NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 18a0436n.06
No. 17-1860
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
FILED
Aug 23, 2018
)
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
ANTONIO RAMON MARTINEZ-LOPEZ ) COURT FOR THE WESTERN
) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
)
)
BEFORE: SUHRHEINRICH, CLAY, and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.
JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Antonio Martinez-Lopez appeals his
convictions for crimes related to a conspiracy involving staged car accidents and fraudulent
insurance billings. He argues that certain testimony at his trial should have been excluded as
hearsay, that insufficient evidence existed to convict him of naturalization fraud, and that the
intended loss calculation for his sentence was too high. We affirm his convictions and sentence.
I.
This case involves a conspiracy by several individuals to open and operate physical therapy
clinics that fraudulently billed insurance companies—Revive Therapy Center, LLC (“Revive
Therapy”), Renue Therapy Center, LLC (“Renue Therapy”), and H&H Rehab Center, LLC
(“H&H Rehab”). In this fraud scheme, the clinics would bill insurance companies for treatments
not provided, often to patients whose accidents and injuries had been staged in return for payment
by the clinic’s owners and operators.
No. 17-1860, United States v. Martinez-Lopez
The first clinic, Revive Therapy, was opened by Belkis Soca-Fernandez, David Sosa-
Baladron, and Martinez-Lopez in Wyoming, Michigan, in April 2012. Martinez-Lopez served as
Revive Therapy’s manager. Around the time of Revive Therapy’s opening, Martinez-Lopez,
Soca-Fernandez, and Sosa-Baladron met with Doctor Flor Borrero, a local pediatrician, to
convince her to see patients from Revive Therapy, representing that Revive Therapy was serving
the low-income Hispanic community in Wyoming. Borrero agreed to see patients from the clinic
outside of her normal business hours, and thereafter Martinez-Lopez began bringing patients to
see her.
Many of the patients that Martinez-Lopez brought to see Borrero, however, had not
suffered real injuries but had instead been involved in staged car accidents. These “patients” would
be recruited by individuals involved in Revive Therapy to stage car accidents, and afterward,
Martinez-Lopez would accompany them to Borrero’s office and coach them on what symptoms to
report. After obtaining a prescription from Borrero for physical therapy, the participants would
sign blank therapy treatment forms or forms overstating the treatment they received at Revive
Therapy—they generally received very little treatment or no treatment at all. Revive Therapy
would then bill insurance companies for these treatments, and the “patients” would typically be
paid between one and two thousand dollars for their participation in the fraud.
One staged-accident participant who reported false treatments at Revive Therapy was
Martinez-Lopez’s childhood friend Gustavo Acuna-Rosa. Acuna lived with Martinez-Lopez for
a period of time, and Martinez-Lopez often referred to Acuna as his “cousin.” At Revive Therapy,
Acuna, Martinez-Lopez, and Soca-Fernandez discussed opening another clinic named Renue
Therapy Center in Lansing, Michigan. In May 2013, Acuna filed corporate documents for Renue
Therapy and began operating and managing that clinic in Lansing.
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No. 17-1860, United States v. Martinez-Lopez
Renue Therapy used the same fraud scheme as Revive Therapy—staging car accidents and
billing insurers for treatment that was never provided. Renue Therapy was also able to establish
the same relationship with Borrero as Revive Therapy. Martinez-Lopez arranged for this,
introducing Acuna to Borrero’s son, who was her office manager, and vouching for Acuna as his
cousin. Renue Therapy patients were then able to be seen and prescribed treatment by Borrero.
One such Renue Therapy patient, Maria Sanchez, was a confidential informant for the
Department of Homeland Security. Sanchez was approached by a Renue Therapy recruiter who
asked whether she wanted to make easy money by faking a car accident. With help of a
government agent, Sanchez produced an accident report to make it appear that she had staged a
crash. After this, Acuna and Martinez-Lopez, took her to see Borrero. Sanchez later met up with
Acuna and another individual in a parking lot to sign blank therapy forms for Renue Therapy.
Acuna, however, forgot the forms and had to call Martinez-Lopez to bring them over. After
Martinez-Lopez arrived with the blank treatment forms, Sanchez signed them, and the forms were
later submitted to an insurance company for payment, even though Sanchez never received
treatment at Renue Therapy.
Sanchez later signed blank treatment forms for H&H Rehab after being told that Acuna
had shut down Renue Therapy. Yoisler Herrera-Enriquez, who had worked as a massage therapist
at Revive Therapy, formed H&H Rehab in Wyoming, Michigan, in August 2013. H&H Rehab
followed the same fraud scheme as Revive Therapy and Renue Therapy, and it submitted
Sanchez’s fraudulent therapy treatment bills. Herrera-Enriquez testified at trial that Martinez-
Lopez helped him set up H&H Rehab and that Martinez-Lopez worked as a patient recruiter for
the clinic, sharing in the profits from patients he recruited.
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No. 17-1860, United States v. Martinez-Lopez
Martinez-Lopez, along with several others, was indicted in March 2016, and he was
arrested in Florida shortly thereafter. He was tried jointly with Soca-Fernandez and Sosa-
Baladron, and the jury found him guilty on all counts—one count of conspiracy to commit mail
fraud, nine counts of health care fraud, seven counts of mail fraud, and one count of unlawful
procurement of naturalization. He was sentenced to 87 months’ imprisonment.
II.
A.
On appeal, Martinez-Lopez first argues that the district court incorrectly allowed several
statements made by Acuna to be admitted, when they should have been excluded as hearsay.
During trial, Herrera-Enriquez testified that he heard Acuna discussing Renue Therapy with
Martinez-Lopez and Soca-Fernandez at Revive Therapy.1 Martinez-Lopez challenges the
admission of the following exchange:
Q. Who would you hear talking about Renue Therapy at Revive Therapy?
MR. UPSHAW: Objection. Again, assumes facts not in evidence. He never said he
heard anyone.
MR. STELLA: I have to—
THE COURT: Overruled. Go ahead.
THE WITNESS: Okay. Gustavo [Acuna] is kind of like a friend or cousin of
Antonio. I guess they knew each other for a long time, and they decide to open
another clinic, which the name is Renue Therapy Center, something like that in
Lansing.
BY MR. STELLA:
Q. Would Mr. Acuna talk about the clinic with Mr. Martinez while he was at Revive
Therapy?
A. Yes.
...
BY MR. STELLA:
1
Acuna did not testify. Prior to trial, Acuna pled guilty to charges related to the fraud, and his plea agreement
specified that he would testify at Martinez-Lopez’s trial; however, when he was called, he refused to testify, and the
court held him in criminal contempt.
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No. 17-1860, United States v. Martinez-Lopez
Q. When you were at Revive Therapy, would you hear discussions between
Defendant Soca and Mr. Acuna about Renue Therapy?
MS. COBB: Objection, hearsay.
MR. STELLA: Your Honor, it’s co-conspirator’s statement and it’s an admission
by a party opponent.
THE COURT: Objection is overruled. Go ahead.
THE WITNESS: What do you mean with discussion? What do you mean
discussion?
BY MR. STELLA:
Q. Were they talking about Renue Therapy?
A. Yes.
Q. They were?
A. Okay.
Q. Tell us what they were talking about?
A. That they were going to open another clinic, the name is Renue Therapy Center.
DE 365, Trial Tr. Vol. II, Page ID 2380–82. The district court concluded that these statements fell
within the co-conspirator exception to hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and allowed their
admission over Martinez-Lopez’s objection. We hold that these statements were properly admitted
because they were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted and therefore were not hearsay.
Hearsay, an out-of-court statement offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted,” is
not admissible at trial unless a rule or statute provides otherwise. Fed. R. Evid. 801, 802. Though
we generally review a district court’s evidentiary determinations for abuse of discretion, “whether
a statement is hearsay is a legal question” that we review de novo. United States v. Porter, 886
F.3d 562, 566 (6th Cir. 2018). When “[t]he significance [of a statement] lies entirely in the fact
that the words were spoken . . . the statement does not fall within the Rule 801(c) definition of
hearsay.” United States v. Hathaway, 798 F.2d 902, 905 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Fed. R. Evid.
801(c) advisory committee’s note to the 1972 proposed rules. This is because in such cases “there
is no need to assess the credibility of the declarant.” Hathaway, 798 F.2d at 905.
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No. 17-1860, United States v. Martinez-Lopez
Here, all that matters for the prosecution’s purpose is that the conversation between Acuna
and Martinez-Lopez occurred, and therefore these statements were not hearsay. The mere fact that
the conversation took place provides circumstantial evidence of Martinez-Lopez’s participation in
and knowledge of the Renue Therapy scheme. Indeed, the very reason Martinez-Lopez contends
that these statements were prejudicial to him is because they “placed him in conversations
regarding the formation of Renue Therapy” and “went to the very heart of the disputed issue of
whether Defendant-Appellant participated in the fraud at Renue.” CA6 R. 15, Appellant Br., at
25. It is true that these statements tend to show—and by introducing them the prosecution sought
to prove—that Martinez-Lopez was aware of and participated in the conspiracy to open Renue
Therapy. But Martinez-Lopez’s involvement does not depend on the truth of Acuna’s
statements—just on his participation in the conversation. That it is difficult to identify an actual
statement that’s truth could be at issue further indicates that the significance of the offered
testimony was to show simply that the conversation happened—not the content of any statements
made. Herrera-Enriquez’s testimony therefore did not offer hearsay and was properly admitted.
B.
Martinez-Lopez next contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction of
naturalization fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) because there was no evidence he
committed a crime prior to completing the naturalization forms. But Martinez-Lopez waived any
objection for sufficiency of the evidence in the district court, and on appeal he supports this
argument by erroneously narrowing the charge in the indictment. He is therefore not entitled to
relief on this ground.
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No. 17-1860, United States v. Martinez-Lopez
1.
Generally, the standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence is whether any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt;
however, when a defendant fails to make or renew a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, he
waives any objection to the sufficiency of the evidence. See United States v. Jordan, 544 F.3d
656, 670 (6th Cir. 2008). When there is such a waiver, we review the sufficiency of the evidence
only for a manifest miscarriage of justice. Id.
Martinez-Lopez did not make a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal in the district
court, and he therefore waived any objection to the sufficiency of the evidence. Indeed, not only
did Martinez-Lopez’s counsel fail to make a Rule 29 motion—he affirmatively chose not to make
one:
THE COURT: . . . At side bar, we decided the Rule 29s would be reserved until
now, and as if made at the close of the government’s proofs. Mr. Upshaw, do you
have a motion in that regard, sir?
MR. UPSHAW: I do not have a Rule 29, your Honor.
DE 369, Trial Tr. Vol. VI, Page ID 3422. Immediately following this exchange, counsel for
codefendants Soca-Fernandez and Sosa-Baladron both made their own Rule 29 motions.
Given Martinez-Lopez’s counsel’s affirmative decision not to make a Rule 29 motion, it is
arguable that we should not entertain his sufficiency argument at all—even under the manifest-
miscarriage-of-justice standard. In addition to holding that “[f]ailure to make the required [Rule
29] motions constitutes a waiver of objections to the sufficiency of the evidence,” Jordan, 544
F.3d at 670, we have held that “[a]lthough specificity is not required in a Rule 29 motion, ‘when a
defendant makes a motion on specific grounds . . . all grounds not specified in the motion are
waived,’” United States v. Osborne, 886 F.3d 604, 618 (6th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Wesley, 417 F.3d 612, 617 (6th Cir. 2005)); see United States v. Dandy,
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No. 17-1860, United States v. Martinez-Lopez
998 F.2d 1344, 1357 (6th Cir. 1993). When the “waiver” is of the former kind—the unwitting
failure to make or renew a Rule 29 motion—we review the sufficiency of the evidence for manifest
miscarriage of justice. See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 714 F.3d 951, 957 (6th Cir. 2013);
United States v. Street, 614 F.3d 228, 236 (6th Cir. 2010); Jordan, 544 F.3d at 670. But when the
waiver is of the latter type—raising only some grounds in a Rule 29 motion for acquittal but
omitting others—this court generally does not review the omitted grounds at all; i.e., we deem
them completely waived. See Osborne, 886 F.3d at 618 (declining to review waived claims at all
where a defendant “made a motion for judgment of acquittal on specified grounds, and those
grounds did not include the claim that is on appeal”); United States v. Montgomery, 379 F. App’x
527, 530 (6th Cir. 2010) (same); see also United States v. Winkle, 477 F.3d 407, 415 (6th Cir.
2007); Wesley, 417 F.3d at 617. This is because when a Rule 29 motion is based on specific
grounds, there “is an indication that counsel has evaluated the record and has these particular
reasons for his motion.” Osborne, 886 F.3d at 618 (quoting Dandy, 998 F.2d at 1357). Thus,
although both types of Rule 29 omissions are termed “waiver,” they are generally treated
differently by a reviewing court.2
Here, Martinez-Lopez’s counsel’s affirmative decision not to make a Rule 29 motion is
more akin to an attorney’s decision to omit certain grounds from a Rule 29 motion—his counsel’s
exchange with the court indicates that he “evaluated the record” and chose not to make a motion
of acquittal to the district court on any grounds. See Osborne, 886 F.3d at 618. Therefore, it is
likely that we could decline to review Martinez-Lopez’s sufficiency of the evidence claim entirely.
2
It is likely that this differing treatment is because inadvertent failure to make or renew a Rule 29 motion is
really a forfeiture—“the failure to make the timely assertion of a right,” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733
(1993)—while raising certain grounds in a Rule 29 motion and omitting others is more akin to a true “waiver”—“the
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right,” id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see
United States v. Mabee, 765 F.3d 666, 671 (6th Cir. 2014).
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No. 17-1860, United States v. Martinez-Lopez
But because there is some ambiguity in this circuit’s precedent regarding when review for a
manifest miscarriage of justice is appropriate, we nevertheless analyze his claim under this
standard. See United States v. LaVictor, 848 F.3d 428, 457–58 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 137
S. Ct. 2231 (2017) (applying the manifest-miscarriage-of-justice standard to grounds that had been
“waived” by their non-inclusion in an otherwise properly made Rule 29 motion); see also United
States v. Guadarrama, 591 F. App’x 347, 351–52 (6th Cir. 2014) (same). “A miscarriage of justice
exists only if the record is devoid of evidence pointing to guilt.” Jordan, 544 F.3d at 670 (quoting
United States v. Price, 134 F.3d 340, 350 (6th Cir. 1998)).
2.
Martinez-Lopez is not entitled to relief based on the sufficiency of evidence for his
naturalization fraud conviction, as the record is not “devoid of evidence pointing to guilt.” Price,
134 F.3d at 350 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). More than sufficient evidence
exists to uphold his conviction.
Martinez-Lopez was found guilty of Count 22 in the indictment, which charged him with
“knowingly making a false statement in connection with his [February 2013] application for
naturalization” by answering “No” to a question on his N-400 Application for Naturalization
asking whether “he previously committed a crime or offense for which he had not been arrested.”
DE 229, Fourth Superseding Indictment, Page ID 854. The indictment charged that Martinez-
Lopez had
committed the crimes of health care fraud and mail fraud when he submitted, or
caused to be submitted, false and fraudulent HCFA Health Insurance Claim Forms
for treatment related to a staged automobile accident of Gustavo Ramiro Acuna-
Rosa, which accident occurred on October 13, 2012, as well as for staged
automobile accidents for other alleged patients of Revive Therapy Center, L.L.C.
Id.
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No. 17-1860, United States v. Martinez-Lopez
Martinez-Lopez contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of
naturalization fraud because the government did not show that he was involved in the October 13,
2012, staged car accident. His arguments on appeal relate solely to his knowledge of and
involvement in the October 2012 crash. But, as the government notes, the indictment also alleged
that Martinez-Lopez lied based on his involvement in “staged automobile accidents for other
alleged patients of Revive Therapy Center, L.L.C.” Id. And the jury heard evidence of Martinez-
Lopez’s involvement in several staged accidents prior to his February 2013 naturalization
application.
For example, Dolis Rojas-Lopez testified that in July 2012, she participated in a staged car
accident and that afterward Martinez-Lopez coached her on what symptoms to report to Borrero,
had her sign blank therapy forms for Revive Therapy, and paid her $2,000. Mirna Lopez-Publes
similarly testified that in August 2012, Rojas-Lopez recruited her to stage a crash and that
afterward Martinez-Lopez met Lopez-Publes at Borrero’s office and coached her on what injuries
to report. Martinez-Lopez then paid her for staging the accident and had her fill out paperwork for
treatment at Revive Therapy, where she only received treatment a few times, despite the many
more billings submitted by Revive Therapy as insurance claims.
Moreover, the record is not devoid of evidence that Martinez-Lopez was involved in the
October 2012 crash. The October 2012 crash involved Juan Espinosa-Ramon, who lived in
Nebraska, traveling to Grand Rapids, Michigan, to stage a car accident with Acuna. Espinosa-
Ramon testified that when he arrived in Grand Rapids, he met with Acuna and Martinez-Lopez at
the apartment they shared and that he spent the night there. The next day, Espinosa-Ramon crashed
into the back of Acuna’s car, as he and Acuna had previously discussed. Espinosa-Ramon again
spent the night at the apartment of Acuna and Martinez Lopez, and the following morning he
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No. 17-1860, United States v. Martinez-Lopez
retrieved an envelope from the countertop containing $2,000 in cash. Acuna then sought treatment
at Revive Therapy, and Revive Therapy submitted bills to insurance companies for treatment
Acuna did not receive.
Martinez-Lopez points out that Espinosa-Ramon never testified that he discussed the plan
with Martinez-Lopez and that Espinosa-Ramon testified that did not see Martinez-Lopez at the
apartment after the crash. But this does not mean that the record is devoid of evidence that could
support Martinez-Lopez’s involvement. Espinosa-Ramon met Martinez-Lopez and Acuna at their
apartment when he first arrived in Grand Rapids, spent the night there before and after the staged
crash, and collected an envelope full of cash from the apartment’s countertop as payment for his
involvement. These facts could support Martinez-Lopez’s knowledge of and involvement in the
October 2012 crash. Moreover, Martinez-Lopez was the manager of Revive Therapy, and the jury
heard testimony that he was responsible for handling Revive Therapy’s bank accounts and that he
had previously paid other participants in staged car accidents. This evidence more than meets the
manifest-miscarriage-of-justice standard. See United States v. Clemons, 427 F. App’x 457, 461
(6th Cir. 2011) (no manifest miscarriage of justice when there was “some evidence probative” of
guilt).
Given that the record is not devoid of evidence of Martinez-Lopez’s involvement in fraud
“for treatment related to a staged automobile accident . . . on October 13, 2012,” and there is
substantial evidence of his fraud related to “staged automobile accidents for other alleged patients
of Revive Therapy” prior to his February 2013 naturalization application, there is sufficient
evidence to sustain his conviction for naturalization fraud. DE 229, Fourth Superseding
Indictment, Page ID 854; see Price, 134 F.3d at 350.
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No. 17-1860, United States v. Martinez-Lopez
C.
Martinez-Lopez last argues the district court improperly attributed losses associated with
Renue Therapy to him in calculating his sentence, resulting in a 16-level enhancement to his base
offense level. We review a district court’s factual findings in sentencing a defendant for clear error
and its application of a Sentencing Guidelines provision de novo. E.g., United States v.
Hazelwood, 398 F.3d 792, 795 (6th Cir. 2005). Here, the district court did not err in attributing
the losses related to Renue Therapy to Martinez-Lopez for purposes of his loss calculation. See
USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) cmt.3.
The PSR grouped all of Martinez-Lopez’s counts besides unlawful procurement of
naturalization for Guidelines calculation purposes. USSG § 3D1.2(d). The applicable guideline
for these offenses is USSG § 2B1.1. See USSG § 3D1.3(b). Under § 2B1.1(b)(1)(I), Martinez-
Lopez Received a 16-level increase to his base offense level because the intended loss attributed
to him was $1,637,076.50, which falls within the range of over $1,500,000 but less than
$3,500,000. This intended loss calculation included $386,233.25 of fraudulent billing from Renue
Therapy. Martinez-Lopez alleges that he should not have been held responsible for the intended
losses associated with Renue Therapy because he did not participate in the fraud associated with
that clinic. He therefore contends that he should have received only a 14-level enhancement, as
without the losses from Renue Therapy, the intended loss amount would be more than $550,000
but less than $1,500,000. USSG § 2B1.1(b)(1)(H).
The Guidelines provide that the base offense level calculation includes “in the case of a
jointly undertaken criminal activity . . . , all acts and omissions of others that were—(i) within the
scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, (ii) in furtherance of that criminal activity, and
(iii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity.” USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).
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No. 17-1860, United States v. Martinez-Lopez
We have held that § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) “requires that the district court make particularized findings
with respect to both the scope of the defendant’s agreement and the foreseeability of his co-
conspirators’ conduct before holding the defendant accountable for the scope of the entire
conspiracy.” United States v. Campbell, 279 F.3d 392, 400 (6th Cir. 2002); see also United States
v. Valentine, 692 F. App’x 235, 239 (6th Cir. 2017). Thus, “the scope of conduct for which a
defendant can be held accountable under the sentencing guidelines is significantly narrower than
the conduct embraced by the law of conspiracy.” United States v. Orlando, 281 F.3d 586, 600
(6th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Swiney, 203 F.3d 397, 402 (6th Cir. 2000)). However,
“[i]n order to determine the scope of the defendant’s agreement, the district court may consider
any explicit agreement or implicit agreement fairly inferred from the conduct of the defendant and
others.” Campbell, 279 F.3d at 400 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, the district court addressed the scope of Martinez-Lopez’s involvement in the
conspiracy, concluding that he had “very significant involvement in this conspiracy,” and, though
he may have been less involved than Soca-Fernandez and Sosa-Baladron, Martinez-Lopez was
“very much involved” in the conspiracy’s “various components.” DE 371, Sent. Tr., Page ID
3624. The district court also specifically addressed Martinez-Lopez’s involvement in Renue
Therapy, concluding that it was “jointly undertaken activity” that was “foreseeable to the
defendant in light of the links, especially the introduction of the doctor, [and] the supplying of
blank treatment forms,” as well as other factual development in the presentence report. Id. at 3610.
Martinez-Lopez “admits that he was aware of the operation of Renue Therapy” but
contends that he should not be held responsible for these losses because he never worked there and
never “recruited or hired employees” or “referred clients to the clinic.” CA6 R. 15, Appellant Br.,
at 21. But those facts do not take the Renue Therapy fraud outside of the scope of his jointly
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No. 17-1860, United States v. Martinez-Lopez
undertaken criminal activity. As the district court observed, there was evidence at trial that
Martinez-Lopez was involved in discussions about the opening of Renue Therapy and that he aided
in its operations once it was open. Martinez-Lopez introduced Acuna to Borrero’s son and office
manager, vouching for Acuna as his cousin, which allowed Renue Therapy to establish a
relationship with Borrero and receive treatment referrals from the physician. Moreover, Martinez-
Lopez accompanied Acuna when he took Sanchez, the government informant, to Borrero’s office
for an examination after she reported to have staged a car accident. Later, when Sanchez was
supposed to sign blank treatment forms for Renue Therapy and Acuna forgot to bring them, it was
Martinez-Lopez that Acuna called to bring the blank treatment forms, which were later submitted
as false claims. From this, the district court could fairly infer that Martinez-Lopez agreed to
participate in the Renue Therapy fraud. See Campbell, 279 F.3d at 400. The district court therefore
did not clearly err in attributing the losses from Renue Therapy to Martinez-Lopez.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the district court and uphold Martinez-Lopez’s
convictions and sentence.
14