T.C. Memo. 1998-417
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
WILLIAM O. HARRISON, JR. AND
CATHY L. HARRISON, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 24616-95. Filed November 18, 1998.
Robert G. Wheeler, for petitioners.
Franklin R. Hise, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
WHALEN, Judge: Respondent determined the following
deficiencies in and additions to petitioners' Federal
income tax:
Addition to Tax
Year Deficiency Sec. 6651(a)(1)
1988 $136,933 $34,233
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1989 179,964 44,991
1990 14,324 3,581
Unless stated otherwise, all section references are to the
Internal Revenue Code as in effect for the years in issue.
After concessions, the issue for decision is whether
petitioners are liable for additions to tax under section
6651(a)(1) for failure to file timely income tax returns
for 1988 and 1989.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so
found. The stipulation of facts and the exhibits attached
thereto are incorporated herein by this reference.
Petitioners are husband and wife who filed joint individual
income tax returns for 1988, 1989, and 1990. At the time
the petition was filed in this case, petitioners resided
in Corpus Christi, Texas. In this opinion, references to
petitioner are to Mr. William O. Harrison, Jr.
Petitioner received a bachelor's degree in 1967 from
Texas Christian University where he majored in history. He
received a law degree in 1970 from the University of Texas
Law School where, among other courses, he took a tax course
and a required course in legal accounting. After
graduating from law school, petitioner was employed from
1971 through 1975 by a law firm in Corpus Christi, Texas.
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He then practiced law for several years as a sole
practitioner before he formed a law firm in Corpus Christi
in 1979. He worked at that firm until it dissolved in
1983. Petitioner served as an elected representative in
the Texas House of Representatives from 1979 through 1980,
and again from 1983 through 1984.
In 1984, petitioner moved to Houston where he joined
Perdue, Brandon, Blair & Fielder. At that law firm, he
devoted great effort to obtaining contracts with State and
local governments for the collection of delinquent tax
accounts. Several months after petitioner's arrival, the
firm dissolved.
In 1985, petitioner participated in the formation of
Blair, Williams & Harrison. At the end of the year, that
firm combined with another firm to form Heard, Goggan,
Blair, Williams & Harrison (hereinafter referred to as the
Houston firm). Petitioner held a one-ninth interest in the
Houston firm. Petitioner was successful on behalf of the
firm in obtaining a number of lucrative contracts with
municipal governments for the collection of delinquent tax
accounts.
In 1987, petitioner became concerned about the manner
in which the firm was being managed. He withdrew from the
firm in December 1987, and commenced negotiations with the
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firm to value his interest therein, including the govern-
ment contracts that he had originated. In April 1988,
petitioner filed suit against the firm. On October 25,
1988, petitioner and the firm resolved their dispute.
Under the settlement, the firm agreed to pay petitioner
3 percent of the gross income realized by the firm during
the years 1989 through 1992. The firm also paid petitioner
$500,000 in October 1988.
After petitioner withdrew from the Houston firm, he
returned to Corpus Christi to engage in the practice of
law as a sole practitioner. During 1989, petitioner made
expenditures of approximately $300,000 with respect to his
law practice in Corpus Christi, of which approximately
$80,000 were for furniture and leasehold improvements.
Other Businesses
From 1984 through 1988, petitioner held an investment
in a cattle feeding business in Oklahoma that was operated
by Mr. Sam Gilmore. The business earned income or incurred
loss from the purchase and sale of cattle. Petitioner was
not directly involved in managing the business. He relied
on Mr. Gilmore to decide which cattle to purchase, how much
to feed them, and when to sell them. Mr. Gilmore operated
the business through a bank line of credit. Petitioner
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had met Mr. Gilmore through a partner at the Houston firm,
Mr. Les Williams.
The record does not document the amount of income or
loss petitioner realized during the years 1984 through 1986
from his investment in the cattle feeding business. The
Schedule F filed with petitioners' 1987 return reports net
farm profit of $11,595 from the cattle feeding business.
During the period 1986 through 1989, petitioner was
involved in a number of other businesses. In 1977, he
started Cooper's Alley, a restaurant and bar. Cooper's
Alley operated restaurants in Corpus Christi, Texas, and
in Port Arkansas, Arkansas. It incurred losses and ceased
business in July 1986. In 1983, petitioner and Mr. Hank
Parkinson started Compuprint, Inc. and Parkinson
Associates. Those entities ceased business in 1989 when
Mr. Parkinson died. Petitioner was also engaged in
another restaurant, Lighthouse Restaurant, in Corpus
Christi, a real estate business called T-Head Marina
which owned the real estate for the restaurant, and a
partnership, Bayview I. Finally, throughout the period
in issue, petitioner owned a one-third interest in a
family partnership, Harrison, Harrison & Harrison. That
partnership owned a furniture store, a funeral home,
an automobile dealership, and it engaged in ranching.
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Petitioner's Books and Records
Ms. Lynn Cates was petitioner's bookkeeper from 1983
through the years in issue. She worked in an office that
petitioner maintained during the years in issue in Corpus
Christi. Ms. Cates used a journal bookkeeping system
referred to as the "One Write System" to record
petitioner's cash disbursements and deposits. All of
the checks in petitioner's checkbook were made with a
carbon backing so that anything written on a check was
automatically copied into a journal. Ms. Cates reconciled
the entries in the journal with petitioner's bank account
each month. In 1989, she established a general ledger
system which she used in addition to the "One Write
System".
Ms. Cates had no bookkeeping experience when she
started working for petitioner in 1983. She received
some initial training from petitioner's previous bookkeeper
and some additional training from Ms. Elizabeth Ruble, a
certified public accountant, who was involved in the
preparation of petitioners' 1988, 1989, and 1990 returns,
as further described below. Ms. Cates took a basic
accounting class and a computer accounting class in 1985.
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Petitioners' Accountants
Since 1971 when petitioner graduated from law school,
he has retained certified public accountants to prepare his
individual income tax returns. From 1977 through the years
at issue, petitioners have retained Mr. Gary Whittington, a
certified public accountant, to prepare their individual
income tax returns and the returns of some of the
businesses with which petitioner was involved.
Petitioners' personal returns for 1978 through the years
in issue were prepared by Mr. Whittington and Ms. Elizabeth
Ruble, whom Mr. Whittington employed. As mentioned above,
Ms. Ruble is a certified public accountant who began
working closely with Ms. Cates soon after Ms. Cates was
employed by petitioner.
The preparation of each of petitioners' individual
returns followed a similar pattern. Typically, Ms. Ruble
would contact Ms. Cates in March or early April to
determine whether petitioners had sufficient information to
file a return for the prior calendar year by April 15th, or
whether it would be necessary to file application for an
extension of the filing deadline. If, as was often the
case, an extension was necessary, Ms. Ruble would work with
Ms. Cates to estimate petitioners' tax liability for the
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year. Typically, they would discuss by telephone the
changes to the taxable income reported on petitioners' last
tax return that were necessary to estimate petitioners'
taxable income for the calendar year under review. During
these discussions, Ms. Ruble would review petitioners' last
tax return, and Ms. Cates would review petitioners' books
and records, and other tax information. Ms. Ruble would
make an adding machine tape that showed the additions to
and subtractions from the taxable income reported on
petitioners' last tax return. The total on the tape was
petitioners' estimated taxable income for the calendar year
under review.
During the years in issue, Mr. Whittington's office
had a policy concerning the manner in which Forms 4868,
Application for Automatic Extension of Time To File U.S.
Individual Income Tax Return, were to be completed if a
client had no taxable income for the year. In that event,
the accountants in Mr. Whittington's office would enter the
amount of any income tax withheld, plus any estimated tax
payments, on the Form 4868 on the line provided for the
taxpayer's total tax liability, and they would show a
balance due of zero, rather than a negative amount.
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Petitioners' Joint Return for 1987
Petitioners filed a joint Federal income tax return
for 1987 on Form 1040. They paid $119,585 with the return,
consisting of $117,799 in tax, and a penalty of $1,786
for underpayment of estimated tax. On the Schedule E,
Supplemental Income Schedule, filed with the return,
petitioners reported receiving $445,375 in nonpassive
income from the Houston firm. On the Schedule F, Farm
Income and Expenses, filed with the return, petitioners
reported a net farm profit of $11,595 from the cattle
feeding operation.
Petitioners' Joint Return for 1988
In April 1989, Mr. Whittington and Ms. Ruble prepared
and filed, on petitioners' behalf, a Form 4868, requesting
an automatic extension of time to file petitioners' 1988
return. The Form 4868 states that petitioners' total
income tax liability for 1988 is $1,408, that they had
Federal income tax withheld for the year of $1,408, and
that they had a balance due of zero. The Form W-2, Wage
and Tax Statement, for petitioner's wife reports $1,408 in
Federal income tax withheld. Petitioners' accountants
estimated that petitioners would incur a loss for 1988,
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and, pursuant to their office policy, they entered the
amount of income tax withheld from Mrs. Harrison's salary
as petitioners' total tax liability for 1988.
In estimating petitioners' income for 1988,
petitioners' accountants took into account Mr. Harrison's
share of partnership income from the Houston firm.
Petitioner, Ms. Cates, and Ms. Ruble all attempted to
contact Mr. Greg Dewinney, the C.P.A. for the Houston firm,
prior to April 15, 1989, in order to obtain information
about Mr. Harrison's income from the firm for 1988, but
they were unsuccessful.
Petitioners' accountants knew that Mr. Harrison had
finally withdrawn from the firm in early April 1988
and that he had reported income from the firm for the
prior year of approximately $400,000. Accordingly, they
estimated that he would realize approximately $100,000
from the firm for the first 3 months of 1988 before his
withdrawal from the firm (i.e., $400,000 x 3/12ths).
Subsequently, petitioners received a Schedule K-1,
Partner's Share Of Income, Credits, Deductions, Etc., from
the Houston firm in a letter from the firm dated August 15,
1989. The Schedule K-1 reports that Mr. Harrison's income
from the firm for 1988 is $261,309. Petitioners and their
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accountants were surprised that the income was so high,
approximately $160,000 more than the accountants had
estimated.
In estimating petitioners' taxable income for 1988,
petitioners' accountants also took into account the
income from Mr. Harrison's interest in the cattle feeding
business, described above. Petitioner, Ms. Cates, and
Ms. Ruble all attempted to contact Mr. Gilmore prior to
April 15, 1989, in order to obtain information about
Mr. Harrison's income from the cattle feeding business for
1988, but they were unsuccessful.
Petitioners' accountants estimated that Mr. Harrison
had realized a loss from this business for 1988. This was
based upon the fact that losses had been realized in prior
years and upon a letter written by Mr. Gilmore to
Mr. Harrison in August 1988. In that letter, Mr. Gilmore
stated that the operations of the business during fall of
1987 and spring of 1988 had not gone well and that
Mr. Harrison's letter of credit had been exhausted and he
needed to pay approximately $64,600 to replenish the letter
of credit. Based upon that letter, petitioners and their
accountants believed that the operating results for 1988
would show a loss.
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In July or August 1989, petitioners received a
statement referred to as the "W.O. Harrison Income
Statement Cash Basis 1988" that reports the following
income and expenses from the cattle feeding business for
1988:
Income:
Sale of cattle $1,880,166.94
Cost of cattle sold 1,123,070.95
757,095.99
Expenses:
Interest
Leadership Banks $52,360.77
Ralph Grounds 9,500.00
Futures loss 4,584.38
Feed expense 402,862.12
Total expenses 469,307.27
1988 Taxable income 287,788.72
Petitioners and their accountants were surprised by the
amount of income shown on this statement. Petitioner's
participation in this business came to an end at the close
of 1988.
In August 1989, petitioners' accountants filed, on
their behalf, Form 2688, Application for Additional
Extension of Time To File U.S. Individual Income Tax
Return, requesting an additional extension of time to
file petitioners' 1988 return. The Form 2688 gives the
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following reason why the extension was needed: "[t]he
taxpayer's C.P.A. has currently been experiencing an
extremely heavy workload. Although additional staff have
been employed, they have been unable to complete all
returns."
On or about October 17, 1989, petitioners filed their
joint individual income tax return for 1988 on Form 1040,
U.S. Individual Income Tax Return. They paid $101,093 with
the return. This amount consists of total tax of $96,418,
less Federal income tax withheld of $1,408, plus a penalty
for underpayment of estimated tax reported on Form 2210,
Underpayment of Estimated Tax by Individuals and
Fiduciaries, in the amount of $6,083.
On the Schedule E, Supplemental Income Schedule, filed
with their return, petitioners reported net income from the
Houston firm in the amount of $120,374, consisting of the
income reported on the Schedule K-1 sent by the firm to
Mr. Harrison, $261,309, less aggregate expenses of
$140,935. On the Schedule F, Farm Income and Expenses,
filed with their return, petitioners reported net farm
profit of $287,789 from the cattle feeding business.
Petitioners' 1988 return included a Form 6252,
Installment Sale Income, and a Form 8308, Report of a Sale
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or Exchange of Certain Partnership Interests. These forms
state that a sale of Mr. Harrison's partnership interest in
the Houston firm took place on October 25, 1988, for an
"estimated" selling price of $3,740,000. Form 6252 also
reports a cost or other basis in the partnership interest
of $195,351. Petitioners did not report the $500,000
payment that Mr. Harrison received in 1988 from the
partnership. They treated this payment as a loan, rather
than as income.
Petitioners' Joint Return for 1989
In April 1990, Mr. Whittington and Ms. Ruble prepared
and filed, on petitioners' behalf, a Form 4868 requesting
an automatic extension of time to file petitioners' 1989
return. The Form 4868 states that petitioners' total
income tax liability for 1989 is $2,200, that they had
Federal income tax withheld for the year of $2,200, and
they had a balance due of zero. The Form W-2, Wage and
Tax Statement, issued to petitioner's wife for 1989 by
her employer reports $2,374 in Federal income tax withheld,
and respondent's records show a payment in the same amount.
The record of this case does not explain why $2,200, rather
than $2,374, was entered on Form 4868.
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In computing petitioners' estimated tax liability for
1989, petitioners' accountants, Mr. Whittington and
Ms. Ruble, followed the practice that they had established
in prior years. Ms. Ruble contacted Ms. Cates in March or
early April 1990, and they discussed the changes to
petitioners' taxable income for 1988 that were necessary to
estimate petitioners' taxable income for 1989. During this
discussion, Ms. Ruble reviewed petitioners' 1988 return and
Ms. Cates reviewed petitioners' books, records, and other
tax information. They identified a number of changes that
were necessary in estimating petitioners' 1989 taxable
income. These included subtracting the profit reported for
1988 from the cattle feeding business to reflect the fact
that Mr. Harrison had disposed of his investment in the
business during 1988, subtracting the income reported from
the Houston firm to reflect Mr. Harrison's withdrawal from
the firm in 1988, adding payments attributable to the sale
of Mr. Harrison's interest in the Houston firm, as offset
by a carryover of capital losses from the termination of
Cooper's Alley Restaurant, and subtracting the expenses
incurred by Mr. Harrison in connection with his law firm in
Corpus Christi.
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In discussing the last item by telephone, Ms. Cates
told Ms. Ruble that the total expenditures for
Mr. Harrison's Corpus Christi law firm, as reflected in
her journal, amounted to approximately $300,000. Ms. Ruble
used this amount in computing petitioners' 1989 estimated
tax liability. She did not discuss with Ms. Cates the
composition of the amounts in that total, and she failed to
take into account the fact that a substantial portion of
that total consisted of capital expenditures, including
$64,000 for leasehold improvements, $6,982 for reception
room furniture, and $8,000 for office furniture, that were
not fully deductible in 1989.
In August 1990, petitioners' accountants filed, on
their behalf, a Form 2688, Application for Additional
Extension of Time To File U.S. Individual Income Tax
Return, requesting an additional extension of time to file
petitioners' 1989 return. The Form 2688 states that the
extension is needed because petitioners' accountant has an
extremely heavy workload and has been unable to complete
the return.
On or about October 16, 1990, petitioners filed a
joint individual income tax return for 1989 on Form 1040.
They paid $41,915 with the return. This amount consists
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of a total tax of $38,702, less Federal income tax withheld
of $2,374, plus a penalty for the underpayment of estimated
tax of $2,438, and a penalty and interest for late payment
in the aggregate amount of $3,149.
On the Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business, filed
with their return, petitioners reported a net loss of
$208,542 from Mr. Harrison's law practice in Corpus
Christi. They reported gross income of $28 and total
expenses of $208,570 from this business, including
depreciation of $3,319. Included among the assets on which
depreciation is claimed are expenditures during 1989 for
furniture in the aggregate amount of $17,982 and leasehold
improvements of $64,199. On a Form 6252, Installment Sale
Income, filed with their return, petitioners reported that
they had received $552,218 from the sale of Mr. Harrison's
interest in the Houston firm, of which 94.77 percent or
$523,337 was long-term capital gain from an installment
sale.
Petitioners' Joint Return for 1990
In April 1991, petitioners' accountant filed, on their
behalf, a Form 4868, requesting an automatic extension of
time to file petitioners' 1990 return. The Form 4868
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states that petitioners' total income tax liability for
1990 is $2,560, that they had Federal income tax withheld
for the year of $2,560, that they had a balance due of
zero. The Form W-2, Wage and Tax Statement, for
petitioner's wife for 1990 lists $2,560 in Federal income
tax withheld.
In August 1991, petitioners' accountants filed,
on their behalf, a Form 2688 requesting an additional
extension of time to file petitioners' 1990 return.
The Form 2688 states that petitioners' accountant was
overworked and was unable to complete petitioners' return.
On or about October 18, 1991, petitioners filed a
joint individual income tax return for 1990 on Form 1040.
They paid $124,186 with the return. This amount consists
of total tax of $124,103, less the Federal income tax
withheld of $2,560, plus a penalty for underpayment of
estimated tax of $2,643.
On the Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business, filed
with the return, petitioners reported gross income of
$50,331, total expenses of $61,267, and a loss of $10,936
from Mr. Harrison's law practice in Corpus Christi.
Petitioners also reported on Schedule E, Supplemental
Income and Loss, a loss of $113,338 from W.O. Harrison,
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P.C., an S corporation. On Form 6252, Installment Sale
Income, petitioners reported that they had received
$617,482 from the sale of Mr. Harrison's interest in the
Houston firm, of which 94.77 percent or $585,188 was long-
term capital gain from an installment sale.
The following schedule deals with petitioners' returns
for the years 1986 through 1992. It shows the filing date
of each return, the total tax shown on each return, the
amount of tax, interest, and penalty paid with each return,
and the amount of tax paid on or before April 15th of the
following year:
Return Total Tax Amount Paid Amount Paid
Year Filed Per Return With Return Prior to 4/15
1986 10/16/87 $26,449 $26,801 $118
1987 10/15/88 117,799 119,585 -0-
1988 10/17/89 96,418 101,093 1,408
1989 10/16/90 38,702 41,915 2,374
1990 10/18/91 124,103 124,186 2,560
1991 10/19/92 113,316 107,966 5,350
1992 10/18/93 79,675 -0- -0-
Notice of Deficiency
Respondent issued a notice of deficiency to
petitioners with respect to their 1988, 1989, and 1990
returns. Among the other adjustments made in the notice,
respondent determined that the payment of $500,000
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petitioner received from the Houston firm in 1988 was not
a loan, as petitioners claimed, and should have been
included in petitioners' income as ordinary income, less
petitioner's basis of $195,351 (i.e., net ordinary income
of $304,649). Respondent also determined that the payments
of $552,218 and $617,482 petitioner received in 1989 and
1990, respectively, from the Houston firm, are ordinary
income, rather than capital gain, as reported by
petitioners on their tax returns.
Respondent also determined that petitioners are liable
for the addition to tax under section 6651(a)(1) for
failure to timely file their 1988, 1989, and 1990 returns.
Respondent determined that the extension of time to file
each of petitioners' tax returns for 1988, 1989, and 1990
was invalid because in filing Form 4868, for each of those
years, petitioners did not properly estimate their correct
tax. The notice of deficiency describes this determination
as follows:
Since your income tax returns for 1988, 1989 and
1990 were not filed within the time prescribed
by law, and it is determined that the extensions
you filed were invalid since you did not properly
estimate your correct tax, 25 percent of the
total underpayment of tax is added as provided
by section 6651(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue
Code * * *
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Prior to trial, the parties stipulated to reduced tax
deficiencies and additions to tax for 1988 and 1989. The
revised deficiencies and additions to tax for those years
are as follows:
Revised
Revised Additions to Tax
Year Deficiency Sec. 6651(a)(1)
1988 $79,268 $19,817
1989 77,687 19,422
With respect to 1990, the parties stipulated that there was
an overassessment of tax of $11,472 and an overassessment
of the addition to tax of $2,868.
Set out below is a summary to the adjustments made by
respondent in the notice of deficiency and the adjustments
agreed to by the parties:
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Summary of Income Tax Changes by Notice of Deficiency
and Agreed Computation of Deficiencies
Adjustments to Income-- Years Ending
Notice of Deficiency 12/31/88 12/31/89 12/31/90
A. Agreed item--adjustment to
income from the Houston firm $4,593
B. Schedule F income
(cattle feeding business) 46,000
C. Schedule F expenses
(cattle feeding business) 9,803
D. Schedule E passive activity loss
(loss from condominiums) 1,827 $1,305 $660
E. Income
(payments by the Houston
firm of partnership interest) 304,649 552,218 617,482
F. Whipsaw adjustment to income
(related to income from the
Houston firm) (166,667)
G. Partnership expense (claimed
as offset to petitioner's
income from the Houston firm) 140,935
H. Other gains and losses
(from sale of airplane) (17,403)
I. Constructive dividend
(life insurance proceeds) 190,943
J. Schedule C expenses (disallowed
expenses attributable to
Corpus Christi office) 208,570 61,267
K. Schedule K-1 1120S flow-through
(disallowed expenses from
professional corporation) 54,929
L. Capital gains and losses (disallowed
capital loss carryover and losses
claimed for worthless stock in
Cooper's Alley & Compuprint and
disallowed capital gains claimed
for sale of partnership interest
in the Houston firm) 3,000 (314,272) (535,018)
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M. Itemized deductions (17,074) 64,884 16,742
Total adjustments per
notice of deficiency: 493,733 686,245 49,395
Taxable income per return: 319,525 82,640 438,332
Adjusted taxable income
per notice of deficiency: 813,258 768,885 487,727
Adjustments to Income--Agreed
Computation of Deficiencies
A. Income
(various capital losses from
Cooper's Alley & Compuprint allowed) (178,305) (158,020) (76,918)
B. Partnership expenses (87,447)
C. Constructive dividend (190,943)
D. Schedule C expenses (41,978) (16,258)
E. Schedule K-1 1120S flow-through (6,769)
F. Capital gains and losses -- -- --
G. Itemized deductions 59,804 25,665 7,817
Total adjustments per
agreed computation: (205,948) (365,276) (92,128)
Total taxable income as revised: 607,310 403,609 395,599
OPINION
The addition to tax under section 6651(a)(1) applies
in the case of a failure to file any return "on the date
prescribed therefor (determined with regard to any
extension of time for filing)". Sec. 6651(a)(1). As
stated above, petitioners' liability for the additions
under section 6651(a)(1) that were determined by respondent
for 1988 and 1989, turns on whether petitioners'
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accountants "properly estimated" petitioners' tax liability
on the Forms 4868, Application for Automatic Extension of
Time to File U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, that were
filed for those years. See sec. 1.6081-4(a)(4), Income
Tax Regs. If petitioners' tax liability was not properly
estimated, then the extensions of time to file are invalid
and petitioners' returns are delinquent. Crocker v.
Commissioner, 92 T.C. 899, 910 (1989). In that event,
petitioners are liable for the addition to tax under
section 6651(a)(1), unless they establish that the failure
to file their returns by the date prescribed by law is due
to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect. Id.
at 912-914.
Generally, individuals who compute their Federal
income tax on the basis of the calendar year are required
to file their return on or before April 15th following
the close of such year. Sec. 6072(a). The Secretary of
the Treasury or his delegate may grant a reasonable
extension of time for filing a return. Sec. 6081(a).
Regulations promulgated pursuant to that authority
state that individual taxpayers may obtain an automatic
4-month extension of time to file their return. Sec.
1.6081-4(a)(1), Income Tax Regs. In order to do so, the
taxpayer must prepare and sign a Form 4868, Application
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for Automatic Extension of Time to File U.S. Individual
Income Tax Return, and file the form with the appropriate
internal revenue officer on or before the due date
prescribed for filing the taxpayer's income tax return.
Sec. 1.6081-4(a)(2) and (3), Income Tax Regs. Section
1.6081-4(a)(4), Income Tax Regs., as in effect during
the years in issue, provided that such application for
extension:
must show the full amount properly estimated as
tax for such taxpayer for such taxable year, and
such application must be accompanied by the full
remittance of the amount properly estimated as
tax which is unpaid as of the date prescribed for
the filing of the return.
A taxpayer will be treated as having "properly
estimated" his tax liability, within the meaning of
section 1.6081-4(a)(4), Income Tax Regs., quoted above,
when he makes a bona fide and reasonable estimate of his
tax liability based on the information available to him
at the time he makes his request for an extension. Crocker
v. Commissioner, supra at 908. As a prerequisite for this
treatment, however, the taxpayer must make a bona fide and
reasonable attempt to locate, gather, and consult informa-
tion which will enable him to make a proper estimate of
his tax liability. Crocker v. Commissioner, supra.
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As stated in section 1.6081-4(a)(4), Income Tax Regs.,
quoted above, the granting of an automatic extension of
time within which a taxpayer may file an income tax return
does not operate to extend the time for payment of any tax
due on such return. See Crocker v. Commissioner, supra at
905; sec. 1.6081-4(b), Income Tax Regs. A taxpayer who
computes his taxes on a calendar year basis must pay his
taxes by the 15th of April following the close of such
calendar year regardless of whether he has been granted
an extension of time to file his return. Secs. 6151(a);
6072(a).
In this case, petitioners ask the Court to find that
the estimates of their tax liability made by their
accountants on the Forms 4868 filed for 1988 and 1989 were
proper. According to petitioners, they made a "bona fide
and reasonable estimate of their tax liability based upon
the information available to petitioners at the time of the
making of the extension requests." Petitioners also assert
that their accountants made "a bona fide and reasonable
attempt to locate, gather and consult information which
would enable them to make a reasonable estimate."
In the case of their 1988 tax liability, petitioners
note that neither the Schedule K-1 from the Houston firm,
nor the income statement from the cattle feeding business
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was available until July or August 1989, after the Form
4868 was filed in April 1989, and petitioners argue that
the estimates of their income from those activities were
reasonable. Furthermore, petitioners contend that
Mr. Harrison and their accountants made reasonable
attempts to obtain accurate information from both the
Houston firm and the cattle feeding business before the
Form 4868 for 1988 was filed.
In the case of their 1989 tax liability, petitioners
argue that their accountants also made a reasonable
estimate of their tax liability based upon available
information and that they made a reasonable attempt to
obtain accurate information. They argue that Ms. Ruble's
"oversight regarding capitalization of leasehold improve-
ments" which caused the estimate to be understated should
not cause the estimate to be considered improper.
Alternatively, petitioners argue, if the Court finds
that proper estimates were not made for 1988 or 1989,
then the Court should find that the additions to tax under
section 6651(a)(1) determined by respondent are not
applicable because petitioners' failure to timely file was
due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect.
Petitioners argue that they relied upon their accountants,
Ms. Cates, Ms. Ruble, and Mr. Whittington "to prepare
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proper estimates so as to cause the tax returns to be filed
on time" and "[A]ny failure of Petitioners to file tax
returns on time would have been the result of the failure
of their accountants to make a proper estimate."
Respondent contends that the Forms 4868 filed by
petitioners for the years 1988 and 1989 were invalid
because petitioners failed to estimate properly their tax
liability as required by section 1.6081-4(a)(4), Income Tax
Regs. Respondent points out that petitioners' Forms 4868
for 1988 and 1989 estimated their tax liability to be
$1,408 and $2,200, respectively, whereas petitioners paid
$101,093 and $41,915 with their 1988 and 1989 returns,
respectively. Respondent also notes that the parties have
agreed that petitioners' corrected income tax liabilities
for 1988 and 1989 are $176,998 and $116,389, respectively.
Respondent contends that petitioners have a history
of failing to make proper estimates of their Federal tax
liability. According to respondent, "[F]or each of the
years 1986 through 1992, petitioners filed both Form 4868
and Form 2688 extension agreements" and "[F]or each of
these years, petitioners paid 99 percent of their Federal
income tax liability with their filed return in October."
Respondent asserts that petitioners' allegations that
their estimates for the years in issue were reasonable,
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"are not supported by any evidence." To find otherwise,
according to respondent, the Court would have to disregard
"petitioners' past conduct in filing extensions and failing
to make proper estimated tax payments" and the Court would
have to "accept the unsupported testimony of petitioners
and their representatives." Finally, respondent argues
that petitioners cannot avoid the delinquency addition
by claiming reasonable reliance on their accountants.
According to respondent, petitioners have not shown "'that
the advisor had sufficient knowledge of the taxpayer's
relevant financial circumstances to make an informed
decision.'" (quoting Stovall v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1983-450, affd. 762 F.2d 891 (11th Cir. 1985)).
Respondent's position in this case places great
emphasis on "the past history of petitioners' failure
to make proper estimates of Federal tax liability".
However troubling we find that history to be, we are
mindful of our opinion in Crocker v. Commissioner, 92 T.C.
899, 906 (1989), which states that "a mere comparison of
estimated tax liabilities with true tax liabilities will
not reveal whether petitioners' estimates were 'proper.'"
In that case, we continued with the following:
An estimate is no more than that. It is, "A
valuing or rating by the mind, without actually
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measuring, weighing or the like. A rough or
approximate calculation only." Black's Law
Dictionary, 494 (5th ed. 1979).
To require exactitude in the estimation
called for under section 1.6081-4(a)(4), Income
Tax Regs., would be unreasonable. The taxpayer
would have no need for an extension of time
within which to file his return if he could
determine his true tax liability at the time
he submits the Form 4868. The mere fact that
petitioners underestimated their 1981 and 1982
tax liabilities, standing alone, does not cause
their applications to be invalid and the auto-
matic extensions to be void. See Hudspeth v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1985-628.
Id. at 906-907; see also Arnaiz v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1992-729. ("The mere fact that petitioners in fact
underestimated their 1985 tax finally shown to be due does
not mean that they did not properly estimate their tax; the
standard is whether they made a 'bona fide and reasonable
attempt' to secure information * * * necessary to make a
'bona fide' and reasonable estimate' of their tax
liabilities. Crocker v. Commissioner, supra at 907-908.")
Respondent's position that petitioners' allegations
"are not supported by any evidence" disregards the evidence
advanced by petitioners, consisting of Mr. Harrison's
testimony, the testimony of his bookkeeper, Ms. Cates, and
the testimony of the certified public accountants,
Mr. Whittington and Ms. Ruble, whom petitioners retained
to prepare and submit their income tax returns. We found
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the testimony of petitioners' witnesses to be credible and
decline respondent's invitation to dismiss it as "simply
the unsupported self-serving testimony of petitioners."
In this regard, we note that, as of the time of trial,
Ms. Ruble had no ongoing business or other connection
with petitioners or her former employer, Mr. Whittington.
The problem with petitioners' evidence, however, is
that it does not go far enough. Petitioners have shown
that for the year 1988, after making reasonable inquiry
of petitioner's former law firm and petitioner's cattle
feeding business, petitioners' accountants estimated
petitioners' income from those activities. According to
petitioners: "These two items alone accounted for more
than the difference between the amount of tax shown due on
the 1988 return and the amount of tax estimated on Form
4868 for 1988." In effect, petitioners have limited their
case to showing the reasonableness of their estimated tax
liability for 1988, $1,408, as compared to the total tax of
$96,418 reported on their 1988 return. Petitioners have
not addressed the adjustments determined in the notice of
deficiency, as revised by the agreed computation of the
1988 deficiency, on the basis of which their total
tax liability is $175,686, or $79,268 more than the tax
reported on their return. Nor have petitioners shown any
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reason to conclude that it is unnecessary to evaluate the
reasonableness of petitioners' estimate for 1988 in terms
of their full tax liability, what Crocker v. Commissioner,
supra at 906, referred to as the taxpayer's "true tax
liability." As a result, petitioners have not established
the reasonableness of the estimate made on petitioners'
behalf on Form 4868 for 1988. Accordingly, we find that
petitioners have not met their burden of disproving
respondent's determination that the Form 4868 for 1988
was void and that petitioners failed to make a timely
return for 1988.
Similarly, petitioners' evidence for 1989 shows that
in computing petitioners' estimated tax liability
Ms. Ruble assumed that all of the amounts classified by
Ms. Cates as office expenses for petitioners' Corpus
Christi law office were fully deductible, whereas that
total included approximately $80,000 of capital
expenditures. According to petitioners: "That
classification difference, capitalized vs. deductible
leasehold improvements, accounted for the difference in
tax liability between the amount estimated and that shown
due on the return." As was true in the case of 1988,
petitioners have limited their case to showing the
reasonableness of their estimated tax liability for 1989,
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$2,200, as compared to total tax of $38,702 reported on
their 1989 return. Petitioners have not addressed the
adjustments determined in the notice of deficiency, as
revised by the agreed computation of the 1989 deficiency,
on the basis of which their total tax liability is
$116,389, or $77,687 more than the tax reported on their
return, nor have petitioners shown any reason to conclude
that it is unnecessary to evaluate the reasonableness of
petitioners' estimate for 1989 in terms of their true tax
liability. As a result, petitioners have not established
the reasonableness of the estimate made on petitioners'
behalf on Form 4868 for 1989. Accordingly, we find that
petitioners have not met their burden of disproving
respondent's determination that Form 4968 for 1989 was void
and that petitioners failed to make a timely return for
1989.
This brings us to petitioners' alternative contention
that, even if we find that petitioners failed to file
timely returns, we should, nevertheless, find that the
additions to tax under section 6651(a)(1), as determined by
respondent, are not applicable because petitioners' failure
to timely file was due to reasonable cause and not due to
willful neglect. In this regard, petitioners assert that
they relied upon their accountants to compute their
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estimated tax liability for each of the subject years.
Respondent asks the Court to reject this contention and
suggests that petitioners failed to supply their
accountants with complete and accurate records from which
to make a reasonable estimate of their tax liability.
As a preliminary matter, we note that there is no
evidence in the record of this case that petitioners'
failure to file timely returns for 1988 and 1989 resulted
from "willful neglect" in the sense of "a conscious,
intentional failure or reckless indifference." United
States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 245 (1985). Thus, this
issue turns on whether there was "reasonable cause" within
the meaning of section 6651(a)(1) for petitioners' failure
to file timely returns for 1988 and 1989. According to
section 301.6651-1(c)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs.,
"reasonable cause" is found "If the taxpayer exercised
ordinary business care and prudence and was nevertheless
unable to file the return within the prescribed time".
See generally Roberts v. Commissioner, 860 F.2d 1235, 1240-
1241 (5th Cir. 1988), affg. T.C. Memo. 1987-391.
The late filing in this case was not due to the
failure by petitioner's accountants to ascertain the
correct deadline for filing petitioners' 1988 and 1989
returns or to the accountants' failure to file the subject
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returns through oversight. If it were, petitioners could
not escape the application of section 6651(a)(1) by
claiming reliance on their accountants. See United States
v. Boyle, supra at 252; McGee v. Commissioner, 979 F.2d 66,
70-71 (5th Cir. 1992), affg. per curiam T.C. Memo. 1991-
510; Denenburg v. United States, 920 F.2d 301 (5th Cir.
1991). For example, in United States v. Boyle, supra, the
executor of an estate, argued that reliance on an attorney
was "reasonable cause" for failure to meet the filing
deadline for an estate tax return. The Court stated that
it was not "reasonable" for the executor to "assume" that
the attorney would comply with the statute. United States
v. Boyle, supra at 250. The Supreme Court held: "The
failure to make a timely filing of a tax return is not
excused by the taxpayer's reliance on an agent, and such
reliance is not 'reasonable cause' for a late filing under
§6651(a)(1)." United States v. Boyle, supra at 252. In
its opinion, the Supreme Court made it clear that the case
before it was not one in which "a taxpayer has relied on
the erroneous advice of counsel concerning a question of
law", such as the advice of an accountant or attorney that
it was unnecessary to file a return. Id. at 250.
In this case, petitioners and their accountants did
more than the executor and his lawyer in United States
- 36 -
v. Boyle, supra. In this case, petitioners' accountants
prepared Forms 4868, including the accountants' computation
of petitioners' estimated tax liability, and filed the
forms on petitioners' behalf before the filing deadline.
The filing of each of these forms on which petitioners'
accountants had estimated petitioners' tax liability for
the year constituted the advice of petitioners' accountants
not only as to petitioners' estimated tax liability but
also as to petitioners' filing obligations. This is the
type of substantive advice of an accountant as to which it
is reasonable for a taxpayer to rely. Id. at 251. The
late filing in this case was not due to an oversight or
inattention on the part of petitioners or their
accountants. It was due to the advice of petitioners'
accountants that petitioners' tax liability was properly
estimated on the Forms 4868 filed for 1988 and 1989, and
that they had validly claimed an automatic extension to
file the return for each year. This advice, on which
petitioners relied, constitutes "reasonable cause" for
petitioners' failure to file timely returns. See
Commissioner v. American Association of Engrs. Employment,
Inc., 204 F.2d 19, 21 (7th Cir. 1953), affg. a Memorandum
Opinion of this Court; Burton Swartz Land Corp. v.
Commissioner, 198 F.2d 558, 560 (5th Cir. 1952), affg. in
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part and revg. in part a Memorandum Opinion of this Court;
Haywood Lumber & Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 769,
771 (2d Cir. 1950), modifying 12 T.C. 735 (1949); Orient
Inv. & Fin. Co. v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 601, 603-604
(D.C. Cir. 1948); Furman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-
157.
The only argument made by respondent regarding
petitioners' reliance on their accountants is the
following:
Petitioners cannot simply lay the blame
on accountants or bookkeepers for failing to
obtain the information necessary to make a proper
estimate. "It is the taxpayer's obligation to
supply his or her accountant with complete and
accurate records from which to make a reasonable
estimate of the tax liability." Boatman v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-356 (citing Estate
of Duttenhofer v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 200, 205
(1967), aff'd, 410 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1969)).
Neither can petitioners avoid the I.R.C. § 6651
(a)(1) penalty by attempting to lay the blame
on a representative for failing to timely file
a return. "To demonstrate reasonable reliance,
it must be shown that the advisor had sufficient
knowledge of the taxpayer's relevant financial
circumstances to make an informed decision."
Stovall v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1983-450
(citing Yale Avenue Corp. v. Commissioner, 58
T.C. 1062 (1972) and Railroad Realty Co. v.
Commissioner, 25 T.C. 458 (1955)).
We find no support in the record for respondent's argument.
Petitioners' accountants had a longstanding relationship
- 38 -
with petitioners and a close working relationship with
petitioners' bookkeeper, Ms. Cates. There is no evidence
that petitioners or their bookkeeper withheld any
information from their accountants.
Based on the foregoing and concessions of the parties,
Decision will be entered
under Rule 155.