Case: 17-10643 Date Filed: 07/06/2018 Page: 1 of 3
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 17-10643
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 6:15-cv-02109-ACC-DCI
JUAN SILVA,
Petitioner - Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondents - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(July 6, 2018)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JORDAN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act imposes a one-year
statute of limitations in which a petitioner may file a writ of habeas corpus in a
Case: 17-10643 Date Filed: 07/06/2018 Page: 2 of 3
federal district court, running from any one of four circumstances. See 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(1). The one-year clock may be tolled when a petitioner files post-
conviction motions for relief in state court, see § 2244(d)(2), but not all motions
toll the AEDPA one-year statute of limitations.
Juan Silva was convicted in Florida state court of numerous crimes, and his
convictions became final, for purposes of the AEDPA one-year statute of
limitations, on July 18, 2011. See § 2244(d)(1)(A). Following those convictions,
and over the course of years, Mr. Silva filed a flurry of post-conviction motions for
relief, namely under Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.800 and 3.850. It is
settled law that timely Rule 3.800(a) and Rule 3.850 motions toll the one-year
AEDPA clock. See Ford v. Moore, 296 F.3d 1035, 1040 (11th Cir. 2002); Cadet v.
Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 853 F.3d 1216, 1219 (11th Cir. 2017). But when Mr. Silva
filed his petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus from the federal district court on
December 14, 2015, it was an open question whether Rule 3.800(c) motions toll
the AEDPA clock. The state concedes that if Rule 3.800(c) motions toll the
AEDPA clock, then Mr. Silva’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus was timely
filed within the one-year statute of limitations. If they do not toll the clock,
however, then Mr. Silva’s petition was untimely.
On January 6, 2017, the district court ruled that Rule 3.800(c) motions do
not toll the clock, and dismissed Mr. Silva’s petition as untimely. During the
2
Case: 17-10643 Date Filed: 07/06/2018 Page: 3 of 3
pendency of Mr. Silva’s appeal, however, we held that Rule 3.800(c) motions do
indeed toll the AEDPA clock. See Rogers v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 855 F.3d 1274,
1275 (11th Cir. 2017). Thus, Mr. Silva’s habeas petition was timely filed within
the one-year AEDPA statute of limitations. Accordingly, we vacate the district
court’s dismissal of Mr. Silva’s habeas petition and remand for further
proceedings.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
3