twenty years in prison.
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[5] Bradley now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[6] Bradley contends that the trial court should not have let the State question him
about his prior conviction for manufacturing meth. He argues that the “intent
of the State in introducing this evidence was to argue to the jury that because
Bradley had been convicted of manufacturing in the past he must have
committed dealing in the present.” Appellant’s Br. p. 13. As such, Bradley
asserts, the admission of the evidence violated Evidence Rule 404(b)(1), which
provides that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to
prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the
person acted in accordance with the character.”
[7] The State, on the other hand, maintains that the evidence was admissible under
Rule 404(b)(2), which provides that such “other act” evidence “may be
admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”
Specifically, the State contends that Bradley’s history of manufacturing meth
tends to make it at least somewhat more probable that he intended to deliver
the meth found in this case (i.e., that he is more than just a user) and that the
evidence was therefore admissible under the “intent” provision of Rule
404(b)(2).
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[8] We are inclined to agree with the State, but we need not delve any deeper into
the issue. Even if we assume that the trial court erred by admitting the prior-
conviction evidence, the error was harmless. The erroneous admission of
evidence does not require reversal unless it prejudices the defendant’s
substantial rights. Blount v. State, 22 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. 2014). To determine
whether an error in the introduction of evidence affected the defendant’s
substantial rights, we assess the probable impact of that evidence upon the jury
considering all the other evidence that was properly presented. Id. If we are
satisfied that the conviction is supported by independent evidence of guilt such
that there is no substantial likelihood that the challenged evidence contributed
to the verdict, the error is harmless. Id.
[9] Here, the independent evidence that Bradley intended to deliver at least some of
the meth is significant, if not overwhelming. He had approximately nineteen
grams of meth, which would be a very large amount for a mere user. See Tr.
Vol. II pp. 111-12. The nineteen grams were divided between twenty-two bags,
a strong indicator of dealing. See id. at 113, 142-43. The bags had been stored
in a variety of locations, a common tactic of drug dealers. See id. at 114-16,
151. Text messages outlining the terms of a drug deal appeared on the screen of
a phone in Bradley’s car. Bradley had several supplies used by drug dealers,
including packaging materials, bread ties, and a digital scale. A black marker
was found among other drug supplies, and a black marker had been used to
identify the amount of meth in at least some of the bags. And perhaps most
tellingly, Bradley had an “itemized list of the methamphetamine.” He testified
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that the purpose of the list was to keep track of his own personal use, but one
can easily see why a jury would reject such an explanation. In light of all this
evidence, we are convinced that the jury would have reached the same result
even if it had not learned about Bradley’s prior conviction.
[10] Affirmed.
Barnes, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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