Mary Adamowicz, individually and in her capacity as guardian for Lilly Adamowicz and Lilly Adamowicz, by next friend Mary Adamowicz v. Anonymous, M.D. (mem. dec.)
MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Oct 02 2018, 8:39 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES –
Kyle L. Hankins ANONYMOUS, M.D. AND
Gloria J. Danielson ANONYMOUS ORGANIZATION,
Danielson & Hankins, LLP INC. D/B/A ANONYMOUS
Fortville, Indiana OB/GYN, LLC
George M. Plews
Tonya J. Bond
Josh S. Tatum
Plews Shadley Racher & Braun
LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana
Lara D. Engelking
Engelking Law Group, LLC
Carmel, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Mary Adamowicz, individually October 2, 2018
and in her capacity as guardian Court of Appeals Case No.
for Lilly Adamowicz and Lilly 18A-MI-742
Adamowicz, by next friend Mary Appeal from the Bartholomew
Adamowicz, Circuit Court
Appellants-Petitioners, The Honorable Kelly S. Benjamin,
Judge
v. Trial Court Cause No.
03C01-1707-MI-4106
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MI-742 | October 2, 2018 Page 1 of 8
Anonymous, M.D. and
Anonymous Organization, Inc.
d/b/a Anonymous OB/GYN,
LLC,
Appellees-Petitioners,
v.
Anonymous Hospital d/b/a
Anonymous Hospital,
Defendant,
v.
Stephen W. Robertson, in his
capacity as Acting
Commissioner of the Indiana
Department of Insurance,
Third-Party Respondent.
Najam, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] Mary Adamowicz, individually and on behalf of her minor daughter Lilly,
appeals the trial court’s order that she pay attorneys’ fees to Anonymous, M.D.
and Anonymous Organization, Inc. d/b/a Anonymous OB/GYN, LLC
(collectively, “Provider”) following Adamowicz’s noncompliance with
Provider’s discovery requests while she had a proposed medical-malpractice
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MI-742 | October 2, 2018 Page 2 of 8
complaint pending before a medical review panel.1 Adamowicz raises two
issues for our review, but we need only decide the following issue: whether we
are required to affirm the trial court’s judgment in light of Adamowicz’s failure
to timely object to Provider’s allegedly objectionable discovery requests. We
conclude that, because Adamowicz did not timely seek a protective order in
accordance with our Trial Rules, we cannot say that the trial court’s judgment
for Provider is erroneous. Thus, we affirm.2
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In October of 2016, Adamowicz filed her proposed complaint for damages
against Provider with the Indiana Department of Insurance. According to
Adamowicz’s proposed complaint, Provider committed medical malpractice
during Lilly’s birth. The proposed complaint further alleged that, as a result of
Provider’s alleged malpractice, Lilly will require special care for the rest of her
life.
[3] On November 3, Provider propounded twenty-seven interrogatories, not
counting subparts, on Adamowicz. Provider also made eighteen requests for
production. However, although Adamowicz amended her proposed complaint
after she had received the Provider’s discovery requests, she did not respond to
those discovery requests. On March 22, 2017, Provider additionally requested
1
Anonymous Hospital and Stephen W. Robertson, in his official capacity as Acting Commissioner of the
Indiana Department of Insurance, do not participate in this appeal.
2
We decline Provider’s request for appellate attorneys’ fees.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MI-742 | October 2, 2018 Page 3 of 8
Adamowicz’s authorization to release medical records to Provider. But
Adamowicz continued to disregard Provider’s requests.
[4] On May 31, Provider contacted Adamowicz about the pending discovery
requests. Adamowicz responded one week later with a partial response to
Provider’s interrogatories. However, Adamowicz objected to the remainder of
Provider’s discovery requests as “not relevant” to a medical-malpractice action.3
Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 54. For the same reasons, Adamowicz refused to
respond to the requests for production and also refused to authorize the release
of medical records. Nonetheless, Adamowicz did offer to comply with all of
Provider’s discovery requests if Provider agreed to “waive the panel
process . . . .” Id. at 59. Provider did not accept that offer.
[5] After Adamowicz continued to not fully comply with Provider’s discovery
requests, Provider filed a motion to compel in the trial court. The court held a
hearing on the motion, after which it ordered Adamowicz to respond to the
discovery requests listed above. The court further ordered Adamowicz to pay
Provider’s attorneys’ fees relating to the motion to compel. The court set a
subsequent hearing to determine a reasonable amount for those fees. While
3
Adamowicz also complained that Provider had served the discovery requests by mail only and not also
electronically, as required by Indiana Trial Rule 26(A.1). But, while Adamowicz mentioned that argument
in passing in the trial court and does so again on appeal, there is no dispute that Provider responded to
Adamowicz’s original protest by emailing her the discovery requests. See Appellants’ App. at 62; Appellants’
Br. at 8. Provider’s email was more than one month before Provider filed the motion to compel, and, as
explained below, Adamowicz did not respond to the properly served discovery requests by seeking a
protective order.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MI-742 | October 2, 2018 Page 4 of 8
that hearing on fees was pending, rather than comply with the order on the
motion to compel Adamowicz instead withdrew her proposed complaint,
rendering moot her need to comply with the trial court’s order.
[6] Thereafter, the court held an evidentiary hearing on fees, after which it found as
follows:
[Adamowicz] had failed to respond to [Provider’s]
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents for
over four months. [Provider’s] attorney then sent [Adamowicz’s]
attorney a letter inquiring about discovery and enclosing
additional medical authorizations. There was no response.
[Provider’s] attorney then sent another letter two months later
again inquiring about the past due discovery and medical
authorizations. Within the next week, [Adamowicz’s] attorney
then responded, partially responding to some Interrogatories but
refusing to fully respond to discovery requests, refusing to sign
medical authorizations and failing to identify specific medical
providers of [Mary and Lilly]. [Provider’s] attorney, two weeks
later, again asked [Adamowicz’s] attorney to supplement
discovery responses. After numerous inquiries over several
months, [Adamowicz] failed to proper[l]y respond and
specifically objected to authorization for records of health care
providers in a medical malpractice issue. [Adamowicz’s]
attorney believed the discovery requests exceeded the
requirements of a Medical Review Panel Proceeding . . . and
refused to answer. [Adamowicz] did not ask for an extension of
time to answer discovery or move the court for a protection
order; [she] did not answer because of the belief [she was] not
required to under the proceedings and issues. Some of the
discovery requests were never answered. The court does not find
that the refusal and/or objection to answer discovery as
requested and as ordered was substantially justified. Nor does
the court find there are other circumstances that make an award
of expenses unjust.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MI-742 | October 2, 2018 Page 5 of 8
[7] Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 14. The court then ordered Adamowicz to pay
$17,413.27 to Provider in attorneys’ fees.4 This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[8] Adamowicz argues on appeal that the trial court erred when it ordered her to
pay Provider’s attorneys’ fees. The court’s judgment followed an evidentiary
hearing at which the court heard witness testimony, and the court’s judgment
includes findings of fact and conclusions thereon. Our “usual review” of such
judgments is under the clearly erroneous standard. Anderson v. Wayne Post 64,
Am. Legion Corp., 4 N.E.3d 1200, 1206 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App 2014), trans. denied; see,
e.g., Masters v. Masters, 43 N.E.3d 570, 575 (Ind. 2015).
[9] As the Indiana Supreme Court has explained, under the clearly erroneous
standard we apply “a two-tiered standard of review by first determining
whether the evidence supports the findings and then whether the findings
support the judgment.” Masters, 43 N.E.3d at 575 (quotation marks omitted).
“[D]ue regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court . . . to judge the
credibility of the witnesses.” Id. “[W]e will reverse only upon a showing of
clear error—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). However, we review
4
Adamowicz does not dispute the reasonableness of the amount of fees on appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MI-742 | October 2, 2018 Page 6 of 8
the trial court’s conclusions on questions of law de novo. Gertiser v. Stokes (In re
Marriage of Gertiser), 45 N.E.3d 363, 369 (Ind. 2015).
[10] The trial court held its hearing on fees pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 37(A)(4).
According to that Rule, the trial court
shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party . . . whose
conduct necessitated the motion [to compel] . . . to pay to the
moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the
order, including attorney’s fees, unless the court finds that the
opposition to the motion was substantially justified or that other
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
Ind. Trial Rule 37(A)(4) (emphasis added).
[11] On appeal, Adamowicz argues that she was substantially justified to oppose
Provider’s discovery requests as listed above, and, as such, the trial court erred
under Trial Rule 37(A)(4) when it awarded attorneys’ fees to Provider. In
particular, Adamowicz argues that Provider’s discovery requests were not
relevant requests under Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Act, Ind. Code §§ 34-18-
0.5-1 to -18-2 (2018) (“the Act”).5 She additionally argues that her opposition
to Provider’s discovery requests was substantially justified based on certain
evidence she presented to the trial court at the hearing on fees.
5
In her brief on appeal, Adamowicz repeatedly cites the 1998 version of the Indiana Code rather than the
current version of the Code. See App. R. 22. The 2018 version of the Indiana Code is freely available online
at http://iga.in.gov/legislative/laws/2018/ic/titles/001.
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[12] However, we need not consider those arguments on appeal because
Adamowicz did not timely object to the scope of Provider’s discovery requests
pursuant to our Trial Rules. See T.R. 37(D); see also I.C. § 34-18-11-1(a)(2)
(stating that the trial court had jurisdiction over the motion to compel discovery
“in accordance with the Indiana Rules of Procedure”). In particular, Trial Rule
37(D) prohibits a party who opposes a discovery request from being excused
from compliance “on the ground that the discovery sought is objectionable
unless the party failing to act has applied for a protective order as provided by
[Trial] Rule 26(C).” There is no dispute that Adamowicz never applied for a
protective order under Rule 26(C). Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 37(D), she
did not preserve her objections to Provider’s discovery requests. Having not
preserved her objections, we cannot say that the trial court erred when it
concluded that her failure to comply with Provider’s discovery requests was not
substantially justified. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
[13] Affirmed.
Crone, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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