MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jul 31 2018, 8:34 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jennifer A. Joas Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Madison, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Tyler G. Banks
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Tracy M. Inman, July 31, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
78A01-1711-CR-2596
v. Appeal from the Switzerland
Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable W. Gregory Coy,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
78C01-1301-FB-30
Crone, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Tracy Inman argues that the trial court abused its discretion in executing her
suspended sentence following two probation violations. Finding that the court
did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On January 18, 2013, Inman was charged with class B felony escape, class D
felony battery, and class D felony resisting law enforcement. On September 1,
2015, Inman pled guilty but mentally ill to the escape charge in exchange for
the remaining charges and charges in four other cases being dismissed, and she
was placed on supervised probation for 1208 days.
[3] On August 31, 2016, the State filed a petition alleging that Inman had violated
her probation by pleading guilty to disorderly conduct in Ohio in July 2016.
Inman later admitted to the violation, and the trial court sanctioned her with
time served. On August 1, 2017, the State filed a second petition alleging that
Inman had again violated her probation by committing the offense of disorderly
conduct in Ohio in June 2017 and by failing to report to her Ohio probation
office.
[4] Inman’s probation officer was unable to locate her, and a bench warrant was
issued for Inman’s arrest on August 1, 2017. She was served with the warrant,
and on September 27, 2017, Inman turned herself in to the local jail.
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[5] At a factfinding hearing in October 2017, Inman admitted to violating her
probation, and the trial court executed the remaining 1124 days of her
suspended sentence to the Indiana Department of Correction. This appeal
ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[6] Inman argues that the trial court erred in revoking her probation. Her appeal
turns on the subsection of the Indiana Code that governs the disposition of
probation violations, which states in pertinent part:
If the court finds that the person has violated a condition at any
time before termination of the period, and the petition to revoke
is filed within the probationary period, the court may impose one
(1) or more of the following sanctions:
(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying
or enlarging the conditions.
(2) Extend the person’s probationary period for not more than
one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.
(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was
suspended at the time of initial sentencing.
Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h).
[7] “Probation is a favor granted by the State, not a right to which a criminal
defendant is entitled.” Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952, 955 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005). “Probation revocation is a two-step process. First, the court must make
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a factual determination that a violation of a condition of probation actually
occurred. If a violation is proven, then the trial court must determine if the
violation warrants revocation of the probation.” Parker v. State, 676 N.E.2d
1083, 1085 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). “When there is proof of a single violation of
the conditions of probation, the court may revoke probation.” Beeler v. State,
959 N.E.2d 828, 830 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. A trial court’s
sentencing decisions for probation violations are reviewed under the abuse of
discretion standard. Rosa v. State, 832 N.E.2d 1119, 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
“An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is against the logic and effect of
the facts and circumstances before the court.” Id.
[8] Inman argues that the trial court’s order to execute the remainder of her
previously suspended sentence in the Indiana Department of Correction was an
abuse of discretion because she suffered from mental illnesses, noting that (1)
she pled guilty but mentally ill to the underlying offense, and (2) the
presentence investigation report indicates she was diagnosed with attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and bipolar disorder in approximately
2005 when she was twenty years old.
[9] Inman’s sentence was not an abuse of discretion. She repeatedly violated her
probation by being convicted of disorderly conduct twice and failing to report
for probation. The record indicates that the trial court did acknowledge that
Inman pled guilty but mentally ill and that the court did not consider her to be
“a good candidate for continued probation.” Tr. at 11-12. Inman attempts to
minimize her probation violations by contending that they occurred during a
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period of grief following the loss of her child in 2015. However, as the State
points out, “[g]rief is not a mental illness… and its existence does not provide a
nexus between Inman’s alleged mental health conditions and being convicted of
disorderly conduct twice while on probation and then seemingly evading
contact with probation.” Appellee’s Br. at 12-13. Thus, the trial court could
certainly conclude that Inman was unwilling to cooperate with the conditions
of her probation.
[10] Given Inman’s multiple probation violations, criminal history, and
unwillingness to comply with the conditions of her probation, the trial court
acted within its discretion when it executed the remainder of her previously
suspended sentence.
[11] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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