United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 24, 2006
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-40362
Summary Calendar
HERMENEGILDO RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ROBERT ZEPEDA,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 7:03-CV-364
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Before Barksdale, Stewart, and Clement, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Hermenegildo Rodriguez, a Texas resident, appeals from the
district court’s entry of judgment in favor of defendant-appellee
Robert Zepeda, a police officer, following a jury trial in
Rodriguez’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action. Rodriguez
contends that the district court abused its discretion in
admitting evidence that he used drugs on the day he was shot by
Officer Zepeda.
In his complaint, Rodriguez alleged that Officer Zepeda
subjected him to excessive force when he shot Rodriguez without
provocation, while Zepeda and other police officers were
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 05-40362
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executing a search warrant for a house where Rodriguez was
staying. Rodriguez asserted that Zepeda shot him without
identifying himself and without warning. Zepeda, however,
asserted that Rodriguez, who was standing in the house’s carport
when the police arrived in an unmarked vehicle, failed to heed
police commands that he get on the ground and instead reached
into his waistband and pulled out an object that Zepeda believed
to be a weapon. It was undisputed that, after Rodriguez was shot
and fell in the carport, a crack pipe and a cigarette lighter
were found near him on the ground.
The court overruled Rodriguez’s pre-trial motion in limine
to the extent that he sought to prevent Officer Zepeda from
introducing medical and other evidence that Rodriguez was under
the influence of drugs at the time of the shooting. Rodriguez
argues that such evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial bad-
character or bad-act evidence. Officer Zepeda argues that the
drug-use evidence was relevant to resolving the factual disputes
regarding whether Zepeda and other officers identified themselves
and yelled commands that Zepeda drop to the ground and whether a
drug-impaired condition may have prevented Rodriguez from heeding
and obeying these commands.
We review the denial of a motion in limine for abuse of
discretion. Buford v. Howe, 10 F.3d 1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1994).
“The trial judge’s assessment of relative probative value of
evidence and unfair prejudice is generally accorded great
deference because of his or her first-hand exposure to evidence
and familiarity with the course of the proceedings.”
No. 05-40362
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International Ins. Co. v. RSR Corp., 426 F.3d 281, 300 (5th Cir.
2005). “Erroneous evidentiary rulings by the trial court
constitute reversible error only when those rulings have affected
a party’s substantial rights.” Kelly v. Boeing Petroleum Servs.,
Inc., 61 F.3d 350, 361 (5th Cir. 1995) (footnote and citation
omitted). “An error does not affect substantial rights ‘if the
court is sure, after reviewing the entire record, that the error
did not influence the jury or had but a very slight effect on its
verdict.’” Id. (footnote and citation omitted).
The determination whether evidence is relevant depends in
part on what a plaintiff is required to prove in order to make
his case. In the context of the instant case, a claim that a
police officer used excessive force in the course of a seizure is
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 395 (1989). To prove an excessive-use-of-force claim, a
plaintiff must demonstrate (1) an injury, which (2) resulted
directly and solely from the use of force that was clearly
excessive to the need, and the excessiveness of which was
(3) “objectively unreasonable.” Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430,
433-34 (5th Cir. 1996). Whether the force used was objectively
reasonable is determined according to the facts of each case,
“including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the
suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers
or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
For several reasons, we conclude that the probative value of
the drug-use evidence was not “substantially outweighed by the
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danger of unfair prejudice,” see FED. R. EVID. 403, and that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
evidence. Given the purpose of the search warrant and raid and
the presence of a crack pipe near Rodriguez, there was a
reasonable possibility that Rodriguez’s perceptions may have been
impaired by drug use. Although Rodriguez is correct in stressing
that the Fourth Amendment standard for excessive-force claims is
an objective one and that the plaintiff’s subjective state of
mind in such a case is not directly relevant to proving such a
claim, the drug-use evidence in the instant case was directly
relevant both to refuting Rodriguez’s testimony that the officers
gave no warnings or commands and to explaining Rodriguez’s
allegedly odd behavior in the face of such warnings and commands.
Rodriguez has not established that the drug-use evidence
affected his substantial rights. See Kelly, 61 F.3d at 361. The
evidence was relevant, and it was supplemented by significant
other evidence connecting him to drugs and drugs sales.
Moreover, defense counsel emphasized that the drug-use evidence
was not being offered to show that Rodriguez was a “bad person,”
and the special-verdict questions submitted to the jury focused
on the conduct and state of mind of defendant Zepeda, not the
actions of Rodriguez.
For the above stated reasons, we AFFIRM.