Supreme Court of Florida
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No. SC17-975
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DYCK-O’NEAL, INC.,
Petitioner,
vs.
HEATHER LANHAM,
Respondent.
[July 5, 2018]
LAWSON, J.
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the First District
Court of Appeal in Dyck-O’Neal, Inc. v. Lanham, 214 So. 3d 802 (Fla. 1st DCA
2017). The district court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with
decisions of every other district court of appeal—Garcia v. Dyck-O’Neal, Inc., 178
So. 3d 433 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015), Dyck-O’Neal, Inc. v. Hendrick, 200 So. 3d 181
(Fla. 5th DCA 2016), Gdovin v. Dyck-O’Neal, Inc., 198 So. 3d 986 (Fla. 2d DCA
2016), and Dyck-O’Neal, Inc. v. McKenna, 198 So. 3d 1038 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016),
regarding whether a complainant may pursue a separate action at law to recover a
deficiency judgment when the foreclosure court reserved jurisdiction in its final
judgment to adjudicate the deficiency claim. We have jurisdiction, see art. V,
§ 3(b)(3), Fla. Const., and hold that when a foreclosure court reserves jurisdiction
to adjudicate a deficiency judgment claim but has not adjudicated the claim,
section 702.06, Florida Statutes (2014), permits the lender or its assignee to bring
its deficiency claim in a separate action at law. Because the First District held
otherwise, we quash the decision below and approve the certified conflict decisions
of the Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth District Courts of Appeal.
BACKGROUND
Heather Lanham’s residential property in Gadsden County, Florida, was
foreclosed by final judgement. That judgment expressly reserved jurisdiction to
rule on any future deficiency claim, although no one sought to adjudicate the claim
in that forum. Instead, Dyck-O’Neal, Inc. (O’Neal), which was assigned the
mortgage and note, filed a separate action at law seeking a deficiency judgment
against Lanham. The trial court granted summary judgment for Lanham on an
issue relating to the validity of O’Neal’s assignment, and O’Neal appealed. The
First District quashed the trial court’s decision without reaching the assignment
issue based upon its conclusion that the trial court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over the suit under section 702.06, Florida Statutes (2014), because the
foreclosure court had previously reserved jurisdiction to handle the deficiency
claim. In so holding, the First District certified conflict with decisions from all
four of the other district courts of appeal, and we accepted discretionary review.
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ANALYSIS
The sole issue in this case is governed by section 702.06, Florida Statutes
(2014), which every district court of appeal except for the First District has read as
permitting a separate action at law for a deficiency judgment unless the foreclosure
court has already granted or denied a deficiency claim. Questions of statutory
interpretation are reviewed de novo. See Borden v. East-European Ins. Co., 921
So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. 2006).
Section 702.06 reads in relevant part:
In all suits for the foreclosure of mortgages heretofore or
hereafter executed the entry of a deficiency decree for any portion of a
deficiency, should one exist, shall be within the sound discretion of
the court . . . . The complainant shall also have the right to sue at
common law to recover such deficiency, unless the court in the
foreclosure action has granted or denied a claim for a deficiency
judgment.
§ 702.06, Fla. Stat. (2014) (emphasis added).
“When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a
clear and definite meaning, . . . the statute must be given its plain and obvious
meaning.” Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (quoting A.R. Douglass,
Inc. v. McRainey, 137 So. 157, 159 (Fla. 1931)). Here, the statute plainly allows
the foreclosure court to adjudicate the deficiency claim but also gives the
complainant “the right to sue at common law to recover such deficiency, unless the
court in the foreclosure action has granted or denied a claim for a deficiency
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judgment.” (Emphasis added.) A reservation of jurisdiction is not a grant or
denial of the claim. The foreclosure court would have only “granted or denied” the
deficiency judgment if it had adjudicated the claim. Therefore, this statute plainly
precludes the separate action only where the foreclosure court has actually ruled on
the claim—as held by the Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth District Courts of
Appeal.
In reaching a different result below, the First District relied on its prior
decision in Higgins v. Dyck-O’Neal, Inc., 201 So. 3d 157 (Fla. 1st DCA
2016). See O’Neal, 214 So. 3d at 802. However, in Higgins, the First District
examined this Court’s precedent interpreting an older version of section 702.06
that did not contain the “granted or denied” language. See Higgins, 201 So. 3d at
159-63. As correctly explained by the dissent in Higgins: “The clarity of the 2013
statutory language decides this case . . . . [and the cases relied upon by the majority
of the First District panel are] immaterial because the 2013 statutory language at
issue trumps whatever perceived inconsistency . . . [exists] with prior precedents.”
Id. at 167 (Makar, J., dissenting).
CONCLUSION
We quash the decision below in O’Neal, disapprove Higgins, approve
Garcia, Hendrick, Gdovin, and McKenna, and hold that section 702.06, Florida
Statutes (2014), permits an independent action at law for a deficiency judgment
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when the foreclosure court has expressly reserved jurisdiction to handle a
deficiency claim but has not actually decided the merits of the claim.
It is so ordered.
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and
LABARGA, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND,
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Certified
Direct Conflict of Decisions
First District - Case No. 1D16-1624
(Gadsden County)
David M. Snyder, Tampa, Florida; Susan B. Morrison of Law Offices of Susan B.
Morrison, P.A., Tampa, Florida; and Joshua D. Moore of Law Offices of Daniel C.
Consuegra, Tampa, Florida,
for Petitioner
Rick A. Savage of Savage Law Office, PLLC, Tallahassee, Florida; and Jacob D.
Flentke of Flentke Legal Consulting, PLLC, Orlando, Florida,
for Respondent
Natasha Shaikh of Shaikh & Shaikh, P.A., Orlando, Florida,
Amicus Curiae
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