NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 25 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOHN H. TODD, No. 17-36034
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:17-cv-00738-CL
v.
MEMORANDUM*
FRANK SKRAH; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Ann L. Aiken, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 12, 2018**
Before: RAWLINSON, CLIFTON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
John H. Todd appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations arising from the
seizure of neglected cats pursuant to a search warrant. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal on the basis of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
claim preclusion. Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002). We
affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Todd’s unreasonable search and
seizure claim against defendants Skrah and Klamath County Sheriff’s Department
on the basis of claim preclusion because Todd’s claim was raised, or could have
been raised, in a prior action between the parties or those in privity with them, and
the prior action resulted in a final judgment on the merits. See id. (setting forth
elements of claim preclusion under federal law); see also Tahoe–Sierra Pres.
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1081 (9th Cir.
2003) (“Even when the parties are not identical, privity may exist if there is
substantial identity between parties, that is, when there is sufficient commonality
of interest.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Todd’s motion for
reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) because Todd failed to
establish grounds for relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v.
ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of
review and listing factors for relief from judgment under Rule 59(e)).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, including the dismissal of Todd’s equal protection claim and
his claim against Gerald Warren. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2
2 17-36034
(9th Cir. 2009).
We reject as unsupported by the record Todd’s contentions that the district
court was biased against him as a pro se litigant and “rubber stamped” defendants’
arguments.
AFFIRMED.
3 17-36034