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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JOHN HENRY SNYDER, :
:
Appellant : No. 1756 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 20, 2017
in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0002081-2015
BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED JULY 25, 2018
John Henry Snyder (“Snyder”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed following his convictions of aggravated indecent assault of a child,
aggravated indecent assault (complainant less than thirteen years old),
indecent assault (complainant less than thirteen years old), unlawful contact
with a minor, and corruption of minors. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3125(b),
3125(a)(7), 3126(a)(7), 6318(a), 6301(a)(1). We affirm.
In October 2014, the victim, A.M., told her mother about a series of
sexual encounters that Snyder had initiated with A.M. when A.M. was
approximately six years old. During the sexual encounters, Snyder would
enter A.M.’s bedroom around 2:00 a.m. and demand that she undress and lay
on her bed. Snyder would lay on top of A.M. and insert his fingers into her
genitals. Snyder also attempted to put his penis inside of A.M.’s vagina. If
A.M. attempted to cry or scream, Snyder would put his hand over A.M.’s
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mouth and tell A.M. that he would kill her mother if she told anyone of the
abuse. A.M. subsequently described the events to an interviewer at the
Harrisburg Children Resource Center (“CRC”). A physical examination was
also conducted; however, the doctor did not find definitive evidence of sexual
abuse.
Snyder was arrested and charged with numerous crimes. In June 2017,
a jury convicted Snyder of the above-mentioned crimes. On September 20,
2017, the trial court sentenced Snyder to an aggregate term of thirteen to
twenty-six years in prison. Snyder filed a timely Post-Sentence Motion, which
was denied. Thereafter, Snyder filed a timely Notice of appeal and a court-
ordered Concise Statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
On appeal, Snyder raises the following questions for our review:
I. [Whether] the trial court erred in denying [Snyder’s] Post-
Sentence Motion contesting the sufficiency of the evidence
and testimony used to convict [Snyder] of count five (5),
unlawful contact with a minor, in that no contact, as defined
by the statute, occurred[?] The victim in the above-
captioned case denied that any such contact took place; she
testified that [Snyder] said nothing prior to allegedly
engaging in any acts with her[.]
II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying
[Snyder’s] Post-Sentence Motion because the jury verdict
was so contrary to the weight of the evidence as to shock
one’s sense of justice where the Commonwealth failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Snyder]
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly sexually assaulted the
victim in this case?
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Brief for Appellant at 5 (internal citation and some capitalization omitted;
questions reordered).
In Snyder’s first claim, he alleges that the evidence was insufficient to
sustain his conviction of unlawful contact with a minor. Id. at 14. Snyder
claims that A.M.’s statements to a CRC forensic interviewer prior to trial
contradicted A.M.’s testimony at trial. Id. at 16-17. Snyder claims that the
evidence demonstrates that he and A.M. were clothed during the series of
abuses, and the only thing said by Snyder was for A.M. to keep quiet. Id. at
17.
We apply the following standard of review when considering a challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
is whether[,] viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
considered. Finally, the finder of fact[,] while passing upon the
credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
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Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 39-40 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
omitted).
The Crimes Code defines unlawful contact with a minor as follows:
(a) A person commits an offense if he is intentionally in contact
with a minor, or a law enforcement officer acting in the
performance of his duties who has assumed the identity of
a minor, for the purpose of engaging in an activity prohibited
under any of the following, and either the person initiating
the contact or the person being contacted is within this
Commonwealth:
***
(1) Any of the offenses enumerated in Chapter 31 (relating to
sexual offenses).
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6318(a)(1).
The elements of unlawful contact with a minor “consist of intentionally,
either directly or indirectly, contacting or communicating with a minor for the
purpose of engaging in a sexual offense[.]” Commonwealth v. Morgan, 913
A.2d 906, 910 (Pa. Super. 2008) (emphasis omitted). “The communication
may take place in person, on the telephone, via a computer, or in other ways.”
Commonwealth v. Rose, 960 A.2d 149, 153 (Pa. Super. 2008) (emphasis
added). “[O]nce [the defendant] contacts or communicates with the minor
for the purpose of engaging in the prohibited activity, the crime of unlawful
contact with a minor has been completed.” Morgan, 913 A.2d at 910
(emphasis omitted). “[T]he actor need not be successful in completing the
purpose of his contact or communication with the minor.” Id. at 911.
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Here, A.M. testified that Snyder engaged in sexual encounters with her
over a course of five to seven days. N.T., 6/12/17, at 32. A.M. stated that
Snyder walked into her bedroom around 2:00 a.m., verbally demanded, and
physically motioned, for her to go to the bathroom and undress. Id. at 23-
24, 28, 29. A.M. testified that Snyder told her to get onto her bed and lay on
her stomach. Id. at 29-30. A.M. further testified that, on at least one
occasion, Snyder was naked, pushed her to the bed, got on top of her, and
put his hand over A.M.’s mouth when she tried to scream. Id. at 30-31. A.M.
stated that Snyder threatened to spank her and kill her mom if she said
anything about the encounters. Id. at 29-30.
Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
Snyder made unlawful contact with A.M. when he told her to undress and to
lay on her bed on her stomach. See Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116
A.3d 73, 80 (Pa. Super. 2015) (holding that defendant unlawfully contacted a
minor where he hugged victim, tried to pull her skirt up while saying “how the
hell you get this thing up,” and rubbed victim’s buttocks and private areas
while asking her if it felt good). While Snyder claims that A.M.’s testimony
contradicted her statements to the CRC, this does not render the evidence
insufficient to support the unlawful contact conviction. See Commonwealth
v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 258 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted) (stating
that the “[existence] of inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness does not
alone render evidence insufficient to support a verdict.”); Commonwealth v.
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Cruz, 919 A.2d 279, 281-82 (Pa. Super. 2007) (stating that “[t]he finder of
fact is the exclusive judge of the weight of the evidence[,] as the fact finder
is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented[,] and determines
the credibility of the witnesses.”); see also Commonwealth v. Bishop, 742
A.2d 178, 189 (Pa. Super. 1999) (stating that “the uncorroborated testimony
of the complaining witness is sufficient to convict a defendant of sexual
offenses.”). Thus, Snyder’s first claim is without merit.
In his second claim, Snyder argues that the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence presented at trial because the Commonwealth failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Snyder had intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly sexually assaulted A.M. Brief for Appellant at 12. Snyder claims
that he was unable to commit the above-mentioned crimes, because he was
in prison during the time that A.M. said that the abuses had occurred. Id. at
12-13.
“As an initial matter, a challenge to the weight of the evidence must be
preserved either in a post-sentence motion, by a written motion before
sentencing, or orally prior to sentencing.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 2018
PA Super 173, at *3 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(1)-(3)).
“The purpose of this rule is to make it clear that a challenge to the weight of
the evidence must be raised with the trial judge or it will be waived.” Jones,
2018 PA Super 173, at *3 (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 607, cmt.). “Further, … issues
not presented in a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement are deemed
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waived on appeal.” Jones, 2018 PA Super 173, at *3 (citing Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b)(4)(vii)). “[A] Concise Statement which is too vague to allow the court
to identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of no
Concise Statement at all.” Commonealth v. Seibert, 799 A.2d 54, 62 (Pa.
Super. 2002) (citation omitted); see also id. (stating that “[w]hen the trial
court has to guess what issues an appellant is appealing, that is not enough
for meaningful review.”) (citation omitted).
Here, Snyder did not raise the claim that it was factually impossible for
him to have committed the crimes because he was in prison in either his Post-
Sentence Motion or his Rule 1925(b) Concise Statement. Indeed, Snyder’s
Post-Sentence Motion and 1925(b) Concise Statement make no mention of
the conviction that he is appealing, or the reasons for appealing that
conviction. Instead, Snyder vaguely claims that the evidence failed to prove
the mens rea for sexual assault, which prevented the trial court from analyzing
the specific issue. See Commonwealth v. Lemon, 804 A.2d 34, 37 (Pa.
Super. 2002) (holding that appellant’s claims were waived, because he did not
raise them specifically in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement and the trial court
did not address the claims in its opinion). Thus, because Snyder raises new
legal arguments for the first time on appeal, his weight claim is waived. See
Jones, 2018 PA Super 173, at *4 (stating that “since [a]ppellant failed to
raise his particular new weight theories before the trial court and the trial court
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did not, therefore, review the new theories and weigh the evidence according
to it, there is no discretion for this Court to review.”).
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 07/25/2018
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