UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 17-4731
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ALEXANDER JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Raleigh. James C. Dever III, Chief District Judge. (5:17-cr-00022-D-1)
Submitted: June 27, 2018 Decided: July 18, 2018
Before KING, DUNCAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Dhamian Blue, BLUE LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jennifer P. May-
Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Alexander Jones appeals his convictions and the sentence imposed after he pled
guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012); and possession of a
firearm and ammunition by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e)(1)
(2012). Counsel has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), indicating that he has found no meritorious issues for appeal. Counsel
nonetheless raises as possible issues for review the propriety of Jones’ designation as an
armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)
(2012) (ACCA), and whether the selected sentence is otherwise reasonable. Jones has
filed a pro se supplemental brief, also arguing that his ACCA enhancement was
improper. The Government declined to file a response brief. Finding no error, we
affirm.
We review Jones’ sentence for reasonableness, applying an abuse of discretion
standard, see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007), and review unpreserved, non-
structural sentencing errors for plain error, see United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575-
76 (4th Cir. 2010). This review requires consideration of both the procedural and
substantive reasonableness of the sentence. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Thus, we must first
assess whether the district court properly calculated the advisory Sentencing Guidelines
range, considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012), analyzed any
arguments presented by the parties, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. See
Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-51; Lynn, 592 F.3d at 575-76. If no procedural error is found, we
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may then review the sentence for substantive reasonableness, “examin[ing] the totality of
the circumstances[.]” United States v. Mendoza–Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir.
2010). “Any sentence that is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is
presumptively reasonable[,]” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.
2014), and “[t]hat presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is
unreasonable when measured against the . . . § 3553(a) factors[,]” United States v.
Vinson, 852 F.3d 333, 357-58 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Jones’ Guidelines range, including his armed career criminal designation—which
was premised on Jones’ prior convictions for serious drug offenses—was correctly
calculated. We reject Jones’ argument that our decision in United States v. Newbold, 791
F.3d 455 (4th Cir. 2015), requires that we vacate his ACCA-enhanced sentence. Jones’
1990 North Carolina conviction for possession with intent to sell cocaine, for which he
was sentenced to 10 years in custody, qualifies as an ACCA predicate conviction. See id.
at 464 (vacating ACCA-enhanced sentence where the predicate conviction’s judgment
established only that the defendant faced the presumptive term, but acknowledging that
“where a defendant actually receives a ten-year sentence, clearly that offense is
punishable by ten years for the purposes of the ACCA”).
In addition, Jones’ 1999 North Carolina convictions for possession with intent to
sell and deliver cocaine and conspiracy to sell or deliver cocaine, for which he was
sentenced to 116 to 149 months in prison, also qualify as an ACCA predicate. Because
the two charges were consolidated for judgment with another offense, the North Carolina
court was required to impose a sentence “specified for the class of offense and prior
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record level of the most serious offense[.]” United States v. Davis, 720 F.3d 215, 218
(4th Cir. 2013) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.15(b) (2001)). Jones’ 1999
convictions were consolidated for sentencing with an habitual felon charge, which is in
the nature of a criminal history enhancement, and the consolidated offenses resulted in a
Class C felony classification under North Carolina law, which allowed the state court to
sentence Jones to a 149-month maximum sentence. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
1340.17(c), (e) (2001). Because Jones was actually sentenced to a term of imprisonment
exceeding ten years, the maximum term of imprisonment for ACCA purposes was at least
ten years. See Newbold, 791 F.3d at 464. We thus discern no error in the district court’s
decision to enhance Jones’ Guidelines range under the ACCA.
After hearing the parties’ arguments and allowing Jones to allocute at sentencing,
the district court thoroughly addressed the parties’ arguments and explained the selected
sentence in terms of the § 3553(a) factors it deemed relevant, including the nature and
circumstances of Jones’ offenses and his history and characteristics. Moreover, counsel
correctly concedes that Jones’ sentence is presumptively substantively reasonable, and
nothing in the record rebuts this presumption. We thus conclude that Jones’ sentence is
reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in this case and have
found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Jones, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Jones requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may
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move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Jones. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court
and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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