T.C. Memo. 1998-280
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
JAMES LOGAN CLARK, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 18556-97. Filed August 3, 1998.
James Logan Clark, pro se.
Deanna R. Kibler, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
DINAN, Special Trial Judge: This case was fully stipulated
under Rule 122 and was submitted pursuant to the provisions of
section 7443A(b)(3) and Rules 180, 181, and 182.1
1
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are
to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the taxable year in
issue. All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of
Practice and Procedure.
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Respondent determined a deficiency in petitioner's Federal
income tax for 1995 in the amount of $1,395.
The issue presented by petitioner is whether various
provisions of sections 86 and 6013 are unfair and
unconstitutional.
The facts have been fully stipulated. The stipulations of
fact and the accompanying exhibits are incorporated herein by
this reference. Petitioner resided in Bonne Terre, Missouri, at
the time the petition was filed in this case.
Petitioner and his former wife, Shirley Clark (Ms. Clark),
separated in September 1995 and began living apart at that time.
They were divorced in March 1996. Despite petitioner's requests,
Ms. Clark refused to file a joint Federal income tax return with
him for 1995.
Petitioner received Social Security benefits in the amount
of $11,064 during 1995. He timely filed his 1995 return,
claiming the filing status of married filing separately. On his
return, he reported the full amount of his Social Security
benefits for 1995 on line 13a. He did not, however, include any
of his Social Security benefits in gross income on line 14.
In the statutory notice of deficiency, respondent determined
that $9,404 of petitioner's Social Security benefits must be
included in his gross income. Petitioner does not contest this
adjustment made by respondent pursuant to the provisions of
section 86. Rather, he argues that section 86(c)(1)(C) and
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(2)(C), which establishes, for purposes of calculating the
taxable amount of his Social Security benefits, a "base amount"
and an "adjusted base amount" of zero for taxpayers who were
married and lived together during the taxable year but did not
file jointly, and section 6013, which allows Ms. Clark to
unilaterally decide whether or not to file a joint return with
him, are unfair and unconstitutional.
After reviewing the record, we find that respondent properly
determined that $9,404 of petitioner's Social Security benefits
for 1995 must be included in his gross income under section 86.
The record does not show that petitioner and Ms. Clark were
legally separated under a decree of divorce or of separate
maintenance by the end of 1995. Sec. 7703(a)(2). Petitioner
also stipulated that they lived together until September 1995.
Consequently, since petitioner did not file a joint return with
Ms. Clark for 1995, his "base amount" and his "adjusted base
amount" are both zero. Sec. 86(c)(1)(C) and (2)(C); Rafter v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1991-349.
As we informed petitioner at trial, this Court is one of
limited jurisdiction, and we must apply the laws as written by
Congress. There is no provision in the Internal Revenue Code
which requires an individual taxpayer such as Ms. Clark to file a
joint return, which would make her jointly and severally liable
for the Federal income tax due on petitioner's individual income.
Sec. 6013(d)(3). With respect to the effect that Ms. Clark's
refusal to file jointly with petitioner has on the taxability of
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his Social Security benefits, we do not have the authority to
disregard the express provisions of a statute enacted by Congress
even where the result in a particular case may seem harsh. See,
e.g., Everage v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-373.
In essence, petitioner questions the fairness of section 86.
However, this is not the proper forum to question the policy
considerations that impelled the enactment of this legislation.
“Normally, a legislative classification will not be set aside if
any state of facts rationally justifying it is demonstrated to or
perceived by the courts.” United States v. Maryland Savings-
Share Ins. Corp., 400 U.S. 4, 6 (1970). The legislative history
of section 86, as enacted by the Social Security Amendments of
1983, Pub. L. 98-21, sec. 121(a), 97 Stat. 80, demonstrates that
Congress had a valid and rational basis for establishing a base
amount of zero for married taxpayers who lived with their spouse
for any part of the taxable year and file separate returns:
The base amount is * * * zero in the case of a
married individual filing a separate return, unless he
or she lived apart from his or her spouse for the
entire taxable year; * * *
The base amount is zero for married individuals
filing separate returns because the committee believes
that the family should be treated as an integral unit
in determining the amount of social security benefit
that is includible in gross income under this
provision. If the base amount for these individuals
were higher, couples who are otherwise subject to tax
on their benefits and whose incomes are relatively
equally divided would be able to reduce substantially
the amount of benefits subject to tax by filing
separate returns. [S. Rept. 98-23, at 27 (1983), 1983-
2 C.B. 326, 328.]
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Congress carried forward this rationale when it amended
section 86 for 1994 and succeeding taxable years and established
an adjusted base amount of zero for married taxpayers who file
separate returns and do not live apart for the entire taxable
year. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-66,
sec. 13215(b), 107 Stat. 312, 476.
Petitioner argues that the legislative history quoted above
shows that Congress did not intend to eliminate the Social
Security "tax base" of taxpayers such as himself and Ms. Clark
because his income for 1995 was five times greater than her
income for 1995. We recognize that “‘No scheme of taxation,
whether the tax is imposed on property, income, or purchases of
goods and services, has yet been devised which is free of all
discriminatory impact.’” Druker v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 867,
872 (1981) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 41 (1973)), affd. in part on this issue and revd. in
part on another issue 697 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1982). There is
simply no statutory exception to the plain language of section
86(c)(1)(C) and (2)(C). We hold that sections 86 and 6013 do not
suffer any constitutional infirmities and sustain respondent's
determination in this case. See Roberts v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1998-172.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
for respondent.