MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Aug 30 2018, 8:52 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
R. Brian Woodward Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Crown Point, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Ellen H. Meilaender
Supervising Deputy Attorney
General
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Michelle Faye Gonzales Hughes, August 30, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-112
v. Appeal from the Lake Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Diane Ross
Appellee-Plaintiff. Boswell, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
45G03-1509-MR-6
Pyle, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-112 | August 30, 2018 Page 1 of 11
Statement of the Case
[1] Michelle Hughes (“Hughes”) appeals the thirty-year aggregate sentence
imposed after she pleaded guilty to two counts of Level 3 felony kidnapping.1
She specifically argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing her
and that her thirty-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offense and her character. Because we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in sentencing Hughes and that Hughes’ sentence is not
inappropriate, we affirm Hughes’ sentence.
[2] We affirm.
Issues
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing
Hughes.
2. Whether Hughes’ sentence is inappropriate.
Facts
[3] When seventeen-year-old Aarion Greenwood (“Greenwood’) was released
from the Porter County Juvenile Detention Center in June 2015, he was met by
his girlfriend, twenty-six-year-old Hughes; his father (“Father”); his stepmother
(“Stepmother”); his brother (“Brother”); and his brother’s friend (“Brother’s
Friend”). Greenwood, his family, and his friends immediately drove to a
nearby motel to retrieve a firearm that Greenwood had given to a friend,
1
IND. CODE § 35-42-3-2.
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eighteen-year-old Aareon Lackey (“Lackey”). Hughes drove a car in which
Greenwood, Brother, and Brother’s Friend were passengers. Other family
members followed behind in a van. The two vehicles arrived at the motel, and
the group confronted Lackey about the gun. When Lackey told the group that
he did not know where the gun was, the group forced Lackey and his sixteen-
year-old brother, Antonio, (“Lackey’s Brother”) to leave the motel without their
shoes or cell phones. As Lackey’s Brother got into Hughes’ car, Lackey
attempted to get into the same vehicle. Father, however, forcefully directed
Lackey to get into the van.
[4] Hughes drove Greenwood, Brother, and Lackey’s Brother to a trailer park to
look for the gun. On the way, Greenwood struck Lackey’s Brother in the
mouth, drawing blood. Other family members and Lackey followed in the van.
When the group arrived at the trailer, Brother got out of the car and approached
the van, where Stepmother handed him a gun and told him that she did not
trust anyone in the trailer. Brother’s Friend got out of the van holding a gun.
When no one answered the trailer’s front door, Brother gave the gun back to
Stepmother and got back into the car with Hughes, Greenwood, and Lackey’s
Brother, and the two vehicles drove away.
[5] Hughes subsequently followed the van down a narrow access road and into a
field. Lackey and his brother were forced out of the vehicles and led into the
woods where Stepmother shot and killed them both. Their decomposing
remains, including bones and teeth, were discovered in July 2015, and they
were identified through dental records.
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[6] In September 2015, the State charged Hughes and her co-defendants with two
counts of murder, two counts of felony murder, and two counts of Level 5
felony kidnapping. Two years later, Hughes pled guilty to two counts of Level
3 felony kidnapping in exchange for the dismissal of the other counts. At the
guilty plea hearing, Hughes admitted to the facts contained in the stipulated
factual basis.
[7] At the sentencing hearing, the State pointed out that the Lackey brothers had
been “left in those woods rotting, torn apart by animals, and denying the ability
of their parents to kiss them goodbye one last time and bury them” (Tr. 25-26).
The State further pointed out that all that was left of the Lackey brothers was
“bones, teeth, pieces of hair[,] and clothing.” (Tr. 26). In addition, the State
argued that at “any point in time, [Hughes] could have peeled off, but she
didn’t. She drove Antonio Lackey to his death in that death mobile, to that
farm.” (Tr. 29). The State also argued that “after everything was done, she
drove away. She knew those boys didn’t come out of the woods. They didn’t
get into the van. They certainly didn’t get into the car. She drove away.” (Tr.
29).
[8] Evidence presented at the sentencing hearing further revealed that Hughes’ four
young children had been living with Hughes’ mother since 2014, and that
Hughes had “signed over parental rights [to her mother]” in 2015. (App. Vol. 2
at 215). In addition, Hughes’ prior criminal history included convictions for
misdemeanor theft in 2011 and Level 5 felony burglary in 2015. Hughes was
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sentenced for the burglary conviction days after committing the offenses in this
case.
[9] Following the sentencing hearing, the trial court found as mitigating factors that
Hughes had a limited criminal history and that she had accepted responsibility
for her actions and pled guilty. The trial court found as aggravating factors that
the “crime was a heinous cold-blooded execution of two teenage boys” and that
Hughes “had ample opportunity to extricate herself from the situation” and
failed to do so. (App. Vol. 2 at 235). Specifically, the trial court explained as
follows regarding the second aggravator:
I’m sure it didn’t escalate or spiral out of control after
[Greenwood’s stepmother] walked those children into the woods.
You saw that building up long before it happened. Long before it
happened, you knew that this was not going to end well, but you
did not extricate yourself at all.
(Tr. 47). Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Hughes to fifteen years for each
conviction and ordered the sentences to run consecutively to each other for an
aggregate sentence of thirty (30) years. Hughes now appeals her sentence.
Decision
1. Abuse of Discretion
[10] Hughes first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing her.
Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007). So long as the sentence is
in the statutory range, it is subject to review only for an abuse of discretion. Id.
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An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and
effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable,
probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. at 491. A trial
court may abuse its discretion in a number of ways, including: (1) failing to
enter a sentencing statement at all; (2) entering a sentencing statement that
includes aggravating and mitigating factors that are unsupported by the record;
(3) entering a sentencing statement that omits reasons that are clearly supported
by the record; or (4) entering a sentencing statement that includes reasons that
are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-91.
[11] Here, Hughes contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it “relied
upon aggravating circumstances not supported by the record.” (Hughes’ Br. 7).
Hughes specifically argues that the trial court did “nothing more than us[e] an
element of the offense as an improper aggravator.” (Hughes’ Br. 8). Although
it is true that a material element of the crime may not be used as an aggravating
factor to support an enhanced sentence, the trial court may properly consider
the particularized circumstances of the crime as aggravating factors. McElroy v.
State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 589-90 (Ind. 2007). Generally, this aggravator is thought
to be associated with particularly heinous facts or situations. Id. at 590.
[12] Here, the trial court found as aggravating factors the “crime was a heinous cold-
blooded execution of two teenage boys” and that Hughes “had ample
opportunity to extricate herself from the situation” and failed to do so. (App.
Vol. 2 at 235). These particularized circumstances of the crime were proper
aggravating factors, which are well-supported by the evidence. Specifically,
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Hughes participated in removing the teenaged brothers from their motel room
and driving them down a narrow access road, where they were then led into the
woods, shot, and killed. Their bodies were left to decay in the woods, and by
the time they were found, the only things left were teeth, bones, hair and pieces
of their clothing. This evidence supports the trial court’s first aggravating factor
that the “crime was a heinous cold-blooded execution of two teenage boys.”
(App. Vol. 2 at 235).
[13] In addition, Hughes was the driver of the car in which Lackey’s brother was
placed. She drove the young man from the motel to a trailer park. When the
group left the trailer park, Hughes followed the van down a remote access road
into a field and watched the boys being led into the woods. We agree with the
State that Hughes, “who was driving herself in her mother’s car, had multiple
opportunities to break off from the rest.” (State’s Br. at 11). This evidence
supports the trial court’s second aggravating factor. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in its determination of aggravating factors.
[14] Hughes also argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered her
two sentences to run consecutively to each other. Specifically, she argues that
the trial court failed to balance the aggravating factors against the mitigating
factors. However, Anglemyer makes clear that, when imposing a sentence, a
trial court “no longer has any obligation to ‘weigh’ aggravating and mitigating
factors against each other” and thus “a trial court can not now be said to have
abused its discretion in failing to ‘properly weigh’ such factors.” Anglemyer, 868
N.E.2d at 491. Hughes’ argument therefore fails. The trial court did not abuse
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its discretion in failing to balance the aggravating factors against the mitigating
factors.
[15] Hughes also appears to argue that the aggravating factors did not support
consecutive sentences. A single aggravating factor may be used to both
enhance a sentence and to impose consecutive sentences. See Haggard v. State,
771 N.E.2d 668, 676 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. Here, the trial court
found two valid aggravating factors. We further note that consecutive
sentences reflect the significance of multiple victims. See McCann v. State, 749
N.E.2d 1116, 1120 (Ind. 2001). “[W]hen the perpetrator commits the same
offense against two victims, enhanced and consecutive sentences seem
necessary to vindicate the fact that there were separate harms and separate acts
against more than one person.” Serino v. State, 798 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. 2003).
2. Inappropriate Sentence
[16] Lastly, Hughes argues that her sentence is inappropriate. Indiana Appellate
Rule 7(B) provides that we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after
due consideration of the trial court’s decision, we find that the sentence is
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender. The defendant bears the burden of persuading this Court that her
sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).
Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate turns on the “culpability of the
defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad
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other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d
1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).
[17] The Indiana Supreme Court has further explained that “[s]entencing is
principally a discretionary function in which the trial court’s judgment should
receive considerable deference.” Id. at 1222. “Such deference should prevail
unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the
nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of
brutality) and the defendant’s character (such as substantial virtuous traits or
persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122
(Ind. 2015).
[18] When determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, the advisory sentence is
the starting point the legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the
crime committed. Childress, 848 N.E.2d at 1081. Here, Hughes was convicted
of two Level 3 felonies. The sentencing range for a Level 3 felony is between
three and sixteen years with an advisory sentence of nine years. See I.C. § 35-
50-2-5. The trial court sentenced Hughes to fifteen years for each conviction
and ordered the two sentences to run consecutively to each other for an
aggregate sentence of thirty years. This is less than the maximum sentence and
more than the advisory sentence.
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[19] With regard to the nature of the offense, we agree with the trial court that the
offense was a “heinous cold-blooded execution.”2 (App. Vol. 2 at 235).
Hughes was part of a group that forcibly removed the Lackey brothers from
their motel room and drove them in separate cars to a field, where they were led
into the woods, shot, and killed. Their bodies were then left in the woods to
decompose.
[20] Next we turn to the nature of Hughes’ character. To the extent that Hughes
argues that she was a young mother of four children at the time of sentencing,
Hughes’ children had been living with Hughes’ mother since 2014, and Hughes
had “signed over parental rights [to her mother]” in 2015. (App. Vol. 2 at 215).
In addition, this was not Hughes’ first contact with the criminal justice system.
She was convicted of misdemeanor theft in 2011 and Level 5 felony burglary in
2015. In fact, as the State points out, the “burglary case was still pending
against her at the time she decided to commit these heinous crimes; she was
sentenced on the burglary only days after the events of this case.” (State’s Br.
18). In addition, we agree with the State that it “speaks very poorly of
[Hughes’] character that the realization of facing the consequences of a felony
burglary conviction was not enough to dissuade her from deciding her to
participate in these even more serious crimes.” (State’s Br. 18-19). Hughes has
2
Although the murder charges were dismissed when Hughes pled guilty to the kidnapping charges, the trial
court was nevertheless allowed to consider the facts of the dismissed charges for sentencing purposes. See
Bethea v. State, 983 N.E. 1134, 1145 (Ind. 2013) (trial court does not err when considering facts presented
relating to crimes under a plea agreement, including those crimes to be dismissed).
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failed to meet her burden to persuade this Court that her thirty-year sentence for
her two Level 3 felony kidnapping convictions is inappropriate.
[21] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Barnes, Sr.J., concur.
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