J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: J.S.C., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: S.C. :
:
:
:
:
: No. 62 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered December 7, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): 54 OC 2016
IN RE: S.J.M., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: S.C. :
:
:
:
:
: No. 63 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered December 2, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): 24 OC 2016
IN RE: S.J.M., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: TIOGA COUNTY :
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES :
:
:
:
: No. 64 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered December 7, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): 24 OC 2016
J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
BEFORE: STABILE, MOULTON, and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 20, 2017
S.C. (“Mother”)1 appeals from the December 2, 2016 order granting
the petition filed by the Tioga County Department of Human Services
(“DHS”) to involuntarily terminate her parental rights to J.S.C. (born in
February 2015), pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.2 Mother
also appeals the December 7, 2016 order granting the petition filed by DHS
to involuntarily terminate her parental rights to S.J.M. (born in August
2012), whose biological father is L.V.N.3 DHS appeals the trial court’s
December 7, 2016 order denying its petition to terminate the parental rights
of L.V.N. to S.J.M. With respect to all three appeals, we affirm.
The trial court set forth the relevant factual background of the appeal
involving J.S.C. as follows:
4. Upon discharge from the hospital, [J.S.C.] resided with
his mother. . . .
...
____________________________________________
1
S.C. is also described in the record as S.E.C.
2
In the December 2, 2016 order, the trial court also granted the
petition to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of M.J.G., who is
J.S.C.’s biological father. M.J.G. has not filed an appeal from the termination
of his parental rights, nor is he a party to the instant appeal.
3
We refer to J.S.C. and S.J.M. collectively as “Children”.
-2-
J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
10. [J.S.C.] was removed from the care of [Mother] on
October 27, 2015 and has remained in care since that
time.
11. During [J.S.C.’s] placement, the [DHS] Family Services
Division has offered services to [Mother] and [M.J.G.].
...
13. [Mother] has failed to consistently participate in
recommended services.
14. [Mother] has failed to follow through with
recommended mental health counseling.
15. [Mother] has been unable or unwilling to maintain
consistent housing or employment.
16. [Mother] has been inconsistent in meetings with
providers including [Intensive Case Management (“ICM”)]
and [Support, Teach, and Educate Parents (“STEPs”)].
17. [Mother] has continued to struggle with maintaining a
safe environment for [J.S.C.].
18. [Mother] has exhibited erratic behavior including,
during the pendency of the termination action, threatening
self-harm by ingestion of an overdose of prescribed
medication.
Trial Court Opinion (J.S.C.), 12/2/16, at 1-2 (“Termination Op. (J.S.C.)”).
The trial court set forth the relevant factual background of the appeals
involving S.J.M. as follows.
4. Upon discharge from the hospital, [S.J.M.] resided with
his mother. . . .
5. [S.J.M.] was removed from [Mother’s] care and placed
on or about July 29, 2014.
6. Prior to [S.J.M.’s] removal f[ro]m [Mother’s] home,
[L.V.N.] had no contact with him and was not aware of his
status as father until at or near the time of removal.
-3-
J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
7. The [DHS] Family Services Division[] has continually
offered services to [Mother] and has attempted to offer
services to [L.V.N.].
8. [Mother] has failed to follow through with the services
offered by [DHS] Family Services Division.
9. [L.V.N.] has accepted some services, but has struggled
to maintain his sobriety and has been incarcerated for a
substantial portion of [S.J.M.’s] placement.
10. [L.V.N.] also has been forced to deal with a serious
medical condition.
11. [L.V.N.] specifically declined to have contact with
[S.J.M.] during his period of incarceration.
12. [L.V.N.] also elected not to pursue contact with
[S.J.M.] upon his release from his most recent
incarceration prior to the filing of the petition.
13. [Mother] has been unwilling to maintain steady
housing and employment from the time of placement until
after the intent petition was filed.
14. [Mother] has failed to [comply] with treatment
recommendations for mental health throughout the
placement.
15. [Mother] has been inconsistent in meetings with
providers including ICM and STEPs.
16. [Mother] has continued to struggle with maintaining a
safe environment for [S.J.M].
17. [Mother] has exhibited erratic behaviors including,
during the pendency of the termination action, threatening
self-harm by ingestion of an overdose of prescribed
medication.
Trial Court Opinion (S.J.M.), 12/7/16, at 1-2 (“Termination Op. (S.J.M.)”).
On April 5, 2016, DHS filed the petitions for the involuntary
termination of the parental rights to S.J.M. of Mother and L.V.N. pursuant to
section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). On June 27, 2016, DHS filed the
-4-
J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
petitions for the involuntary termination of the parental rights to J.S.C. of
Mother and M.J.G., J.S.C.’s biological father, pursuant to section 2511(a)(1),
(2), (5), and (b). At the time that DHS filed the petitions, Children resided
with D.F. and his wife, J.F., (“the F.’s” or “Foster Parents”).
On September 21, 2016, September 22, 2016, and October 26, 2016,
the trial court held a hearing on the petitions to terminate the parental rights
of Mother and the respective fathers to Children. At the September 21,
2016 hearing, DHS presented the testimony of: its supervisor, Lindsey
Hinman, N.T., 9/21/16, at 5, 139; Denise Feger, Ph.D., who is the vice-
president of operations for Crossroads Counseling, as an expert in bonding
and attachment issues, id. at 14; licensed psychologist Joseph McNamara,
Ph.D., as an expert in clinical psychology, id. at 57-58; Kaleena Allen, who
is the extensive case manager through Service Access and Management
(“SAM”), id. at 65-66; Holly Doud, who took over the case from Ms. Allen at
SAM, id. at 81; Jessica Becker, the STEPs provider for Tioga County, id. at
100; Jamie Hulbert, the STEPs provider for SAM, id. at 113, J.F., who is the
foster mother and L.V.N.’s first cousin, id. at 201, 208. The trial court
admitted the dependency records for Children into evidence. Id. at 13. On
September 21, 2016, L.V.N.’s counsel presented the testimony of L.V.N.’s
mother, A.C. Id. at 221. Mother’s counsel presented the testimony of Carl
Linscott, a minister who runs a teen center that Mother attended, id. at 253-
255, and the testimony of Mother’s sister, L.J, id. at 267.
-5-
J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
On September 22, 2016, Mother presented the testimony of Donna
Cummings, who is a family partner for Tioga Early Head Start, which is a
home visitor position, N.T., 9/2/16, at 3; Robin Flynn, a family partner at
Tioga Early Head Start who works out of the Elkland, Pennsylvania office, id.
at 28; and Mother’s fiancé, T.K., his mother C.K., and his grandfather, T.M,
id. at 43, 58, 66. In addition, L.V.N. presented the testimony of L.V.N.’s
supervisor, N.R., his girlfriend, S.A., and his father, L.V. Id. at 73-74, 79,
90.
On October 26, 2016, L.V.N. testified on his own behalf. N.T.,
10/26/17, at 3. Mother presented the testimony of D.H., who had resided in
Mother’s home for a few weeks at the time of the hearing. id. at 62, and
Mother testified on her own behalf, id. at 67.
In the December 2, 2016 order, the trial court terminated the parental
rights of Mother to J.S.C. pursuant to section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (b) of
the Adoption Act. In the December 7, 2016 orders, the trial court
terminated the parental rights of Mother to S.J.M. pursuant to section
2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), and denied the petition to terminate
L.V.N.’s parental rights to S.J.M. In both the order terminating Mother’s
parental rights to S.J.M. and the order denying the petition for termination
of L.V.N.’s parental rights regarding S.J.M., the trial court provided that legal
custody of S.J.M. would remain with DHS and his placement would remain
with Foster Parents, pending further order of court.
-6-
J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
On January 4, 2017 and January 6, 2017, Mother timely filed notices
of appeal from the termination orders, along with concise statements of
errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
On January 5, 2017, DHS timely filed a notice of appeal from the order
denying the termination of L.V.N.’s parental rights to S.J.M, along with a
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.4
In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we
adhere to the following standard:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion
standard when considering a trial court’s determination of
a petition for termination of parental rights. As in
dependency cases, our standard of review requires an
appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility
determinations of the trial court if they are supported by
the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error
of law or abused its discretion. As has been often stated,
an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the
reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion.
Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of
discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.
As we discussed in [In re] R.J.T., [9 A.3d 1197 (Pa.
2010),] there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of
discretion standard of review in these cases. We observed
that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped
to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record,
where the trial judges are observing the parties during the
relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
____________________________________________
4
We will dispose of the appeals in one Memorandum for ease of
disposition.
-7-
J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d
at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an
opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and
termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge
to second guess the trial court and impose its own
credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must
defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are
supported by the record and the court’s legal conclusions
are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of
discretion.
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-827 (Pa. 2012) (some internal
citation omitted).
“In termination cases, the burden is upon [the petitioner] to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that its asserted grounds for seeking the
termination of parental rights are valid.” In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276
(Pa.Super. 2009). We have explained that “[t]he standard of clear and
convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty
and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.’” Id. (quoting
In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa.Super. 2003)).
I. Mother’s Appeal of the Termination of her Parental Rights
In her brief on appeal regarding J.S.C., Mother raises the following
issue:
1. The trial court was provided with evidence of a bonding
assessment that was performed in regards to the bond
between Child and Mother, [L.V.N.], and foster parents,
respectively. The assessment and the associated
testimony provided clear evidence that there is a bond
between Mother and Child and that Mother desires to take
care of her children. Did the trial court abuse its discretion
-8-
J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
when it determined that terminating the rights of Mother
was in the child’s best interest, when Mother and Child
have the bond that they do?
2. Each service provider who testified at the termination
hearing who had worked with Mother in the months
approaching the termination hearing acknowledged a
marked improvement in both Mother’s housekeeping and
Mother’s parenting ability (two of the primary concerns
about Mother in the dependency matter). Mother also got
a full-time job in the time preceding the termination
hearing (a third concern in the dependency matter). Did
the trial court abuse its discretion when it determined that
the grounds for termination had been met, or that if they
had, that it was in Child’s best interest to terminate, when
Mother had been making a marked improvement in three
areas that had been large concerns?
Mother’s Br. (J.S.C.) at 3-4.
In her brief on appeal regarding S.J.M., Mother raises the following
issues:
1. The trial court terminated the rights of Mother, while
simultaneously determining that Father’s [L.V.N.’s] rights
should not be terminated. Pennsylvania law repeatedly
acknowledges that a Child is entitled to support from two
parents. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it
determined that terminating the rights of Mother was in
the child’s best interest, while Father [L.V.N.] still retains
his rights?
2. The trial court was provided with evidence of a bonding
assessment that was performed in regards to the bond
between Child and Mother, [L.V.N.] and foster parents,
respectively. The assessment and the associated
testimony provided clear evidence that there is a bond
between Mother and Child, that Child is comfortable with
Mother, and that Mother desires to take care of her
children. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it
determined that terminating the rights of Mother was in
the child’s best interest, when Mother and Child have the
bond that they do?
-9-
J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
3. Each service provider who testified at the termination
hearing who had worked with Mother in the months
approaching the termination hearing acknowledged a
marked improvement in both Mother’s housekeeping and
Mother’s parenting ability (two of the primary concerns
about Mother in the dependency matter). Mother also got
a full-time job in the time preceding the termination
hearing (a third concern in the dependency matter). Did
the trial court abuse its discretion when it determined that
the grounds for termination had been met, or that if they
had, that it was in Child’s best interest to terminate, when
Mother had been making a marked improvement in three
areas that had been large concerns?
Mother’s Br. (S.J.M.) at 3-4.
Preliminarily, we conclude that Mother waived the first issue raised in
her brief challenging the termination of her parental rights to S.J.M.
(concerning the termination of her parental rights while not terminating
L.V.N.’s parental rights) because she did not include it in her 1925(b)
statement. See Krebs v. United Refining Co. of Pa., 893 A.2d 776, 797
(Pa.Super. 2006) (holding that an appellant waives issues that are not raised
in both his or her concise statement of errors complained of on appeal and
the Statement of Questions Involved in his brief on appeal).5
To affirm the termination of parental rights, this Court need only agree
with any one subsection of section 2511(a), along with section 2511(b). In
____________________________________________
5
Further, even if Mother had preserved this issue, we would conclude
it lacks merit. That the trial court determined DHS failed to present clear
and convincing evidence to support the termination of L.V.N.’s parental
rights does not affect the analysis of whether the trial court properly
terminated Mother’s parental rights.
- 10 -
J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). We conclude
that the trial court in this case properly terminated Mother’s parental rights
pursuant to sections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
...
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
well-being and the conditions and causes of the
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied by the parent.
...
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the
parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to
subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider
any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to
the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
To terminate parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(2), the
moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the
following elements: “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
- 11 -
J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” See In re
Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003).
Regarding the decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights to J.S.C.
under section 2511(a)(2), the trial court stated the following.
[J.S.C.] was born [in February 2015] to [Mother].
[J.S.C.’s] father, [M.J.G.], had no involvement with
[J.S.C.] since his birth. [J.S.C.] was removed from
[Mother’s] care on October 27, 2015 and placed in a foster
home with [Foster Parents,] where he has remained.
Since [J.S.C.’s] removal, the Tioga County Department of
Human Services Family Services Division has offered
services to the parents. [M.J.G.] has not participated in
services and maintained little or no contact with Family
Services. [Mother] has remained in contact but struggled
as discussed below.
On June 27, 2016, Family Services filed the . . . Petition
for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights naming both
[Mother] and [M.J.G.] as respondents. Family Services
specifies subsections (a)(1), (a)(2) and (a)(5) as grounds
for termination. Following a consolidated termination
hearing occurring over portions of three days, and having
considered the closing summations submitted thereafter,
the Court determines that Petitioner has established by
clear and convincing evidence that the parental rights of
both [M.J.G.] and [Mother] as to [J.S.C.] should be
terminated.
...
Since [J.S.C.’s] removal from [Mother’s] care, Family
Services has offered a variety of supportive services to
[Mother], including parenting skills through the STEPs
program, Intensive Case Management, support within the
home to address safety and health concerns and it has
attempted to ensure [Mother] has access to and maintains
appropriate mental health services. [Mother] has
frequently been unwilling to work with service providers.
- 12 -
J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
She has been argumentative with providers and
sometimes unwilling to implement the recommendations
she was presented with. On various occasions, [Mother]
has declined to cooperate with or even meet with service
providers. Family Services has worked to help [Mother]
maintain home conditions to safely allow visits in the
home, but [Mother] is unwilling or at least unable to
maintain safe, appropriate conditions on her own.
[Mother] has, prior to the filing of the termination petition,
been unable or unwilling to obtain employment. She also
has been unable to maintain stable housing. Additionally,
[Mother] has been unwilling to maintain necessary mental
health services to address her needs. She has been
discharged by service providers for failing to attend
appointments. The record establishes these difficulties
have not occurred due to circumstances beyond [Mother’s]
control. Dr. McNamara noted [Mother] has substantial
cognitive abilities, but needed to follow through with
support and mental health services. [Mother] simply failed
to do so. The Court finds there is no credible likelihood
that [Mother] will remedy the conditions which led to
[J.S.C.’s] placement. Rather, in the absence of a
termination of [Mother’s] parental rights, [J.S.C.] would
almost certainly be maintained in placement but denied
permanency as [Mother] continues to present superficial
cooperation, but no progress toward alleviating the many
serious circumstances that prevent her from being a
parent to him.
Additionally, the evidence in the case also establishes
[Mother’s] “repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal . . .” as [J.S.C.’s] parent causing him “to
be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being . . .” as
alleged by Petitioner pursuant to §2511(a)(2). [Mother]
has been presented with the services discussed above in
an effort to address the problems necessitating Family
Service and Court Dependency involvement. She has
refused to accept and/or adopt the services and remedies
offered. There is no evidence to suggest that the
incapacity and refusal will be remedied. In fact, the record
indicates the contrary and establishes that [Mother] cannot
or will not make the necessary changes.
Termination Op. (J.S.C.), 2/2/17, at 2-6.
- 13 -
J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
The trial court provided the following reasoning in support of its
decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights to S.J.M.
[S.J.M.] was born [in August 2012] to [Mother].
[L.V.N.], the biological father of [S.J.M.] was unaware of
his status as father until [S.J.M.] was approximately one
year old, at or about the time he was removed from
[Mother’s] care. Following the child’s removal from
[Mother’s] home he was placed with [L.V.N.’s] mother,
[A.C.], and step-father where he remained for nearly a
year until medical concerns in the [C.] family forced [A.C.]
to seek a change in [S.J.M.’s] placement[,] at which time
he was placed with the [Foster Parents,] who continue to
provide placement at this time.
Petitioner asserts subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5) and
(a)(8) of Title 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511 as grounds for
termination of parental rights. Turning to the parental
rights of [Mother], the Court finds Petitioner has
established grounds for termination. As noted above,
[S.J.M.] was removed from [Mother’s] care on October 27,
2015, and the termination petition was filed on June 27,
2016. . . .
Since [S.J.M.’s] removal from [Mother’s] care, Family
Services has offered a variety of supportive services to
[Mother], including parenting skills through the STEPs
program, Intensive Case Management, support within the
home to address safety and health concerns and it has
attempted to ensure [Mother] has access to and maintains
appropriate mental health services. [Mother] has
frequently been unwilling to work with service providers.
She has been argumentative with providers and
sometimes unwilling to implement the recommendations
she was presented with. On various occasions, [Mother]
has declined to cooperate with or even meet with service
providers. Family Services has worked to help [Mother]
maintain home conditions to safely allow visits in the
home, but [Mother] is unwilling or at least unable to
maintain safe, appropriate conditions on her own.
[Mother] has, prior to the filing of the termination petition,
been unable or unwilling to obtain employment. She also
has been unable to maintain stable housing. Additionally,
[Mother] has been unwilling to maintain necessary mental
- 14 -
J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
health services to address her needs. She has been
discharged by service providers for failing to attend
appointments. The record establishes these difficulties
have not occurred due to circumstances beyond [Mother’s]
control. Dr. McNamara noted [Mother] has substantial
cognitive abilities, but needed to follow through with
support and mental health services. [Mother] simply failed
to do so. The Court finds there is no credible likelihood
that [Mother] will remedy the conditions which led to
[S.J.M.’s] placement. Rather, in the absence of a
termination of [Mother’s] parental rights, [S.J.M.] would
almost certainly be maintained in placement but denied
permanency as [Mother] continues to present superficial
cooperation, but no progress toward alleviating the many
serious circumstances that prevent her from being a
parent to him.
...
Additionally, the evidence in the case also establishes
[Mother’s] “repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal . . .” as [S.J.M.’s] parent causing him “to
be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being . . .” as
alleged by Petitioner pursuant to §2511(a)(2). [Mother]
has been presented with the services discussed above in
an effort to address the problems necessitating Family
Service and Court [d]ependency involvement. She has
refused to accept and/or adopt the services and remedies
offered. There is no evidence to suggest that the
incapacity and refusal will be remedied. In fact, the record
indicates the contrary and establishes that [Mother] cannot
or will not make the necessary changes.
Termination Op. (S.J.M.), 2/2/17, at 2-5.
As there is competent evidence in the record that supports the trial
court’s findings and credibility determinations, we conclude the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights to Children
under section 2511(a)(2). In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27.
- 15 -
J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
The trial court must also consider how terminating Mother’s parental
rights would affect the needs and welfare of Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511(b). This Court has stated that the focus in terminating parental
rights under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child pursuant
to section 2511(b). See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008
(Pa. Super 2008) (en banc). In reviewing the evidence in support of
termination under section 2511(b), our Supreme Court recently stated as
follows:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are
met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs
and welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to
include “[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and
stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa.Super. 2012).
In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court
held that the determination of the child’s “needs and
welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds
between the parent and child. The “utmost attention”
should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of
permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53
A.3d at 791.
In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).
When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use
expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
well. Additionally, section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010) (internal
citations omitted).
- 16 -
J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
A parent’s abuse and neglect are likewise a relevant part of this
analysis:
[C]oncluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent
simply because the child harbors affection for the parent is
not only dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s
feelings were the dispositive factor in the bonding analysis,
the analysis would be reduced to an exercise in semantics
as it is the rare child who, after being subject to neglect
and abuse, is able to sift through the emotional wreckage
and completely disavow a parent. . . . Nor are we of the
opinion that the biological connection between [the parent]
and the children is sufficient in of itself, or when
considered in connection with a child’s feeling toward a
parent, to establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The
psychological aspect of parenthood is more important in
terms of the development of the child and [his or her]
mental and emotional health than the coincidence of
biological or natural parenthood.
In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). Thus, the court may emphasize the safety needs
of the child. See In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 763 (Pa.Super. 2008)
(affirming involuntary termination of parental rights, despite existence of
some bond, where placement with mother would be contrary to child’s best
interests). It is well-settled that “we will not toll the well-being and
permanency of [a child] indefinitely.” In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d
999, 1007 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc); accord In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726,
732 (Pa. Super. 2008) (noting child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in
the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the
responsibilities of parenting.”).
- 17 -
J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
With regard to the termination of Mother’s parental rights to J.S.C.
under section 2511(b), the trial court stated the following.
Turning to the considerations contained in §2511(b), it
is clear there is a relationship and bond between [J.S.C.]
and [Mother]. It is equally clear that [J.S.C.] has bonded
with the [F.’s] while placed there. [Mother] has not been
able to offer safety, security and stability. After the filing
of the termination petition, [Mother] chose to return to
counseling and chose to obtain and maintain employment.
The evidence establishes her difficulties were the result of
circumstances within her control.
Concerning the [F.’s], [J.S.C.] has made significant
progress while placed there. [J.S.C.], while in placement,
receives Early Intervention and Occupational Therapy
services. Mrs. [F.] testified that [J.S.C.] is drastically
improving. Mrs. [F.] also testified that she and her family
are ready and willing to provide permanency for [J.S.C.]
and will adopt him, if given the opportunity.
It is clear there will be difficulty for all parties, most
importantly [J.S.C.], if [Mother’s] parental rights are
terminated. The existing bond will be severed between the
two. On balance though, the temporary challenges
presently will be outweighed by the advancement of
[J.S.C.’s] long-term best interest which will best be served
by moving him out of the limbo and into a permanent
home where his developmental, physical and emotional
needs will be met.
Termination Op. (J.S.C.) at 7.
With regard to the termination of Mother’s parental rights to S.J.M.
under section 2511(b), the trial court stated as follows.
Turning to the considerations contained in § 2511(b), it
is clear there is a relationship and bond between [S.J.M.]
and [Mother]. It is equally clear that [S.J.M.] has bonded
with the [F.’s] while placed there. [Mother] has not been
able to offer safety, security and stability. After the filing
of the termination petition, [Mother] chose to return to
counseling and chose to obtain and maintain employment.
- 18 -
J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
The evidence establishes her difficulties were the result of
circumstances within her control.
Concerning the [F.’s], [S.J.M.] has made significant
progress while placed there. [S.J.M.], while in placement,
receives Early Intervention and Occupational Therapy
services. Mrs. [F.] testified that [S.J.M.] is drastically
improving. Mrs. [F.] also testified that she and her family
are ready and willing to provide permanency for [S.J.M.]
and will adopt him, if given the opportunity.
It is clear there will be difficulty for all parties, most
importantly [S.J.M.], if [Mother’s] parental rights are
terminated. The existing bond will be severed between the
two. On balance though, the temporary challenges
presently will be outweighed by the advancement of
[S.J.M.’s] long-term best interest[,] which will best be
served by moving him out of the limbo and into a
permanent home where his developmental, physical and
emotional needs will be met.
Termination Op. (S.J.M.) at 6.
We find that there is competent evidence in the record that supports
the trial court’s findings and credibility determinations, and that there was
no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights
to Children under section 2511(b). See In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at
826-27.
II. DHS’s Appeal of the Denial of the Petition to Terminate
L.V.N.’s Parental Rights
Next, we address DHS’s issues on appeal. In its brief on appeal
regarding S.J.M., DHS raises the following issues:
1. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in finding
that the grounds for termination of parental rights of
father [L.V.N.] under 23 P.S. [sic] § 2511 (a)(1), (a)(2),
(a)(5), and (a)(8) were not met in that efforts by the
father to remedy the conditions leading to the filing of the
- 19 -
J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
termination petition were first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition[?]
2. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in
determining that the best interest of the child would not be
served by terminating the [f]ather’s [L.V.N.’s] parental
rights[?]
3. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in failing
to address the impact of severing the sibling bond of S.J.M
and his half[-]sibling for whom parental rights were
terminated?
DHS’s Br. (S.J.M.) at 3.6
Here, regarding DHS’s petition for the termination of parental rights of
L.V.N., the trial court discussed various provisions of 2511(a), but ultimately
decided DHS failed to meet its burden under section 2511(b). The trial court
stated the following:
With regard to the parental rights of [L.V.N.], the Court
for the following reasons determines that termination of
his parental rights at this time is not appropriate.
The evidence presented in this case demonstrates that
while [L.V.N.] failed to exercise the appropriate level of
parental support and control at times[,] the unique
circumstances in this case do not warrant finding that it is
in the best interest of [S.J.M.] that [L.V.N.’s] rights be
terminated. Specifically, the Court notes [L.V.N.] has
undergone periods of incarceration including a term
immediately prior to the filing of the petition now before
the Court, [L.V.N.] has availed himself to substantial drug
and alcohol treatment during the incarceration in
significant effort to alleviate the conditions that previously
prevented him from being an appropriate parent. The
circumstances in [L.V.N.’s] life have at this time
____________________________________________
6
DHS stated its issues somewhat differently in its concise statement.
We, nevertheless, find the issues sufficiently preserved for our review.
- 20 -
J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
progressed in such a way that it appears reunification in
the near future is an attainable goal. [L.V.N.] has
demonstrated an adequate ability to maintain his sobriety,
employment and appropriate housing. The evidence also
demonstrates that he has the necessary parenting skills to
provide a safe home for [S.J.M.].
While [L.V.N.’s] contact with [S.J.M.] was limited during
the pendency of the dependency case, he did maintain
some contact through visits conducted while [S.J.M.] was
in his mother’s, [A.C.’s,] care. The Court further notes
that [S.J.M.] has established and maintained significant
contacts with [L.V.N’s] family, including but not limited to
the child’s grandmother and grandfather. Severing all
bonds with the [L.V.N.’s] family is not in his best interest.
Termination Op. (S.J.M.), 2/2/17, at 6-7.
We find that there is competent evidence in the record that supports
the trial court’s findings and credibility determinations, and that there was
no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in ruling that L.V.N.’s parental rights
to S.J.M. should not be terminated under section 2511(b) at this time under
the individual circumstances of this case. See In re Adoption of S.P., 47
A.3d at 826-27, 830-31 (discussing the abuse of discretion standard and
citing In re R.J.T.); see also In re Adoption of: A.C., 2017 Pa. Super 143
(May 12, 2017) (affirming trial court order denying the agency’s petition for
the termination of the father’s parental rights where finding that CYS did not
- 21 -
J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
establish by clear and convincing evidence that Father’s rights should be
terminated under section 2511(a)(1) was supported by record).7
Finally, we address DHS’s contention that the trial court abused its
discretion by separating S.J.M. from his half-sibling, J.S.C., through its
refusal to terminate L.V.N.’s parental rights so that both Children may be
adopted by Foster Parents.
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained: “focusing
exclusively upon [the relationship between S.J.M. and J.S.C.], would compel
the abandonment of consideration of any other bonds including the child’s
bond to another half sibling fathered by [L.V.N.].” Trial Court Opinion
Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2511(a)(2)(ii) at 1.
In In re R.N.J., the trial court terminated the parental rights of the
mother to two of her children, even though the children to whom her
parental rights had been terminated shared a foster home with a child as to
____________________________________________
7
As both the statute and our case law make clear, the focus under
section 2511(b) is on the child. See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d at
1008. We note that much of the trial court’s discussion focuses on Father’s
conduct. That discussion is appropriate under 2511(b) to the extent that
Father’s conduct is relevant to the best interests of Child. The trial court
relied on the unique nature of this case and the relationship that Child has
with Father’s family, as well as the steps Father has taken to make
reunification an attainable goal, and determined that it would not be in
Child’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights. While a more
extended discussion of Child’s interests might have been preferable, we will
not second guess the trial court, who observed the parties and whose
decision is not the result of “manifest unreasonable, partiality, prejudice,
bias, or ill-will.” See In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27.”
- 22 -
J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
whom her parental rights had not been terminated. 985 A.2d 273
(Pa.Super. 2009). This Court held that the trial court had not abused its
discretion in concluding that the termination of the mother’s parental rights
to the two children would best serve the children’s developmental, physical
and emotional needs and welfare, and that the termination of the mother’s
parental rights was proper. Id. at 279. We reasoned:
The trial court considered each child’s situation
independently. It found that the children’s unique
emotional needs and their respective relationships with
Mother compelled DHS to tailor individualized permanency
goals that best served each child’s needs and welfare. As
the record supports the trial court’s determination, we will
not disturb it.
Id. at 280.
Here, we have determined that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that the termination of the parental rights of Mother
and M.J.G. served J.S.C.’s best interests, and that the termination of L.V.N.’s
parental rights does not serve S.J.M.’s best interests. We have no reason to
disturb that determination on the basis that J.S.C. may now be adopted by
Foster Parents, and S.J.M. may not be adopted by them at this time. 8
Finding no abuse of the trial court’s discretion, we affirm the trial court’s
orders.
____________________________________________
8
In fact, the trial court’s order denying DHS’s termination petition as
to L.V.N. directs that S.J.M. will remain with Foster Parents until further
order of court.
- 23 -
J-S37018-17, S37019-17, S37020-17
Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/20/2017
- 24 -