FILED
Sep 27 2018, 7:35 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Donald J. Frew Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Fort Wayne, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Caryn N. Szyper
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Joseph B. Fernanders, III, September 27, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-812
v. Appeal from the Allen Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable John F. Surbeck,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Jr., Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
02D06-1706-F6-749
Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-812 | September 27, 2018 Page 1 of 8
Case Summary
[1] Following a jury trial, Joseph B. Fernanders, III (“Fernanders”), was convicted
of Battery, as a Level 6 felony.1 He now appeals.
[2] We affirm.
Issues
[3] Fernanders raises two issues, which we restate as follows:
I. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to refute
his defense of parental privilege to discipline his child; and
II. Whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel due
to counsel’s failure to timely disclose certain witnesses.
Facts and Procedural History
[4] In early 2017, A.F. was six years old. Her first-grade teacher used a “color
chart” system to keep track of student behavior. Under the system, each
student’s name was on a clip. Every day, the student started with the clip on
“green.” For good behavior, the student could move up to “blue” or “purple.”
If the student received a warning, the student would move to “yellow.” If the
student continued to misbehave, the student might move to “orange” for a visit
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c)(1), -1(e)(3).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-812 | September 27, 2018 Page 2 of 8
to the office or “red” for a phone call home. At the end of the day, the teacher
would record the student’s color status on a paper that the student took home.
[5] Fernanders is A.F.’s father. Under an early-2017 arrangement, Fernanders and
his ex-wife, Cassandra Ort (“Ort”), shared physical custody of A.F. and her
older sister, R.F. On February 8, 2017, the girls stayed with Fernanders after
school. Fernanders found out that A.F. was marked “yellow” that day for
talking out of turn. A.F. received the warning for shouting an answer before
the teacher had called on her. This was A.F.’s third “yellow,” and she had
received previous warnings for similar behavior. Fernanders told A.F. to go
upstairs, which she did. A.F. then prepared to be punished, pulling her pants
and underwear down, and leaning over a bed. Fernanders spanked A.F. on her
buttocks multiple times with a belt. Afterward, he told A.F. to clean her room.
Downstairs, R.F.—eight years old at the time—had heard A.F. screaming for a
long time. R.F. noticed that A.F. seemed to limp when she came downstairs.
[6] Although A.F. usually slept on her back, she spent that night “going . . . side to
side” because “it was hurting.” Tr. Vol. II at 115-16. The next morning, A.F.
was still in pain, and was moving “back and forth a little bit” as she sat on the
school bus to school. Id. at 116. After school that day, A.F. and R.F. went to
Ort’s residence. When A.F. bathed that evening and R.F. came in to give her a
towel, R.F. froze when she saw bruises on A.F.’s buttocks and leg. R.F.
summoned Ort, who took pictures of the bruising and called the police.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-812 | September 27, 2018 Page 3 of 8
[7] The State charged Fernanders with Battery and Domestic Battery2 as Level 6
felonies. A jury trial was held on February 8, 2018, at which Fernanders
admitted to spanking A.F., but claimed a privilege to discipline A.F. At trial,
Fernanders sought to elicit testimony from two of his children “as it relates to
discipline, that’s it, no additional questions other than that.” Id. at 182. The
State objected because Fernanders had not timely disclosed the witnesses and
because there was “no indication that these other children were present at the
time” of the spanking. Id. The trial court ultimately excluded the testimony.
Later, the jury found Fernanders guilty of Battery and not guilty of Domestic
Battery. The court imposed a two-year sentence, fully suspended to probation.
[8] Fernanders now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
Parental Discipline
[9] To obtain the instant conviction of Battery, the State was obligated to prove
that Fernanders knowingly or intentionally touched A.F. in a rude, insolent, or
angry manner when Fernanders was over the age of eighteen and A.F. was
under the age of fourteen. See I.C. 35-42-2-1(c)(1), -1(e)(3). Fernanders does
2
I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-812 | September 27, 2018 Page 4 of 8
not dispute that there is sufficient evidence supporting these statutory elements.
Rather, he argues that the State failed to refute his defense of parental privilege.
[10] Under Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-1, “[a] person is justified in engaging in
conduct otherwise prohibited if he has legal authority to do so.” Moreover, a
parent has legal authority—sometimes referred to as the “parental discipline
privilege”—to “apply such reasonable force” upon his child as the parent
“reasonably believes to be necessary for . . . proper control, training, or
education.” Willis v. State, 888 N.E.2d 177, 182 (Ind. 2008) (quotation marks
omitted) (adopting the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 147 (Am. Law Inst.
1965)). When a defendant claims this privilege, “the State must disprove at
least one element of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Thus, “the
State must prove that either: (1) the force the parent used was unreasonable or
(2) the parent’s belief that such force was necessary to control [the] child and
prevent misconduct was unreasonable.” Id. The State may refute the defense
“by direct rebuttal or by relying upon the sufficiency of the evidence in its case-
in-chief.” Id. Ultimately, “[t]he decision of whether a claim of parental
privilege has been disproved is entrusted to the fact-finder.” Id.
[11] Where—as here—the defendant alleges that the State failed to refute his claim
of parental privilege, we apply “the same . . . standard [as] for any sufficiency
claim.” Id. at 182-83. That is, “we look only at the probative evidence and
reasonable inferences supporting the verdict” and “[w]e do not assess the
credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence.” Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693,
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696 (Ind. 2017). “Unless no reasonable factfinder could find the defendant
guilty, we affirm.” Jones v. State, 87 N.E.3d 450, 454 (Ind. 2017).
[12] Fernanders spanked A.F. on her bare buttocks with a belt, multiple times, with
sufficient force to leave large bruises and to cause A.F. to limp afterward. In
the hours after the spanking, A.F. had difficulty sleeping on her back and sitting
on the school bus. Fernanders spanked A.F. because she volunteered an
answer in class before her first-grade teacher called on her, and because A.F.
had spoken out of turn on prior occasions at school. On appeal, Fernanders
argues that it was reasonable for him to spank A.F., and asserts that the
“spanking was nothing more than a progressive response to a continuing
behavior problem demonstrated by the child.” Appellant’s Br. at 14. However,
in evaluating the reasonableness of the discipline, the jury is free to consider
factors such as the age of the child, the nature of the disobedience, and whether
the use of force is disproportionate to the “offense.” Willis, 888 N.E.2d at 182.
Ultimately, the evidence supports a reasonable conclusion that Fernanders used
an unreasonable amount of force when disciplining six-year-old A.F. for her
misbehavior. Thus, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to
refute the defense of parental privilege.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
[13] Fernanders alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation
of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. To prevail on this
claim, Fernanders must establish both elements of the Strickland test: (1) that
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-812 | September 27, 2018 Page 6 of 8
counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance
prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Ind. 1984);
Passwater v. State, 989 N.E.2d 766, 770 (Ind. 2013). As to the first element,
Fernanders points out that trial counsel failed to timely disclose two witnesses.
Assuming arguendo that counsel’s performance was deficient, Fernanders must
nevertheless demonstrate resulting prejudice, which requires a showing “that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694.
[14] Because of counsel’s untimely disclosure, Fernanders could not question two of
his children about disciplinary matters. Notably, however, Fernanders already
had the opportunity to question two of his children: A.F. and R.F. Moreover,
Fernanders testified about his approach to discipline as did his girlfriend, who
was in the residence when Fernanders spanked A.F. It appears, then, that
Fernanders is alleging prejudice from the inability to present merely cumulative
testimony. Yet, this sort of prejudice “has not been shown to be great enough,
standing alone, to satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test.” Smith v. State,
547 N.E.2d 817, 819 (Ind. 1989) (involving the exclusion of testimony that
appeared to be “merely cumulative to that of the five alibi witnesses who did
testify at trial”). Furthermore, as there is no indication that the potential
witnesses were present when Fernanders spanked A.F., the testimony would
have had little bearing on the key question before the jury—which is not
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-812 | September 27, 2018 Page 7 of 8
whether Fernanders was usually a reasonable disciplinarian, but instead whether
his discipline was reasonable on this occasion. We ultimately conclude that
Fernanders has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that, had he been
able to present the testimony, the result of the trial would have been different.
[15] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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