FILED
COURT OF APPEALS DIV I
STATE OF WASHINGTON
N18111.-2 AM 11: 12
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Personal ) No. 76509-4-1
Restraint of )
) DIVISION ONE
ERIC MATTHEW HOPPER, )
) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Petitioner. )
) FILED: July 2, 2018
LEACH, J. — Eric Hopper collaterally challenges his 2014 conviction for
commercial sexual abuse of a minor. He claims that his trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance because his counsel did not move to suppress evidence of
his text messages. He called and sent text messages to the number listed in a
Backpage.com advertisement featuring a photograph of an unidentifiable female
with the fictitious name of "Whisper." He ultimately paid to have sex with K.H.,
the 16-year-old girl pictured in the ad. Although he believed that he was
communicating with K.H. by text, he was actually communicating with her pimp,
Allixzander Park. Hopper asserts that Park violated the Washington privacy actl
by "intercepting" his "private communications" to K.H.
But the totality of the circumstances show that Hopper did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in these text messages. Thus, his text
messages to K.H. were not "private communications." Park did not violate the
1 Ch. 9.73 RCW.
No. 76509-4-1 /2
act, and Hopper's trial counsel acted reasonably in not requesting suppression of
the text messages. We dismiss Hopper's petition.
FACTS
In December 2012, Hopper searched Backpage.com2 with the intent of
purchasing sex. Backpage operated an online classified advertising service. Its
users created and posted their own ads, including ads in the adult category. This
category included ads for prostitution activity, often under the guise of an adult
escort or entertainment service. The ads often featured pictures of women
identified by false names and ages, along with hourly rates.
Hopper saw an advertisement for a woman named "Whisper," who he
later learned was K.H. The ad stated that she was 19 years old. She was
actually 16 years old. It listed a phone number that Hopper both called and
contacted by text. When he contacted the number by text, he initially believed
that he was communicating with K.H. But K.H.'s pimp, Allixzander Park, had
listed his own number on the ad and was reading and responding to Hopper's
text messages.
2 The Department of Justice seized Backpage.com in April 2018. Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Leads Effort to Seize
Backpage.Com, the Internet's Leading Forum for Prostitution Ads, and Obtains
93-Count Federal Indictment (April 9, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
justice-department-leads-effort-seize-backpagecom-internet-s-leading-forum-
prostitution-ads.
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No. 76509-4-1 / 3
In December 2012, police arrested Park and, with a warrant, searched his
cell phone. K.H. told police that Hopper had paid to have sex with her and
identified him from a photograph montage. The police located Hopper's home
address from the text messages stored on Park's phone. The State charged
Hopper with commercial sexual abuse of a minor. In March 2014, a jury
convicted Hopper as charged. Hopper appealed his conviction. This court
affirmed the conviction in an unpublished opinion.3 Hopper now challenges his
conviction with this personal restraint petition (PRP).4
ANALYSIS
As a preliminary matter, the State asserts that this court's rejection of
Hopper's privacy act claim on the merits in his direct appeal bars Hopper from
raising this claim again in his PRP. Because our earlier opinion did not clearly
address the merits of Hopper's current claim, we do not reach this issue.
Hopper claims that his trial counsel should have asked the trial court to
suppress his text messages to K.H., which police found stored on Park's cellular
phone. Because he does not establish that these text messages were "private
communications" under the act, he does not show that his counsel's performance
fell below an objectively reasonable standard of care. His claim fails.
3 State v. Hopper, No. 71799-5-1 (Wash. Ct. App. June 8, 2015)
(unpublished opinion), http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/17995.pdf.
4 On June 13, 2017, the clerk of this court granted the State's motion to
transfer the record from his direct appeal.
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No. 76509-4-I /4
Standard of Review
To obtain collateral relief by a PRP, a defendant must show either an error
of constitutional magnitude that gives rise to actual prejudice or a
nonconstitutional error that "'inherently results in a complete miscarriage of
justice.'"5 An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a claimed constitutional
error. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,
section 22 of the Washington Constitution guarantee the right to effective
assistance of counsel to help ensure a fair tria1.8
Claims of ineffective assistance present mixed questions of law and fact,
which this court reviews de novo.7 To succeed on an ineffective assistance
claim, the defendant must show that (1) his counsel's performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and (2) prejudiced him.8 If a defendant
submitting a PRP meets this burden, then he has necessarily met his burden to
show a constitutional error that caused actual prejudice.8
5 In re Pers. Restraint of Grantham, 168 Wn.2d 204, 212, 227 P.3d 285
(2010) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Isadore, 151 Wn.2d 294, 298, 88 P.3d
390 (2004)).
6 See State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 32, 246 P.3d 1260 (2011); see also
State v. Coristine, 177 Wn.2d 370, 375, 300 P.3d 400(2013).
7 In re Pers. Restraint of Fleming, 142 Wn.2d 853, 865, 16 P.3d 610
(2001).
8 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed.
2d 674 (1984).
9 In re Pers. Restraint of Crace, 174 Wn.2d 835, 846-47, 280 P.3d 1102
(2012).
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No. 76509-4-1/ 5
This court approaches an ineffective assistance of counsel claim with a
strong presumption that counsel provided effective representation.1° A petitioner
can "'rebut this presumption by proving that his attorney's representation was
unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that the challenged action
was not sound strategy.'"11 This court evaluates the reasonableness of counsel's
performance from "counsel's perspective at the time of the alleged error and in
light of all the circumstances.'"12 To establish prejudice, the defendant must
show a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different
without his counsel's deficient performance.13 "A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."14 If a reviewing
court concludes that a defendant fails to establish either prong of the test, it need
not inquire further.15
Washington Privacy Act
Hopper asserts that Park violated the act by "intercepting" his text
messages to K.H., which he claims were "private communications." He contends
that because evidence deriving from information obtained in violation of the act is
inadmissible under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, his trial counsel
10 In re Pers. Restraint of Davis, 152 Wn.2d 647, 673, 101 P.3d 1 (2004).
11 Davis, 152 Wn.2d at 673 (quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S.
365, 384, 106 S. Ct. 2574, 91 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1986)).
12 Davis, 152 Wn.2d at 673(quoting Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 384).
13 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
14 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
15 State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 78, 917 P.2d 563(1996).
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No. 76509-4-1/6
performed deficiently when his counsel failed to move to suppress the relevant
text messages that police found stored on Park's phone. Because we conclude
that Hopper's text messages to K.H. are not "private communications," Park did
not violate the act. This decision resolves this case. So we do not address
Hopper's remaining arguments.
A privacy act violation occurs when "(1) a private communication
transmitted by a device. . . was(2) intercepted or recorded by use of(3) a device
designed to record and/or transmit (4) without the consent of all parties to the
private communication."16 Hopper claims that his text messages to K.H. were
"private communications" under the act because he intended them for her alone
and they concerned illegal activity. Whether communications are private is a
question of fact but may be decided as a question of law where, as here, the
parties do not dispute the facts.17
The act does not define "private."18 Instead, Washington courts have
adopted the dictionary definition: "belonging to one's self. . . secret. . . intended
only for the persons involved (a conversation)... holding a confidential
relationship to something . . . a secret message: a private
16 State v. Roden, 179 Wn.2d 893, 899, 321 P.3d 1183 (2014); see RCW
9.73.030(1)(a).
17 Roden, 179 Wn.2d at 900.
18 See ch. 9.73 RCW; Roden, 179 Wn.2d at 899.
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No. 76509-4-I /7
communication . . . secretly: not open or in public.'"19 "IA] communication is
private (1) when parties manifest a subjective intention that it be private and (2)
where that expectation is reasonable'"29 based on "the duration and subject
matter of the communication, the location of the communication, and the
presence of potential third parties."21 Washington courts will generally presume
that each of the two parties participating in the conversation intends it to be
private.22
Hopper likens his case to State v. Roden23 and State v. Townsend,24 in
which our Supreme Court held that the communications at issue were private. In
Roden, the court held that Roden's text messages to Lee, his drug dealer, were
private because Lee's cell phone number was a personal contact of Roden's,
Roden did not use a group texting function, and his messages concerned illicit
subject matter.25 Similarly, in Townsend, the court held that Townsend's e-mail
19 Roden, 179 Wn.2d at 899-900 (alterations in original)(internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting State v. Townsend, 147 Wn.2d 666, 673, 57 P.3d 255
(2002)). '
29 State v. Modica, 164 Wn.2d 83, 88, 186 P.3d 1062 (2008) (quoting
State v. Christensen, 153 Wn.2d 186, 193, 102 P.3d 789 (2004)).
21 Roden, 179 Wn.2d at 900.
22 Roden, 179 Wn.2d at 900.
23 179 Wn.2d 893,896,900,321 P.3d 1183(2014).
24 147 Wn.2d 666,670,674,57 P.3d 255 (2002).
25 179 Wn.2d at 896; see also State v. Kipp, 179 Wn.2d 718, 730-31, 317
P.3d 1029 (2014)(explaining that "incriminating statement[s] of a serious subject
matter is the type of conversation protected under the act").
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No. 76509-4-1/ 8
and ICQ26 communications to a detective who he believed was a 13-year-old girl
named Amber were private because they concerned illicit subject matter and
because he told "Amber" not to "tell anyone about us."27 The court explained,"Mt
is readily apparent from the undisputed facts that Townsend's subjective
intention was that his messages to Amber were for her eyes only."28
By contrast, in State v. Goucher,29 Goucher called the house of his drug
dealer, Luis, while police were searching it pursuant to a warrant. A detective
answered, and Goucher proceeded to buy cocaine from the detective.30 Our
Supreme Court held that because Goucher did not try to conceal his desire to
buy drugs from a stranger, he accepted the risk that his drug purchase would not
be confidentia1.31
Similarly, in State v. Clark,32 our Supreme Court held that defendants'
communications with a police informant who claimed that he wanted to purchase
cocaine were not private. These conversations were "routine sales
conversations . . . between the defendants and a stranger who happened to be
26 "ICQ [is] an Internet discussion software program that allows real-time
client-to-client communications." State v. Townsend, 105 Wn. App. 622, 625, 20
P.3d 1027(2001), aff'd, 147 Wn.2d 666, 57 P.3d 255(2002).
27 Townsend, 147 Wn.2d at 670, 674.
29 Townsend, 147 Wn.2d at 674.
29 124 Wn.2d 778, 780-81, 881 P.2d 210 (1994). Goucher addressed only
whether the defendant's constitutional privacy rights were violated. Although it
did not concern the privacy act, the case is relevant by analogy.
39 Goucher, 124 Wn.2d at 780-81.
31 Goucher, 124 Wn.2d at 786-87.
32 129 Wn.2d 211, 215, 916 P.2d 384 (1996).
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No. 76509-4-1 / 9
an undercover police informant," which occurred in or near the informant's car
parked on public streets, often in a "bazaar-like setting," and in front of third
parties.33 The court distinguished Roden from Clark with this explanation: "We
have found information willingly imparted to an unidentified stranger falls outside
the protection of the act, as do some conversations that take place in 'the
presence of one or more third parties' in a 'marketplace atmosphere.'"34
Here, although Hopper had a subjective expectation of privacy in his text
messages to K.H., this expectation was unreasonable. So he does not satisfy
the objective prong of the test, and his claim fails. Hopper testified that he
searched Backpage.com knowing that it contained advertisements for
prostitution. He saw what he later learned was K.H.'s advertisement, which listed
a phone number underneath a female's picture that did not show her face.
Although the ad did not state her name, Hopper testified that the description
implied she went by "Whisper."
He called the number with the intent of scheduling sex, and a female voice
answered. K.H. testified that she did, in fact, speak to Hopper on the phone; she
stated that individuals calling in response to the ad would call Park's phone and
Park would give her the phone to talk to them. When Hopper called, he told her
that he had seen her ad and wanted to negotiate a meeting. Hopper also sent
at 214-15, 228.
33 Clark, 129 Wn.2d
34 Roden, 179 Wn.2d at 903 (quoting Clark, 129 Wn.2d at 228).
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No. 76509-4-1 /10
K.H. numerous text messages before he met her in person. He stated that she
"seemed very nervous in text, but not via voice, about whether I would actually
be there or not. . .[w]hich was a little confusing to me."
When K.H. met Hopper at his home, he recognized her as the woman with
whom he believed he had been communicating because "her shape and overall
appearance matched the ad." After they had sex, Hopper paid her $250. But
soon after she left, he received a text message asking, "[D]id you give me $250?"
At that point, he "started being very worried that she had a pimp." He stated that
after that text conversation, "[i]t was really obvious that I wasn't talking to her."
Days later, when Hopper attempted to set up another meeting with her through
text, he was "fairly certain that[he] was talking to her pimp."
Similar to Townsend, who intended to communicate only with Amber,
Hopper intended to communicate only with the woman pictured in the
Backpage.com ad. Because Hopper called the number listed in the ad, a female
voice answered, he told her that he had seen her ad on Backpage.com, and they
discussed a time to meet, his text messages were "for her eyes only.'"35 It was
not clear to him that he was communicating by text message with Park until after
he had sex with K.H. And consistent with Roden, the fact that his
communications with K.H. concerned illicit subject matter involving paying for sex
35 Personal restraint petition at 22(quoting Townsend, 147 Wn.2d at 674).
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No. 76509-4-1/ 11
suggests that he intended his text messages to be private. In light of the general
presumption that parties intend their conversations to be private and the fact that
K.H. was the sole intended recipient of Hopper's communications concerning
illegal activity, he manifested a subjective intent that his text messages to K.H.
would remain private.
But Hopper's subjective expectation of privacy was objectively
unreasonable. He responded to an ad on Backpage.com, a website notorious for
advertising prostitution activity. The ad was titled "any way you want it 19" and
i
,
featured an unidentifiable woman with a fictitious name. A reasonable Person
would not expect that contacting a stranger by text through the phone number
i
listed in this advertisement would provide a legitimate opportunity for a !::1 rivate
conversation with a known person. Even Hopper admitted that "the icture
wasn't a good enough picture to clearly identify a specific person."
The facts here differ from Clark because Hopper's text messages did not
occur in a "marketplace atmosphere" or in front of third parties. But, as in
Goucher, Hopper told a stranger that he was interested in illegal activity. When
he called the number listed in the ad, a woman answered who he believed was
, the woman in the ad, but when he proceeded to send text messages to the same
number, he could not be sure whether a man or a woman was respond ng, let
I
alone the woman in the ad. And, unlike Townsend, who began communicating
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No. 76509-4-1 /12
with "Amber" over e-mail and a discussion software program under pretense of
developing a social relationship, Hopper called to directly solicit sex.
In addition, although Hopper was not certain that he was talking to a pimp
until after he had sex with K.H., the fact that K.H. "seemed very nervous in text,
but not via voice" confused him and indicated that, at a minimum, he was not
talking with and text messaging the same person. And regardless of whether
Hopper was initially aware of K.H.'s pimp, it is common knowledge that
prostitutes often have pimps. Thus, even though Hopper subjectively intended
for his text messages to K.H. to be private, his communications were not private
because this expectation was unreasonable. Park did not violate the act when
he recorded and stored Hopper's messages to K.H. on his cell phone.
CONCLUSION
We dismiss Hopper's PRP. His trial counsel did not provide ineffective
assistance by failing to move to suppress his text messages to K.H. because
those messages were not "private communications" under the privacy act.
WE CONCUR:
‘11AY41 1
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