In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
____________________
NO. 09-16-00429-CR
____________________
ELIAS GUSTAVO RODRIGUEZ, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
________________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 359th District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 15-11-11820-CR
________________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In two issues, Elias Gustavo Rodriguez appeals his conviction for aggravated
sexual assault of a child, T.T., 1 his daughter. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
1
The opinion refers to the child identified in the indictment by using a
pseudonym, “T.T.,” to protect the child’s privacy. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 30(a)(1)
(granting victims of crime “the right to be treated with fairness and with respect for
the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process”).
1
22.021(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 2017). 2 Rodriguez argues the trial court erred in (1)
allowing T.T.’s neighbor to testify about statements made by T.T. as excited
utterances, and (2) permitting the State to elicit T.T.’s prior consistent statements
from two witnesses re-called to rebut Rodriguez’s contention the State coerced T.T.
to fabricate allegations of sexual abuse during trial. We overrule both of Rodriguez’s
issues and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Background
The State charged Rodriguez under two separate indictments for the
aggravated sexual assault of a child. Rodriguez pleaded not guilty to both charges.
The charges arose after Rodriquez’s daughter, T.T., sought help from her neighbor,
M. Hernandez, one morning before school.
When Hernandez first saw T.T, she said T.T. was emotional, nervous, scared,
and crying. Hernandez asked what happened, and T.T. asked if Hernandez could
take her to school. T.T. then explained she was scared and did not want to be home
when Rodriguez returned. When asked why, T.T. told Hernandez she previously
asked her father for permission to go to a school dance, and he agreed, “but [told
T.T.] the next time when they were by themselves, that she would have to be naked
2
We cite to the current version of the Texas Penal Code as any amendments
since the commission of the offense do not affect the outcome of this appeal.
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with him.” T.T. would have been alone with her father that morning. Hernandez
asked if something between T.T. and Rodriguez had happened before, and T.T.
answered, “yes, that it had happened before.” Hernandez took T.T. to school and
alerted the school to T.T.’s allegations against Rodriguez, and an investigation
ensued.
T.T. testified about asking her father for permission to attend the school dance.
T.T. said that Rodriguez agreed she could go to the dance but would have to have
sex with him as a result. However, at trial T.T. recanted her claims that Rodriguez
previously forced her to have sex with him. Rather, she testified that on the Tuesday
morning before the dance, Rodriguez attempted to have sex with her, but she got up
from the bed before he could and went to the school bus. Thus, he only exposed
himself to her.
After taking a break at trial, however, T.T. returned to testify and explained
she told the truth originally: Rodriguez had intercourse with her. Nevertheless, T.T.
clarified Rodriguez only had intercourse with her on Tuesday before the dance, not
on Thursday as she previously alleged. Rodriguez testified and denied ever sexually
assaulting his daughter.
Kathleen McKinney, the lead forensic scientist for the Texas Department of
Public Safety Crime Laboratory in Houston, testified she performed DNA testing in
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this case. McKinney explained the testing performed on the evidence collected
revealed the presence of sperm on T.T.’s panties. Her analysis indicated it was 367
quintillion times more likely the sperm came from Rodriguez’s DNA rather than an
unknown individual.
The jury convicted Rodriguez of one of the two charges of aggravated sexual
assault of a child, and he was assessed a fifty-year prison sentence. Rodriguez
appeals and raises two issues complaining about the admission of alleged hearsay
testimony.
Excited-Utterance Exception to Hearsay Prohibition
In his first issue, Rodriguez asserts the trial court erred by allowing Hernandez
to testify about T.T.’s statements claiming the testimony was inadmissible hearsay.
See Tex. R. Evid. 801(d), 802. The State contends the testimony was admissible
under the excited-utterance exception because the hearsay statements related to “a
startling event or condition, made while [T.T.] was under the stress of excitement
that it caused.” Tex. R. Evid. 803(2). We review a trial court’s admission of evidence
under the excited-utterance exception to the hearsay rule for an abuse of discretion.
See Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 595–96 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
Rodriguez argues his alleged statement to T.T. about sex the next time they
were alone in exchange for attending the dance occurred days before T.T. went to
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Hernandez’s house; and thus, T.T.’s statements were too far removed from the event
and did not qualify as an excited utterance. We disagree. The exception assumes that
when the declarant makes the statement, they are not capable of the kind of reflection
that would enable them to fabricate information. Apolinar v. State, 155 S.W.3d 184,
186 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Thus, a statement is an excited utterance if the declarant
made the statement while dominated by the emotions, excitement, fear, or pain of
the event of condition. McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.3d 824, 846 (Tex. Crim. App.
1992), overruled on other grounds, Bingham v. State, 915 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1994). “[U]nder the excited-utterance exception, the startling event may trigger
a spontaneous statement that relates to a much earlier incident.” McCarty v. State,
257 S.W.3d 238, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
The event triggering an excited utterance and the event it describes may be
separated by days or even months. See Hunt v. State, 904 S.W.2d 813, 815–16 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref’d). The startling event itself need not be the crime.
See id. at 816; see also McCarty, 257 S.W.3d at 239. For example, in Hunt, a child’s
statement concerned an incident of abuse that occurred three months prior to the
outcry. 904 S.W.2d at 815. The child made the statement after watching a news story
on television that caused her great concern and fear regarding her own sexual abuse.
See id. The court of appeals held that despite the three-month intervening time
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passage, the startling nature of the television program and the victim’s demeanor
during her outcry rendered the statement sufficiently reliable to fall under the
excited-utterance hearsay exception. Id.
In determining whether a statement falls under the excited-utterance
exception, we consider the following non-dispositive factors:
(1) whether the exciting event is startling enough to evoke a truly
spontaneous reaction from the declarant;
(2) whether the reaction to the startling event is quick enough to avoid
the possibility of fabrication;
(3) whether the resulting statement is sufficiently “related to” the
startling event to ensure the reliability and trustworthiness of the
statement; and
(4) whether the statement was made in response to a question.
Pickron v. State, 515 S.W.3d 462, 465 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet.
ref’d) (citing McCarty, 257 S.W.3d at 241; Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 154
(Tex. Crim. App. 2001)).
The statements at issue related to Rodriguez’s behavior—actions frightening
T.T. to a point she was afraid to be alone with her father. Hernandez testified T.T.
was in tears, nervous, and scared when she arrived at Hernandez’s house, to such a
degree that Hernandez suspected someone had broken into T.T.’s house while she
was home alone. T.T. explained to Hernandez that Rodriguez had given her
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permission to go to the dance in exchange for having sex with him the next time they
were alone together. When T.T. ran to Hernandez’s house, she was trying to get
away from her house because Rodriguez would soon be home, leaving the two of
them alone. When asked, T.T. admitted to Hernandez that her father had previously
had sex with her. T.T. just wanted to go to school and even hid from sight while in
Hernandez’s car, because Rodriguez had already returned home by the time they left
for school, and she was afraid her father would see her.
Taking the factors into consideration, they support the admission of T.T.’s
statements as excited utterances. See Pickron, 515 S.W.3d at 465. The startling event
triggering T.T.’s statements was Rodriguez’s impending return, which would leave
him alone with T.T. and allow him to sexually assault her. T.T.’s demeanor under
the circumstances showed the thought of being alone with Rodriguez was
exceptionally traumatic. Like Hunt, the events immediately preceding T.T.’s
statements to Hernandez were sufficiently shocking and startling, and T.T.’s
demeanor was sufficiently disturbed rendering T.T.’s statements reliable as excited
utterances. See Hunt, 904 S.W.2d at 815.
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining T.T.’s
statements to Hernandez were excited utterances and admitting the statements into
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evidence as an exception to the rule against hearsay. See McCarty, 257 S.W.3d at
241. We overrule Rodriguez’s first issue.
Admission of Declarant-Witness’s Prior Consistent Statements
In his second issue, Rodriguez contends the trial court erred by admitting
alleged hearsay testimony when it permitted the State to elicit prior consistent
statements of T.T. from two re-called witnesses. Specifically, Rodriguez argues the
motive for T.T. to fabricate allegations about the assault arose before she made the
statements. We review the trial court’s determination of whether a prior consistent
statement is admissible because the cross-examination suggested or implied an
assertion of recent fabrication or improper motive for abuse of discretion. See
Hammons v. State, 239 S.W.3d 798, 805–06 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
Rule 801(e)(1)(B) designates prior consistent statements made by a declarant-
witness as non-hearsay when those statements are offered to rebut an express or
implied charge that the declarant recently fabricated her testimony or acted from a
recent improper influence or motive. See Tex. R. Evid. R. 801(e)(1)(B); Klein v.
State, 273 S.W.3d 297, 304 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Among Rule 801(e)(1)(B)’s
requirements, a prior consistent statement must be made prior to the time the
supposed motive to falsify arose. See Hammons, 239 S.W.3d at 804. The motive to
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falsify can arise at any time, including during the declarant-witness’s direct
examination. See Klein, 273 S.W.3d at 313.
In this case, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling admitting Forensic Interviewer Mayra Domingue’s and Detective
Shannon Spencer’s statements. See id. at 304 (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d
85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “[T]here need be only a suggestion that the witness
consciously altered [their] testimony in order to permit the use of earlier statements
that are generally consistent with the testimony at trial.” Hammons, 239 S.W.3d at
804 (quoting United States v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893, 904 (3d Cir. 1991)).
Originally, on direct examination, T.T. denied that Rodriguez had sexually
assaulted her. But, after a short recess, T.T. testified one of the two alleged acts of
sexual assault did occur. During cross-examination the next day, the following
exchange took place:
[Defense Counsel:] So, [T.T.], yesterday you took the witness
stand and you started saying that your dad—
that the—about your dad sexual[ly]
assaulting you was a lie. That’s what you
started saying, right?
[T.T.:] Yes.
[Defense Counsel:] Then there was a break and the prosecutors
took you out and there was a recess; and then
when you came back, your story changed?
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[T.T.:] Yes.
[Defense Counsel:] So, what did they tell you?
[T.T.:] To tell the truth.
[Defense Counsel:] Okay. Was anything said about you getting in
trouble if you continue to testify the way you
were testifying?
[T.T.:] No.
Prior to the State resting its case, the State recalled two witnesses to testify about
statements that T.T. made prior to trial consistent with her testimony she was
sexually assaulted by Rodriguez at least one time. After the trial court overruled
Rodriguez’s hearsay objection, both Domingue and Spencer confirmed T.T. told
each of them details regarding Rodriguez sexually assaulting her.
During cross-examination, Rodriguez implicitly accused the State of coercing
T.T. into changing her testimony. At the time the State proffered the prior consistent
statements, the trial court found these statements were made prior to the time the
alleged motive to falsify her testimony arose. We conclude the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence. See Hammons, 239 S.W.3d at 806.
We overrule issue two and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
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AFFIRMED.
_________________________
CHARLES KREGER
Justice
Submitted on April 6, 2018
Opinion Delivered October 3, 2018
Do Not Publish
Before Kreger, Horton, and Johnson, JJ.
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