In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 17‐3391
SEAN C. WALKER,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant‐Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.
No. 1:16‐cv‐396 — Theresa L. Springmann, Chief Judge.
____________________
ARGUED JULY 5, 2018 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2018
____________________
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SCUDDER and ST. EVE,
Circuit Judges.
SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Sean Walker has degrees in
robotics and electrical engineering and worked for 21 years,
primarily as an engineer, before suffering a stroke in 2008.
Walker tried but was not able to return to work after his
stroke. Medical records show that his physical and cognitive
condition has gradually worsened since 2008. In a separate
proceeding, the Social Security Administration determined
2 No. 17‐3391
that Walker became disabled as of December 2014. Before us
in this appeal is the question of Walker’s disability status at
an earlier point in time, from his stroke in January 2008 to
December 2014. Here, an ALJ, though recognizing the
agency’s prior finding of disability as of December 2014,
determined that Walker was not disabled before that date,
and the district court affirmed. We vacate and remand, as the
ALJ’s conclusion sweeps too broadly by not accounting for
medical and other evidence strongly suggesting that Walker’s
condition and residual functional capacity had worsened to
such a degree that he become disabled by approximately the
middle of 2012.
I
A
Our starting point is the medical evidence and what it
shows over time. Walker’s condition was in no way static and
indeed changed substantially over the seven‐year period in
question. What emerges by approximately the middle of 2012
is record evidence showing an individual who, at first, ap‐
pears to have recovered from a stroke, but then takes a turn
for the worse that leaves him unable to live on his own,
fighting recurring dizziness, imbalance, and short‐term
memory difficulties, while also struggling to walk any mean‐
ingful distance.
The account begins with Walker reporting to the
emergency room with complaints of vertigo and a persistent
headache on January 13, 2008. A CT scan revealed Walker had
suffered a stroke, which resulted in his being hospitalized for
a week. Approximately one month later, a neurologist, Dr. Isa
Canavati, examined Walker and found that the brain
No. 17‐3391 3
hemorrhaging from the stroke had resolved. Dr. Canavati
noted ongoing complaints of dizziness and headache, but
observed that Walker had functioned well since his release
from the hospital.
Following his stroke, Walker began seeing his primary
care physician, Dr. William Goudy, on a regular basis. At his
appointment with Dr. Goudy on January 31, 2008, Walker re‐
ported dizziness and needed the assistance of a cane to walk.
He continued to see Dr. Goudy approximately every three
months during 2008 and then biannually from 2009 until 2014.
As the ALJ observed, Dr. Goudy’s treatment notes from
Walker’s visits in June and September 2008 and February
2009, do not reflect any stroke‐related complaints such as diz‐
ziness, headaches, or fatigue. The same seems to be true for
the period between March 2008 and February 2012, when
Walker did not see Dr. Goudy for any acute stroke‐related
problems and only occasionally for dizziness.
In April 2012, Walker underwent an examination by
clinical psychologist Kay Roy. Dr. Roy opined that Walker
had difficulties with concentration and attention and
struggled to understand, remember, and follow simple
instructions in a sustained manner due to his moderate to
severe challenges with memory. Dr. Roy also assigned
Walker a Global Assessment of Functioning score of 52, which
indicated moderate difficulty functioning psychologically,
socially, and occupationally. See AMERICAN PSYCH. ASSOC.,
DIAGN. & STAT. MAN. OF MENTAL DISORDERS 34 (4th ed., rev.
2000) (DSM‐IV). (Another metric has since replaced the GAF.
AMERICAN PSYCH. ASSOC., DIAGN. & STAT. MAN. OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 16 (5th ed. 2013) (DSM‐V).) A few weeks after her
examination of Walker, but without conducting any further
4 No. 17‐3391
examination, Dr. Roy revisited her findings and adjusted
Walker’s GAF score to 66, which indicated just mild
impairments (rather than moderate impairments, as the
earlier score of 52 indicated). See DSM‐IV at 34. In the end, Dr.
Roy opined that Walker displayed difficulties with
concentration and attention, while also being limited in his
abilities to understand and follow instructions due to mild
challenges with his memory.
The picture begins to change in early 2012. In May 2012,
for instance, physician Abdali Jan examined Walker and
found that he had short‐term memory deficits but a normal
attention span. Dr. Jan also observed Walker’s difficulty walk‐
ing and maintaining his balance. Dr. Jan further opined that
Walker’s back pain prevented him from walking or standing
for prolonged periods.
Walker’s condition then deteriorated further. On August
16, 2012, Dr. Goudy met with Walker and recorded his obser‐
vations in a letter. Dr. Goudy began by noting that, while
Walker’s “current status is stable,” he has been “unable to
work” since suffering the stroke in 2008. Dr. Goudy then
grounded his prognosis in specific observations about
Walker’s then‐current condition and limitations, including
that Walker “gets intermittent, unpredictable episodes of diz‐
ziness and near fainting since he had his stroke,” is “unable
to stand alone on either leg for more than 3 seconds because
of leg weakness and poor balance,” cannot “walk heel‐to‐toe
for more than 3 steps without losing his balance,” “loses his
ability to stay focused after about 30 minutes at a task,” and
has experienced a worsening of his short‐term memory since
the stroke. All of this left Dr. Goudy of the opinion that
No. 17‐3391 5
Walker’s “cognitive skills, his physical strength, and his abil‐
ity to concentrate on tasks will all slowly worsen over the next
few years.”
For his own part, Walker testified at the July 2016 hearing
before the ALJ that he was “down” three to five times a week
because of dizziness and was experiencing episodes of dizzi‐
ness throughout the summertime that prevented him from
getting out of bed three to four times a week, as the heat has
impacted him negatively since his stroke. Walker added that
he was avoiding driving because of unpredictable dizzy
spells. He also testified that he moved in with his mother
sometime in 2012 or 2013, as he was no longer capable of liv‐
ing alone.
B
In March 2012, Walker filed for both disability insurance
benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act and supple‐
mental security income under Title XVI, claiming he became
disabled as of January 15, 2008, just after suffering his stroke.
Following a hearing, an ALJ determined that Walker was not
disabled. Walker successfully appealed the ALJ’s decision,
and the district court remanded the case to the agency for re‐
newed consideration of Dr. Goudy’s opinions and observa‐
tions as Walker’s treating physician. Before this proceeding
concluded, Walker filed a second application for supple‐
mental security income under Title XVI, alleging that he had
become disabled by December 5, 2014. The agency agreed and
granted the application, expressly finding that Walker was
disabled by that date.
As for Walker’s original application for disability benefits
and supplemental income, his claim proceeded to rehearing
6 No. 17‐3391
before a new ALJ. The ALJ recognized that the proper starting
point was the agency’s intervening determination that Walker
had become disabled by December 5, 2014. Accordingly, the
ALJ expressly accepted that determination and proceeded to
evaluate whether Walker was disabled during the earlier pe‐
riod of January 2008 to December 2014. After holding a hear‐
ing, the ALJ found no disability during this seven‐year pe‐
riod.
In accordance with Social Security regulations, the ALJ fol‐
lowed the five‐step sequential evaluation process to deter‐
mine that Walker was not disabled prior to December 2014.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v). At step one, the ALJ
found that Walker was not engaged in substantial gainful ac‐
tivity. At step two, the ALJ concluded that Walker had three
severe impairments: status post cerebral hemorrhage, degen‐
erative disk disease of the lumbar spine, and a cognitive dis‐
order not otherwise specified. At step three, the ALJ deter‐
mined that none of these severe impairments, alone or in com‐
bination, established that Walker was disabled, and therefore,
at step four, the ALJ reviewed the record and determined that
Walker had the residual functional capacity (or RFC) to per‐
form certain sedentary work with various limitations. Finally,
at step five, the ALJ concluded that, although Walker could
not perform any past relevant work given his RFC, he was
capable of performing certain jobs that existed in significant
numbers in the national economy.
The ALJ’s determinations at step four are the most rele‐
vant to this appeal. In determining Walker’s RFC, the ALJ did
not give Dr. Goudy’s opinion controlling weight. Instead, the
ALJ found that Dr. Goudy’s opinion was not fully supported
by the record evidence and thus entitled to only “partial
No. 17‐3391 7
weight.” More specifically, the ALJ explained that she dis‐
counted Dr. Goudy’s opinion that Walker was unable to work
because this conclusion was not based solely on medical evi‐
dence. The ALJ also found that Dr. Goudy’s treatment rec‐
ords, in addition to likely being based on Walker’s subjective
statements (as opposed to medical observations by Dr.
Goudy), did not consistently document episodes of dizziness
and fainting until closer to 2013 to 2014. The ALJ further de‐
termined that Dr. Goudy’s conclusions about Walker’s loss of
memory were at odds with other evidence in the record, in‐
cluding the fact that the memory problems “did not preclude
the claimant from living independently for almost four years
[from 2008 through 2011] following his stroke.”
The driving force behind the ALJ’s determination of
Walker’s RFC appears to have been Dr. Roy’s April 2012 as‐
sessment of Walker, which the ALJ gave “significant weight.”
As the ALJ saw it, Dr. Roy’s assessment limited Walker to
“simple routine repetitive work in an environment free from
fast paced production, with simple work‐related decisions,
and few, if any, workplace changes.” These limitations, the
ALJ reasoned, not only recognized Walker’s memory deficits,
but also accounted for prior reports of Walker’s daily activi‐
ties from “2008 until at least 2012,” including his living alone,
driving short distances, managing his own money, reading,
and tinkering with electronics.
II
A
What makes this case challenging is the combination of a
seven‐year period of alleged disability, from January 2008 to
December 2014, and the extensive medical evidence of
8 No. 17‐3391
Walker’s condition during these years following his stroke.
Our review is to determine whether substantial evidence sup‐
ported the ALJ’s findings. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). As the Supreme
Court explained in Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971),
this standard requires more than “a mere scintilla” of proof
and instead “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 401.
In reviewing the administrative record, our role is not to re‐
weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the
ALJ. See Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008).
We begin where the ALJ began—and indeed from a point
of common agreement among the parties: Walker was
disabled by December 5, 2014. The central issue, therefore, is
whether the medical evidence shows that Walker’s RFC had
so deteriorated as to leave him disabled before that date—in
particular, at some point between 2008 and 2014. The Social
Security Administration has issued an administrative ruling
that supplies the framework for determining when a claimant
became disabled—the so‐called “onset date.” In Social
Security Ruling 83‐20, the agency explained that the “onset
date should be set on the date when it is most reasonable to
conclude from the evidence that the impairment was
sufficiently severe to prevent the individual from engaging in
[Substantial Gainful Activity] (or gainful activity) for a
continuous period of at least 12 months or result in death.”
SSR 83‐20 at *3. By its terms, then, SSR 83‐20 supplies the
framework for answering the “when” question after the
agency first employs the familiar five‐step process and finds
that a claimant is disabled. See Scheck v. Barnart, 357 F.3d 697,
701 (7th Cir. 2004).
No. 17‐3391 9
The circumstance making the proper analysis here
unusual is that a separate administrative proceeding
culminated in the finding that Walker was disabled as of
December 5, 2014. The ALJ acknowledged this fact, however,
and indeed rightly accepted it at the outset of evaluating
Walker’s claim. For all intents and purposes, then, the
question before the ALJ was whether Walker’s disability
onset date fell before December 5, 2014. Seen in this light, the
agency’s guidance in SSR 83‐20 provides important direction.
In SSR 83‐20, the agency recognized that determining an
onset date often requires approximation, particularly “with
slowly progressive impairments, [where] it is sometimes
impossible to obtain medical evidence establishing the precise
date an impairment became disabling.” Id. at *2. That a precise
onset date is not established by the medical evidence does not
doom a claim for disability. See Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v.
Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 353 (7th Cir. 2005). In such a scenario,
an ALJ must “infer the onset date from the medical and other
evidence” in the administrative record. Id. (citing SSR 83‐20 at
*2). Whether explicitly or implicitly—and especially in light
of the ALJ’s acceptance of the agency’s finding that Walker
was disabled as of December 5, 2014—the ALJ needed to align
the analysis of Walker’s claim with these principles. See 20
C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1) (explaining that Social Security Rulings
“are binding on all components of the Social Security
Administration” and “represent precedent final opinions and
orders and statements of policy and interpretations that [the
agency has] adopted”).
In Briscoe, we relied on the guidance provided by SSR 83‐
20 in affirming a district court’s decision that substantial evi‐
dence did not support an ALJ’s finding that the claimant was
10 No. 17‐3391
not disabled before a particular date. See 425 F.3d at 355. In
terms fully applicable to Walker’s circumstances, we ex‐
plained that “[w]here, as here, a claimant is found disabled
but it is necessary to decide whether the disability arose at an
earlier date, the ALJ is required to apply the analytical frame‐
work outlined in SSR 83‐20 to determine the onset date of dis‐
ability.” Id. at 352. We then turned to a close examination of
the three factors identified in SSR 83‐20 for “determining the
onset date of disabilities of a nontraumatic origin: (1) the
claimant’s alleged onset date; (2) the claimant’s work history;
and (3) medical and all other relevant evidence.” Id. at 353
(citing SSR 83‐20 at *2). This same approach charts our review
of the administrative record here.
B
Walker contends that the ALJ improperly gave Dr.
Goudy’s opinion only “partial weight” and also failed to in‐
corporate all of his medical impairments into the RFC deter‐
mination. The agency sees the record the other way, contend‐
ing that the totality of medical and other evidence from 2008
to 2014 supports the ALJ’s determination that Walker was not
disabled during this seven‐year period.
Our review of the record leaves us unpersuaded that the
question presented is amenable to such an all‐or‐nothing an‐
swer in either party’s favor. The medical evidence shows that
Walker’s condition changed considerably between 2008 and
2014. The initial signs pointed to Walker recovering from his
stroke and perhaps eventually being able to return to work.
By approximately the middle of 2012, however, Walker’s con‐
dition worsened, leaving him experiencing recurring bouts of
dizziness, substantial difficulty walking and standing, and a
No. 17‐3391 11
slipping memory—with Dr. Goudy opining that these condi‐
tions likely would worsen further over time. And we know
Walker’s overall condition worsened to a degree that the
agency determined him to be disabled as of December 2014.
On this record we are unable to conclude that the ALJ’s
determination that Walker was not disabled at any point dur‐
ing the seven‐year period before December 2014 was sup‐
ported by substantial evidence. The ALJ’s error stemmed
from considering evidence from particular points between
2008 and 2014 to support a conclusion covering the entire pe‐
riod. By trying to fit the evidence to support a conclusion cov‐
ering such a broad period of time, the ALJ failed to remain
watchful for the intermediate possibility of Walker becoming
disabled sometime between the bookends of January 2008
and December 2014. The record evidence itself exposes the er‐
ror, revealing the iterative and progressive deterioration in
Walker’s condition over time and the reality that his condition
may have become “sufficiently severe to prevent [him] from
engaging in SGA (or gainful activity) for a continuous period”
of at least one year. SSR 83‐20 at *3.
Take, for example, the fact that Dr. Goudy’s treatment
notes reported only a few instances of dizziness and cognitive
impairments from 2008 to 2012, but then sometime after 2012
began documenting more severe and recurring episodes of
dizziness. The ALJ’s opinion, while noting the changing na‐
ture of Dr. Goudy’s observations, never stepped back to eval‐
uate and explain how these changes impacted Walker’s RFC
or the weight assigned to Dr. Goudy’s opinion. The approach
closed the door on a conclusion—invited by the agency’s di‐
rection in SSR 83‐20—that Walker’s worsening condition sig‐
naled the onset of disability in or around 2012.
12 No. 17‐3391
Consider a related point clear from the record. The ALJ
observed that, “[o]nly occasional dizziness and headache was
noted in February 2008 shortly after [Walker’s] stroke with
more severe and ongoing episodes not documented until
2013.” At another point, and in much the same vein, the ALJ
observed that, while “Dr. Goudy’s treatment records do not
consistently document intermittent, unpredictable episodes
of dizziness and near fainting since the claimant had his
stroke,” the records do “show these issues nearer 2013 to
2014.” In making these observations, the ALJ gave short shrift
to the fact that the relevant period included 2013 and 2014—
again signaling the possibility of disability onset by that point
in time.
By way of another example clear from the record, the ALJ
afforded Dr. Roy’s 2012 assessment significant weight be‐
cause the limitations Dr. Roy placed on Walker were, in the
ALJ’s view, compatible with Walker’s own accounts of his
daily living in 2012. Specifically, the ALJ explained that
Walker was “largely independent in his activities of daily liv‐
ing, i.e., living alone, driving, managing his own money, read‐
ing, and tinkering with electronics, from 2008 until at least
2012.” But here again the ALJ overlooked that the relevant pe‐
riod extended beyond 2012. Indeed, in his own testimony,
Walker explained that sometime in 2012 or 2013 he moved in
with his mother because it became too difficult to live alone.
The ALJ’s focus on evidence from 2008 to Dr. Roy’s examina‐
tion in 2012 left unanswered the possibility of disability onset
sometime thereafter, and perhaps shortly thereafter as
evinced by Walker’s own testimony. See Briscoe, 425 F.3d at
354 (drawing on 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2) to explain that an
ALJ must consider a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain
No. 17‐3391 13
and its effects on him even when available objective evidence
does not substantiate the claimant’s statements).
We owe a word about the ALJ’s decision to afford only
partial weight to Dr. Goudy’s August 2012 assessment of
Walker. As the treating physician, Dr. Goudy’s opinion was
entitled (under the regulations in effect at the time) to control‐
ling weight unless the ALJ set forth “good reasons” for assign‐
ing it lesser weight. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); Schaff v. Astrue,
602 F.3d 869, 875 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining that an ALJ “must
give a good reason” for rejecting a treating physician’s opin‐
ion). The reasons set forth by the ALJ are not supported by
substantial evidence, as they too discount, if not overlook, ex‐
press conclusions Dr. Goudy made about Walker’s condition
from August 2012 forward. In clear and precise terms, Dr.
Goudy stated that Walker’s condition—his recurring dizzi‐
ness and imbalance, worsening memory, inability to walk any
meaningful distance—not only left him unable to work, but
was expected to worsen further in the coming years. The ALJ
needed to offer a good reason for disregarding this opinion,
coming as it did from Walker’s treating physician in August
2012. In the face of Walker’s deteriorating condition, the rec‐
ord does not support the ALJ’s decision to prefer Dr. Roy’s
one‐time assessment of Walker in April 2012 over the views
and prognosis of Walker’s treating physician from a later
point in time.
III
We are mindful that Walker’s application for disability
benefits has already made two laps through the
administrative process. And, while we appreciate the
understandable desire for finality, we cannot short circuit the
requirement that substantial evidence support the Social
14 No. 17‐3391
Security Administration’s final decision. It will be up to the
ALJ on remand to revisit whether Walker became disabled
before 2014 and, in particular, by approximately the middle
of 2012. Both parties will have the opportunity to present their
respective positions.
For these reasons, we VACATE the ALJ’s decision and
REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opin‐
ion.