T.C. Summary Opinion 2001-112
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
JAMES R. AND JANET M. LANDRUM, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 919-00S. Filed July 26, 2001.
O. Christopher Meyers, for petitioners.
Ann L. Darnold, for respondent.
WOLFE, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to
the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in
effect at the time the petition was filed. The decision to be
entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion
should not be cited as authority. Unless otherwise indicated,
subsequent section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in
effect for the years in issue.
- 2 -
Respondent determined deficiencies in petitioners’ 1996 and
1997 Federal income taxes of $4,805 and $6,720, respectively, and
an accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) for 1997 of
$1,344. The issues for decision are: (1) Whether petitioners’
Amway distributorship was an activity engaged in for profit
within the meaning of section 183; (2) whether petitioners are
entitled to claimed Schedule C deductions for expenditures
relating to their Amway activity; (3) whether petitioners are
entitled to deduct as charitable contributions amounts in excess
of the amounts allowed by respondent; and (4) whether petitioners
are liable for an accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a)
for 1997.
Background
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
The stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are
incorporated herein by this reference.
When the petition was filed, petitioners resided in Lawton,
Oklahoma. Petitioner James R. Landrum (Mr. Landrum) worked full-
time for Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. (Goodyear) as a quality
technician in 1996 and as an alignment specialist in 1997.
Petitioner Janet M. Landrum (Mrs. Landrum) worked full-time as an
x-ray technician for Southwestern Medical Center during both
years in issue. Petitioners’ four children were, respectively,
- 3 -
14, 16, 21, and 24 years of age at the time of trial (January 22,
2001).
For convenience and clarity, additional findings of fact and
the applicable law are discussed together with respect to each
issue.
Background Concerning Amway
Prior to the years in issue, petitioners had three separate
experiences with Amway, beginning in 1974. Mr. Landrum was a
corporal in the Marine Corps and was stationed in Hawaii in 1974.
His Amway activity consisted of purchasing cases of wax from an
Amway distributor at wholesale, selling “a case or two a month to
[his] friends,” and keeping the difference between the wholesale
and retail prices. He ceased his activities with Amway in 1976
when he was transferred from Hawaii and then released from active
duty with the Marine Corps. After their marriage in 1977,
petitioners participated in an Amway distributorship. Their
experience with Amway was unprofitable, and they terminated it
after 2 years. Petitioners became involved with Amway a third
time in 1985, while Mr. Landrum was employed at Goodyear.
Although petitioners had about 50 persons reporting to them,
directly or indirectly, in the pyramid structure of Amway, there
were insufficient sales for profit. Petitioners’ third Amway
venture lasted approximately 2 years, and again, petitioners
- 4 -
terminated the activity for lack of profit. In late 1995,
petitioners were introduced to Amway a fourth time by friends of
Mrs. Landrum. This fourth Amway experience is the subject of the
present controversy.
Petitioners understood the Amway structure and compensation
technique throughout the years in issue. Mr. Landrum summarized
it in terms of a 6-4-2 illustration. He explained that the Amway
participant should purchase his own household products from
Amway. If he buys $100 of merchandise monthly, he receives a
bonus. He then recruits six other persons to use $100 of Amway
merchandise monthly, and consequently the initial Amway
participant receives appropriate bonus amounts with respect to
those six persons. He is “upline” from them, and they are
“downline” from him. If each of the six downline recruits then
enlists four subrecruits, each of whom uses $100 of products
monthly, the initial Amway participant receives bonus as to usage
from this larger group (1 + 6 + 24 for a total of 31). Finally,
in this illustration, if each of the 24 subrecruits persuades two
additional people to participate in Amway and purchase $100 of
product monthly, the group relevant to the computation of the
initial Amway participant’s monthly bonus will be expanded to an
even larger number (1 + 6 + 24 + 48 for a total of 79). In the
6-4-2 illustration, if each participant continues to purchase
- 5 -
$100 of merchandise monthly, the initiator of the group will
receive commission based on monthly sales of $7,900, subject to
commission-sharing adjustments. Mr. Landrum estimated that the
person who established a successful 6-4-2 grouping would receive
$1,800 to $2,200 in monthly commissions and then might proceed to
gain even greater benefits as a “direct distributor” who might
then triple his organization and receive an “Emerald bonus” and
then expand to have six legs and a “Diamond organization”.
According to Mr. Landrum, Amway distributors with an emerald
organization make $75,000 to $100,000 annually, and those with a
diamond organization make $125,000 to $250,000 yearly, “And it
goes up from there” as he put it.1
Petitioners had no such experience during the years in issue
and all the earlier years of their participation in Amway
distributorships. There simply is no resemblance between the
wonderfully optimistic projection that Mr. Landrum recited and
the reality of petitioners’ experience during their many years of
association with Amway.
1
See Nissley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-178, for this
Court’s recent summary of Amway operations with somewhat more
detail and less fantasy, at least as to himself, than Mr. Landrum
provided.
- 6 -
1. Petitioners’ Amway Distributorship Was Not an Activity
Engaged in for Profit During 1996 and 1997
Petitioners filed Schedules C, Profit and Loss From
Business, with their 1996 and 1997 Federal income tax returns and
reported the following:
Income 1996 1997
Gross receipts $150 $84.63
Less: cost of goods sold -0- -0-
Gross income 150 84.63
Expenses
Car and truck $8,866 $12,119
Commission and fees 28 -0-
Legal and professional services 300 300
Travel 45 380
Meals and entertainment 305 437
Other expenses1 2,358 2,545.39
Total expenses 11,902 15,781.39
Total net losses (11,752) (15,696.76)
1
The “Other expenses” claimed for 1996 were:
Monthly seminars (11 seminars at $28 each) $308
Quarterly conferences (3 conferences at
$130 each, plus food and lodging) 840
Tapes, catalogs, business support 850
Cell phone (basic) 360
The “Other expenses” claimed for 1997 were:
Monthly training seminars (tickets) $308
Quarterly conferences (3) 470
Training tapes and business support 1,767.39
In the notices of deficiency for 1996 and 1997, respondent
determined that petitioners’ Amway activity did not satisfy
requirements for carrying on a business, and that the expenses
- 7 -
incurred in connection with the Amway activity were therefore
deductible only to the extent of income earned from the activity.
Section 183(a) provides that if an activity engaged in by an
individual is not engaged in for profit, no deduction
attributable to such activity shall be allowed, except as
provided in section 183(b).2 An “activity not engaged in for
profit” means any activity other than one for which deductions
are allowable under section 162 or under paragraph (1) or (2) of
section 212. Sec. 183(c). Section 162 allows a deduction for
all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during
the taxable year in carrying on a business. Section 212 allows a
deduction for all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred during the taxable year for the production or collection
of income, or for the management, conservation, or maintenance of
property held for the production of income. The profit standards
applicable to section 212 are the same as those used in section
162. Antonides v. Commissioner, 893 F.2d 656, 659 (4th Cir.
1990), affg. 91 T.C. 686 (1988).
2
In the case of an activity not engaged in for profit, sec.
183(b)(1) allows a deduction for expenses that are otherwise
deductible without regard to whether the activity is engaged in
for profit. Sec. 183(b)(2) allows a deduction for expenses that
would be deductible only if the activity were engaged in for
profit, but only to the extent that the total gross income
derived from the activity exceeds the deductions allowed by sec.
183(b)(1).
- 8 -
For a taxpayer to deduct expenses of an activity under
section 162, he must show that he engaged in the activity with an
actual and honest objective of making a profit. Ronnen v.
Commissioner, 90 T.C. 74, 91 (1988); Fuchs v. Commissioner, 83
T.C. 79, 98 (1984); Dreicer v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 642, 645
(1982), affd. without opinion 702 F.2d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
sec. 1.183-2(a), Income Tax Regs. Although a reasonable
expectation of profit is not required, the taxpayer’s profit
objective must be bona fide. Hulter v. Commissioner, 91 T.C.
371, 393 (1988); Beck v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 557, 569 (1985).
“Profit” in this context means economic profit, independent of
tax savings. Drobny v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1326, 1341 (1986).
Whether a taxpayer has an actual and honest profit objective is a
question of fact to be resolved from all the relevant facts and
circumstances. Keanini v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 41, 46 (1990);
sec. 1.183-2(b), Income Tax Regs. Greater weight is given to
objective facts than to a taxpayer’s statement of intent. Thomas
v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 1244, 1269 (1985), affd. 792 F.2d 1256
(4th Cir. 1986); sec. 1.183-2(a), Income Tax Regs.
Section 1.183-2(b), Income Tax Regs., provides the following
nonexclusive list of factors to consider in determining whether
an activity is engaged in for profit: (1) The manner in which
the taxpayer carried on the activity; (2) the expertise of the
- 9 -
taxpayer or his advisers; (3) the time and effort expended by the
taxpayer in carrying on the activity; (4) the expectation that
the assets used in the activity may appreciate in value; (5) the
success of the taxpayer in carrying on other similar or
dissimilar activities; (6) the taxpayer’s history of income or
losses with respect to the activity; (7) the amount of occasional
profits, if any, which are earned; (8) the financial status of
the taxpayer; and (9) elements of personal pleasure or
recreation.
These factors are not merely a counting device where the
number of factors for or against the taxpayer is determinative.
Instead, all facts and circumstances must be taken into account,
and more weight may be given to some factors than to others.
Dunn v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 715, 720 (1978), affd. 615 F.2d 578
(2d Cir. 1980). Some of the factors summarized above are
inapplicable to this situation, and others provide little
guidance to the resolution of the question here. Therefore, we
focus on the factors that lead to our decision.
The most significant factors by far in this case are
petitioners’ long history of failure in Amway activities and
their almost total lack of gross revenue from those activities
during the period in issue. Three times before the years in
issue Mr. Landrum had attempted Amway activity, and Mrs. Landrum
- 10 -
had participated in the last two of those efforts. Each time the
activity was terminated after 2 years. Mr. Landrum says he
stopped the activity the first time because he was in the
military and left the area of his Amway activity. He mentions
that the birth of petitioners’ first child had something to do
with terminating Amway the second time. Nevertheless,
petitioners’ own testimony establishes that they never made any
significant amount from three previous Amway efforts. They tried
different approaches. In the first effort, Mr. Landrum sold some
product but did not enlist “downline” distributors. The second
effort, in 1977-1979 was, according to Mr. Landrum, “just kind of
a break-even deal.” During the third effort, in 1985-1987,
petitioners built up their downline distributorship to include
more than 50 people, but as Mr. Landrum explained, “they weren’t
doing a lot of product”, and consequently, once again there was
no profit.
The obvious question is why after three strikes petitioners
did not call themselves out of Amway permanently. They have
provided no satisfactory answer. Instead, they explain that in
1995 they were introduced to Amway again. Mrs. Landrum testified
that they were “personal friends” with people that were doing
Amway successfully, so they thought they also could succeed.
These “personal friends” were upline seven or eight steps from
- 11 -
petitioners (at the so-called emerald level) and sometimes would
work with them. Mr. Landrum explained that his friend and upline
adviser told him he would have to spend $500 per month on
inspirational and instructive tapes and materials, for
approximately 3 months, and then he could expect to gross $500 to
$1,000 or more monthly from Amway. From this advice, what they
read in Amway literature, and what they heard at Amway seminars,
petitioners say that when they started a fourth time in 1995 they
expected to start making a profit in 90 days. Despite mounting
losses, petitioners continued their Amway activity for more than
2 years beyond the 90-day trial period, long after it was clear
that the activity was not viable. The regulations provide that
“where losses continue to be sustained beyond the period which
customarily is necessary to bring the operation to profitable
status such continued losses, if not explainable, as due to
customary business risks or reverses, may be indicative that the
activity is not being engaged in for profit”. Sec. 1.183-
2(b)(6), Income Tax Regs.
The exact date when petitioners commenced their fourth
effort at Amway is unclear, but petitioners’ own testimony
establishes that it was in 1995. Since petitioners might have
explained the starting date and failed to do so, we conclude that
the entire 90-day starting period that petitioners mention took
- 12 -
place prior to the years in issue. By the beginning of 1996,
petitioners had ample experience with Amway and even had tried it
for the appropriate initiating time with their new group and the
aid of their “personal friends”. Their decision to continue
their Amway activity during 1996 and 1997 after their extensive
and wholly unsuccessful experiences with Amway simply cannot be
accepted as a bona fide business decision.
Petitioners did not conduct their Amway activity in a
businesslike manner during the years in issue. They had no
separate bank account for Amway. They had no records concerning
their meager receipts. Mr. Landrum suggested that the few
dollars of receipts must have been from the little checks that
Amway occasionally sent, but he had no records about such
matters. Petitioners kept receipts of expenditures and
calendars, but these materials were not organized or analyzed in
any manner to improve results. Petitioners did not retain
canceled checks or banking records to prove their expenditures.
Petitioners had no business plan other than the 6-4-2 concept and
a one-page inspirational listing of such items as “Listen to at
least one audiotape promoted by our upline” and “Read 15 minutes
per day from a book promoted by our upline”. They did not
consult with business experts but relied only on advice from one
of their upline distributors and other interested Amway persons.
- 13 -
Under the Amway system, the upline distributor’s income depends
on the downline person’s sales, so the upline person’s interest
is to keep as many people as possible in his organization without
regard to profitability. Nissley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2000-178.
The amount of profits in relation to the amount of losses
incurred, and in relation to the amount of the taxpayer’s
investment and the value of the assets used in the activity, also
are relevant in determining the taxpayer’s intent. Sec. 1.183-
2(b)(7), Income Tax Regs. Petitioners’ gross receipts of $150
and $84.63 in 1996 and 1997, respectively, were trivial in
relation to their total claimed expenses of $11,902 and
$15,781.39, respectively. The magnitude of these discrepancies
is an indication that petitioners did not have the requisite
profit objective. See, e.g., Burger v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1985-523, affd. 809 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1987).
We do not question that petitioners spent some time and
money in their Amway activity. But petitioners’ evidence as to
the extent of these efforts and expenditures is questionable and
exaggerated. The claims to mileage exceed the distances to some
of their claimed destinations. Petitioners presented numerous
receipts for expenditures for Amway tools, but there are no
checks to substantiate the payments. The upline sponsors,
- 14 -
supposedly petitioners’ personal friends, and others in the Amway
chain, did not testify to confirm petitioners’ efforts and
expenditures.
Substantial income from sources other than the activity may
indicate that the activity is not engaged in for profit,
particularly if the losses from the activity generate substantial
tax benefits. Sec. 1.183-2(b)(8), Income Tax Regs. Petitioners
were not wealthy people. They explain their needs for funds for
retirement and other purposes. However, in the years in issue,
Mr. and Mrs. Landrum maintained full-time jobs apart from their
Amway activity. They reported combined wages for 1996 and 1997
of $83,797.08 and $86,401.55, respectively. This income was more
than sufficient to allow their Amway losses to generate
substantial tax benefits.
Mr. Landrum said he enjoyed meeting “good people” in his
Amway sales efforts, although he did not enjoy the rejection of
his proposals. Petitioners qualified to attend Amway promotional
weekend meetings by accumulating the required points within a
limited time. They qualified by buying a vacuum cleaner and
making other Amway purchases themselves, not by selling to others
or enlisting downline distributors. Nevertheless, petitioners
attended numerous inspirational weekend programs, both together
and separately. Mr. Landrum explained the excitement and
- 15 -
enthusiasm of these weekends but was not willing explicitly to
classify them as pleasure. Sometimes petitioners went
separately, partly because of his work schedule and partly
because they were separated during some portion of the years in
issue. Petitioners’ expenditure of substantial funds and
attendance at numerous Amway conventions and seminars, near and
far, even though their financial return from Amway was nil, and
had been minimal during many years of Amway experience, suggests
an element of pleasure or recreation in the participation. See
Nissley v. Commissioner, supra, where we commented about this
aspect of the Amway organization as follows: “The record suggests
that petitioners enjoy the same congenial sense of family and the
same gratifying motivational feeling from participating in their
Amway activity as do many other individuals who remain committed
to Amway.”
Based upon the objective facts and the totality of the
circumstances, petitioners’ contention that their Amway activity
was engaged in for profit is unsupportable. They had extensive
experience with Amway. By the years in issue they knew or surely
should have known that they were not going to make money at
Amway. They benefited to some extent by deducting automobile and
legal and other necessary expenditures that otherwise would be
nondeductible, and they participated in the excitement of the
- 16 -
Amway conventions and inspirational weekends. But certainly on
this record we must conclude that they did not have an actual and
honest profit objective in their Amway activities in 1996 and
1997. Because we hold that petitioners’ Amway activity was not
an activity engaged in for profit within the meaning of section
183, we do not explicitly address the alternative issue as to
whether petitioners are entitled to claimed Schedule C deductions
for expenditures relating to their Amway activity. We note,
however, that, as pointed out above, we consider petitioners’
claims to such deductions exaggerated and erroneous, and we
consider their testimony as well as the documents they presented
in substantiation to be inaccurate and distorted in their favor.
The examination in this case commenced after July 22, 1998.
Accordingly, section 7491(a), a new provision created by Internal
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 1998),
Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001, 112 Stat. 726, concerning the
allocation of the burden of proof, is effective. Higbee v.
Commissioner, 116 T.C. (2001). In the present case, we do
not rest our decision on the burden of proof. As demonstrated
above, the totality of evidence here, including the stipulation
of facts, petitioners’ own testimony, and petitioners’ own
records, amplified by their explanatory testimony, establish
overwhelmingly that petitioners did not conduct their Amway
- 17 -
activity with a bona fide profit objective during 1996 and 1997.
Plainly, if respondent had the burden of proof, he satisfied it;
so section 7491(a) is of no help to petitioners. Kelly v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-161. Also, since petitioners
failed to introduce credible evidence of their profit objective
and failed to cooperate with respondent’s reasonable requests for
witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and interviews
through failure of their accountants or otherwise, section
7491(a) would not place the burden of proof as to this issue on
respondent. Higbee v. Commissioner, supra.
2. Charitable Contributions
Petitioners filed Schedules A, Itemized Deductions, with
their joint Federal income tax returns in 1996 and 1997, and
reported the following gifts to charity:
1996 1997
Gifts by cash or check $2,200 $2,600
Gifts other than by cash or check 5,200 6,700
Total gifts 7,400 9,300
Respondent determined that petitioners did not adequately
substantiate the fair market value of the clothing and other
items that they contributed to various nonprofit organizations.
Accordingly, respondent allowed deductions for charitable
contributions for 1996 and 1997 in the amounts of $740 and $930,
respectively. The amounts allowed represent 10 percent of the
- 18 -
amounts claimed as contributions on petitioners’ 1996 and 1997
Federal income tax returns.
Deductions for charitable contributions are allowable only
if verified under regulations prescribed by the Secretary. Sec.
170(a). Section 1.170A-13, Income Tax Regs., in turn, sets forth
the types of substantiation necessary to support deductions for
charitable contributions.
For charitable contributions of money, taxpayers must
maintain for each contribution one of the following: (1) A
canceled check; (2) a receipt from the donee organization; or (3)
other reliable written records. Sec. 1.170A-13(a)(1), Income Tax
Regs. Petitioners testified that they regularly made cash and
check contributions averaging $50 per week to First Assembly of
God in Lawton, Oklahoma. Petitioners, however, could produce no
evidence in support of this claim. Petitioners testified that
they lost the receipts, and that the church did not have any
records dating back to either 1996 or 1997. Petitioners had no
canceled checks to substantiate any portion of their alleged
contributions.
We are not required to accept a taxpayer’s uncorroborated
testimony at face value if it is improbable, unreasonable, or
questionable. Lovell & Hart, Inc. v. Commissioner, 456 F.2d 145,
148 (6th Cir. 1972), affg. T.C. Memo. 1970-335; Tokarski v.
Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986). In view of their testimony
- 19 -
concerning their need for funds for retirement savings and other
purposes, and their complete failure of substantiation by check
or receipt or corroborating testimony, we decline to believe
petitioners’ self-serving testimony as to their cash
contributions. We hold that petitioners are not entitled to
deductions for cash contributions beyond the amounts allowed by
respondent.
For charitable contributions of property other than money,
taxpayers generally must maintain for each contribution a receipt
from the donee showing the following information: (1) The name
of the donee; (2) the date and location of the contribution; and
(3) a description of the property in detail reasonably sufficient
under the circumstances. Sec. 1.170A-13(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.
The amount of the contribution is the fair market value of the
property at the time of the contribution. Sec. 1.170A-1(c)(1),
Income Tax Regs.
Petitioners’ contributions of property other than money
consisted of used clothing and household appliances. To
substantiate their values, petitioners offered documents
consisting of preprinted forms issued by charitable organizations
that petitioners filled in with the type and number of items
allegedly donated and the estimated value of the donation.
Petitioners testified that they determined the values by
- 20 -
comparing prices in classified ads, used furniture stores, and
the retail sales outlets of various charitable organizations.
While the preprinted forms appear authentic, we nevertheless
conclude that petitioners’ self-generated receipts and other
documents do not substantiate the deductions claimed in the
instant case. See Higbee v. Commissioner, supra. We do not find
petitioners’ valuations reliable. The value of an individual’s
used clothing and old furniture and furnishings, in questionable
condition, obviously is not the same as the retail asking price
or list price at a retail store, even a second-hand store. Once
again we note that petitioners testified about their need for
funds. Consequently, if they really had items worth many
thousands of dollars, they might be expected to sell these items
and use the proceeds to satisfy their admitted financial needs.
They did not do so, but chose to give away the property in
question without obtaining any sort of appraisal and claim
substantial deductions. Under these circumstances, we must
conclude that petitioners have exaggerated the value of their
charitable contributions. We hold that petitioners have failed
to introduce credible evidence to substantiate the actual items
contributed and their fair market values. Accordingly,
petitioners’ deductions for charitable contributions are limited
to the amounts allowed by respondent.
- 21 -
3. Accuracy-Related Penalty
Section 6662(a) imposes an accuracy-related penalty of 20
percent of the portion of the underpayment which is attributable
to negligence or disregard of rules or regulations. Sec.
6662(b)(1). Negligence is the lack of due care or failure to do
what a reasonable and ordinarily prudent person would do under
the circumstances. Neely v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 934, 947
(1985). The term “disregard” includes any careless, reckless, or
intentional disregard. Sec. 6662(c). No penalty shall be
imposed if it is shown that there was reasonable cause for the
underpayment and the taxpayer acted in good faith with respect to
the underpayment. Sec. 6664(c).
As to the penalty under section 6662(a), under RRA 1998,
respondent has the burden of production, sec. 7491(c), but not
the burden of proof. The requirements of RRA 1998 as to penalty
provisions are discussed in detail in Higbee v. Commissioner, 116
T.C. (2001), and there is no reason to repeat that discussion
here.
Respondent has shown that petitioners have failed to keep
adequate books and records and that such records as they have
kept are inaccurate or exaggerated. Respondent also has
demonstrated that petitioners’ claim that they were engaged in
the Amway activity in 1996-1997 with a bona fide profit objective
is erroneous and inappropriate in view of petitioners’ long and
- 22 -
unsuccessful experience with Amway. Additionally, respondent has
shown that petitioners failed to substantiate their claimed
charitable contribution deductions. These circumstances show
that respondent has met his burden of production for his
determination of the accuracy-related penalty based on
negligence. Also, with regard to that determination, petitioners
have failed to meet their burden of proof that they acted with
reasonable cause and in good faith.
On this record, we find that petitioners have failed to
demonstrate that they were not negligent and also have failed to
show that they did not disregard applicable rules or regulations.
They have not shown that there was reasonable cause for their
underpayment or that they acted in good faith.
Accordingly, we sustain respondent’s imposition of the
accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) for 1997.
Reviewed and adopted as the report of the Small Tax Case
Division.
Decision will be entered
for respondent.