NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 4 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
YVONNE MARIE FORD, No. 17-55430
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
3:16-cv-00013-JLS-NLS
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting MEMORANDUM*
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Janis L. Sammartino, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 30, 2018**
Before: LEAVY, TROTT, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges
Yvonne Marie Ford appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Ford’s application for supplemental
security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. We review de novo,
Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014), and we reverse and
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
remand.
Substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting the
medical opinions of Drs. Sepulveda, Cabrejos, and Davis, Ford’s treating
psychiatrists. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012 (requiring the ALJ to provide
specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence to reject the
opinions of treating physicians).
First, over half of Ford’s mental status examinations found poor memory,
tangential and circumstantial thought process, or both. These examinations
examined as a whole do not support the ALJ’s finding that her mental status
examinations were “generally normal.”
Second, Ford’s last job was to provide in-home support services to her
disabled daughter, a job that ended in August, 2011 because of Ford’s deteriorating
mental condition. Her daughter then entered residential care. Fourteen months
later, in October 2012, Ford asked Dr. Lauren Gannon to provide her with “a note
to say she can be her daughter’s conservator.” Dr. Gannon acceded to Ford’s
request because Ford appeared to Dr. Gannon to be “stable enough to do this.”
Accordingly, the doctor “wrote a letter stating this.” The record does not explain
what “this” was. The record is devoid of (1) an explanation of the type, duties, and
responsibilities of this conservatorship; (2) Dr. Gannon’s letter; and (3) whether or
not Ford became her daughter’s conservator. Moreover, the ALJ did not explain
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why Ford’s request and her doctor’s response to it was evidence that Ford was
capable of full-time work. Nevertheless, the ALJ concluded that these
undeveloped facts served in part to undermine Ford’s treating psychiatrists’
opinions. We respectfully disagree. These sparse facts do not support the
inferences from them drawn by the ALJ. Thus, concluding that Ford’s conservator
request weighed against her psychiatrists’ opinions was error.
Third, substantial evidence based on the record as a whole does not support
the ALJ’s conclusion that Ford’s symptoms improved with medication. Numerous
progress notes indicated that Ford’s medications were not adequately controlling
her symptoms, with some notes indicating that previously effective medication no
longer worked. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1017 (explaining that the ALJ errs in
relying on limited evidence of improvement when the record as a whole shows
ongoing waxing and waning of symptoms with no clear improvement overall).
The ALJ erred in rejecting the opinion of Ms. Wang and Dr. Daroglou as to
Ford’s cognitive impairments. The ALJ’s reason for rejecting this opinion was
because it was “not supported by the objective medical evidence as discussed
above.” See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012 (requiring the ALJ to provide specific and
legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence to reject the opinions of
treating or examining physicians). Because we conclude that the ALJ’s evaluation
of “the objective medical evidence” does not withstand scrutiny, this reason for
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discounting Ms. Wang’s and Dr. Daroglov is equally defective.
The ALJ discredited Ford’s testimony based in part because of what he
considered to be relatively “benign medical evidence.” We disagree with this
characterization of the record.
Accordingly, on remand the ALJ shall reevaluate the medical opinions,
considering them in the context of the medical record as a whole. In evaluating the
medical opinions, the ALJ shall address the factors listed in 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(2)-(6). See Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 676 (9th Cir. 2017)
(concluding that failure to consider these factors “constitutes reversible legal
error.”). In addition, the ALJ shall revisit Ford’s credibility and his assessment of
Ford’s residual functional capacity in light of the revised evaluation of the import
of the medical evidence. The evidentiary record may be reopened as the ALJ
determines to be necessary to reconsider his decision.
We do not consider any issues that are not specifically and distinctly raised
in Ford’s opening brief. See Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d
1155, 1161 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008).
Because the record as a whole contains ambiguities and important factual
issues that have not been resolved, we remand for further administrative
proceedings. See Leon v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir. 2017)
(concluding that remand for an immediate award of benefits is not appropriate
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when the record contains gaps and ambiguities that should be addressed by further
administrative proceedings).
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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