In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of S.L., A.E., and D.E. C.E. (Father) and M.L. (Mother) v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jul 24 2018, 10:27 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT- ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
FATHER Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Rebecca L. Gray Attorney General of Indiana
The Law Offices of Rebecca Gray, LLC
Carmel, Indiana David E. Corey
Deputy Attorney General
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT- Indianapolis, Indiana
MOTHER
Cara Schaefer Wieneke
Wieneke Law Office, LLC
Brooklyn, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination July 24, 2018
of the Parent-Child Relationship Court of Appeals Case No.
of S.L., A.E., and D.E.; 18A-JT-261
C.E. (Father) and M.L. Appeal from the Shelby Superior
(Mother), Court
The Honorable R. Kent Apsley,
Appellants-Respondents,
Judge
v. Trial Court Cause No.
73D01-1705-JT-4
73D01-1705-JT-5
Indiana Department of Child
73D01-1705-JT-6
Services,

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-261 | July 24, 2018 Page 1 of 21
 Appellee-Petitioner.

Najam, Judge.

Statement of the Case
[1] C.E. (“Father”) and M.L. (“Mother”) (collectively “Parents”) appeal the trial

court’s termination of their parental rights over their minor children A.E. and

D.E., and Mother also appeals the termination of her parental rights over her

minor child by another father, S.L.1 Parents present the following issues for our

review:

1. Whether the trial court erred when it concluded that the
Indian Child Welfare Act does not apply to this
proceeding.

2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support
the termination of Father’s parental rights.

[2] We affirm.

1
S.L.’s father, S.B., does not participate in this appeal.

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 Facts and Procedural History
[3] Mother gave birth to S.L. on October 5, 2011. Thereafter, Mother met and

married Father, and they had two children together, A.E. and D.E., born in

2013 and 2015, respectively.2 At some point prior to D.E.’s birth, Father, a

foreign national, left the United States to live in Spain, but he remained married

to Mother.

[4] On July 1, 2015, Mother sought emergency medical treatment because she

“believed herself and [the C]hildren [to be] covered with bedbugs.” Appellants’

App. Vol. 2 at 64. After health care providers determined that Mother and the

Children were not covered in bedbugs and were medically fine, Mother

continued to insist that “bedbugs were crawling all over her and [the

C]hildren.” Id. Accordingly, the Indiana Department of Child Services

(“DCS”) took emergency custody of the Children and placed them in foster

care. Thereafter, DCS filed petitions alleging that the Children were children in

need of services (“CHINS”), and the trial court found the Children to be

CHINS by order dated February 12, 2016. After Parents failed to fully comply

with services, on May 1, 2017, DCS filed petitions to terminate their parental

rights over A.E. and D.E., as well as a petition to terminate Mother’s parental

rights over S.L.

2
For ease of discussion, we will refer to the three children, collectively, as “the Children.” We will also,
however, refer to A.E. and D.E. as “the Children” where our discussion is relevant only to them, as will be
obvious from the context.

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[5] Following a hearing, the trial court granted the petitions on December 26, 2017.

In support of its order, the trial court entered the following findings and

conclusions:

9. Father . . . is a foreign national, educated from middle school
through high school in the United States, but due to a violation
of the United States law cannot return to the United States at this
time or for the next seven and one-half (7 ½) years. He continues
to be married to [M]other. . . .

10. Father . . . had left the United States prior to the beginning of
the CHINS cases concerning [the C]hildren, and [he] is currently
in Spain with no current possibility for return to the United
States.

***

12. All three [C]hildren were in the custody and control of
[M]other . . . on July l, 2015[,] and were removed by DCS
without court order on an emergency basis. A hearing was
timely held on July 2, 2015. The Court found that the emergency
removal and detention was necessary to protect the [C]hildren.
The Court further found that on July l, 2015[,] [M]other . . . was
hysterical and believed herself and her [C]hildren were covered
with bedbugs. She believed one of her children had a seizure due
to the bedbugs digging into his skin and that the child had
stopped breathing. When medics arrived the child was pink,
warm and dry. No bedbugs or evidence of bedbugs was
observed. Mother and the [C]hildren were examined at W.S.
Major Hospital. There were no bite marks or any evidence of
bedbugs. Mother stated that she was not crazy and continued to
state that bedbugs were crawling all over her and her [C]hildren.

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 13. All three [C]hildren were detained by Court Order at the
hearing held on July 2, 2015, [and they were] placed in foster
care[,] where they remain.

14. Mother appeared with counsel on September 24, 2015[,] and
admitted that her [C]hildren were CHINS.

15. The Court held a Dispositional Hearing on February 11,
2016[,] and issued a written order on February 12, 2016.

16. As a part of the Dispositional Order, [M]other was ordered
to inpatient drug treatment and to contact her Family Case
Manager every week.

17. Mother resisted all help from DCS and failed to visit [the
C]hildren.

18. DCS attempted to provide visitation with the [C]hildren and
[M]other from the day the [C]hildren were detained.

19. DCS provided transportation for [M]other to visit [the
C]hildren, however [M]other repeatedly failed to visit [the
C]hildren.

20. Father . . . remained married to [M]other and communicated
with her by phone after his [C]hildren were detained.

21. Father . . . called the Family Case Manager on August 6,
2015[,] and again on August 7, 2015, asserting he was the father
of two of the children. DCS asked him to confirm his identity
and relationship with the children. In his conversation with the
Case Manager, he was told of the next court date and he
informed the Case Manager that his lawyer would be
representing him at the hearing.

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 22. Father . . . did attempt to send a [facsimile] to DCS with his
identifying information, however, the photograph of his
ID/passport was illegible.

23. As of February 8, 2016, neither DCS nor the Court had any
additional information concerning either father [S.B. or C.E.]
and the Court authorized service on the fathers by publication.

24. Fathers, [S.B. and C.E.], were defaulted at a hearing held
May 12, 2016.

***
27. As of September 8, 2016, over a year since the [C]hildren
were detained, [M]other had failed to participate in services.
Mother, however at that time was in jail on an unrelated criminal
matter and substance abuse treatment was provided to her while
in jail and DCS arranged for inpatient treatment upon her
release.

28. The DCS Family Case Manager drove [Mother] to her
inpatient treatment program and [M]other did complete the
program. However, [M]other failed to attend the first meeting
after her release. Mother also tested positive for
methamphetamine upon her release from inpatient treatment and
promptly relapsed.

29. Services offered to [Mother] included:

a. Take Back Control (substance abuse);
b. Gallahue Community Mental Health Center;
c. Home-based case management;
d. Physical health/disease testing:
e. Three (3) referrals to in-patient substance abuse treatment,
including Volunteers of America and Wheeler Mission;
f. Visitation services; and
g. Home-based services (including employment, housing).

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 30. Mother showed little interest in any services including
visiting [the C]hildren since the beginning of the case. By the
time of the termination hearing, [M]other had not visited [the
C]hildren for [more than] a year. Service providers made
multiple efforts to facilitate [M]other’s visitation, including
arrangements to pick up both [M]other and the [C]hildren and
take them wherever [M]other wanted to go. When [Mother]
would fail to be where she was supposed to be for pick up, the
[C]hildren would become upset, screaming and crying. Providers
attempted a “Visitation Contract,” [and] they made up a
visitation calendar. After twenty-three (23) missed visits,
[Mother’s] visitation ended.

31. [A.E. and D.E.] have spent the majority of their lives in
foster care. Their CHINS cases have been going on for the
majority of their young lives.

32. [A.E. and D.E.] no longer have any emotional attachment to
their biological parents and view the foster placement as their
parents. The older sibling, [A.E.], has no recollection of either of
her biological parents. The younger child, [D.E.], has never
met his biological father.

33. [S.L.] has now been in foster care for a third of her life.

***

36. Father . . . voluntarily left the country prior to the birth of his
child[ D.E.] and has had no consistent contact with either of his
[C]hildren since. When [Father] left the United States[,] the
pregnant [Mother] and [S.L. and A.E.] could have gone with
him, but all stayed behind. Since leaving the United States,
[Father] has undertaken no legal or other action to attempt to
reunite with his family. [Father] is not eligible to reenter the
United States of America for seven and one-half (7 ½) more
years.

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 37. Father . . . had actual knowledge that his [C]hildren had
been detained by DCS and called DCS in August 2015 and
informed DCS he would be appearing by counsel. However, he
didn’t appear by counsel until March l7, 2017.

38. Counsel for [F]ather . . . then withdrew several months later
on July 12, 2017.

39. Father . . . notified the Court at a hearing held July 17,
2017[,] that he would be rehiring counsel. [Father]’s prior
counsel did not reenter his appearance.

40. Despite evidence that [F]ather . . . and his family are
financially well-off, [Father] never did hire counsel. The Court,
sua sponte, appointed counsel at public expense to protect
[Father]’s interest.

41. Despite this Court’s order in the CHINS case that he have
weekly contact with DCS,[3] Father . . . has failed to stay in
contact with the CASA or his Family Case Manager.

***

43. Since the filing of the underlying CHINS case, [Father] has
not communicated with [the C]hildren. No letter, no birthday or
Christmas cards. [Father’s] mother has on occasion expressed an
interest in being involved in the [C]hildren’s lives. The Court
allowed the paternal grandmother to intervene in the underlying
CHINS cases. Nevertheless, other than a visit, no substantial
steps have been taken to become actively involved with the
[C]hildren.

3
Father notes, and DCS concedes, that the trial court did not order him to maintain weekly contact with
DCS. But Father does not contend that this error requires reversal. We address below Father’s general
contentions regarding his contact with DCS.

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 44. On July 1, 2015, when these [C]hildren were detained,

a. Mother . . . was unable to provide the [C]hildren with the
necessities of life and supervision due to her use of illegal drugs.

***

c. Father . . . had been out of the country prior to the birth of his
youngest child and was unable to return due to his violation of
his visa.

Two and one-half years later the situation remains virtually
unchanged.

45. This matter was set for fact-finding hearing on the combined
petitions for termination of parental rights on October 26, 2017.
Mother . . . had actual notice of the termination hearing, but
failed to show up for the hearing. The Court made arrangements
for both fathers to appear telephonically for the hearing. . . .
Father [C.E.] was present for a period of time telephonically, but
the call “timed out” at some point. The Court set the matter for
further hearing on the petitions to terminate the parental rights of
[both fathers] in order to allow the fathers a fair opportunity to
further participate and offer additional evidence and testimony.
Sometime prior to the hearing Mother’s counsel was able to
locate [Mother] and managed to get her to the second hearing.
[Both f]athers . . . did . . . participate in the November 14th
hearing by telephone.

46. Despite not appearing for the original fact-finding hearing,
the Court allowed Mother . . . to testify. For the first time in the
history of any of the Termination of Parental Rights cases or the
underlying [CHINS] cases, [M]other stated that she “recently
learned from my grandmother I have Indian heritage . . .
Cherokee . . . .” She testified she was not involved in any Native
American tribe or tribal activity.

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 47. The foster parents testified that they intend to adopt all three
[C]hildren as the permanency plan for the children.

48. The [C]hildren’s Court Appointed Special Advocate
[(“CASA”)] testified that termination of parental rights and
adoption by the foster parents is in the best interest of the
[C]hildren. Further, [sic] that none of the parents have a
significant relationship with their children. The [C]hildren are
strongly bonded with their foster family.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

***

3. The Indian Child Welfare Act defines an “Indian child” as
“any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either
(1) a member of an Indian tribe or (2) is eligible for membership
in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an
Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903). Under federal law, individual
tribes have the right to determine eligibility, membership, or
both. However, in order for ICWA to apply, the child must be
a member of, or eligible for membership in, a federally
recognized tribe. The child must be either: (1) a member of an
Indian tribe; or (2) eligible for membership AND is the
biological child of a member of a tribe.

a. No tribal membership documents, evidence of tribal
membership or membership eligibility was introduced.

b. The Indian Child Welfare Act has not [sic] applicability to this
cause.

4. The minor [C]hildren have been removed from Mother for at
least six (6) months under the dispositional decree.

5. The minor children have been removed from Mother and
their respective Fathers and have been under the supervision of

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 the DCS for at least fifteen (15) of the most recent twenty-two
(22) months at the time that DCS filed its Verified Petition for
Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights.

6. There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in the minor children’s removal will not be remedied.

7. The parents of these children are either unable or unwilling to
meet their responsibilities as parents.

8. The minor children are not required to wait indefinitely for
their parents to take some substantial step toward becoming a
responsible parent. The children should not be required to wait
any longer to enjoy the permanency that is essential to their
development and overall well-being.

9. There is a reasonable probability that the reasons for
placement outside the home of Mother and [both] Fathers will
not be remedied.

10. There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the
parent-child relationship[s] poses a threat to the well-being of the
minor children.

11. Termination of the parent child relationship[s] is in the best
interests of the minor children.

12. DCS has a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the
minor children, which is adoption by their current placement.

13. If any of the foregoing Conclusions of Law should be more
properly denominated as Findings of Fact, then they are so
denominated.

JUDGMENT

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 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED: That DCS’ petition for termination of Mother’s
parental rights is granted; and that the parent-child
relationship[s] between the [C]hildren . . . and their Mother . . . is
hereby terminated.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED: That DCS’ petition for termination of
Father[’s] . . . parental rights is granted; and that the parent-child
relationship[s] between [A.E. and D.E.] and their Father, [C.E.]
is hereby terminated. . . .

Id. at 63-70. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision
Issue One: Indian Child Welfare Act

[6] Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that “the termination order is invalid and

should be reversed” because “the court failed to comply with the notice

requirement of the Indian Child Welfare Act.” Appellant Mother’s Br. at 7-8.

In particular, Mother maintains that,

[o]nce [she] testified that she had discovered information that
Children may be of Indian ancestry, the court had “reason to
know” Children were of Indian ancestry and was required [under
federal law] . . . to ensure that DCS undertook due diligence to
determine whether in fact the Children were eligible to be
members of a certain Indian tribe.

Id. at 12. We cannot agree.

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[7] The Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) was enacted “to protect the best

interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian

tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards for the

removal of Indian children from their families[.]” 25 U.S.C.A. § 1902. A party

who seeks to invoke a provision of the ICWA has the burden to show that the

Act applies in the proceeding. Thompson v. Elkhart Ofc. of Fam. and Child. (In re

S.L.H.S.), 885 N.E.2d 603, 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Following an evidentiary

hearing, the trial court concluded that the ICWA does not apply here. Thus,

Mother appeals from a negative judgment, see, e.g., Romine v. Gagle, 782 N.E.2d

369, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied, and she must show that the

evidence points unerringly to a conclusion different from that reached by the

trial court, or that the judgment is contrary to law. Wilder-Newland v. Kessinger,

967 N.E.2d 558, 560 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.

[8] Applicability of the ICWA depends on whether the proceeding involves an

“Indian child,” which is defined as “any unmarried person who is under the age

of eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for

membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an

Indian tribe.” 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). Here, at the conclusion of the termination

hearing, Mother testified that her “grandma” had recently told her that Mother

has “Indian heritage,” specifically that Mother has Cherokee heritage. Tr. at

161. And Mother testified that, accordingly, the Children have “Indian

heritage,” too. Id. But Mother also testified that her grandmother does not

have any “involvement” with a Native American tribe, and there is no evidence

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 that Mother has ever identified as a Native American or has been involved with

a Native American tribe in any way. Id. Thus, there is no evidence that either

Mother or the Children are members of a Native American tribe or have any

“tribal status.” See In re S.L.H.S., 885 N.E.2d at 613. Thus, Mother has failed

to provide any evidence that the Children are Indian children within the

purview of the ICWA, and we conclude that the ICWA did not apply to the

proceedings to terminate Parents’ parental rights to the Children. See id.

(holding ICWA did not apply despite parents’ allegations that they were

members of Native American tribes where parents could not prove

membership).

Issue Two: Sufficiency of the Evidence

[9] We begin our review of this issue by acknowledging that “[t]he traditional right

of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the

Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Bailey v. Tippecanoe

Div. of Fam. & Child. (In re M.B.), 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans.

denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to

those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a

termination. Schultz v. Porter Cty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re K.S.), 750 N.E.2d

832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Termination of a parent-child relationship is

proper where a child’s emotional and physical development is threatened. Id.

Although the right to raise one’s own child should not be terminated solely

because there is a better home available for the child, parental rights may be

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 terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental

responsibilities. Id. at 836.

[10] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS

is required to allege and prove:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the
conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the
reasons for placement outside the home of the
parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the
continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a
threat to the well-being of the child.

***

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2018). DCS’s “burden of proof in termination of

parental rights cases is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” R.Y. v. Ind.

Dep’t of Child Servs. (In re G.Y.), 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting

I.C. § 31-37-14-2).

[11] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Peterson v. Marion Cty. Off. of

Fam. & Child. (In re D.D.), 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans.
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 denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that

are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the trial

court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court’s

judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous.

Judy S. v. Noble Cty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re L.S.), 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind.

Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.

[12] Here, in terminating Parents’ parental rights, the trial court entered specific

findings of fact and conclusions thereon. When a trial court’s judgment

contains special findings and conclusions, we apply a two-tiered standard of

review. Bester v. Lake Cty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005).

First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, we

determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly

erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either

directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). If

the evidence and inferences support the trial court’s decision, we must affirm.

In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208.

[13] On appeal, Father contends that the trial court erred when it concluded that:

the conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal and the reasons for their

placement outside of Mother’s home will not be remedied; there is a reasonable

probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationships poses a threat

to the well-being of the Children; and termination is in the Children’s best

interests. Because the statute is written in the disjunctive, we need not address

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 the court’s conclusion that continuation of the parent-child relationships poses a

threat to the Children’s well-being. I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).

Conditions that Resulted in the Children’s Removal will not be Remedied

[14] In determining whether the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that

Father is unlikely to remedy the reasons for the Children’s removal, we engage

in a two-step analysis. E.M. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs. (In re E.M.), 4 N.E.3d

636, 643 (Ind. 2014). “First, we identify the conditions that led to removal; and

second, we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those

conditions will not be remedied.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). In the

second step, the trial court must judge a parent’s fitness to care for his children

at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of

changed conditions. Id. However, the court must also “evaluate the parent’s

habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or

deprivation of the child.” Moore v. Jasper Cty. Dep’t of Child Servs., 894 N.E.2d

218, 226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted). Pursuant to

this rule, courts have properly considered evidence of a parent’s prior criminal

history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support,

and lack of adequate housing and employment. Id. Moreover, DCS is not

required to rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it need establish only that

there is a reasonable probability the parent’s behavior will not change. Id.

[15] Father contends that “many of the court’s findings are erroneous,” but he

challenges only the following specific findings: that he failed to maintain

contact with the Children, the CASA, and the family case manager, and that he
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 made no attempts to unify his family. Appellant Father’s Br. at 12. In support

of his contention on this issue, Father first states that “Mother was Father’s sole

source of communication with the [C]hildren. Once Mother ceased

communicating with Father and changed her number, Father had no choice but

to wait for Mother to call so that he could speak to his Children.” Appellant

Father’s Br. at 13. The undisputed evidence shows that Mother stopped visiting

the Children in March 2016, so Father has not spoken to the Children since

then. And Father does not explain why he did not attempt to reach the

Children by telephone through DCS or by petitioning the trial court for contact.

Father does not suggest, and there is no evidence, that DCS would have

thwarted his efforts to talk to the Children at any time.

[16] As for Father’s inconsistent communication with DCS and the CASA, Father

asserts that DCS did not let him know there was a problem with the identifying

information he had provided by fax (it was illegible) in August 2015. Father

testified that he called DCS “every day for a week” and then stopped calling

and tried to hire a lawyer. Tr. at 145. Father testified that he did not contact

DCS again after that time. And Father spoke to the CASA by telephone one

time, only a few weeks prior to the final hearing. Finally, Father asserts that he

attempted to reunify his family by buying plane tickets for Mother and the

Children to travel to Spain. Father’s arguments amount to a request that we

reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. Father ignores the evidence that:

he has not seen either of his Children since before D.E. was born in 2015; he

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 has not sent his Children cards or letters; and he has not talked to them on the

telephone since March 2016, at the latest.

[17] In any event, Father does not challenge the evidence supporting the trial court’s

conclusion that the reasons for the Children’s removal from Mother’s home will

not be remedied. The Children were removed from Mother’s care due to

Mother’s substance abuse and delusions about bedbugs crawling all over the

Children. At that time, Father was not in the country, and, during the CHINS

proceeding, Father made no efforts to take custody of the Children. At the time

of the termination hearing, Mother had not visited the Children for over one

year, she had failed to complete several court-ordered services, and she had not

demonstrated sobriety. Father remained out of the country and had not taken

meaningful steps to seek custody of the Children.

[18] Father’s arguments on appeal simply seek to have this court disregard the

evidence most favorable to the trial court’s judgment and instead reweigh the

evidence in his favor, which we cannot do. We cannot say that the trial court

clearly erred when it concluded that the conditions that resulted in the

Children’s removal will not be remedied.

Best Interests

[19] In determining whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a

child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. A.S. v.

Ind. Dep’t. of Child Servs. (In re A.K.), 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

“A parent’s historical inability to provide adequate housing, stability and

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 supervision coupled with a current inability to provide the same will support a

finding that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child’s best

interests.” Castro v. State Off. of Fam. & Child., 842 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2006), trans. denied. “Additionally, a child’s need for permanency is an

important consideration in determining the best interests of a child.” In re A.K.,

924 N.E.2d at 224.

[20] Father contends that termination is not in the Children’s best interests because

he and Mother are “still married,” and he has expressed “a willingness for

Mother and [all three] Children to come to Spain to live” and “to help get

Mother into substance abuse treatment[.]” Appellant Father’s Br. at 18. Again,

Father’s contentions on this issue amount to nothing more than a request that

we reweigh the evidence, which, again, we cannot do.

[21] The undisputed evidence shows that Mother had failed to participate in court-

ordered services, failed to keep in contact with her family case managers, and

failed to visit the Children for more than a year at the time of the termination

hearing. Father has not seen the Children since before D.E.’s birth in 2015 and

has not communicated with them since March 2016. Father’s Children do not

know him. The Children need consistent and reliable care, and they need

permanency. The Children’s CASA testified that removing the Children from

their foster parents, the only parents they know, would be “traumatic.” Tr. at

27. And the CASA testified that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the

Children’s best interests. The totality of the evidence, including Father’s

historical inability to provide a safe and stable home for the Children and his

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 failure to maintain contact with the Children, supports the trial court’s

conclusion that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Children’s best

interests.

[22] Affirmed.

Crone, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

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