J-A15028-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
LYSBETH W. CLARK : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
BRUCE L. CLARK :
:
Appellant : No. 1817 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Order November 15, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Civil Division at
No(s): CI-1979-May-262
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED JULY 11, 2018
Bruce L. Clark (Husband) appeals pro se from the order denying his
motion for the “Determination of the Obvious Validity of the Defendant’s and
the Court’s Documented Identical Versions of the Postnuptial Agreement of
1984.” We affirm.
The trial court summarized the relevant factual history of this case as
follows:
Husband and [Lysbeth W. Clark (Wife)] signed a post-
nuptial agreement on December 27, 1984. As stated in paragraph
twelve (12) of the Agreement, Wife is entitled to a percentage of
Husband’s Philadelphia Electric Company pension when Husband
begins drawing on it. Paragraph 12 also contains a formula to
determine Wife’s monthly portion of Husband’s pension payout.
In 1995, Husband retired and Wife began receiving her portion of
Husband’s pension payment directly from Husband. The amount
of this payment was $532.30 per month. Husband began
withholding monthly payments to Wife in October 2015. Husband
stated the reason he stopped making the payments was because
Wife interfered with his relationship with their daughter and their
grandchildren.
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Trial Court Opinion, 12/15/17, at 4-5 (citations omitted).
On July 6, 2016, Wife filed a petition to enforce the postnuptial
agreement and for counsel fees, which the trial court granted on July 8, 2016.
Between July 14, 2016 and November 30, 2016, Husband filed eight petitions
challenging the validity of the postnuptial agreement, all of which were denied
by the trial court. On December 14, 2016, the parties came to an agreement
and executed a Qualified Domestic Relations Order addressing Wife’s
entitlement to a portion of Husband’s pension payout. However, beginning on
January 4, 2017 through November 14, 2017, Husband filed another six
petitions challenging the validity of the postnuptial agreement. The trial court
denied each petition. On November 27, 2017, Husband filed a timely pro se
notice of appeal from the trial court’s order denying as moot Husband’s most
recent motion challenging the validity of the postnuptial agreement. The trial
court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion on December 15, 2017.
In reviewing Husband’s brief, we are unable to discern the issue or
issues that Husband wishes this Court to review because Husband has failed
to include a statement of questions involved. We have recognized that the
omission of a statement of questions involved is “particularly grievous since
the statement . . . defines the specific issues this court is asked to review.”
Commonwealth v. Maris, 629 A.2d 1014, 1015-16 (Pa. Super. 1993).
“When the omission of the statement of questions [involved] is combined with
the lack of any organized and developed arguments, it becomes clear that
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appellant’s brief is insufficient to allow us to conduct meaningful judicial
review.” Smathers v. Smathers, 670 A.2d 1159, 1160 (Pa. Super. 1996).
Additionally, Husband’s brief fails to comply with the Pennsylvania Rules
of Appellate Procedure. Rule 2111(a) mandates that an appellant’s brief shall
consist of the following matters, separately and distinctly entitled, and in the
following order:
(1) Statement of jurisdiction.
(2) Order or other determination in question.
(3) Statement of both the scope of review and the standard of
review.
(4) Statement of the questions involved.
(5) Statement of the case.
(6) Summary of argument.
(7) Statement of the reasons to allow an appeal to challenge
the discretionary aspects of a sentence, if applicable.
(8) Argument for appellant.
(9) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(10) The opinions and pleadings specified in paragraphs (b) and
(c) of this rule.
(11) In the Superior Court, a copy of the statement of the
matters complained of on appeal, filed with the trial court
pursuant to Rule 1925(b), or an averment that no order
requiring a statement of errors complained of on appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) was entered.
(12) The certificates of compliance required by Pa.R.A.P. 127 and
2135(d).
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Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a) (emphasis added).
Husband’s pro se brief does not contain any of the sections mandated
by Rule 2111(a). Moreover, Husband’s brief fails to include citations to legal
authority and record citations. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (requiring that an
appellant develop an argument with citation to and analysis of relevant legal
authority); see also Papadoplos v. Schmidt, Ronca & Kramer, P.C., 21
A.3d 1216, 1229 (Pa. Super. 2011) (finding waiver where the appellants
advanced only a cursory argument in support of their issue, and failed to cite
to any pertinent legal authority). Based upon these deficiencies, Husband’s
claim is waived.1 For this reason, we find no basis upon which to disturb the
trial court’s order.
Order affirmed.
____________________________________________
1 Although Husband is proceeding pro se in this appeal, he must still comply
with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Jones v. Rudenstein,
585 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. Super. 1991) (citing Farretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 834 n.46 (1975)). Husband’s pro se representation does not relieve him
of his duty to properly raise and develop appealable claims. Smathers, 670
A.2d at 1160. We have explained:
[A]ny layperson choosing to represent himself in a legal
proceeding must, to some reasonable extent, assume the risk that
his lack of expertise and legal training will prove his undoing.
Kovalev v. Sowell, 839 A.2d 359, 367 n.7 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation,
quotation marks and brackets omitted).
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 07/11/2018
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