J-S42029-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: S.A.M., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: L.M., NATURAL MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 339 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Entered January 17, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Orphans' Court at No(s):
4223
BEFORE: BOWES, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED AUGUST 24, 2018
L.M. (“Mother”) appeals from the order terminating her parental rights
to S.A.M. (“Child”). We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion
and, therefore, affirm.
The trial court set forth the factual and procedural history, which we
adopt and incorporate herein. Trial Court Opinion, filed Jan. 17, 2018, at 1-8.
The trial court concluded that Children and Youth Services (“CYS”)
established, by clear and convincing evidence, that grounds for termination of
Mother’s rights existed under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8). The
trial court further found that termination was proper under § 2511(b). Mother
filed a timely Notice of Appeal.
Mother raises the following issue on appeal:
1. Whether the lower court erred in terminating Mother’s
parental rights when she would not separate from her
husband who was the natural father of the minor child?
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S42029-18
Mother’s Br. at 5. Mother contends the trial court erred because it relied on
environmental factors beyond Mother’s control and on Mother’s unwillingness
to separate from Father.
When reviewing orders terminating parental rights, we must “accept the
findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are
supported by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa.
2012). Where “the factual findings are supported,” we review the decision “to
determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion.” Id.
We will reverse a decision “for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration
of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained the reason for applying
an abuse of discretion standard to termination decisions:
[U]nlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to
make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record,
where the trial judges are observing the parties during the
relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
hearings regarding the child and parents. Therefore, even
where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often
the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate
court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court
and impose its own credibility determinations and
judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long
as the factual findings are supported by the record and the
court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law
or an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 826-27 (citations omitted).
A trial court may terminate parental rights only after finding grounds for
termination existed under Section 2511(a) and that termination is in the
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child’s best interest under Section 2511(b). Although the trial court terminated
Mother’s parental rights pursuant to several subsections of 2511(a), we need
only conclude that its decision was proper under any one subsection of Section
2511(a). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). Here,
we conclude that the trial court properly terminated Mother’s parental rights
pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2).
We will first review the trial court’s conclusion that termination was
proper under Section 2511(a)(2), which provides:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
...
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2).
To terminate parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), the moving
party must produce clear and convincing evidence of the following: “(1)
repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or
mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d
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1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003). Further, Section 2511(b) provides: “The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors
such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if
found to be beyond the control of the parent.”
The trial court found that Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) proved,
by clear and convincing evidence, that grounds to terminate Mother’s parental
rights under Section 2511(a)(2) existed. Contrary to Mother’s contention on
appeal, the trial court did not rely on her refusal to not live with Father or
solely on environmental factors that were beyond her control. Rather, the
court stated that Mother could not recognize the safety threat that Father
posed and noted, among other concerns, that Mother had physical and mental
limitations and was unable to provide for Child’s basic needs without
assistance. TCO at 13. Mother was unable to feed or diaper Child, and could
not recognize Child’s cues. Id. The court reasoned that CYS “provided ample
assistance and education to Mother . . . , both in the past with respect to
R.M.[, an older sibling,] and more recently during supervised visits with
[Child], but Mother has not shown progress in developing competencies to
meet these most basic needs of a child.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
We conclude the record supports the trial court’s factual findings and
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Mother’s parental
rights to S.A.M. After review of the briefs, the record, and the well-reasoned
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opinion of the Honorable Katherine V. Oliver, we agree with the trial court and
affirm on the basis of the trial court opinion. TCO at 13-14.1
To the extent mother also challenges the trial court’s findings under
Section 2511(b), we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
finding termination proper under Section 2511(b).
Section 2511(b) provides:
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). The focus under Section 2511(b) is not on the parent,
but on the child. In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa.Super.
2008) (en banc). Pursuant to Section 2511(b), the trial court must determine
“whether termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884
A.2d 1284, 1286 (Pa.Super. 2005). This Court has explained that
“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the
inquiry into [the] needs and welfare of the child.” Id. at 1287. The trial court
“must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost
attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond.” Id.
Here, the trial court found termination would be in Child’s best interest.
It reasoned that Child is thriving in her foster placement, is physically and
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1 In the event of future proceedings, the parties shall attach a redacted copy
(using initials) of the trial court opinion.
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developmentally on track, and the foster parents are meeting her physical,
emotional, and medical needs. TCO at 15. The trial court further noted that
Child lives with her biological sister, R.M., and has two foster siblings. Id. The
trial court noted that Mother loved child, but found that “there was no evidence
of a reciprocal bond between Mother and [Child].” Id. The record supports
these factual findings and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding
termination would best meet Child’s developmental, physical and emotional
needs and welfare.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 08/24/2018
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..... Received 4/9/2018 4:27:26 PM Sl>f{eRef Court Middle District
Circulated 08/10/2018 01:31 PM
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-· Filed 4,9 2018 4:27:00 PM StJt)ef!Gr Court:M�d�f)�i�g��
IN THE COlJRT OF COMMON PLEAS, CENTRE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
ORPHA},JS' COURT DIVISION
IN RE: S-A-Mrl••, a minor NO: 4223 .
DOB: March/, 2016
Oliver, J.
S.
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Counsel for Natural Mother, U g.M...: