TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-18-00327-CV
J. M. and C. S., Appellants
v.
Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 459TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. D-1-FM-17-001683, HONORABLE DUSTIN M. HOWELL, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellants J. M. and C. S. appeal from the trial court’s order terminating their
parental rights to their child. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001. Following a jury trial, the trial court
entered judgment in accordance with the jury’s findings by clear and convincing evidence that
statutory grounds existed for terminating J. M.’s and C. S.’s parental rights and that termination
was in the child’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (b)(2).
Each appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed a brief concluding that the
appeal is frivolous and without merit. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); In re P.M.,
520 S.W.3d 24, 27 & n.10 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (approving use of Anders procedure in appeals
from termination of parental rights because it “strikes an important balance between the defendant’s
constitutional right to counsel on appeal and counsel’s obligation not to prosecute frivolous appeals”
(citations omitted)). The briefs meet the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional
evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced on
appeal. See 386 U.S. at 744; Taylor v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 160 S.W.3d 641,
646–47 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied) (applying Anders procedure in parental-termination
case). Both appellants’ counsels have certified to this Court that they have provided their respective
clients with a copy of the Anders brief and clerk’s and reporter’s record and have informed their
respective clients of their right to file a pro se brief. The Department of Family and Protective
Services has filed responses to the Anders briefs waiving its right to file an appellee’s brief but
requesting that it be afforded an opportunity to respond to any pro se brief filed by appellants. To
date, no pro se briefs have been filed.
We have conducted a full examination of all of the proceedings to determine whether
the appeals are wholly frivolous, as we must when presented with an Anders brief. See Penson v.
Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). After reviewing the record and the Anders briefs, we find nothing in
the record that would arguably support either J. M.’s or C. S.’s appeal. We agree with appellants’
counsels that the appeals are frivolous and without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order
terminating the parental rights of J. M. and C. S. We deny counsels’ respective motions to withdraw.1
1
The Texas Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel in suits seeking termination
of parental rights extends to “all proceedings [in the Texas Supreme Court], including the filing of
a petition for review.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam). Accordingly,
counsels’ respective obligations to J. M. and C. S. have not yet been discharged. See id. If after
consulting with counsel appellants desire to file petitions for review, their counsels should timely
file with the supreme court “a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.”
See id.
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__________________________________________
David Puryear, Justice
Before Justices Puryear, Goodwin, and Bourland
Affirmed
Filed: August 28, 2018
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