T.C. Memo. 1995-504
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
MICHAEL T. SHANE, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 8409-94. Filed October 23, 1995.
Charles C. Shelton and Evan Shelton, for petitioner.
Elizabeth S. Henn, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
WRIGHT, Judge: Respondent determined deficiencies of
$8,483 and $6,910 in petitioner's Federal income taxes for
taxable years 1990 and 1991, respectively.
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The sole issue for decision is whether petitioner's
horseracing and horse-breeding activity was undertaken with the
objective of making a profit within the meaning of section 1831
during the years at issue. We hold that it was.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are found
accordingly. The stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits
are incorporated herein. At the time the petition was filed,
petitioner resided in Towson, Maryland. Petitioner timely filed
Federal income tax returns for taxable years 1990 and 1991.
During the years at issue, petitioner worked as a full-time
computer programmer for Baltimore County, Maryland. In exchange
for his services to Baltimore County, petitioner earned
approximately $35,000 per year. Petitioner also maintained a
part-time job with Maryland Casualty Co. during the years at
issue. In 1990, petitioner worked an average of 20 hours per
week, or a total of 844 hours, for Maryland Casualty Co. In
1991, petitioner worked a total of 111 hours for Maryland
Casualty Co.
During the years at issue, petitioner also was engaged in
the breeding and racing of horses. Petitioner's involvement with
horses dates back to the early 1970's. In the mid-1970's, while
1
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code in effect during the years in issue,
and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice
and Procedure.
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pursuing an undergraduate degree at Johns Hopkins University,
petitioner took approximately 2 years off from his studies in
order to gain the experience, skills, and knowledge necessary to
obtain a horse trainer's license. Petitioner traveled to New
York and New Jersey in order to work for horse trainers with
established reputations. Not only did petitioner need to learn
the rules and regulations promulgated by various racing
commissions; it was necessary for him to master the art of
handling a variety of horses and a multitude of equipment. It
was also necessary for petitioner to be able to properly
administer various medications and work with veterinarians.
Petitioner eventually obtained a horse trainer's license in
Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and New Jersey.
After graduating from Johns Hopkins University in 1977,
petitioner elected to discontinue his involvement with horses in
order to concentrate his energies on learning the art of computer
programming. In 1980, however, petitioner aspired to be a
successful racehorse owner. To this end, petitioner began a 2-
year period during which he studied racehorses. Although this
study was informal, it was regular and involved. Petitioner read
several trade periodicals and studied charts tracking the
accomplishments of various horses. Petitioner frequently used
the services and facilities of the Maryland Horse Breeders
Association to conduct research and study pedigrees. Petitioner
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also spent a significant amount of time at racetracks observing
racehorses in action.
This study period culminated in 1982 when petitioner
acquired2 his first horse, Andiamo Bella, in a claiming race.3
Petitioner was of the opinion that Andiamo Bella had numerous
characteristics of a successful racehorse but that she had
received poor training. In acquiring Andiamo Bella, petitioner
felt that the negative effects of her prior training could be
overcome through the application of proper training. After
undergoing petitioner's personal training regimen, Andiamo Bella
proved profitable, winning approximately $65,000 during the 18-
month period ending with 1983.
Motivated by his success with Andiamo Bella, petitioner
began to expand his enterprise in 1984. By 1987, petitioner
owned eight horses. In response to having been unable to attain
results similar to those achieved with Andiamo Bella in 1983,
petitioner began enlarging the scope of his operation to include
horse breeding in 1986. Consequently, petitioner has been a
member of the Maryland Horse Breeders Association since 1986.
2
Petitioner actually acquired a 50-percent interest in his
first horse in 1982. Eventually, however, petitioner acquired
the remaining interest in this horse.
3
Generally speaking, a claiming race is a race specified by
race officials in which an interested party can "claim" or
purchase the winning horse from its owner. In order to claim a
horse, the interested party must tender a specified dollar amount
to the owner of the horse within a specified period of time.
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In 1988, following several years of poor results with regard to
the racing component of his enterprise, petitioner began
concentrating his attention on horse breeding, though horseracing
remained a peripheral part of his activity. This emphasis on
horse breeding remained petitioner's practice throughout the
years at issue.
A principal factor underlying petitioner's decision to focus
on breeding was his belief that through a combination of
successful breeding and proper training he could produce foals
that would appreciate substantially in value. In accordance with
his desire to produce quality horses with established pedigrees,
petitioner bred his horses with two of the top-rated stallions in
Maryland. Despite petitioner's efforts, however, prior to the
time of trial he had not attained significant acclaim as a
successful breeder and had not sold any foals.
Petitioner boarded his horses at a boarding facility located
approximately 20 miles from his residence. According to
petitioner, he spent several hours each morning and several hours
each night tending to his horses. In tending to his horses,
petitioner performed a variety of activities. The horses were
exercised, fed, and groomed. Medications were administered, and
stalls were cleaned. Not infrequently, petitioner's night-time
horse activity kept him at the boarding facility until midnight.
Often times, under those circumstances, petitioner slept in his
automobile at the boarding facility rather than travel the 20
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miles to his home only to return to the boarding facility 4 or 5
hours later in order to perform his morning activities.
Petitioner managed the financial affairs of his horse
activity through his personal checking account. The management
of this dual-purpose account was facilitated by the use of a
computer program petitioner had created. By design, petitioner
used this program to distinguish between personal expenditures
and expenditures made in furtherance of his horse activity.
Other than his check register, however, petitioner did not
maintain formal financial records relating to his horse activity.
Nonetheless, petitioner did keep detailed records regarding the
training, care, and pedigree of his horses.
Petitioner did not maintain his horses for entertainment or
other recreational purposes. Petitioner did not ride his horses,
nor did he permit others, except for qualified jockeys, to ride
his horses.
For taxable years 1986 through 1991, petitioner incurred the
following losses with respect to his horse activity:
Year Loss
1986 $35,631
1987 26,990
1988 39,834
1989 32,996
1990 39,324
1991 36,039
In 1990 and 1991, petitioner used the respective losses of
$39,324 and $36,039 to offset income he received from Baltimore
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County and Maryland Casualty Co. Respondent determined that
petitioner's horse activity did not constitute an activity
engaged in for profit under section 183. Accordingly, respondent
disallowed the losses claimed by petitioner.
OPINION
We must decide whether section 183 applies to petitioner's
horseracing and horse-breeding activity. Respondent maintains
that petitioner's lack of a profit objective precludes him from
deducting the expenses attributable to that activity in excess of
those which are allowed by section 183. In contrast, petitioner
contends that he possessed the requisite profit objective during
the years at issue and, therefore, section 183 is inapplicable.
Accordingly, petitioner argues that the expenses attributable to
his horse activity are fully deductible under section 162. We
agree with petitioner.
Section 183 allows only specified deductions unless an
activity is engaged in for profit. Section 183(c) defines an
activity not engaged in for profit as any activity other than one
with respect to which deductions are allowable for the taxable
years under section 162 or under paragraphs (1) or (2) of section
212. Petitioner argues that he engaged in the horse activity
with the requisite profit objective; respondent disagrees.
An activity engaged in for profit is one in which the
taxpayer has an actual and honest objective of making a profit.
Dreicer v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 642, 645 (1982), affd. without
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published opinion 702 F.2d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Respondent's
determination is presumptively correct, and petitioner bears the
burden of proving his profit objective. Rule 142(a). Petitioner
need not, however, establish that his profit objective was
reasonable. Dreicer v. Commissioner, supra at 644-645; sec.
1.183-2(a), Income Tax Regs. Profit in this context means
economic profit, independent of tax consequences. Antonides v.
Commissioner, 91 T.C. 686, 694 (1988), affd. 893 F.2d 656 (4th
Cir. 1990). The determination of profit objective is factually
based and requires a consideration of all the surrounding facts
and circumstances. Finoli v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 697, 722
(1986); sec. 1.183-2(b), Income Tax Regs.
Although the purpose of the inquiry is to ascertain the
taxpayer's subjective intent, greater weight is placed on
objective factors than on the taxpayer's statement of his or her
intent. Beck v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 557, 570 (1985); sec.
1.183-2, Income Tax Regs. In conducting the profit-objective
analysis, courts have relied on the factors enumerated in the
regulations under section 183. See Hendricks v. Commissioner, 32
F.3d 94 (4th Cir. 1994), affg. T.C. Memo. 1993-396; Independent
Elec. Supply, Inc. v. Commissioner, 781 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1986),
affg. Lahr v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-472; Elliott v.
Commissioner, 90 T.C. 960 (1988), affd. without published opinion
899 F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1990). However, no single factor is
determinative of the issue. Golanty v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 411
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(1979), affd. without published opinion 647 F.2d 170 (9th Cir.
1981).
Section 1.183-2(b), Income Tax Regs., provides the following
nonexclusive list of nine factors that should normally be taken
into account in determining whether an activity is engaged in for
profit: (1) The manner in which the taxpayer carries on the
activity; (2) the expertise of the taxpayer or his advisers; (3)
the time and effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying on other
similar or dissimilar activities; (4) the expectation that the
assets used in the activity may appreciate in value; (5) the
success of the taxpayer in carrying on other similar or
dissimilar activities; (6) the taxpayer's history of income or
losses with respect to the activity; (7) the amount of occasional
profits, if any, that are earned; (8) the financial status of the
taxpayer; and (9) the elements of personal pleasure or recreation
involved in the activity.
A review of the entire record in this case persuades us that
petitioner has succeeded in proving that his horse activity was
motivated by an actual and honest objective of making a profit.
We find that most of the above-enumerated factors weigh in favor
of petitioner; we find further that those factors not in
petitioner's favor do not require a decision for respondent.
First, the manner in which the taxpayer carries on the
activity is one indication of a profit objective. Engdahl v.
Commissioner, 72 T.C. 659 (1979); Grommers v. Commissioner, T.C.
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Memo. 1992-343; sec. 1.183-2(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. We find
that petitioner conducted his horse activity in a businesslike
manner. Although petitioner did not maintain a separate checking
account in the conduct of his financial affairs relating to his
horse activity, we find his testimony explaining his rationale
for not doing so credible. Petitioner testified that, given the
scale of his operation, keeping costs low was a principal
concern. Petitioner further testified that conducting his
business affairs through his personal checking account was
advantageous because his financial institution did not charge a
fee for managing personal checking accounts but did charge a fee
for managing business checking accounts. Additionally,
petitioner testified that he managed his dual-purpose checking
account via a self-generated computer program fully capable of
distinguishing between business and personal expenditures.
Accordingly, petitioner was able to avoid an expense without
compromising the accuracy of his check register.
Moreover, after experiencing an extended period of
unpromising results from the racing component of his horse
activity, petitioner redirected the focus of his operation,
placing increased attention on its breeding aspect and
discontinuing to a large extent its racing aspect. The
discontinuation of an unprofitable branch of operations indicates
a profit objective. Allen v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 28 (1979);
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Pirnia v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-627; sec. 1.183-2(b)(1),
Income Tax Regs.
Respondent argues that petitioner failed to operate his
horse activity in a businesslike manner. In support of this
argument, respondent contends that petitioner lacked a credible
business plan and points to occasional inconsistencies in
petitioner's testimony. We know of nothing in the Code,
regulations, or case law that requires a business plan with the
degree of formality alluded to by respondent. Petitioner's
activity spanned a period of years. Petitioner initially placed
emphasis on horseracing but eventually shifted his emphasis to
horse breeding after coming to the realization that he was not
well situated to prosper in an activity which heavily emphasized
racing. With regard to the inconsistencies identified by
respondent, most, if not all, appear attributable to petitioner's
effectuating the shift from racing to breeding over a period of
time rather than at a specific point in time.
Respondent further contends that petitioner's lack of formal
financial records evidences his lack of a profit objective.
While it is true that the maintenance of complete and accurate
books and records weighs in favor of finding the existence of a
profit objective, the absence of such books and records does not
conclusively establish the lack of a profit objective. See
Engdahl v. Commissioner, supra at 666-667. In any event,
petitioner maintained meticulous records regarding the training
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and care of his horses. When the record is considered in the
aggregate, we find that this factor weighs in favor of
petitioner.
Second, preparation for the start of an activity through
extensive study of its accepted business, economic, and
scientific practices, or consultation with those who are experts
therein, indicates that a taxpayer has entered into an activity
for a profit. Id. at 668; Pederson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1994-555; sec. 1.183-2(b)(2), Income Tax Regs. Petitioner went
to great lengths to develop a degree of expertise involving
horses. By the time petitioner graduated from college in 1977,
he had received a horse trainer's license in five States.
Petitioner further testified that following a brief period during
which he was not involved with horses, he spent 2 years studying
the characteristics of successful racehorses. Petitioner studied
pedigree charts and read numerous trade periodicals. Petitioner
also testified that he spent a significant amount of time at a
racetrack studying the performance of various horses. This 2-
year period of study culminated in 1982 when petitioner purchased
his first horse.
Petitioner also called a former general manager of the
Maryland Horse Breeders Association as a witness. This witness
testified that petitioner spent an extraordinary amount of time
studying pedigrees and conducting other research in a library
maintained by the Maryland Horse Breeders Association.
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In light of the record before us, we conclude that
petitioner has developed and maintained expertise involving
horses. Accordingly, we find that this factor weighs heavily in
favor of petitioner.
Third, the time and effort expended by the taxpayer in
carrying on the activity is an indication of whether a profit
objective existed, particularly if there are no substantial
personal or recreational elements associated with the activity.
Haladay v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-45; Archer v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-70; sec. 1.183-2(b)(3), Income Tax
Regs. As was stated by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit: "Common sense indicates to us that rational people do
not perform hard manual labor for no reason, and if the
possibility that petitioners performed these labors for pleasure
is eliminated the only remaining motivation is profit."
Nickerson v. Commissioner, 700 F.2d 402, 407 (7th Cir. 1983),
revg. T.C. Memo. 1981-321.
Although the record does not support a finding of the exact
amount of time petitioner spent working with his horses, we are
convinced that it was substantial. Moreover, respondent concedes
on brief that petitioner spent a substantial amount of time and
effort engaged in his horse activity. Petitioner did not own a
farm or stable at which he could keep his horses; rather, he
rented space at a boarding facility located a significant
distance from his residence. Petitioner testified that he spent
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several hours each morning caring for his horses prior to going
to his full-time job. Petitioner also testified that he spent
several hours each night similarly caring for his horses.
Petitioner further testified that on numerous occasions the
nature of his work kept him at the boarding facility until
midnight. On many of these occasions, rather than commute to his
residence only to commute back to the boarding facility 4 or 5
hours later, petitioner testified that he slept in his automobile
at the boarding facility.
Fourth, an expectation that assets used in the activity may
appreciate in value may be an indication of a profit objective.
Engdahl v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. at 668; Anderson v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-102; sec. 1.183-2(b)(4), Income Tax
Regs. The expectation that he would experience appreciation in
the value of his horses was a principal factor underlying
petitioner's motivation for maintaining his horses. During the
early years of his operation, petitioner concentrated on racing.
In doing so, petitioner may have been somewhat less inclined to
expect his horses to appreciate in value. But petitioner altered
the focus of his activity and began concentrating heavily on
breeding. Here asset appreciation was petitioner's principal
expectation. Petitioner studied pedigree records in order to
determine what he believed to be good breeding combinations.
Petitioner, as would seem customary among horse breeders,
expected that it was through this system of selective breeding
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that the value of his horses would appreciate. The appreciation,
however, is not instantaneous; it is gradual, often occurring
over many years. The caliber of petitioner's existing stock had
to be established. Once the grade and the quality of
petitioner's stock were established, offspring had to be
generated and trained. Petitioner endeavored to produce quality
genetics in his foals, and then to further develop his foals
through his training regimen. It was through a combination of
this selective breeding and proper training that petitioner
expected the value of his horses to appreciate.
Although, as respondent correctly points out, petitioner had
yet to sell any of his foals prior to the time of trial, this
fact alone is not determinative and does not diminish
petitioner's expectation. Actual success need not exist for us
to find that petitioner maintained a reasonable expectation that
his horses would appreciate in value. Accordingly, we find that
this factor supports petitioner.
Fifth, the success of the taxpayer in carrying on other
activities can be some indication of whether the taxpayer had a
profit objective for the activity in question. Hoyle v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-592; Pirnia v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1989-627; sec. 1.183-2(b)(5), Income Tax Regs. The record
lacks sufficient evidence regarding petitioner's experience in
other activities. Nevertheless, we find that this lack of
evidence neither supports nor weakens petitioner's position.
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Sixth, a history of income, losses, and occasional profits
with respect to an activity can be indicative of whether a profit
objective exists. Allen v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. at 34; Kobza v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-176; sec. 1.183-2(b)(6), Income Tax
Regs. Respondent contends that the history of losses relating to
petitioner's horse activity conclusively establishes that he
lacked the requisite profit objective necessary to render section
183 inapplicable. Although a long history of losses is a
persuasive criterion, it has long been established that this
factor alone is not determinative of a lack of a profit
objective. See Engdahl v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. at 669 (profit
objective found to exist despite 12 consecutive years of losses
in horse-breeding activity); Pirnia v. Commissioner, supra
(profit objective found to exist despite 6 consecutive years of
losses in horse-breeding activity). This is particularly true
when such losses occur during the formative years of a business,
especially one involving horses. The startup phase of an
American saddlebred breeding operation is 5 to 10 years. Engdahl
v. Commissioner, supra at 669.
During the initial years of his horse activity, petitioner
expected to make a profit racing his horses. However, due to his
limited resources, petitioner soon concluded that such an
expectation was unrealistic and shifted his focus to horse
breeding. Given that this shift occurred around 1988,
petitioner's horse-breeding function was well within the 5- to
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10-year startup phase identified above. Accordingly, we find
that petitioner's history of losses does not establish that he
lacked the requisite profit objective.
Seventh, the amount and frequency of occasional profits
earned from the activity may also be indicative of a profit
objective. Golanty v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. at 427; sec. 1.183-
2(b)(7), Income Tax Regs. Other than the occasional cash awards
received from racing his horses, petitioner's horse activity
produced no income. However, an opportunity to earn a
substantial ultimate profit in a highly speculative venture may
be sufficient to indicate that the activity is engaged in for
profit even though only loses are generated. Pirnia v.
Commissioner, supra; sec. 1.183-2(b)(7), Income Tax Regs. The
business of breeding and racing horses is undoubtedly highly
speculative and risky. Nevertheless, petitioner aspired to be a
successful breeder of horses. It was petitioner's objective to
eventually produce horses capable of competing in a triple crown
race. Furthermore, petitioner had hoped that his activity would
at least be successful enough to facilitate his purchase of a
farm from which he could operate the activity. Accordingly, we
find that petitioner's failure to make occasional profits is not
a determinative factor in this case.
Eighth, the lack of substantial income from sources other
than the activity in question may indicate the existence of a
profit objective. Pederson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-555;
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sec. 1.183-2(b)(8), Income Tax Regs. Petitioner is by no means a
wealthy individual. In 1990, petitioner earned roughly $35,000
from his full-time job as a computer programmer. Petitioner also
earned approximately $7,000 in 1990 from a part-time job.
Petitioner's income in 1991 differed only slightly from that of
1990, as petitioner earned roughly $37,000 from his full-time job
and approximately $1,000 from his part-time job. Further, the
record is devoid of evidence suggesting other sources of wealth
enjoyed by petitioner. Given his income, we think it unlikely
that petitioner would embark on a hobby costing thousands of
dollars and entailing much personal labor without a profit
objective. See Engdahl v. Commissioner, supra at 670.
Finally, the absence of personal pleasure or recreation
relating to the activity indicates the presence of a profit
objective. Schlafer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-66; sec.
1.183-2(b)(9), Income Tax Regs. There is no question that
petitioner enjoyed working with his horses; however, he equally
enjoyed working as a computer programmer. It is human nature to
undertake those activities which we enjoy and to avoid those
activities which we find less appealing. It cannot be said that
petitioner had any more or less enjoyment from his horse activity
than that which customarily should be expected from an
entrepreneurial undertaking. Petitioner did not ride his horses,
nor did he permit others, except qualified jockeys, to ride them.
Even though petitioner derived personal pleasure from his labor-
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intensive horse activity, this is not sufficient to cause the
activity to be classified as not engaged in for profit if the
activity is, in fact, engaged in for profit as evidenced by other
factors. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(9), Income Tax Regs. Accordingly, we
find that this factor weighs in petitioner's favor.
Having considered the facts and circumstances of this case,
we conclude that, during the years at issue, petitioner engaged
in his horse activity with an actual and honest objective of
making a profit.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be
entered under Rule 155.