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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MAURICE EVERETT :
:
Appellant : No. 3079 EDA 2017
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 15, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-1100801-1995
BEFORE: OTT, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED AUGUST 01, 2018
Maurice Everett appeals from the order entered on August 15, 2017,
denying his request for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”),
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
On June 21, 1996, following a bench trial, Everett was convicted of one
count each of second-degree murder, possession of an instrument of crime
(“PIC”), and criminal conspiracy, and two counts of robbery.1 On October 21,
1996, the trial court sentenced Everett to life imprisonment without parole for
second-degree murder, and imposed concurrent terms of two and one half to
five years’ incarceration for PIC, and five to ten years’ incarceration for
criminal conspiracy. The robbery convictions merged with the murder
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(b), 907, 903, and 3701, respectively.
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conviction for sentencing purposes. This Court affirmed his judgment of
sentence on August 27, 1997. Everett did not seek allowance of appeal.
On January 28, 1998, Everett filed his first counseled PCRA petition,
which the trial court dismissed for lack of merit. This Court affirmed on May
30, 2001. Everett then filed numerous unsuccessful PCRA petitions. On March
25, 2016, he filed the document that gave rise to this appeal, a so-called “Writ
of Habeas Corpus,” which he supplemented on August 29, 2016, with what he
styled a PCRA petition. The trial court treated the petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus as a PCRA petition and, on April 27, 2017, gave notice of its intent to
dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Everett replied to the Rule 907 notice
on May 15, 2017. The trial court dismissed his PCRA petition on August 15,
2017. This timely appeal followed. The trial court did not request that Everett
file a Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b).
Although Everett’s brief does not contain a statement of questions
involved,2 we are able to discern from his brief the issue he raises in this Court
and thus will not quash this appeal. See Kern v. Kern, 892 A.2d 1, 6
(Pa.Super. 2005) (declining to quash appeal where Court was able to discern
issue raised and defects in brief, such as failure to include statement of
matters complained of on appeal, did not hamper appellate review). Everett
argues that the lower court should have granted him PCRA relief based on
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2 See Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a).
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Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) (holding mandatory
sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole was illegal, and
setting forth sentencing procedures). However, Everett’s petition was
untimely, he failed to prove any time-bar exceptions applies, and Batts is
inapplicable here.
A defendant must present all claims cognizable under the PCRA within
one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes final, unless a
statutory exception to the one-year time bar applies. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b).
“[A] judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including
discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the
review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). A PCRA petitioner filing after the one-year
deadline must plead and prove at least one of the three limited time-bar
exceptions:
(i) The failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the
presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution
or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws
of the United States;
(ii) The facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) The right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
provided in this section and has been held by that court
to apply retroactively.
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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). A petitioner must raise the exception within
60 days of the date on which he or she could have first raised it. 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9545(b)(2).
Everett’s sentence became final on September 26, 1997, at the
expiration of the time for him to seek allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. See Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a). He thus had until September 28,
1998, to file a timely PCRA petition.3 Everett filed the instant petition on
August 29, 2016, nearly 18 years later. It was therefore untimely, and the
PCRA court lacked jurisdiction unless Everett pleaded and proved that at least
one of the exceptions applied.
Everett asserts the governmental interference exception. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i). Because he raised this exception for the first time
on appeal, he has waived this claim. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (issues not raised
in lower court are waived and cannot be raised for first time on appeal).
In all events, even if Everett had properly preserved his “governmental
interference” claim, no relief would be due. Everett appears to argue that that
unnamed “governmental officials” interfered by unspecified means in his
discovery of the Supreme Court’s decision in Batts. He seems to believe that
Batts requires relief in his case because he was sentenced to life without
parole “to what ha[s] now been determined to be unconstitutional provisions
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3 Because the one-year deadline fell on a Saturday, Everett had until the
following Monday, September 28, 1998, to file a timely PCRA petition. See 1
Pa.C.S.A. § 1908.
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of 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9711 (requiring sentencing factors to be determined by
the trial court by a preponderance of the evidence) are unseverable, and that
the statutes at issue are unconstitutional.” Everett’s Br. at 5-6.
These arguments – insofar as we understand them – are meritless.
Regarding the specific timeliness issue at hand, Everett does not explain how
any governmental actor impeded his discovery of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Batts. Furthermore, the trial court did not sentence Everett
pursuant to Section 9711, because he was convicted of second-degree
murder, not first-degree murder. In addition, Batts would not afford Everett
relief because he was not a juvenile at the time he committed the crimes at
issue. He was 25 years old. The trial court properly dismissed Everett’s PCRA
petition as untimely.
Finally, we deny Everett’s Emergency Motion to Stay Appeal and
Remand to the PCRA Court for an Evidentiary Hearing. We do so without
prejudice to his ability to seek PCRA relief based on the allegedly “newly
discovered evidence” he cites in his Motion, in a timely PCRA petition after
disposition of the present appeal.
Order affirmed. Motion denied.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/1/18
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