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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 18-10743
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 9:17-cr-80108-RLR-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MASONIEK STINFORT,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(September 20, 2018)
Before MARTIN, NEWSOM, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Masoniek Stinfort pleaded guilty to five counts of aggravated identity theft,
five counts of wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. He now appeals
his 144-month, within-Guidelines sentence, arguing that the district court clearly
erred in applying a two-level sophisticated-means enhancement under U.S.S.G.
§ 2B1.1(b)(10)(C), and a four-level aggravating-role enhancement under U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.1(a). Stinfort also argues that his sentence is procedurally and substantively
unreasonable because it is based on a miscalculation of the Guidelines and an
incorrect weighing of the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). After
careful review of the record, we affirm Stinfort’s sentence.
The facts are known to the parties; we do not repeat them here except as
necessary.
I
First, we consider whether the district court erred in applying a two-level
enhancement for Stinfort’s use of sophisticated means. We review a district
court’s factual findings related to sentencing enhancements—including a finding
that the defendant used sophisticated means—for clear error. United States v.
Clarke, 562 F.3d 1158, 1165 (11th Cir. 2009). Thus, we will disturb the district
court’s imposition of a sentencing enhancement only if, on the entire record, we
are left with the “definite and firm conviction” that the court made a mistake.
United States v. Robertson, 493 F.3d 1322, 1330 (11th Cir. 2007).
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The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a two-level enhancement to a
defendant’s base offense level where the offense “involved sophisticated means
and the defendant intentionally engaged in or caused the conduct constituting
sophisticated means.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C). The Application Note to
§ 2B1.1 sets forth a “nonexclusive list of examples of sophisticated means of
concealment[,]” United States v. Feaster, 798 F.3d 1374, 1380 (11th Cir. 2015),
such as “locating the main office of the scheme in one jurisdiction but locating
soliciting operations in another jurisdiction,” “hiding assets or transactions, or
both, through the use of fictitious entities,” and using “corporate shells, or offshore
financial accounts.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) cmt. n.9.
But these examples are not the only considerations that warrant a
sophisticated-means enhancement. In United States v. Campbell, we affirmed the
use of the enhancement when the mayor of Atlanta solicited bribes from those
seeking to do business with the city, concealed the payments using campaign
accounts and credits cards issued to other people, and failed to report the funds on
his income-tax returns. 491 F.3d 1306, 1309 (11th Cir. 2007). We explained that
although “Campbell did not use offshore bank accounts or transactions through
fictitious business entities,” we saw “no difference between hiding assets or
transactions . . . through the use of fictitious entities, corporate shells, or offshore
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financial accounts, . . . and hiding assets or transactions through the use of a straw
man or campaign fund.” Id. at 1316 (quotations omitted).
We similarly affirmed application of the sophisticated-means enhancement
in United States v. Clarke, a tax-fraud case in which the defendant concealed his
income by depositing his salary into accounts in other peoples’ names and by
directing his employer to pay his insurance premiums directly to insurance carriers
and his monthly car loan payments directly to the dealership. 562 F.3d at 1161. In
upholding the district court’s application of the enhancement, this Court held that,
“[f]or purposes of the sophisticated means enhancement, we see no material
difference between concealing income and transactions through the use of third-
party accounts . . . and using a corporate shell or a fictitious entity to hide assets.”
Id. at 1166.
Likewise here, the defendant perpetrated tax fraud by using third-party
names and accounts to conceal funds and transactions. The evidence showed that
Stinfort’s scheme spanned four years and involved the unauthorized use of 1,084
victims’ personal identifying information. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C). The
evidence also reasonably showed that, after he fled a 2015 traffic stop, Stinfort’s
fingerprints were found on a bag containing debit cards, money orders, and
cashiers’ checks in many different names; notebooks with handwritten lists of
names, social security numbers, and dates of birth; and IRS W-2 forms in several
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different names. Finally, the evidence showed that Stinfort recruited several
co-conspirators and directed their participation in the scheme, using 36 different
email addresses.
In sum, the district court did not clearly err—the use of numerous debit
cards and checks in different names, the use of more than 1,000 victims’ personal
identifying information, and the orchestration of multiple people using multiple e-
mail addresses to file fraudulent tax returns all support the district court’s decision
to apply a two-level enhancement for the use of sophisticated means. See U.S.S.G.
§ 2B1.1(b)(10)(C); Campbell, 491 F.3d at 1309; Clarke, 562 F.3d at 1161.
II
Next, we consider whether the district court erred in applying a four-level
enhancement for Stinfort’s leadership role in the tax-fraud scheme. As noted
above, we review a district court’s factual findings, including a defendant’s role in
a crime, for clear error. United States v. Mesa, 247 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir.
2001). The government bears the burden of establishing a defendant’s role in the
offense. United States v. Pope, 461 F.3d 1331, 1335 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing
United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1300 (11th Cir. 2006)).
Under § 3B1.1(a), a four-level enhancement applies if (1) “the defendant
was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity,” and (2) the criminal activity
“involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.” U.S.S.G.
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§ 3B1.1(a). Factors to consider in determining whether a defendant acted as an
organizer or leader include: (1) “the exercise of decision making authority,” (2)
“the nature of participation in the commission of the offense,” (3) “the recruitment
of accomplices,” (4) “the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime,”
(5) “the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense,” (6) “the
nature and scope of the illegal activity,” and (7) “the degree of control and
authority exercised over others.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4; see also United States
v. Caraballo, 595 F.3d 1214, 1231 (11th Cir. 2010).
Although § 3B1.1 “requires the exercise of some authority in the
organization, the exertion of some degree of control, influence, or leadership,”
Ndiaye, 434 F.3d at 1304, evidence that the defendant recruited or instructed
participants in the conspiracy may be sufficient to support a leadership
enhancement. Caraballo, 595 F.3d at 1231. To qualify for a § 3B1.1
enhancement, the defendant need only have been an “organizer, leader, manager,
or supervisor of one or more of the other participants.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.2.
Here, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Stinfort was an
organizer or leader of the conspiracy. Stinfort admitted to recruiting at least five
co-conspirators and directing them in various ways, including by supplying them
with the fraudulent bank account numbers and e-mails to be used in the scheme.
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt. n.4; see Caraballo, 595 F.3d at 1231. Further, a massive
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quantity of personal identifying information was found in Stinfort’s girlfriend’s car
with his fingerprints on it. This included fraudulent tax returns which were later
loaded onto prepaid debit cards, which were then used to purchase money orders,
many of which were then deposited into Stinfort’s bank account. Thus, Stinfort
did more than recruit his co-conspirators; he also organized their activities and
received a large portion of the fruits of the crime. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt. n.4; see
Caraballo, 595 F.3d at 1231; Ndiaye, 434 F.3d at 1304.
Based “on the entire record,” we are not “left with the definite and firm
conviction” that the district court made a mistake concerning Stinfort’s leadership
role in the tax-fraud scheme. See Robertson, 493 F.3d at 1330. Therefore, the
district court did not clearly err in applying the § 3B1.1 enhancement.
III
Finally, we consider whether Stinfort’s sentence was procedurally or
substantively unreasonable. We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). Although we do not automatically presume that a within-Guidelines
sentence is reasonable, we ordinarily expect that it will be. United States v.
Alvarado, 808 F.3d 474, 496 (11th Cir. 2015). A sentence below the statutory
maximum is also an indicator of reasonableness. United States v. Croteau, 819
F.3d 1293, 1310 (11th Cir. 2016). In reviewing a sentence for reasonableness, we
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first consider whether the district court committed any significant procedural error
and then consider whether the sentence was substantively reasonable. Gall, 552
U.S. at 51.
A sentence may be procedurally unreasonable if the district court improperly
calculates the Guidelines range, treats the Guidelines as mandatory rather than
advisory, fails to consider the appropriate statutory factors, selects a sentence based
on clearly erroneous facts, or fails to adequately explain the chosen sentence.
United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Gall, 552
U.S. at 51).
A sentence may be substantively unreasonable if a district court unjustifiably
relies on any one § 3553(a) factor, fails to consider pertinent § 3553(a) factors, or
bases the sentence on impermissible factors. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d
1179, 1191–92 (11th Cir. 2008). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the sentencing court
must consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and
characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the Sentencing
Guidelines range, pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, the
need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide
restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (3)–(7). The weight given to any
one § 3553(a) factor, however, is “committed to the sound discretion of the district
court.” United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotations
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omitted). Thus, with regard to substantive reasonableness, we will reverse only if
“left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear
error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that
lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.”
United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotations
omitted).
Stinfort’s 120-month, within-Guidelines sentence is both procedurally and
substantively reasonable.1 Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. As to procedural reasonableness,
Stinfort argues only that the district court erred in calculating his Guidelines range.
As discussed above, however, the district court did not clearly err in applying the
enhancements for sophisticated means and aggravating role. Id. Stinfort’s
sentence is also substantively reasonable because while the district court chose—
within its discretion—to place weight on Stinfort’s history and characteristics, it
also stated that it had considered each § 3553 factor.2 Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190; Clay,
483 F.3d at 743.
1
While Stinfort’s total sentence is 144 months’ imprisonment, his aggravated-identity-theft
convictions automatically resulted in a 24-month term of imprisonment, to run consecutive to
any other term of imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). Thus, Stinfort challenges for
reasonableness only his 120-month sentence for the wire-fraud and conspiracy-to-commit-wire-
fraud charges.
2
The court was not required to address Stinfort’s other objections, including that his
enhancements were overlapping or that he had previously spent only a small amount of time in
jail. See United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 873 (11th Cir. 2010) (rejecting the argument that,
when a judge has crafted a sentence in accordance with the § 3553(a) factors, she must also
specifically mention all other mitigating factors a defendant raises).
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Finally, Stinfort’s sentence does not demonstrate that the district court made
a “clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a
sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of
the case.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190. His 120-month sentence lies at the lowest point
in the Guidelines range of 120 to 150 months and is therefore ordinarily expected
to be reasonable. Alvarado, 808 F.3d at 496. It is also well below the statutory
maximum sentence of 240 months—another indicator of reasonableness. Croteau,
819 F.3d at 1310.
* * *
To sum up, the district court did not clearly err in applying either a two-level
enhancement for sophisticated means or a four-level enhancement for a leadership
role. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in weighing the § 3553 factors
and sentencing Stinfort to the low end of the Guidelines range. Accordingly, we
affirm Stinfort’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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