NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 26 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARILYNN THOMASON, No. 18-35030
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:16-cv-00141-BLW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
GREGORY W. MOELLER, an individual in
his personal capacity; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
B. Lynn Winmill, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 22, 2018**
Before: SILVERMAN, GRABER, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
Marilynn Thomason appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing her action alleging constitutional claims and claims under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Hebbe v.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010) (dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6)); Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003) (dismissal
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Thomason’s claims against defendants
Moeller, Simpson, Lansing, Gratton, Gutierrez, J. Jones, Burdick, Eismann,
Horton, and W. Jones because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See id. at 1163-65 (discussing proper
application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see also Henrichs v. Valley View
Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred
plaintiff’s claim because the relief sought “would require the district court to
determine that the state court’s decision was wrong and thus void”). Contrary to
Thomason’s contention, the extrinsic fraud exception to the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine does not apply to her claims.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Thomason’s
claims against defendant Washington Federal Savings for insufficient service of
process because Thomason failed to demonstrate that service was valid under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. See Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 801 (9th
Cir. 2004) (once service is challenged, plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
that service was valid); Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1014
(9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of review); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1),
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4(h); Idaho R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1).
The district court properly dismissed Thomason’s claims against the
remaining defendants because Thomason failed to allege facts sufficient to state
plausible claims. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 681 (2009) (to avoid
dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” and conclusory allegations are
not entitled to be assumed true (citation and internal quotation marks omitted));
Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 341-42 (although pro se pleadings are construed liberally,
plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for
relief); Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (a
party’s conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable
inferences need not be accepted as true).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by taking judicial notice of
Idaho state court proceedings because the documents were matters of public record
or otherwise “not subject to reasonable dispute.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); see also
Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006)
(court may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record);
Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth
standard of review).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Thomason’s
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motions for reconsideration because Thomason failed to demonstrate any basis for
relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255,
1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for
reconsideration).
We reject as without merit Thomason’s contentions regarding summary
judgment, denial of a jury trial, and bias or misconduct on the part of the district
court.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
All pending motions and requests are denied.
AFFIRMED.
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