Aasen v. Rickert

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Appellate Court Date: 2018.06.18
11:30:12 -05'00'

Aasen v. Rickert, 2018 IL App (2d) 170036

Appellate Court CAROLE E. AASEN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DAVID J.
Caption RICKERT, Treasurer and ex officio Collector of Kane County,
Defendant-Appellee.

District & No. Second District
Docket No. 2-17-0036

Filed February 5, 2018
Rehearing denied March 19, 2018

Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County, Nos. 15-TX-164,
Review 15-TX-165, 15-TX-167; the Hon. M. Katherine Moran, Judge,
presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on Thomas J. McNulty, Steven F. Pflaum, David S. Martin, and Amanda
Appeal E. Fraerman, of Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg LLP, of Chicago, for
appellants.

Joseph H. McMahon, State’s Attorney, of St. Charles (Lindsay A.
Hatzis and Joseph F. Lulves, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel),
for appellee.
 Panel JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Justices Zenoff and Jorgensen concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Plaintiffs, Carole Aasen and approximately 665 other tax objectors (Objectors), appeal the
judgment of the trial court denying their motion for summary judgment and dismissing their
tax objection complaints against defendant, David J. Rickert, treasurer and ex officio collector
of Kane County (Collector). The Objectors argue that the Kane County clerk lacked the
authority to use the Illinois Department of Revenue’s amended apportionments for tax year
2012 to collect taxes in tax year 2014. We affirm.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 A. Stipulated Facts
¶4 The parties stipulated to the relevant facts in these three cases, consolidated in the trial
court, as follows. The Objectors each own real property in a part of Kane County within a
taxing district that lies in at least one other county. Specifically, the Objectors own property
located in the following taxing districts lying in the following counties:
District Counties
Elgin School District U46 Kane, Du Page, and Cook
Elgin College District 509 Kane, Cook, and De Kalb
Elgin City Kane and Cook
Gail Borden Library Kane and Cook
¶5 The drafters of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, recognizing the need for the fair
apportionment of the burden of taxation of property in taxing districts that overlap more than
one county, provided as follows:
“The General Assembly may provide by law for fair apportionment of the burden
of taxation of property situated in taxing districts that lie in more than one county.” Ill.
Const. 1970, art. IX, § 7.
¶6 Accordingly, section 18-155 of the Property Tax Code (Code) (35 ILCS 200/18-155 (West
2014)), entitled “Apportionment of taxes for districts in two or more counties,” provides for
the fair apportionment of that burden. To accomplish this goal, section 18-155 authorizes the
Department of Revenue (DOR) to apportion the amounts to be raised by taxation on property
in a district that overlaps multiple counties, so that each county bears the burden as though all
parts of the district had been assessed at the same proportion of actual value. It also authorizes
the DOR to certify to each county clerk the percentage constituting that county’s burden,
which the clerk will apply to the property of the taxing district that lies in that county. 35 ILCS
200/18-155(c) (West 2014).
¶7 Section 18-155 of the Code provides in relevant part:

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 “The burden of taxation of property in taxing districts that lie in more than one county
shall be fairly apportioned as provided in Article IX, Section 7, of the Constitution of
1970.
*** When the Department has received a written request for equalization for
overlapping tax districts as provided in this Section, the Department shall promptly
notify the county clerk and county treasurer of each county affected by that request that
tax bills with respect to property in the parts of the county which are affected by the
request may not be prepared or mailed until the Department certifies the apportionment
among counties of the taxing districts’ levies, except as provided in subsection (c) of
this Section. To apportion, the Department shall:
(a) On or before December 31 of that year cause an assessment ratio study to be
made in each township in which each of the named overlapping taxing districts lies,
using equalized assessed values as certified by the county clerk, and an analysis of
property transfers prior to January 1 of that year. The property transfers shall be in an
amount deemed reasonable and proper by the Department. The Department may
conduct hearings, at which the evidence shall be limited to the written presentation of
assessment ratio study data.
(b) Request from the County Clerk in each County in which the overlapping taxing
districts lie, certification of the portion of the assessed value of the prior year for each
overlapping taxing district’s portion of each township. Beginning with the 1999
taxable year, for those counties that classify property by county ordinance pursuant to
subsection (b) of Section 4 of Article IX of the Illinois Constitution, the certification
shall be listed by property class as provided in the classification ordinance. The clerk
shall return the certification within 30 days of receipt of the request.
(c) Use the township assessment ratio studies to apportion the amount to be raised
by taxation upon property within the district so that each county in which the district
lies bears that burden of taxation as though all parts of the overlapping taxing district
had been assessed at the same proportion of actual value. The Department shall certify
to each County Clerk, by March 15, the percent of burden. Except as provided below,
the County Clerk shall apply the percentage to the extension as provided in Section
18-45 to determine the amount of tax to be raised in the county.
If the Department of Revenue does not certify the percent of burden in the time
prescribed, the county clerk shall use the most recent prior certification to determine
the amount of tax to be raised in the county.
If the use of a prior certified percentage results in over or under extension for the
overlapping taxing district in the county using same, the county clerk shall make
appropriate adjustments in the subsequent year. Any adjustments necessitated by the
procedure authorized by this Section shall be made by increasing or decreasing the tax
extension by fund for each taxing district where a prior certified percentage was used.
No tax rate limit shall render any part of a tax levy illegally excessive which has been
apportioned as herein provided. The percentages certified by the Department shall
remain until changed by reason of another assessment ratio study made under this
Section.” (Emphases added.) 35 ILCS 200/18-155 (West 2014).
¶8 In this case, for the tax year 2012, the DOR did not certify the apportionments for the
districts at issue to the county clerks by March 15, 2013. Accordingly, the Kane County clerk

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 used the most recent prior certification to determine the Objectors’ property taxes for tax year
2012.
¶9 On May 15, 2013, the DOR certified the apportionments for tax year 2012 to the county
clerks. The DOR’s apportionment percentage for Kane County was lower than in the
certification used for the tax bills issued for tax year 2012. On March 14, 2014, the DOR
certified the apportionments for tax year 2013. On March 26, 2014, when the Kane County
clerk extended the tax burden for tax year 2013, he reduced the amount of tax extended to
adjust for the overextension in tax year 2012. The parties do not dispute that the Kane County
clerk had the authority pursuant to section 18-155(c) of the Code to make this adjustment.
¶ 10 On May 21, 2014, the DOR certified a “Corrected” apportionment of the districts’ tax
burdens for tax year 2012, and on December 12, 2014, the DOR certified “Amended”
apportionments of the districts’ tax burdens. For tax year 2014, the Kane County clerk applied
the amended apportionments to the extension for tax year 2012. On February 9, 2015, the Kane
County clerk informed the Objectors via letter that:
“[F]or the past two years the tax rates for the taxing districts [at issue] were
disproportionately low due to an issue with the percent of burden that Kane County
property owners pay to the [taxing districts at issue].
*** The percentages the Department of Revenue assigned to Kane County were too
low and were too high in DuPage and Cook Counties based upon numbers they
received from this office in 2011 and 2012 and did not reflect an accounting change due
to a software issue.
The software issue has been resolved, but the affected parcels will have to pay an
increased rate for the 2014 tax year to make up the difference. As a result, the tax rate
for the affected districts will increase.”
Thus, in 2015, when the Kane County clerk extended the tax burden in the Objectors’ districts
for tax year 2014, the extension included a “Manual Adjustment” that reflected the amended
apportionments for tax year 2012.
¶ 11 The apportionments for tax year 2012 were:

District Originally extended by Certified by DOR Amended by DOR Dec.
clerk May 2013 May 2013 & adjusted by 2014, with “Manual
using prior certified clerk March 2014 Adjustment” included in
percentage 2015

Elgin 34.28% 31.54% 33.63%
U46
Elgin 61.62% 60.53% 61.86%
509
Elgin 79.61% 78.47% 79.60%
City
Borden 68.21% 66.40% 68.09%

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¶ 12 B. Proceedings
¶ 13 On October 1, 2015, the Objectors filed tax objection complaints against the Collector,
pursuant to section 23-5 of the Code (35 ILCS 200/23-5 (West 2014)), alleging that the Kane
County clerk’s application of the amended apportionments for tax year 2012 to the collection
of taxes for tax year 2014 was void and illegal pursuant to, inter alia, section 18-155 of the
Code.
¶ 14 The Objectors moved for summary judgment. On January 10, 2017, after hearing the
parties’ arguments, the trial court denied the Objectors’ motion for summary judgment and
dismissed their complaints, stating, in part:
“[T]he language of Section 18-155, the objective in ensuring correct, appropriate
adjustments are made, and the burden of taxation of property in taxing districts that lie
in more than one county—that lie in more than one county is fairly apportioned as
provided by the statute, this Court finds that the action taken by the County Clerk is not
contrary to [the] statute and the county clerk is authorized under Section 18-155 to
adjust the tax objector’s [sic] 2014 taxes to account for the apportionment for 2012.”
¶ 15 The Objectors filed their notice of appeal on January 12, 2017.
¶ 16 After the parties filed their appellate briefs, this court, on its own motion, ordered the
parties to prepare supplemental briefs addressing “(1) what the legislative intent and legislative
history of section 18-155 of the Code provides relating to the county clerk’s authority and/or
obligation to extend taxes after receiving a certification, and (2) how the legislative history and
legislative intent support their respective interpretations of Section 18-155.”

¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 18 The Objectors argue that the trial court erred by denying their motion for summary
judgment and by dismissing their tax objection complaints because the Kane County clerk
lacked the authority to use the DOR’s amended apportionments for tax year 2012 in
connection with the extension for tax year 2014.
¶ 19 Summary judgment motions are governed by section 2-1005 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2014)). Pursuant to that section, summary judgment
should be granted only where the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file,
when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is clearly entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2014). Whether summary judgment was appropriate in
this case turns on the trial court’s interpretation of section 18-155 of the Code.
¶ 20 We review de novo an order granting or denying summary judgment. See Millennium Park
Joint Venture, LLC v. Houlihan, 241 Ill. 2d 281, 309 (2010). De novo review is also
appropriate to the extent that this case turns on construction of the Code and thus presents a
question of law. See Better Government Ass’n v. Zaruba, 2014 IL App (2d) 140071, ¶ 20.
¶ 21 The Objectors argue that the Kane County clerk lacked the authority to use the DOR’s
2014 certified amended apportionments for tax year 2012. The Objectors contend that section
18-155(c) of the Code allows a county clerk to adjust an apportionment only in “the subsequent
year,” meaning the following tax year, which in this case was 2013. The Collector argues that
this interpretation is contrary to the plain language and purpose of the statute. The Collector
contends that “the subsequent year” means the year after the DOR certifies the apportionment.

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¶ 22 The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature.
Board of Education of Springfield School District No. 186 v. Attorney General of Illinois, 2017
IL 120343, ¶ 24. The best evidence of the legislature’s intent is the language of the statute
itself, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. We must avoid interpreting a statute in a
manner that would create absurd results or render part of the statute a nullity. See Nelson v.
Artley, 2015 IL 118058, ¶¶ 25, 27. “Additionally, in construing statutes relating to the levying
and collection of taxes, this court has sought to give them a reasonable and commonsense
meaning, so as to avoid making it difficult or impossible for taxes to be levied and collected.”
In re Application for Judgment & Sale of Delinquent Properties for the Tax Year 1989, 167 Ill.
2d 161, 169 (1995).
¶ 23 The Objectors’ interpretation, that “the subsequent year” means the following tax year, is
counter to these principles and reads into the relevant language the words “tax year.” This
interpretation ignores the purpose of the statute, which, again, provides:
“The burden of taxation of property in taxing districts that lie in more than one county
shall be fairly apportioned as provided in Article IX, Section 7, of the Constitution of
1970.” 35 ILCS 200/18-155 (West 2014).
¶ 24 Under section 18-155, the DOR conducts an assessment ratio study in each township in
which an overlapping district lies, by using equalized assessed values of taxable property and
an analysis of property transfers. 35 ILCS 200/18-155(a) (West 2014). The DOR then uses
these studies to apportion the amount of property tax to be raised within the district, “so that
each county in which the district lies bears that burden of taxation as though all parts of the
overlapping taxing district had been assessed at the same proportion of actual value.” 35 ILCS
200/18-155(c) (West 2014). The DOR then certifies to each county clerk the percentage
constituting that county’s burden. Id.
¶ 25 A county clerk’s duty is to fix the amount of taxes that will be extended. In re Application
for Judgment & Sale, 167 Ill. 2d at 174. A county clerk’s duties in the extension of taxes are
purely ministerial; thus, a clerk has no power to determine whether taxes have been legally
assessed. Id.
¶ 26 Here, once the DOR certified the amended apportionments, the Kane County clerk had a
duty to extend the taxes to determine the amount to be raised. See id. If it were otherwise, the
DOR’s mandate would be thwarted. In determining the legislature’s intent, we consider the
necessity and purpose for the law, the evils sought to be remedied, and the goals sought to be
achieved. Progressive Universal Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 215 Ill.
2d 121, 134 (2005).
¶ 27 Although the Objectors urge this court to limit “the subsequent year” to mean subsequent
tax year, we will not read this limitation into the statute, particularly where it conflicts with the
legislature’s express intent, namely, that “[t]he burden of taxation of property in taxing
districts that lie in more than one county shall be fairly apportioned.” 35 ILCS 200/18-155
(West 2014); see Brunton v. Kruger, 2015 IL 117663 ¶ 24 (in interpreting a statute, a court
must not read into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the express intent
of the legislature). The Objectors’ interpretation would defeat the stated purpose of section
18-155 by prohibiting a county clerk from applying a fair apportionment, as determined by the
DOR, to property in taxing districts that lie in more than one county. See Brucker v. Mercola,
227 Ill. 2d 502, 514 (2007) (each word, clause, and sentence in a challenged statute is to be
given some reasonable meaning and not rendered superfluous).

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¶ 28 Further, the Objectors’ interpretation would produce an unjust result in this case by
nullifying the Kane County clerk’s appropriate extension based upon the correct
apportionments as certified by the DOR. See Progressive Universal Insurance Co., 215 Ill. 2d
at 134 (when interpreting a statute, a court must presume that the legislature did not intend to
produce absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results). As stated in the Kane County clerk’s February
2015 letter, “[t]he percentages the Department of Revenue assigned to Kane County were too
low and were too high in DuPage and Cook Counties.” If we adopt the Objectors’
interpretation as to the amended apportionments, the statute’s purpose would not be
implemented, and it would be rendered a nullity. See In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d
300, 308 (2002) (when interpreting a statute, courts may consider the nature and object of the
statute and the consequences that would result from construing it one way or the other).
¶ 29 The Objectors support their interpretation of “the subsequent year” in section 18-155 by
citing section 18-157 of the Code. 35 ILCS 200/18-157 (West 2014). Section 18-157 provides
in relevant part:
“If a court, in any tax objection based on the apportionment of an overlapping taxing
district under Section 18-155, enters a final judgment that there was an over extension
or under extension of taxes for an overlapping taxing district based on the
apportionment under Section 18-155 for the year for which the objection was filed, the
county clerks of each county in which there was an under extension shall
proportionately increase the levy of that taxing district by an amount specified in the
court order in that county in the subsequent year or in any subsequent year following
the final judgment of the court.” (Emphasis added.) Id.
¶ 30 The Objectors contend that section 18-157 and section 18-155 use the phrase “the
subsequent year” to refer to the year immediately following the tax year for which an
apportionment is at issue. However, words in a statute must be read in context, rather than in
isolation. Skolnick v. Altheimer & Gray, 191 Ill. 2d 214, 229 (2000). The Objectors’
interpretation of the phrase in section 18-157 entirely ignores the context in which it appears.
The legislature was addressing the action that county clerks must take when a court enters a
specific final judgment. When read in context, that phrase, as well as the phrase “or in any
subsequent year,” relates to the “final judgment of the court” (35 ILCS 200/18-157 (West
2014)). Thus, the Objectors’ interpretation of the phrase in section 18-157 does not support
their interpretation of the phrase in section 18-155. Under section 18-155, the phrase relates to
the DOR’s certification of an apportionment, which it may do in any subsequent year,
requiring the ministerial application by the clerk of a tax rate consistent with that
apportionment.
¶ 31 Further, the Objectors fail to cite authority limiting the DOR to one apportionment, and we
have found no indication that the legislature intended to limit when the DOR may amend an
apportionment. Although section 18-155(c) provides that “[t]he Department shall certify to
each County Clerk, by March 15, the percent of burden,” that section also provides that, if the
DOR “does not certify the percent of burden in the time prescribed, the county clerk shall use
the most recent prior certification” and that “[t]he percentages certified by the Department
shall remain until changed by reason of another assessment ratio study made under this
Section.” 35 ILCS 200/18-155(c) (West 2014). The statute further provides: “If the use of a
prior certified percentage results in over or under extension for the overlapping taxing district
in the county using same, the county clerk shall make appropriate adjustments in the

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 subsequent year.” Id. Reading the statute as a whole, we determine that “the subsequent year”
means the year after the DOR certifies the apportionment. Under the Objectors’ interpretation,
if the DOR had certified a lower percentage in this case, the Kane County clerk would not be
authorized to make an adjustment in the Objectors’ favor. Because the Objectors’
interpretation is illogical, and for the reasons stated above, we reject the Objectors’
interpretation.
¶ 32 In addition, the Objectors argue that their interpretation is supported by the recent addition
of section 18-156 to the Code. The Objectors contend that section 18-156, applicable for tax
year 2015 and thereafter (35 ILCS 200/18-156(e) (West 2016)), authorizes the DOR to revise
an apportionment if a county’s share of an overlapping taxing district’s tax levy “is
subsequently determined to exceed 105% of what that county’s share should have been.” 35
ILCS 200/18-156(a) (West 2016). Therefore, the Objectors argue, here the DOR had no such
authority to revise the apportionment because section 18-156 was not yet effective.
¶ 33 The argument fails because the Objectors fail to recognize that section 18-155 provides
that “[t]he percentages certified by the Department shall remain until changed by reason of
another assessment ratio study made under this Section.” 35 ILCS 200/18-155(c) (West 2014).
Further, section 18-155 does not limit the DOR’s authority to revise an apportionment.
Accordingly, we reject the Objectors’ argument regarding section 18-156.
¶ 34 The Objectors also argue that the Kane County clerk’s manual adjustment was erroneous
because “taxes must have some degree of finality, stability, and security to the taxpayer.”
Hamer v. Kirk, 57 Ill. App. 3d 335, 341 (1978). We recognize the importance of these goals.
However, the purpose of section 18-155 is to fairly apportion the burden of taxation of
property in taxing districts that lie in more than one county. Section 18-155 provides a
mechanism to achieve this purpose by allowing county clerks to make adjustments when the
use of prior certifications results in over or under extensions. The legislature does not appear to
have sought finality in achieving this purpose, and though citing Hamer for the general
proposition, the Objectors do not cite authority directly on point.
¶ 35 Accordingly, the trial court properly denied the Objectors’ motion for summary judgment
and dismissed the Objectors’ tax objection complaints.

¶ 36 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 37 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s order.

¶ 38 Affirmed.

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