In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
___________________
NO. 09-16-00453-CR
NO. 09-16-00454-CR
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JOSEPH ALLEN EDWARDS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
__________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 435th District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause Nos. 16-10-11914-CR & 16-10-11915-CR
__________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
After the trial court denied Joseph Allen Edwards’s motion to suppress, a jury
found him guilty on two charges, possession with the intent to deliver
methamphetamine and possession with the intent to deliver hydrocodone. See Tex.
Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.112 (West 2017). Edwards elected to appeal, and
in two issues he argues that the trial court committed error by denying his motion to
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suppress. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed
evidence relevant to the warrantless search of Edwards’s car, we affirm.
Background
In early February 2016, Edwards, who was on parole based on another
conviction involving illegal drugs, appeared at Montgomery County’s parole office
to provide the Parole Department with a sample of his urine. The parole officer who
accompanied Edwards to the restroom discovered Edwards in the restroom with an
apparatus designed to allow a person to provide a fake sample. After the parole office
contacted the police, the police arrested Edwards for trying to falsify the test. Before
he left the parole office, Edwards left the keys to the car he had parked in the parole
office’s parking lot at the parole office. He requested that one of the parole officers
call his grandparents and ask them to come pick up his car.
Upon being booked into jail, police found Edwards with around $12,000 in
cash, with the bills banded together in a roll. Detective Joseph Foxworth learned that
Edwards was arrested after trying to fake his urine test and on being booked into the
jail had a large sum money on him. Detective Foxworth testified in the proceeding
below that this information made him suspicious that Edwards might be trafficking
in narcotics. Foxworth explained that he learned that Edwards was driving a rented
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car. According to Foxworth, based on his experience, people involved in selling
illegal drugs often use rental cars to traffic narcotics.
Foxworth went to the parole office about three hours after Edwards’s arrest.
When he got there, he discovered that Edwards’s car was still in the parole office’s
lot, and he learned that Edwards had arranged to have someone come to the office
to pick up his car. Based on Detective Foxworth’s testimony, the trial court could
have inferred that Detective Foxworth had no idea how long it might take the people
to pick up Edwards’s car.
Foxworth did a visual inspection on Edwards’s car. He saw no signs of drugs
or drug paraphernalia inside the car. Foxworth then asked Officer Patrick Jolly,
another police officer, to come to the parole office with his trained dog so the dog
could sniff Edwards’s car for drugs.
Officer Jolly testified in both the trial and the suppression hearing. According
to Jolly, the dog he took to the parole office is trained to identify various drugs,
including “marijuana, heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, and Ecstasy[.]” Officer
Jolly testified that when his dog sniffed the car, the dog signaled that it smelled
contraband. After the dog alerted on the car, Foxworth and Jolly searched it and
found a glass pipe, with residue in it, under the front passenger seat. Behind the
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driver’s position in the rear floorboard of the car Officer Jolly found a bag with many
pills along with a set of digital scales.
A forensic scientist at the Department of Public Safety’s Crime Lab tested the
pills from the bag recovered from Edwards’s car, which she received from the police.
The forensic scientist testified during the trial that the tests she ran on the pills show
the pills contain methamphetamine and hydrocodone.
The trial court admitted the evidence that the police discovered during their
search of Edwards’s car. Although Edwards moved to suppress that evidence, the
trial court denied his request. When the jury returned a verdict, it found Edwards
guilty of possessing hydrocodone and possessing methamphetamine with the
required intent to deliver each of the illegal drugs.
Standard of Review
We use a bifurcated standard when reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion
to suppress. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing
Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). Under that standard,
we give the trial court’s findings of historical fact almost total deference if the trial
court’s express and implied findings are supported by the evidence. Id. Likewise, if
the trial court resolves a motion to suppress based on a resolution of mixed question
of law and fact, its evaluation of the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses is
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given almost total deference. Id. In contrast, if the trial court’s findings do not depend
on the trial court’s evaluations of the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses or
turned on resolving a pure question of law, we review its ruling using a de novo
standard. Id. (citing Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 107 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006)); Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89.
The record before us reveals that Edwards did not ask the trial court to prepare
written findings and conclusions explaining its ruling on Edwards’s motion to
suppress. Because there are no written findings in the record, we “impl[y] the
necessary fact findings that would support the trial court’s ruling if the evidence
(viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling) supports these implied
fact findings.” State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818-19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006);
accord State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
Analysis
Edwards filed a brief in which he raises two issues challenging the validity of
the two judgments. In issue one, Edwards argues that because the police had
sufficient time to obtain a warrant to search the car, the warrantless search was
illegal. According to Edwards, given the time that Detective Foxworth had to obtain
a warrant, the search-incident-to-arrest and automobile exceptions to the general rule
requiring search warrants do not apply to his case. In response, the State argues that
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the evidence showing that Officer Jolly’s trained dog alerted on Edwards’s car gave
police the probable cause they needed to search his car without getting a warrant.
In his second issue, Edwards argues the trial court should not have allowed
Officer Jolly to testify as an expert about his dog’s ability to detect the odor of illegal
drugs. According to Edwards, the State, through Officer Jolly, failed to provide the
trial court with sufficient evidence that Officer Jolly’s dog could reliably detect
illegal drugs. In response, the State argues that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by finding (implicitly) that the evidence supported the trial court’s
conclusion that Officer Jolly’s dog could reliably detect the odor of illegal drugs.
Edwards’s argument that police had to obtain a warrant before searching his
car relies mainly on his claim that the police had sufficient time to do so. Edwards
relies on the general constitutional requirements imposed on states through the
Fourth Amendment to support his argument, as it protects citizens against
unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Yet several
recognized exceptions exist to the Fourth Amendment’s general requirement that
police obtain a valid warrant before conducting a search. These include the consent
exception, the exigency exception, the automobile exception, the search-incident-to-
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arrest exception, and the special-needs exception.1 The Court of Criminal Appeals
has explained that
[e]vidence seized by the police without a warrant may be admitted only
if an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement
applies. A defendant challenging the admission of evidence on the basis
of the Fourth Amendment bears the initial burden to prove that the
search occurred without a warrant. If the defendant meets this burden,
the burden then shifts to the State to prove that an exception applies.
Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
One of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement “holds that the
police may lawfully search an automobile if they have probable cause to believe that
the vehicle contains evidence of a crime.” Id. (citing Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17,
24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). The exception applies when the evidence relevant to
the search shows that the car “‘is readily mobile and there is probable cause to
believe that it contains contraband.’” Marcopoulos v. State, 538 S.W.3d 596, 599
(Tex. Crim. App 2017) (quoting Keehn v. State, 279 S.W.3d 330, 335 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009)).
Based on the evidence relevant to the search on Edwards’s car, the trial court
could reasonably find that when police searched Edwards’s car, it was readily
1
See State v. Rodriguez, 521 S.W.3d 1, 9-10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (citing
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386
(1985); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973); U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)).
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mobile. See Keehn, 279 S.W.3d at 335 (noting that one of the two reasons that justify
applying an exception to the general rule requiring police to obtain a search warrant
is that automobiles are readily mobile). Edwards had driven the car to the parking
lot the same day it was later searched, and no evidence in the record shows that
anything happened to the car that made it immobile.
Moreover, because Edwards’s car was in the public part of a business’s
parking lot, Detective Foxworth had the right to direct Officer Jolly to have his dog
sniff the car even if police also suspected before they had the dog sniff the car that
the car might contain drugs. See State v. Weaver, 349 S.W.3d 521, 527 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011). When Officer Jolly’s trained dog signaled that it had detected
contraband in Edwards’s car, probable cause existed for the search even if police
could have obtained a warrant. Matthews v. State, 431 S.W.3d 596, 603-04 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2014) (noting that if a dog trained to detect drugs alerts, “the presence
of drugs is confirmed, and police may make a warrantless search”). We overrule
Edwards’s first issue.
In issue two, Edwards argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
finding (implicitly) that Officer Jolly’s dog could reliably detect the odor of illegal
drugs. According to Edwards, the evidence failed to allow the trial court to conclude
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that Officer Jolly and his dog had sufficient training to show that his dog could
reliably detect drugs.
The record shows that both in the hearing conducted on his motion to suppress
and in the trial, Edwards relied on Rule 702 of the Rules of Evidence when objecting
to Officer Jolly’s testimony about whether the dog could reliably detect the presence
of illegal drugs. See Tex. R. Evid. 702 (allowing expert testimony if the opinion will
help the trier of fact determine a fact in issue). Because the trial court overruled
Edwards’s motion to suppress and the objections Edwards made to Officer Jolly’s
testimony, we imply the trial court found that Officer Jolly’s dog had sufficient skills
and a proven track record showing that it could reliably detect contraband. See Kelly,
204 S.W.3d at 818-19. The United States Supreme Court has explained that in the
context of a dog trained to sniff for drugs, the dog’s “satisfactory performance in a
certification or training program can itself provide sufficient reason to trust his
alert.” Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 246 (2013).
During the suppression hearing, Officer Jolly addressed the training that he
and his dog have gone through to detect the presence of contraband. He explained
that based on their training with the National Narcotic Detector Dog Association,
they held certifications and that the Association has renewed their certifications
annually for the four-year period before he searched Edwards’s car. According to
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Officer Jolly, the certifications were valid when his dog sniffed Edwards’s car.
Officer Jolly testified in some detail about his training with the dog, explaining that
they participate in weekly sessions designed to reinforce the dog’s skills in detecting
the presence of illegal drugs. According to the officer, based on his experience over
the past four years, the dog that sniffed Edwards’s car rarely signals that contraband
is present when it is not.
The evidence before the trial court about the dog’s and the officer’s training
address matters of historical fact. Giving the trial court’s findings almost total
deference, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that
the evidence about the search would be helpful to the jury’s evaluating the dog’s
ability to detect the smell of illegal drugs. Because Edwards fails to show that the
trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence he objected to in the trial,
we overrule both issues he raises in his appeals.
We affirm the trial court’s judgments.
AFFIRMED.
______________________________
HOLLIS HORTON
Justice
Submitted on May 30, 2018
Opinion Delivered October 17, 2018
Do Not Publish
Before McKeithen, C.J, Horton and Johnson, JJ.
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Joseph Allan Edwards v. State
Combined Opinion