People v. Thompson

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
June 14, 2018

2018COA83

No. 14CA1332, People v. Thompson — Crimes — Securities —
Fraud and Other Prohibited Conduct

A division of the court of appeals applies the family

resemblance test, introduced in Colorado by People v. Mendenhall,

2015 COA 107M, to conclude that substantial evidence supports (1)

a decision that the promissory note is a security and (2) the

criminal conviction for securities fraud. The division further

concludes that the laws regarding the definition of a security and

the unit of prosecution for securities fraud were not well settled at

the time of defendant’s conviction, and, because these issues were

not raised before the trial court, any error with respect to these laws

was not obvious and does not constitute reversible error. The

division affirms the conviction and sentence for two counts of

securities fraud and one count of theft.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2018COA83

Court of Appeals No. 14CA1332
Douglas County District Court No. 12CR277
Honorable Paul A. King, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Steven Curtis Thompson,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE RICHMAN
Webb and Fox, JJ., concur

Announced June 14, 2018

Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Nicole D. Wiggins, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Elizabeth Porter-Merrill ,
Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Steven Curtis Thompson, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of two

counts of securities fraud and one count of theft. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The People charged defendant based on transactions he had

entered into with the victims, Tom and Debbie Witt (the Witts).

Defendant was the sole member of SGD Timber Canyon LLC, (SGD),

which held an interest in sixty-three undeveloped lots in the Timber

Ridge subdivision. By October 2009, these lots were in foreclosure,

and in February 2010, SGD filed for bankruptcy. Defendant did not

disclose either of these facts to the Witts when he negotiated the

transactions that gave rise to this case.

¶3 The Witts loaned defendant $200,000 to acquire a lot in

Timber Ridge and another $200,000 for construction of a home on

the lot, with the understanding that the loans would be repaid with

a profit share of as much as $400,000 when the home was sold to a

prequalified buyer. In September 2010, the Witts wired $400,000

to defendant’s accounts.

¶4 Later, at defendant’s urging, the Witts increased the loan

amount to $2.4 million and converted their investment into a
1
 “bridge loan” to defendant, who represented that the proceeds

would be used for continued development of Timber Ridge.

Defendant told the Witts that the investment would be “no risk” to

them and that they would receive a guaranteed profit. He

suggested that the investment was a “no brainer” because he would

secure the loan with other valuable property he owned. The Witts

agreed to the new arrangement because they felt it was a “safer

opportunity.”

¶5 The Witts wired an additional $2 million to defendant’s

account in October 2010, and the parties executed a promissory

note and guarantee agreement. Pursuant to the documents,

defendant agreed to repay the loan with a “profit” of $240,000, all

bank fees, and 8% annual interest by January 2011. The

promissory note was “secured by” defendant’s “primary and second

residences,” with collateral to convert to twenty-four lots in Timber

Ridge “upon closing and final purchase of Timber Ridge.”

¶6 Defendant did not tell the Witts that the collateralized

properties were “heavily leveraged.” He incorrectly listed the

address of his “second residence” on the note. He represented the

value of the Timber Ridge development to be $31 million, but
2
 mortgagee Flagstar Bank estimated the market value at $6.75

million. He did not reveal that Flagstar had initiated foreclosure

proceedings, which had been delayed by SGD’s bankruptcy petition.

The Witts testified that they would not have given any money to

defendant had they known his true financial condition.

¶7 Defendant used the money on items not related to Timber

Ridge, including payment of his own attorney fees, checks made out

to himself or for “cash,” and paying off the note on, and making

improvements to, his “second residence.”

¶8 In December 2010, Flagstar Bank completed foreclosure

proceedings. Defendant did not tell the Witts of the foreclosure and

instead told them that he was “moving forward” with the property.

But he never developed the property in Timber Ridge.

¶9 In January 2011, when the Witts’ note came due, defendant

defaulted on the payment. He attempted to negotiate a new note

with them, offering additional collateral, but the Witts refused.

Defendant thereafter filed for personal bankruptcy, and his

“primary residence” was sold at a public trustee sale. The Witts did

not receive any money from the sale. Defendant eventually repaid

3
 only $70,000 to the Witts. The Witts brought a civil suit against

defendant, but did not recover any further monies from him.

¶ 10 The People charged defendant with two counts of securities

fraud, under sections 11-51-501(1)(b) and (1)(c), C.R.S. 2017, and

one count of theft under section 18-4-401(1)(b), C.R.S. 2017.

Defendant’s theory of defense was that he lacked the mens rea for

the charged offenses. He argued that he was unable to repay the

Witts because his business plan had failed.

¶ 11 A jury found defendant guilty of all three counts. The trial

court sentenced him to twelve years in the custody of the

Department of Corrections for each of the securities counts, to be

served concurrently, and eighteen years for the theft conviction, to

be served consecutively to the other sentences.

¶ 12 On appeal, defendant claims that (1) insufficient evidence

supports his securities fraud convictions; (2) the trial court erred by

tendering an inaccurate jury instruction regarding the definition of

a security; (3) insufficient evidence supports his theft conviction; (4)

the trial court erred by admitting propensity evidence; (5) the two

securities convictions must be merged; and (6) his sentences must

4
 all run concurrently. We address and reject each contention in

turn.

II. Sufficient Evidence of Securities Fraud

¶ 13 First, defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to

support his securities fraud convictions because the promissory

note and guarantee he provided to the Witts do not constitute a

security. The jury was instructed, as relevant here and pursuant to

section 11-51-201(17), C.R.S. 2017, that security “means any note,

. . . or . . . guarantee of. . . any of the foregoing.” Defendant

correctly states that securities fraud cannot occur absent a security

and argues that, despite the statutory definition, not all notes are

securities. See People v. Mendenhall, 2015 COA 107M.

A. Definition of a Security

¶ 14 The securities fraud statute requires that fraud must be

perpetrated in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any

security. § 11-51-501(1). At the time of defendant’s trial, the test

for determining whether a note was a security was “the presence of

an investment in a common enterprise that is premised on a

reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the

entrepren[e]urial or managerial efforts of others.” People v. Milne,
5
 690 P.2d 829, 833 (Colo. 1984); see also Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v.

W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946) (“The test is whether the

scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise

with profits to come solely from the efforts of others.”). In Milne, the

court concluded that the notes issued by the defendant were

securities because the noteholders (1) “entrusted money with the

defendant in return for ‘investment notes,’ with the expectation of

receiving periodic interest payments in addition to repayment of the

principal amount”; (2) “invested with the primary purpose of

receiving profits”; and (3) “had no ability to control or manage the

funds they invested or otherwise ensure that their promised return

was actually paid.” 690 P.2d at 833-34.

¶ 15 The federal definition of securities, on which Colorado’s

definition is based, is purposely broad “to regulate investments, in

whatever form they are made and by whatever name they are

called.” Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990).

Recognizing “the virtually limitless scope of human ingenuity,

especially in the creation of ‘countless and variable schemes devised

by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of

profits,’” Congress enacted a definition of “security” sufficiently
6
 broad to encompass virtually any instrument that might be sold as

an investment. Id. at 60-61 (citation omitted).

¶ 16 In 2015, the year after defendant’s trial, a division of this court

held that the “family resemblance” test adopted by the Supreme

Court in Reves applies to determine when a note is a security under

the Colorado Securities Act (CSA). Mendenhall, ¶ 37.1

¶ 17 Under the family resemblance test, a note is presumed to be a

security, but that presumption may be rebutted by a showing that

the note strongly resembles instruments such as

notes delivered in consumer financing; notes
secured by a mortgage on a home; short-term
notes secured by a lien on a small business or
some of its assets; notes evidencing a
“character” loan to a bank customer;
short-term notes secured by an assignment of
accounts receivable; notes which simply
formalize an open-account debt incurred in the
ordinary course of business; and notes
evidencing loans by commercial banks for
current operations.

1In Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 64 (1990), the Supreme
Court did not overrule Securities & Exchange Commission v. W.J.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946), but distinguished it on the
grounds that Howey addressed “investment contracts” rather than
notes. The division in People v. Mendenhall, 2015 COA 107M, did
not cite Milne or Howey or distinguish the facts of those cases. The
People do not contest resolving this issue based on Mendenhall.
7
 Id. at ¶ 33. This showing may be established by four factors, which

we will describe and analyze below. See id. at ¶ 34.

B. Standard of Review

¶ 18 Defendant did not argue at trial that his promissory note was

not a security, or that not all notes are securities. But he frames

his claim on appeal as a sufficiency of the evidence claim and

asserts that preservation is “not required.” Though he moved for

judgment of acquittal, he only argued that the evidence was

generally insufficient to support a finding of guilt on any of the

charges. The People agree with defendant’s statement regarding

issue preservation.

¶ 19 Ordinarily, a defendant may raise a sufficiency claim for the

first time on appeal. People v. Garcia, 2012 COA 79, ¶ 35. When

reviewing for sufficiency, we view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution to determine if the conviction was

supported beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at ¶ 34. But defendant’s

argument is no ordinary sufficiency challenge; rather, his claim is

premised solely on a novel interpretation of the securities fraud

statute.

8
¶ 20 Some divisions of this court have held that when a defendant

does not raise a sufficiency of evidence claim turning on a statutory

interpretation in the trial court, his argument on appeal provides a

basis for is reversal only if any error is plain. See People v. Kadell,

2017 COA 124; People v. Maestas, (Colo. App. No. 11CA2084, Jan.

15, 2015) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)) (cert. granted Oct.

26, 2015); People v. Lacallo, 2014 COA 78, ¶¶ 6, 20.

¶ 21 Other divisions have held that even in absence of preservation,

we may reverse a conviction if it fails the substantial evidence test.

See People v. McCoy, 2015 COA 76M, ¶ 37 (cert. granted Oct. 3,

2016).

¶ 22 We need not resolve this conflict, because we conclude that

even applying the broader substantial evidence test, defendant’s

claim fails.

C. Analysis

¶ 23 Defendant does not argue that applying the definition of a

security as it existed at the time of his trial — the “presence of an

investment in a common enterprise that is premised on a

reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the

entrepren[e]urial or managerial efforts of others” — was not
9
 sufficiently established by the evidence. Milne, 690 P.2d at 833. He

merely argues that his note was not a security (1) because it was for

a term of less than nine months; and (2) it strongly resembles a

note that is not a security under the family resemblance test,

established in Colorado by Mendenhall, because it was an

unconditional personal loan.

¶ 24 We reject defendant’s first argument. Under Reves, a note is

presumed to be a security. 494 U.S. at 65. Citing a second circuit

case, defendant argues that the presumption only applies if the

note is for a period of longer than nine months. See Exch. Nat’l

Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976). But

Reves explicitly declined to decide the question whether a note for a

term of less than nine months was excepted from the presumption.

494 U.S. at 71. And Mendenhall makes no mention that the note

must extend for at least nine months to be presumed a security.

See Mendenhall, ¶ 32. Further, other circuit courts have held that

the presumption does apply to notes maturing in less than nine

months unless they are commercial paper. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch.

Comm’n v. Reynolds Enters., Inc., 952 F.2d 1125, 1131-32 (9th Cir.

1991) (finding nine-month exception does not apply to notes that
10
 are “not commercial paper”); Holloway v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &

Co., 900 F.2d 1485, 1488-89 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that

exception is limited to “prime quality negotiable commercial paper

of a type not ordinarily purchased by the general public”); Sanders

v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 1079-80 (7th Cir. 1972)

(same).

¶ 25 Nor do we agree with defendant’s argument that consideration

of the family resemblance factors is sufficient to rebut the

presumption that the promissory note is a security. Instead, we

conclude that three of the four factors support a conclusion that the

promissory note is a security.

¶ 26 The four factors are described as follows:

First, we examine the transaction to assess the
motivations that would prompt a reasonable
seller and buyer to enter into it. If the seller’s
purpose is to raise money for the general use
of a business enterprise or to finance
substantial investments and the buyer is
interested primarily in the profit the note is
expected to generate, the instrument is likely
to be a “security.” If the note is exchanged to
facilitate the purchase and sale of a minor
asset or consumer good, to correct for the
seller’s cash-flow difficulties, or to advance
some other commercial or consumer purpose,
on the other hand, the note is less sensibly
described as a “security.”
11
 Second, we examine the “plan of distribution”
of the instrument, to determine whether it is
an instrument in which there is “common
trading for speculation or investment[.]”

Third, we examine the reasonable expectations
of the investing public: The Court will consider
instruments to be “securities” on the basis of
such public expectations, even where an
economic analysis of the circumstances of the
particular transaction might suggest that the
instruments are not “securities” as used in
that transaction.

Finally, we examine whether some factor such
as the existence of another regulatory scheme
significantly reduces the risk of the
instrument, thereby rendering application of
the Securities Acts unnecessary.

Reves, 494 U.S. at 66-67 (citations omitted).

¶ 27 With respect to the first factor, based on the Witts’ testimony

alone, a reasonable jury could infer that defendant’s purpose was to

raise money for the development of Timber Ridge properties and

that the Witts’ interest was primarily to profit from advancing

money to defendant. There was no suggestion that the Witts were

purchasing a “minor asset” or a consumer good. The note promises

that defendant will repay the $2.4 million, in addition to $240,000

12
 profit, fees, and interest. (Emphasis added.) Under this factor, the

note “is likely to be a ‘security.’” Id. at 66.

¶ 28 As to the second factor, the record does not include any

evidence that the instrument obtained by the Witts was traded

under a “plan of distribution.” But a transaction between only two

entities may still be a security. See Nat’l Bank of Yugoslavia v.

Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1010, 1015-16

(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (applying Reves).

¶ 29 With respect to the third factor, no evidence indicated the

reasonable expectations of an “investing public,” but the Witts’

expectation was that they would obtain a profit on their investment,

plus interest, within a period of time. The Witts, as the investing

public, would therefore reasonably view the transaction as an

investment and the note as a security. See id. at 1016.

¶ 30 Finally, defendant suggests no “regulatory scheme,” and we

are not aware of one, that so significantly reduced the investment

risk as to make application of the CSA unnecessary. He suggests

that the availability of a civil suit against him satisfies the Reves

requirement of a “regulatory scheme,” but we disagree. Although

civil suits provide a remedy for victims of fraud, the civil system
13
 does not regulate the risks of a promissory note. Accordingly, we

conclude that the fourth family resemblance factor weighs in favor

of the presumption that the note is a security.

¶ 31 For these reasons, we conclude that the Witts’ investment,

memorialized by the promissory note, was a transaction protected

by the CSA. And it did not strongly resemble the family of

transactions that are not securities.

¶ 32 In sum, we conclude that, after applying the four-factor test

announced in Reves and adopted by Colorado in Mendenhall, the

evidence, viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, was “sufficient to support a rational conclusion that

the defendant is guilty of [securities fraud] beyond a reasonable

doubt.” McCoy, ¶ 37.

III. Jury Instruction Defining “Security”

¶ 33 In instructing the jury, the trial court included the statutory

definition of “security,” which includes “any note.” See

§ 11-51-201(17). Defendant did not object to the definition of

security given to the jury, nor tender an alternative instruction.

Nonetheless, defendant contends the trial court plainly erred by

14
 denying “his right to a jury determination that the notes at issue

were securities.” Mendenhall, ¶ 40. We disagree.

¶ 34 Plain error is error that is obvious. Obvious errors “must

contravene (1) a clear statutory command; (2) a well-settled legal

principle; or (3) Colorado case law.” Scott v. People, 2017 CO 16,

¶ 16 (quoting People v. Pollard, 2013 COA 31M, ¶ 40). “Moreover,

an erroneous jury instruction does not normally constitute plain

error where the issue is not contested at trial[.]” People v. Miller,

113 P.3d 743, 750 (Colo. 2005). Because plain error requires that

the error be obvious and any legal principles be “well settled,” we

only consider the status of the law at the time of trial. People v.

O’Connell, 134 P.3d 460, 465 (Colo. App. 2005).

¶ 35 Definitional jury instructions that accurately track the

language of the applicable statute are generally proper and

sufficient. People v. Houser, 2013 COA 11, ¶ 76.

¶ 36 Mendenhall was decided after defendant’s trial. Though

federal case law concerning the Federal Securities Exchange Act of

1934 and the Federal Securities Act of 1933 is persuasive, it does

not settle the law governing the CSA. See United States v. McKye,

734 F.3d 1104, 1110 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he district court erred
15
 when it instructed the jury that notes are securities.”); see also

Reves, 494 U.S. at 63 (holding that not every note is a security). At

the time of defendant’s trial, no Colorado case law directly

addressed the issue of whether “any note” is a security.

¶ 37 Accordingly, we conclude that, at the time of defendant’s trial,

the law was not well settled, and any error in the given jury

instruction would not have been obvious or plain. See People v.

Valdez, 2014 COA 125, ¶ 27 (“[W]here the law is unsettled, the trial

court’s alleged error with respect to the law cannot constitute plain

error.”); see also People v. Howard-Walker, 2017 COA 81M, ¶¶ 56-

57 (finding no plain error on evidentiary issue where latest supreme

court formulation occurred over a year after trial and no appellate

case directly addressed particular issue raised) (cert. granted May

21, 2018).

IV. Two Convictions for Securities Fraud and Double Jeopardy

¶ 38 Defendant claims that his two convictions and sentences for

securities fraud violated double jeopardy because they are

alternative ways of committing the same offense, and therefore the

two counts should be merged. But he did not raise this claim

16
 before the trial court. As discussed in Part III, supra, the law is not

well settled in this area, and we perceive no plain error.

A. Law of Merger and Double Jeopardy

¶ 39 We review de novo whether merger applies to criminal

offenses. People v. Zweygardt, 2012 COA 119, ¶ 40. An

unpreserved double jeopardy claim is reviewable for plain error.

Reyna-Abarca v. People, 2017 CO 15, ¶¶ 45-46.

¶ 40 Unless a statute expressly authorizes multiple punishments

for the same criminal offense, the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the

United States and Colorado Constitutions prohibit “the imposition

of multiple punishments for the same criminal conduct.” Woellhaf

v. People, 105 P.3d 209, 214 (Colo. 2005); see U.S. Const. amends.

V, XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 18. When a statute provides

alternative ways of committing a single criminal offense, multiplicity

concerns may materialize. Woellhaf, 105 P.3d at 214. In such

cases, courts must determine “the legislatively prescribed unit of

prosecution” and “whether the defendant’s conduct constitutes

factually distinct offenses, that is, whether the conduct satisfies

more than one defined unit of prosecution.” Id. at 211, 218-19.

17
¶ 41 In determining whether offenses are factually distinct, we

consider factors including the time and location of the events, the

defendant’s intent, and whether the People presented the acts as

legally separable. See Quintano v. People, 105 P.3d 585, 591-92

(Colo. 2005). However, no one factor is dispositive and the inquiry

ultimately focuses on “all the evidence introduced at trial to

determine whether the evidence on which the jury relied for

conviction was sufficient to support distinct and separate offenses.”

Id. at 592.

¶ 42 If a defendant is convicted of multiplicitous counts, the proper

remedy is to merge the multiplicitous convictions. See People v.

Rhea, 2014 COA 60, ¶¶ 16-17.

B. Multiplicity Not Obvious

¶ 43 A person commits securities fraud in Colorado when, in

connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any security, he

(b) . . . make[s] any untrue statement of a
material fact or [omits] to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading; or

(c) . . . engage[s] in any act, practice, or course
of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
18
 § 11-51-501(1).

¶ 44 Defendant was charged with one count of securities fraud by

means of an untrue statement or material omission under section

11-51-501(1)(b), and one count of securities fraud based on fraud

by deceit under section 11-51-501(1)(c). Other than by

incorporating the statutory language, the complaint does not

specify what conduct supports the respective charges.

¶ 45 In closing argument, the prosecutor argued that defendant

committed two separate offenses because (1) he did not disclose the

foreclosure or the bankruptcy to the Witts; and (2) he took their

money, put it in in his main bank account, and started to spend it.

The jury instructions state the elements of each charge, but do not

specify the conduct relating to each instruction. The jury returned

one verdict as to each count, but the general verdict forms do not

indicate what conduct supports each verdict.

¶ 46 We agree with defendant that the General Assembly prescribed

only a single unit of prosecution for securities fraud. See People v.

Abiodun, 111 P.3d 462, 466 (Colo. 2005) (holding that when the

legislature joins “a number of acts . . . as a disjunctive series,”

19
 rather than describing them in different provisions under different

titles, it defines alternative means of committing a single offense).

Thus, sections 11-51-501(1)(b) and (c) are alternative means of

committing securities fraud.

¶ 47 Accordingly, defendant’s two convictions and sentences could

be supported only if his alleged offenses were “factually distinct”

under Quintano.

¶ 48 The evidence of defendant’s false statements and material

omissions in obtaining the loans supports a conviction under

section 11-51-501(1)(b). But the prosecution did not argue that

there was a separate fraud or deceit supporting the section 11-51-

501(1)(c) charge. Instead, the prosecution argued that the deceitful

conversion of funds constituted the violation of subsection (c).

Although the misleading act and the conversion of funds happened

on separate days, perhaps giving defendant “time to reflect” on his

behavior, Quintano, 105 P.3d at 592, the prosecutor did not clearly

separate defendant’s misleading statements and omissions from his

later misuse of the funds, each of which related to the same note

and the same victims.

20
¶ 49 We read federal law to require, as relevant here, a separate

sale and a separate fraudulent statement in each count to support

a multiple count indictment for securities fraud. See United States

v. Langford, 946 F.2d 798, 804 (11th Cir. 1991) (reversing some of

the defendant’s multiple convictions for securities fraud in a

scheme against one victim because “each count of the indictment

must be based on a separate purchase or sale of securities and

each count must specify a false statement of material fact — not a

full-blown scheme to defraud — in connection with that purchase

or sale”); see also United States v. Regensberg, 604 F. Supp. 2d 625,

629 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that two counts of securities fraud

were not multiplicitous because each count embodied “groups of

two separate transactions that are governed by different terms and

conditions, involved different buyers, and occurred over different

time periods”).

¶ 50 Applying the federal standard, we conclude that defendant was

charged with and convicted of multiplicitous counts of securities

fraud because the evidence showed a sale of one security, to one

21
 investor based on one set of false or misleading statements.2 But

no Colorado case, well-settled legal principle, or statutory command

addressed the proper unit of prosecution under the Colorado

securities law. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that in the absence

of a motion it would have been obvious to the trial court that the

two convictions were multiplicitous. We conclude that there was no

plain error.

V. Sufficient Evidence of Theft

¶ 51 Defendant was charged with one count of theft under section

18-4-401(1)(b). To support a conviction for that offense, the

prosecution must prove that defendant (1) knowingly obtained,

retained, or exercised control over something of value of another

without authorization or by threat or deception; and (2) knowingly

used, concealed, or abandoned it in a manner to permanently

deprive the Witts of its use or benefit. See id.

2 Had the separate counts charged a securities violation based on
each of the Witts’ advances as part of a continuing fraud, multiple
counts may have been supported, but that is not what was charged
here. See Peoria Union Stock Yards Co. Ret. Plan v. Penn Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 698 F.2d 320, 326 (7th Cir. 1983) (Where the contract was
a continuing one that required periodic payments, fraudulent
statements to keep contributions coming “was fraud in connection
with the continuing sale of a security.”).
22
¶ 52 Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence that he

knowingly used the Witts’ money in a manner to permanently

deprive them of its benefit because the transaction was an

unconditional personal loan and he used a portion of the proceeds

to improve one of the properties offered as collateral on the note.

Although this argument was not preserved, we address it for the

reason described in Part II.B, supra. We are not persuaded.

¶ 53 The Witts testified at trial that they had agreed the money was

to be used for the development of Timber Ridge, as a “no risk”

investment in the project. And an investigator testified that

defendant used the funds to pay his own attorney fees, to improve

the house that his wife continued to occupy at the time of trial, and

for other personal expenses.

¶ 54 Defendant’s argument that he failed to repay the Witts

because they refused to release a lis pendens on his “second

residence” is without merit because this supposed buyer did not

surface until March 2013, well after defendant had defaulted on the

loan to the Witts and after he was criminally charged. The

argument does not affect this conclusion. See People v. Pedrie, 727

23
 P.2d 859, 863 (Colo. 1986) (holding that the return of stolen

property is not a defense to a theft charge).

¶ 55 We conclude that, viewing this evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, it is sufficient to support a rational

conclusion that defendant knowingly obtained the Witts’ money by

deception and intended to permanently deprive them of it.

VI. Admissibility of Evidence of Other Transactions

¶ 56 In a pretrial motion, the prosecution requested the trial court

to allow evidence that in 2010 defendant had obtained money from

another person under false pretenses by entering into an agreement

to sell a lot in Timber Ridge that he did not own. The prosecution

argued the evidence was relevant to show identity, knowledge,

motive, intent, modus operandi, and lack of mistake or accident.

Over defendant’s objection, the court ultimately allowed the

evidence to show identity, knowledge, motive, and lack of mistake

or accident, and gave the jury an instruction limiting use of

witnesses’ testimony to those purposes.3

3 When the prosecutor informed the court that the charge of theft in
the case did not require intent, but only “a knowing use in a
manner to permanently deprive,” the court reversed its position that
the evidence would be admissible for intent.
24
¶ 57 One witness testified that he had purchased lot 8 in the

Timber Ridge subdivision in 2007, and another witness testified

that he had paid defendant $120,000 for the same lot in 2010. The

second witness also testified that when he asked for his money

back, defendant responded with an expletive.4

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 58 Under CRE 404(b), a defendant’s prior act cannot be admitted

to prove the defendant’s character to show that he or she acted in

conformity with that character on a particular occasion, but it can

be admitted for other purposes if the trial court has determined that

the prior act occurred, and that the evidence satisfies the four-

prong test in People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Colo. 1990).

¶ 59 Under Spoto, the Rule 404(b) evidence must

(1) relate to a material fact; (2) be logically
relevant; (3) have a logical relevance that “is
independent of the intermediate inference,
prohibited by CRE 404(b), that the defendant
has a bad character” and committed the crime
charged because he acted in conformity with
that bad character; and (4) have a probative

4Defendant was convicted of theft by deception from this victim and
his conviction was affirmed by a division of this court. People v.
Thompson, (Colo. App. No. 13CA1413, Feb. 16, 2017) (not published
pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).
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 value that is not substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice.

Perez v. People, 2015 CO 45, ¶ 25.

¶ 60 That other act evidence may imply a defendant’s bad character

does not preclude the evidence so long as it is offered for a

permissible purpose. Spoto “does not demand the absence of the

inference but merely requires that the proffered evidence be

logically relevant independent of that inference.” People v. Snyder,

874 P.2d 1076, 1080 (Colo. 1994).

¶ 61 Because defendant objected to the admission of the evidence,

we review the trial court’s admission of other act evidence for abuse

of discretion. The decision will not be disturbed unless it was

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. People v. Osorio-Bahena, 2013

COA 55, ¶ 21.

¶ 62 In ruling on the Rule 404(b) motion, the district court

explicitly noted Spoto and engaged in the required four-part

analysis for the offered purposes.

¶ 63 Defendant argues that the evidence was not logically relevant

to prove identity, motive, knowledge, or absence of mistake. We are

not persuaded.

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 B. Analysis

¶ 64 Defendant’s explanation of his transaction with the Witts was

that (1) it was a legitimate business deal; (2) he had no intention to

defraud or deceive them; (3) he intended to perform according to the

agreement; and (4) he was unable to do so because of unfortunate

or unexpected business consequences beyond his control.

¶ 65 Evidence that the defendant had permanently deprived

another investor of his money, by similar false promises and

deceptive statements involving the same project, is logically relevant

to prove that his motive was not to enter into a legitimate business

agreement with the Witts, and that his inability to return the Witts’

investment was not due to a mistake or accidental circumstances

beyond his control.

¶ 66 We conclude that the probative value of introducing the prior

act was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice, “especially because the court gave a limiting instruction.”

People v. Cooper, 104 P.3d 307, 309 (Colo. App. 2004); see Garcia,

¶ 20 (“We presume that the jury followed the court’s [limiting]

instructions, absent evidence to the contrary.”). We further

conclude that the district court’s admission of the prior act evidence
27
 was not so arbitrary, capricious, or unfair as to constitute an abuse

of discretion. See People v. Torres, 224 P.3d 268, 274 (Colo. App.

2009) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court ruled that,

considering the similarities between the two incidents, the probative

value of the prior act was not substantially outweighed by its

potentially prejudicial effect).

VII. Sentencing

¶ 67 Finally, defendant argues that his sentence for theft must run

concurrently with the concurrent sentences for securities fraud

because the crimes are based on identical evidence. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 68 The parties agree that defendant did not preserve this issue for

review. As such, we review for plain error. See Reyna-Abarca, ¶ 47.

¶ 69 Although a sentencing court generally has discretion to impose

concurrent or consecutive sentences on a defendant convicted of

multiple crimes, consecutive sentences are statutorily prohibited if

identical evidence supported each count. § 18-1-408(3), C.R.S.

2017. To determine whether the evidence is identical, a court must

decide whether the convictions were “based on more than one

distinct act and, if so, whether those acts were separated by time
28
 and place.” People v. Glasser, 293 P.3d 68, 79 (Colo. App. 2011).

The sentencing court’s decision will be overturned “only if the

evidence supports no other conclusion than that the charges are

based on identical evidence.” People v. Muckle, 107 P.3d 380, 383

(Colo. 2005). Further, “the mere possibility that the jury may have

relied on identical evidence in returning more than one conviction is

not sufficient to trigger the mandatory concurrent sentencing

provision.” Id.

B. Analysis

¶ 70 We agree with the People that the theft and securities fraud

charges were not necessarily based on identical evidence, and

therefore decline to disturb the sentencing court’s discretion.

¶ 71 The convictions for securities fraud were predicated on the

misstatements and material omissions made by defendant to the

Witts in connection with the sale of a security, an element of

evidence for securities fraud not required for theft. Defendant’s

retention and use of the funds obtained from the Witts for personal

benefit knowingly permanently deprived them of its use, an element

of evidence not required for securities fraud.

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¶ 72 In these circumstances, it is not the case that “the evidence

supports no other conclusion than that the [theft and securities

fraud] charges are based on identical evidence.” Id. Because

different evidence supported each offense, we affirm the imposition

of a consecutive sentence for the theft conviction.

VIII. Conclusion

¶ 73 The judgment and sentence are affirmed.

JUDGE WEBB and JUDGE FOX concur.

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