MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Sep 07 2018, 10:50 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Bennie Truth Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
New Castle, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
J.T. Whitehead
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Bennie Truth, September 7, 2018
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A04-1711-PC-2610
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Barbara Cook
Appellee-Respondent Crawford, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G09-1509-PC-32400
Baker, Judge.
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[1] Bennie Truth appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief,
arguing that the post-conviction court erroneously determined that he did not
receive the ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Finding no
error, we affirm.
[2] On March 13, 1998, Truth was convicted of Class B felony rape. As a result, he
was required to register as a sex offender. In 2013, Truth was charged with
three Class D felony counts of failure to register as a sex offender. Following a
bench trial, the trial court found him guilty as charged but sentenced him on
only one count. Truth appealed, claiming insufficient evidence. This Court
affirmed. Truth v. State, No. 49A02-1405-CR-334 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 18,
2014).
[3] On September 22, 2015, Truth filed a petition for post-conviction relief, arguing
that he had received the ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. On
August 14, 2017, the post-conviction court denied the petition. Truth now
appeals.
[4] Truth’s sole argument on appeal is that the post-conviction court should have
found that he received the ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel
based on the attorneys’ failure to argue that the application of the Indiana Sex
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Offender Registration Act1 to him was an unconstitutional ex post facto
violation.
[5] Truth is incorrect. The Indiana Legislature passed the Sex Offender
Registration Act in 1994. Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 373 (Ind. 2009).
The 1994-96 versions of the Act required sex offenders to register for having
committed the crime of rape if the victim was under the age of eighteen years
old. In 1997, the General Assembly amended the Act to require registration by
offenders who committed the offense of rape regardless of the age of the victim.2
Truth was convicted of rape in 1998—after the applicable version of the Act was
passed.3 Laws constitute an ex post facto violation only if they are applied to
defendants who committed their offenses before the applicable statutes were
enacted. Id. at 377.
[6] In this case, therefore, there was no ex post facto violation. Consequently,
Truth’s attorneys were not ineffective for failing to raise the claim and the post-
1
Ind. Code ch. 11-8-8.
2
The record on appeal does not indicate the age of the victim of Truth’s rape. But we infer from the State’s
citation to the 1997 amendment of the Sex Offender Registration Act that the victim was eighteen years of
age or older.
3
Generally, the date that matters is the date on which the defendant committed the offense. But see Blakemore
v. State, 925 N.E.2d 759, 763 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (focusing on date of conviction in finding an ex post facto
violation). In this case, the record on appeal does not include that information. It is Truth’s burden to
provide this Court with a complete record on appeal. Finke v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 862 N.E.2d 266, 272
(Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Generally, when the appellant fails to provide us with a complete record, we decline to
review his claims. Id. at 272-73. Here, we will nonetheless endeavor to review Truth’s claim, but must infer
from his conviction date of 1998 that he committed the offense of rape after the relevant amendment was
enacted in 1997.
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conviction court did not err by denying Truth’s petition for post-conviction
relief.
[7] The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.
May, J., and Robb, J., concur.
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