MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Jul 06 2018, 10:05 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as CLERK
precedent or cited before any court except for the Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, and Tax Court
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANTS PRO SE ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES
Penelope Stillwell EAGLE-KIRKPATRICK
William Stillwell MANAGEMENT COMPANY, INC.,
Clearwater Beach, Florida KIRKPATRICK MANAGEMENT
COMPANY, INC., AND SYCAMORE
SPRINGS SECTION C
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
Bradley J. Schulz
State Farm Litigation Counsel
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE G.T.
SERVICES, INC., D/B/A GREEN
TOUCH SERVICES, INC.
Richard A. Rocap
Rocap Law Firm LLC
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE COHEN
& MALAD, LLP
Carol Nemeth Joven
Price Waicukauski Joven & Catlin, LLC
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Penelope Stillwell and William July 6, 2018
Stillwell, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1708-CT-1919
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1708-CT-1919 | July 6, 2018 Page 1 of 10
Appellants-Plaintiffs, Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
v.
The Honorable John F. Hanley,
Judge
Eagle-Kirkpatrick Management
Company, Inc., Kirkpatrick Trial Court Cause No.
49D11-1110-CT-41092
Management Company, Inc.,
G.T. Services, Inc., d/b/a Green
Touch Services, Inc., and
Sycamore Springs Section C
Homeowners Association, Inc.,
Appellees-Defendants,
v.
Cohen & Malad, LLP,
Appellee-Intervenor.
Friedlander, Senior Judge
[1] On December 13, 2011, William Stillwell (“Dr. Stillwell”) slipped and fell on
the front steps of his home located in the Sycamore Springs development in
Indianapolis. Dr. Stillwell subsequently filed a lawsuit against Eagle-
Kirkpatrick Management Company, Inc., Kirkpatrick Management Company,
Inc., G.T. Services, Inc. d/b/a Green Touch Services, Inc., and Sycamore
Springs Section C Homeowners Associations, Inc (collectively “the
Defendants”). Dr. Stillwell’s wife, Mrs. Stillwell, pursued a claim for loss of
consortium. The Stillwells retained attorney Daniel S. Chamberlain to
represent them in their lawsuit. At some point during the course of the lawsuit,
Chamberlain moved to the law firm Cohen & Malad. The Stillwells allowed
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1708-CT-1919 | July 6, 2018 Page 2 of 10
Chamberlain to continue to represent them after his move to Cohen & Malad.1
Cohen & Malad had a contingency fee agreement with the Stillwells in which it
was entitled to one-third of any recovery and reimbursement for advanced
expenses.
[2] Meanwhile, the trial court scheduled the jury trial for August 2, 2016. As the
trial date was approaching, the Defendants filed a motion to exclude testimony
of one of the Stillwells’ witnesses or, as an alternative, a motion to continue the
trial in order to conduct additional discovery. The trial was continued to
January 10, 2017.
[3] Shortly after the continuance, the parties engaged in settlement discussions. In
August of 2016, Cohen & Malad presented the Stillwells with a memorandum
of understanding outlining the terms of the settlement. In the fall of 2016, the
parties formalized the settlement by signing the memorandum. The Defendants
agreed to pay the Stillwells $200,000 as full settlement of all claims. Per the
agreement, the parties also worked over the subsequent months to resolve issues
concerning possible third-party interests in the settlement.2
[4] As the parties continued to discuss the issues related to the payment of medical
bills, the new trial date approached. Due to the settlement, Cohen & Malad, on
1
On May 3, 2017, Chamberlain assigned his rights to recover attorney fees and expenses under the contract
to Cohen & Malad.
2
Medicare and Anthem had interests in the settlement because they paid some of the relevant medical bills.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1708-CT-1919 | July 6, 2018 Page 3 of 10
behalf of the Stillwells, filed the memorandum of understanding with the court
on December 7, 2016. The trial court subsequently removed the January trial
date from its calendar. In mid-January 2017, the parties finally worked out all
of the details of the settlement except for release language related to the
Medicare issue.
[5] On February 15, 2017, Cohen & Malad notified the Defendants that they
would be filing a motion to withdraw as counsel for the Stillwells. As the
settlement checks had been negotiated, Sycamore Springs and Green Touch
sought to prevent Cohen & Malad from withdrawing, and also filed motions to
enforce the settlement. By March 1, 2017, the Stillwells had filed pro se
appearances and the trial court had scheduled a hearing for April 10, 2017.
[6] On April 10, 2017, all parties except the Stillwells appeared by counsel. The
Stillwells had been ordered to appear in person, but failed to do so. Mrs.
Stillwell appeared telephonically, but Dr. Stillwell did not participate. After the
hearing, the trial court allowed Cohen & Malad to withdraw their
representation of the Stillwells, and further allowed Cohen & Malad to deposit
the settlement funds with the clerk. The trial court also granted the motions of
Sycamore Springs and Green Touch to enforce the settlement agreement.
[7] On July 11, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on various motions. The
Stillwells failed to appear at the hearing in any manner, despite being ordered to
attend in person. On July 26, 2017, the trial court signed an order entering
judgment, dismissing the case with prejudice as to the Defendants, and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1708-CT-1919 | July 6, 2018 Page 4 of 10
otherwise enforcing the settlement agreement reached between the parties. The
trial court also ordered the clerk to distribute the requested fees 3 and expenses4
to Cohen & Malad and the remainder of the funds to the Stillwells.
[8] The Stillwells raise several restated issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court
properly enforced the settlement agreement; (2) whether the trial court abused
its discretion in allowing Cohen & Malad to intervene; and (3) whether the trial
court acted within its discretion in ordering that Cohen & Malad be paid for
their fees and expenses.
I. Settlement Agreement
[9] The Stillwells contend that the trial court erred when it found that the
settlement agreement between the parties was enforceable. “Indiana strongly
favors settlement agreements.” Georgos v. Jackson, 790 N.E.2d 448, 453 (Ind.
2003). A settlement is a contract between two or more parties to amicably settle
or adjust their differences on terms to which they agree. Vance v. Lozano, 981
N.E.2d 554 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). It is well-established that if a “party agrees to
settle a pending action, but then refuses to consummate [his or her] settlement
agreement, the opposing party may obtain a judgment enforcing the
agreement.” Georgos, 790 N.E.2d at 453. Generally, a settlement agreement is
3
Specifically, Cohen & Malad was entitled to $66,666.67 under its agreement with the Stillwells (one-third of
the $200,000 recovery), but voluntarily reduced its fee to $54,042.14 (not including expenses).
4
Despite the fact that Cohen & Malad incurred an additional $4000 in expenses after the settlement recap
was signed, the firm agreed to accept $36,560.35 in expenses instead of $40,560.35.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1708-CT-1919 | July 6, 2018 Page 5 of 10
not required to be in writing. MH Equity Managing Member, LLC v. Sands, 938
N.E.2d 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. “Settlement agreements are
governed by the same general principles of contract law as other agreements.”
Id. at 757.
[10] The existence of a contract is a question of law. Batchelor v. Batchelor, 853
N.E.2d 162 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). To be valid and enforceable, a contract must
be reasonably certain and definite. Zukerman v. Montgomery, 945 N.E.2d 813
(Ind. Ct. App. 2011). “All that is required to render a contract enforceable is
reasonable certainty in the terms and conditions of the promises made,
including by whom and to whom; absolute certainty in all terms is not
required.” Id. at 819. Only essential terms are necessary for a contract to be
enforceable. Id.
[11] In this case, the parties agreed to essential terms regarding the following topics
in their memorandum of understanding. Specifically, the memorandum
contained the following terms:
1. Defendants shall pay, or cause to be paid to, the Plaintiffs a
total of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000.00) as full
settlement of all claims, subject to the terms in this Memorandum
of Understanding.
2. The Plaintiffs shall sign an appropriate release, or releases, at a
later date formalizing the terms and conditions of the resolution
of this matter.
3. The Plaintiffs shall sign a Stipulation of Dismissal and this
case shall be dismissed with prejudice.
4. The Plaintiffs agree to provide the Defendants documentation
of reduction to any lien(s) and/or subrogation interest(s) from the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1708-CT-1919 | July 6, 2018 Page 6 of 10
respective lienholder(s) and/or subrogee(s). The Defendants shall
prepare separate drafts to each lienholder and/or subrogee, with
the remaining balance being issued to the Plaintiffs and their
counsel.
Appellees’ Joint App. Vol II pp. 28–29.
[12] The Stillwells confirmed the settlement in a settlement recap that they executed
with Cohen & Malad on August 22, 2016. This recap outlined the gross
recovery, fees and expenses, liens, and the ultimate recovery. The recap also
stated that “we have accepted the settlement offer after serious reflection and
deliberation . . . [and] have concluded that this offer is in our own best
interests.” Appellees’ Joint App. Vol. II p. 136. The only issue that was not
fully addressed in the settlement agreement was the language of the release for
Medicare. The language regarding the release(s), however, was not a material
part of the agreement. It is clear from the terms of the memorandum that the
main issue, the settlement between the parties for the Stillwells’ claims, was
unambiguously resolved. “A court will not find that a contract is so uncertain
as to preclude specific enforcement where a reasonable and logical
interpretation will render the contract valid.” Conwell v. Gray Loon Outdoor
Mktg. Group, Inc., 906 N.E.2d 805, 813 (Ind. 2009). The trial court did not err
in finding that an enforceable settlement agreement existed.
II. Intervenor Status
[13] The Stillwells also argue that the trial court abused its discretion when it
allowed Cohen & Malad to intervene. We review a trial court’s ruling on a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1708-CT-1919 | July 6, 2018 Page 7 of 10
motion to intervene pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 24 for an abuse of discretion
and assume that all facts in the motion are true. Himes v. Himes, 57 N.E.3d 820
(Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the
trial court’s decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances before the court or the reasonable and probable inferences to be
drawn therefrom.” Granite State Ins. Co. v. Lodholtz, 981 N.E.2d 563, 566 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.
[14] Indiana Trial Rule 24 (A) provides in relevant part as follows:
Upon timely motion anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an
action: ... (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to a
property, fund or transaction which is the subject of the action
and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect his interest
in the property, fund or transaction, unless the applicant’s interest
is adequately represented by existing parties.
Here, the evidence shows that Cohen & Malad had the right to intervene
because it had a charging lien and an interest in the settlement funds pursuant
to the terms of its agreement with the Stillwells. A charging lien “is the
equitable right of attorneys to have the fees and costs due [to] them for services
in a suit secured out of the judgment or recovery in that particular suit.” Wilson
v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Servs. Inc., 952 N.E.2d 793, 796 (Ind. Ct. App.
2011). Because Cohen & Malad had a charging lien—a valid interest under
Indiana Trial Rule 24(A)—at the time that it filed its motion to intervene, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed Cohen & Malad to
intervene.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1708-CT-1919 | July 6, 2018 Page 8 of 10
III. Fees and Expenses
[15] Finally, the Stillwells argue that the trial court abused its discretion when it
ordered that Cohen & Malad be paid for their fees and expenses. “We review
the trial court’s decision to award attorney fees under an abuse of discretion
standard.” Bacompt Sys., Inc. v. Ashworth, 752 N.E.2d 140, 146 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001), trans. denied. The record shows that Cohen & Malad had a contingency
agreement that specified that it would be entitled to a one-third contingency fee
if the Stillwells obtained a judgment or settlement on their personal injury
claim. The fee agreement further provided that Cohen & Malad would be
reimbursed for any expenses advanced. The Stillwells were provided with
detailed documentation of Cohen & Malad’s expenses and approved such
expenses when they signed the settlement recap in August of 2016. Specifically,
the settlement recap stated, “We hereby acknowledge that the above settlement
is accurate and in accordance with our contract with the offices of Cohen &
Malad.” Appellees’ Joint App. Vol. II p. 233. The Stillwells make several
arguments regarding lavish and improper spending by Cohen & Malad, but
those claims are not supported by any evidence in the record. Moreover, there
is no evidence to suggest that Cohen & Malad was not entitled to its fees and
expenses in accordance with its contract with the Stillwells. The Stillwells have
failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Cohen &
Malad’s fees and expenses.
[16] Judgment affirmed.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1708-CT-1919 | July 6, 2018 Page 9 of 10
Robb, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1708-CT-1919 | July 6, 2018 Page 10 of 10