T.C. Memo. 1999-417
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
HOWARD G. GRIDER AND ANNA C. GRIDER, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 21303-97. Filed December 23, 1999.
Howard G. Grider, pro se.
David G. Hendricks and Michael J. O'Brien, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
COLVIN, Judge: Respondent determined a deficiency in
petitioners’ 1994 Federal income tax of $40,464 and an accuracy-
related penalty under section 6662(a) for negligence of $8,093.
After concessions,1 the issues for decision are:
1
Petitioners concede that respondent’s adjustments to their
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1. Whether petitioners may deduct the amount of repairs
expenses they incurred in 1994 ($114,823), as petitioners
contend, or the amount they paid ($51,203), as respondent
contends. We hold that petitioners may deduct only the amount of
repairs expenses that they paid in 1994.
2. Whether petitioners are liable for the accuracy-related
penalty for negligence under section 6662(a) for 1994. We hold
that they are.
References to petitioner are to Howard G. Grider. Section
references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect during the
year at issue. Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of
Practice and Procedure.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
Petitioners lived in Warren, Arkansas, when they filed their
petition.
A. Petitioner’s Logging Business
Petitioner has been in the logging business since 1951.
From 1951 to 1994, petitioner reported income from his logging
business on the cash method of accounting (i.e., he did not
1
(...continued)
gross receipts, interest expense, and cost of goods sold are
correct. The parties settled the depreciation issue, and agree
that computational adjustments will be required for petitioners'
self-employment tax for 1994.
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report income until he received it), yet he accrued expenses
(i.e., he deducted expenses when he became liable for them).
Petitioner has about 8-10 suppliers from whom he buys diesel
fuel, truck parts, and other items for his business. Petitioner
generally pays his suppliers within 30 days.
Petitioner incurred $114,823 of repair expenses for logging
machinery and equipment in 1994. However, because he had a
dispute with one of his suppliers, petitioner paid $51,203 of
that amount in 1994 and $63,620 in 1995.
B. Petitioners’ Tax Returns
Petitioner prepared petitioners’ tax returns from 1951
through the year in issue. He had no professional help in
preparing the 1994 return.
Petitioner reported his logging income for 1994 based on
Forms 1099 issued to him. Petitioner computed his expenses by
totaling his cash payments and check stubs for 1994. Petitioner
reported on his Schedule C for 1994 that he used the cash method
of accounting.
Petitioner deducted $94,723 for repairs and maintenance
expenses in 1994. He arrived at this amount by reducing
$119,723, the amount of expenses he thought he had incurred in
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1994,2 by $25,000. He did so to increase petitioners’ income for
Social Security purposes.
Petitioners understated gross receipts on their Schedule C
by $139,993, and purchases by $101,763. Petitioners overstated
their fuel tax credit by $8,884 for 1994.
OPINION
A. Whether Respondent Properly Disallowed Petitioners’
Deduction of $63,630 of Repairs Expenses for 1994
The first issue for decision is whether petitioners may
deduct more than $51,203 for repairs expenses for 1994.
Petitioners contend that they may deduct $114,823 for repairs
expenses for 1994. Petitioners did not report income until they
received it, but they deducted some expenses before they paid
them. Petitioners contend that this is a proper hybrid method of
accounting which they have consistently and properly used to
compute and report petitioner’s income and expenses from his
logging business. Petitioners also contend that respondent’s
determination was an abuse of discretion because the cash method
of accounting does not clearly reflect petitioner’s income from
the logging business.
We disagree. First, petitioners did not explain why the
cash method would not clearly reflect their income. Second,
petitioners did not use a valid hybrid method of accounting.
2
Petitioner incurred only $114,823 of repair expenses in
1994.
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Petitioners improperly reported income on the cash method and
related expenses on an accrual method. See sec. 1.446-
1(c)(1)(iv), Income Tax Regs. A taxpayer’s method of accounting
that is plainly contrary to the regulations does not clearly
reflect income. See Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439
U.S. 522, 523, 533 (1979).
Petitioners rely on G.C.M. 37,316 (Nov. 11, 1977) and G.C.M.
39,328 (June 8, 1984) for the proposition that use of an
accounting method for 2 years is sufficient to establish a
taxpayer’s right to use that method. Petitioners’ reliance is
misplaced. Neither G.C.M. permits a taxpayer to use an improper
accounting method.
Petitioners must deduct business expenses in the taxable
year in which the expenses are paid. See sec. 461(a); sec.
1.461-1(a)(1), Income Tax Regs. Petitioners paid $63,620 of
repair expenses in 1995; thus, they may not deduct those expenses
in 1994.
Petitioners contend that respondent improperly changed
petitioners’ method of accounting from a hybrid method to the
cash method. We disagree. Respondent may change petitioners’
method of accounting to another method that, in respondent’s
opinion, clearly reflects income if respondent determines that
they used an impermissible accounting method to report income.
See sec. 446(b). As discussed above, petitioners used an
improper hybrid method of accounting in 1994, and respondent’s
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determination was not an abuse of discretion. Thus, we sustain
respondent’s determination that petitioners must report income on
the cash method of accounting.
Petitioners cite Hospital Corp. of Am. v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1996-105, for the proposition that taxpayers may use a
hybrid of cash and accrual methods. The facts of Hospital Corp.
of Am. v. Commissioner, supra, are distinguishable from those in
the instant case. In that case, we held that it was an abuse of
discretion for respondent to change the taxpayer’s method of
accounting because the taxpayer’s hybrid method clearly reflected
the taxpayer’s income. In the instant case, however, petitioners
impermissibly mixed cash and accrual methods of accounting in
violation of section 1.446-1(c)(1)(iv)(a), Income Tax Regs.
Petitioners contend that respondent’s disallowance of the
repairs expense for 1994 was an abuse of discretion because
petitioners have consistently used the same method of accounting
for more than 40 years. We disagree; respondent is not estopped
by petitioners’ prior treatment of petitioner’s logging income
and expenses. See Municipal Bond Corp. v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.
20, 32 (1963), revd. and remanded on other issues 341 F.2d 683
(8th Cir. 1965).
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B. Accuracy-Related Penalty Under Section 6662
Respondent determined and contends that petitioners are
liable for the accuracy-related penalty for negligence under
section 6662(a) and (c) for 1994.
Section 6662(a) and (b)(1) imposes a 20-percent penalty on
the portion of an underpayment attributable to negligence.
Negligence includes a failure to make a reasonable attempt to
comply with the Internal Revenue Code or to exercise ordinary and
reasonable care in that respect. See sec. 6662(c). Petitioners
bear the burden of proving that they are not liable for the
accuracy-related penalty imposed by section 6662(a). See Rule
142(a).
Petitioners contend that their underpayment was not due to
negligence or intentional and willful disregard of rules or
regulations because they have consistently used the same method
of accounting for more than 40 years. They also contend that
respondent conceded this addition to tax. Petitioners provided a
copy of an unsigned decision document that appears to have been
prepared by respondent which states that petitioners are not
liable under section 6662(a) for 1994. We do not consider that
document because it is not in evidence.
We believe that petitioners were negligent. Petitioners
improperly mixed cash and accrual methods of accounting. They
understated gross receipts on their Schedule C by $139,993 and
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purchases by $101,763, and overstated their fuel tax credit by
$8,884 for 1994. We conclude that petitioners negligently
disregarded the tax laws, and that they are liable for the
accuracy-related penalty for negligence under section 6662(a) for
1994.
C. Section 481
Petitioners contend that they are entitled to a section 481
adjustment. Respondent did not respond to petitioners’ section
481 argument in posttrial brief. We agree that section 481
applies because respondent’s adjustments sustained herein alter
the timing of certain of petitioners’ deductions, contrary to
petitioners’ traditional treatment of these items. Therefore,
the parties shall apply section 481 in connection with the Rule
155 computation.
Decision will be entered
under Rule 155.