T.C. Memo. 2002-255
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
ANTHONY M. DAVICH, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 458-02L. Filed October 7, 2002.
Anthony M. Davich, pro se.
Alan J. Tomsic and Karen Lynne Baker, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
ARMEN, Special Trial Judge: This matter is before the Court
on respondent’s Motion For Summary Judgment And To Impose A
Penalty Under I.R.C. Section 6673, as supplemented, filed
pursuant to Rule 121.1 Respondent contends that there is no
1
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
(continued...)
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dispute as to any material fact with respect to this levy action
and that respondent’s determination to proceed with collection of
petitioner’s outstanding tax liabilities for 1997 and 1998 should
be sustained as a matter of law.
Summary judgment is intended to expedite litigation and
avoid unnecessary and expensive trials. Fla. Peach Corp. v.
Commissioner, 90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988). Summary judgment may be
granted with respect to all or any part of the legal issues in
controversy "if the pleadings, answers to interrogatories,
depositions, admissions, and any other acceptable materials,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that a decision may be
rendered as a matter of law." Rule 121(a) and (b); see
Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), affd.
17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994); Zaentz v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 753,
754 (1988); Naftel v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 527, 529 (1985). The
moving party bears the burden of proving that there is no genuine
issue of material fact, and factual inferences will be read in a
manner most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.
Dahlstrom v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 812, 821 (1985); Jacklin v.
Commissioner, 79 T.C. 340, 344 (1982).
1
(...continued)
the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and all Rule references
are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
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As explained in detail below, there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact, and a decision may be rendered as a matter
of law. Accordingly, we shall grant respondent’s motion for
summary judgment, as supplemented.
Background
The record establishes and/or the parties do not dispute the
following:
A. Petitioner’s Form 1040 for 1997
On or about April 15, 1998, Anthony M. Davich (petitioner)
submitted to respondent a Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax
Return, for the taxable year 1997. On the Form 1040, petitioner
listed his occupation as “entertainer”.
Petitioner entered zeros on all lines of the income portion
of the Form 1040, specifically including line 7 for wages, line
22 for total income, lines 32 and 33 for adjusted gross income,
and line 38 for taxable income. Petitioner also entered zeros on
line 39 for tax and on line 53 for total tax. Petitioner then
claimed a refund in the amount of $53, which was equal to the
amount of Federal income tax that had been withheld from his
wages.
Petitioner attached to his Form 1040 two Forms W-2, Wage and
Tax Statement, disclosing the payment of wages to him during the
taxable year in issue. The first Form W-2 was from ETN
Productions, Inc., of Las Vegas, Nevada; it disclosed the payment
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of wages to petitioner in the amount of $22,239.62 and the
withholding of Federal income tax in the amount of $53.18. The
second Form W-2 was from Riviera Operating Corp. of Las Vegas,
Nevada; it disclosed the payment of wages to petitioner in the
amount of $4,080.20 and the withholding of no Federal income tax.
Petitioner also attached to his Form 1040 a two-page
typewritten statement that stated, in part, as follows:
I, Anthony M. Davich am submitting this as part of my
1997 income tax return, even though I know that no
section of the Internal Revenue Code:
1) Establishes an income tax “liability” * * * ;
2) Provides that income taxes “have to be paid on
the basis of a return” * * * ;
3) In addition to the above, I am filing even
though the “Privacy Act Notice” as contained in a 1040
booklet clearly informs me that I am not required to
file. It does so in at least two places.
a) In one place, it states that I need only file a
return for “any tax” I may be “liable” for. Since no
Code Section makes me “liable” for income taxes, this
provision notifies me that I do not have to file an
income tax return.
* * * * * * *
6) Please note, that my 1997 return also
constitutes a claim for refund pursuant to Code Section
6402.
7) It should also be noted that I had “zero”
income according to The Supreme Court’s definition of
income (See Note #1) * * * .
8) I am also putting the IRS on notice that my
1997 tax return and claim or [sic] refund does not
constitute a “frivolous” return pursuant to Code
Section 6702. * * *
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* * * * * * *
10) In addition, don’t notify me that the IRS is
“changing” my return, since there is no statute that
allows the IRS to do that. You might prepare a return
(pursuant to Code Section 6020(b)), where no return is
filed, but as in this case, a return has been filed, no
statute authorizes IRS personnel to “change” that
return.
* * * * * * *
*Note #1: The word “income” is not defined in the
Internal Revenue Code. * * * But, as stated above, it
can only be a derivative of corporate activity. * * *
B. Petitioner’s Failure To File for 1998
Petitioner failed to file a return or submit to respondent a
Form 1040 for the taxable year 1998.
C. Respondent’s Deficiency Notice and Petitioner’s Response
On December 8, 1999, respondent (acting through James J.
Walsh, District Director in Phoenix, Arizona) issued a notice of
deficiency to petitioner for the taxable years 1997 and 1998. In
the notice, respondent determined deficiencies in petitioner’s
Federal income taxes, an addition to tax, and an accuracy-related
penalty as follows:
Addition to Tax Accuracy-related Penalty
Year Deficiency Sec. 6651(a)(1) Sec. 6662(a)
1997 $2,966 —–- $593
1998 9,914 $2,479 ---
Insofar as his ultimate tax liability was concerned,
respondent gave petitioner credit for the amounts withheld from
his wages. However, we note that the determination of a
statutory deficiency does not take such withheld amounts into
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account. See sec. 6211(b)(1).
The deficiencies in income taxes were based on respondent’s
determination that petitioner failed to report income determined
as follows:
1997 1998
Wages $26,319 $53,945
Interest income 236 53
Nonemployee compensation --- 125
26,555 54,123
By certified letter dated March 3, 2000, petitioner wrote to
respondent’s district office in Phoenix, Arizona, acknowledging
receipt of the notice of deficiency dated December 8, 1999, but
challenging respondent’s authority “to send me the ‘Notice’ in
the first place.” Petitioner sent copies of his letter by
certified mail to Lawrence H. Summers, Secretary of the Treasury,
and Charles O. Rossotti, Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
Petitioner knew that he had the right to contest
respondent’s deficiency determinations by filing a petition for
redetermination with this Court.2 However, petitioner chose not
to do so. Accordingly, on May 8, 2000, respondent assessed the
2
In this regard, petitioner’s letter dated Mar. 3, 2000,
stated as follows:
According to your “Deficiency Notice”, dated December
8, 1999 (cover sheet attached), there is an alleged
deficiency with respect to my 1997 and 1998 income
taxes of $3,559.00 and $12,393.00, respectively, and if
I wanted to “contest this determination... before
making payment,” I must “file a petition with the
United States Tax Court.”
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determined deficiencies, addition to tax, and accuracy-related
penalty, as well as statutory interest. On that same day,
respondent sent petitioner notices of balance due, informing him
that he had liabilities for 1997 and 1998 and requesting that he
pay them. Petitioner failed to pay the amounts owing.
By certified letter dated May 19, 2000, petitioner wrote to
respondent’s Service Center in Ogden, Utah, acknowledging receipt
of the notices of balance due dated May 8, 2000. In his letter,
petitioner stated, in part, as follows:
This is in reply to your unsigned letters of May
8, 2000 (attached) in which you notified me that “We
changed your account(s)”.
This letter is to put you on notice that there is
no Code Section in the Internal Revenue Code that
authorizes the IRS [to] “change” returns or “accounts”.
Income tax is based on “self-assessment”--see
Treasury Reg. [§]601.103. “Our income tax system is
voluntary and the Internal Revenue Service must
perforce rely on the self-assessment of the taxpayer.”
* * *
Thus it is clear from all of the evidence above
that ONLY I can make a “self-assessment” concerning
what my income tax liability might be for 1997 and
1998. Since I concluded that my 1997 and 1998 income
tax liability is “zero” for those years, I did not
“self-assess” myself with any income tax liability for
those years; therefore, no income tax liability is
shown on my 1997 or 1998 returns. This being the case
and in conformity with the meaning of a TC 150,[3] no
income tax liability can be assessed from my 1997 or
3
“TC 150" refers to transaction code 150 in respondent’s
computerized transcript of account. TC 150 represents the
assessment of tax as reported by a taxpayer on the taxpayer’s
return.
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1998 returns.
D. Respondent’s Final Notice and Petitioner’s Response
On October 10, 2000, respondent mailed to petitioner a Final
Notice--Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a
Hearing in respect of his outstanding tax liabilities for 1997
and 1998.
On or about November 4, 2000, petitioner filed with
respondent Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due Process
Hearing. The request, which was accompanied by a typewritten
statement, included, inter alia, a challenge to the existence of
the underlying tax liabilities for 1997 and 1998, as well as
allegations that petitioner was never provided with a valid
notice of deficiency or notice and demand for payment and that
the Appeals officer had failed “to identify the statute that
makes me ‘liable to pay’ the taxes at issue”. Petitioner also
requested verification from the Secretary that all applicable
laws and administrative procedures were followed with regard to
the assessment and collection of the tax liabilities in question.
E. The Appeals Office Hearing
By letter dated May 30, 2001, Appeals Officer Richard J.
Sigler (the Appeals officer) acknowledged receipt of petitioner’s
request for an administrative hearing. The Appeals officer then
went on to state, in part, as follows:
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I have reviewed your administrative file and your
reasons for disagreeing with the Service Center
Director’s proposed enforcement action. It is my
determination that your reasons for disagreeing with
the proposed enforcement action are frivolous.
The Courts have consistently and repeatedly rejected
the arguments you have expressed and, in some cases,
they have imposed sanctions. In Pierson v.
Commissioner, * * * [115 T.C. 576 (2000)], the Court
issued fair warning of penalties under section 6673 to
all those taxpayers who, in the future, institute or
maintain a lien or levy action primarily for delay or
whose position in such a proceeding is frivolous or
groundless. In an opinion just issued by the Court in
Regina Davis, * * * [T.C. Memo. 2001-87], the Court
imposed a $4,000.00 penalty because the taxpayer was
making frivolous arguments.
By letter dated June 18, 2001, the Appeals officer sent to
petitioner copies of literal transcripts from respondent’s
individual master file (IMF) at the Martinsburg, West Virginia,
Computing Center of petitioner’s accounts for the taxable years
1997 and 1998.4
On July 30, 2001, petitioner attended an administrative
hearing in Las Vegas, Nevada, conducted by the Appeals officer.
Prior to the hearing, the Appeals officer reviewed transcripts
pertaining to petitioner’s accounts for the taxable years 1997
and 1998.
During the hearing, petitioner requested that the Appeals
officer identify the statutory provisions establishing
petitioner’s liability for Federal income tax and provide
4
A literal transcript is a transcript in “plain English”
with a minimum amount of “computerese”.
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verification that all applicable laws and administrative
procedures had been followed in the assessment and collection
process. Petitioner was informed that the transcripts previously
provided were sufficient to satisfy the verification requirement
of section 6330(c)(1). Petitioner also alleged that he never
received “the statutory notice and demand for payment”. In
response to the Appeals officer’s question whether petitioner
wished to discuss collection alternative, the following colloquy
occurred:
APPEALS OFFICER: * * * Do you want to discuss
collection alternatives?
PETITIONER: Yes. I’ll pay the amount you want
right now.
APPEALS OFFICER: Okay, by check? Are you going
to pay me with a check?
PETITIONER: Yep. You just cite for me the
regulation and statute that requires me to pay it [the
outstanding liabilities].
* * * * * * *
PETITIONER: Let the record show I’m willing to
pay the amount that’s at issue right now, if Mr. Sigler
[the Appeals officer] would just point out the statute
and regulation that requires me to pay the tax at
issue.
F. Respondent’s Notice of Determination
On September 21, 2001, respondent’s Appeals Office issued
to petitioner a Notice of Determination Concerning Collection
Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330 with regard to his tax
liabilities for 1997 and 1998. In the notice, the Appeals Office
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concluded that respondent’s determination to proceed with
collection by way of levy should be sustained.
G. Petitioner’s Petition
On January 7, 2002, petitioner filed with the Court a
Petition for Lien or Levy Action seeking review of respondent’s
notice of determination.5 The petition includes allegations
that: (1) The Appeals officer failed to obtain verification from
the Secretary that the requirements of any applicable law or
administrative procedure were met as required under section
6330(c)(1); (2) the Appeals officer failed to identify the
statutes making petitioner liable for Federal income tax; (3)
petitioner never received a “valid” notice of deficiency; i.e.,
one signed by the Secretary or someone with delegated authority
from the Secretary; (4) petitioner never received a notice and
demand for payment; and (5) petitioner was denied the opportunity
to challenge the existence or amount of his underlying tax
liability.
Petitioner attached to his petition several documents,
including copies of the cover page of the notice of deficiency
dated December 8, 1999, the Appeals officer’s May 30, 2001,
letter referencing the Pierson v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 576
(2000) and Davis v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-87 cases, the
5
At the time that the petition was filed, petitioner
resided in Las Vegas, Nevada.
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Appeals officer’s June 18, 2001, letter transmitting the literal
transcripts for 1997 and 1998, and the transcripts themselves.
H. Respondent’s Motion For Summary Judgment
On June 14, 2002, respondent filed his Motion For Summary
Judgment And To Impose A Penalty Under I.R.C. Section 6673.
Respondent contends that petitioner is barred under section
6330(c)(2)(B) from challenging the existence or amount of his
underlying tax liability in this collection review proceeding
because petitioner received a notice of deficiency for the taxes
in question. Respondent also contends that the Appeals officer’s
review of computer transcripts for petitioner’s accounts for the
taxable years 1997 and 1998 satisfied the verification
requirement of section 6330(c)(1). Finally, respondent contends
that petitioner’s behavior warrants the imposition of a penalty
under section 6673.
By letter dated June 25, 2002, respondent’s counsel provided
petitioner with a Form 4340, Certificate of Assessments,
Payments, and Other Specified Matters, pertaining to each of
petitioner’s accounts for the taxable years 1997 and 1998.
On July 9, 2002, petitioner filed an Objection to
respondent’s motion, alleging, inter alia, that the December 8,
1999, notice of deficiency was invalid because District Director
James J. Walsh “did not have any delegated authority to send out
the Deficiency Notice”, that he never received “the statutory
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notice and demand for payment”, and that no statute exists that
makes him liable for Federal income tax and “IRS agents have no
proper enforcement authority to collect the tax.”
On July 12, 2002, petitioner filed an Amended Objection to
respondent’s motion repeating allegations made in his July 9,
2002, Objection. Petitioner attached to his Amended Objection
copies of the Forms 4340 for 1997 and 1998, as well as copies of
the May 8, 2000, notices of balance due for 1997 and 1998.
Pursuant to notice, respondent’s motion was called for
hearing at the Court's motions session in Washington, D.C.
Petitioner did not attend the hearing; however, he did file a
written statement pursuant to Rule 50(c), which incorporated by
reference certain of his prior filings.
Following the hearing, respondent filed a supplement to his
motion. In the supplement, respondent discusses the authority of
a District Director to issue notices of deficiency pursuant to
section 6212. Thereafter, petitioner filed an Objection to
respondent’s supplement, again arguing that a District Director
has no authority to issue a notice of deficiency.
Discussion
Section 6331(a) provides that if any person liable to pay
any tax neglects or refuses to pay such tax within 10 days after
notice and demand for payment, the Secretary is authorized to
collect such tax by levy on the person’s property. Section
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6331(d) provides that at least 30 days before enforcing
collection by levy on the person's property, the Secretary is
obliged to provide the person with a final notice of intent to
levy, including notice of the administrative appeals available to
the person.
Section 6330 generally provides that the Commissioner cannot
proceed with collection by levy until the person has been given
notice and the opportunity for an administrative review of the
matter (in the form of an Appeals Office hearing) and, if
dissatisfied, with judicial review of the administrative
determination. See Davis v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 35, 37
(2000); Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 179 (2000).
Section 6330(c) prescribes the matters that a person may
raise at an Appeals Office hearing. In sum, section 6330(c)
provides that a person may raise collection issues such as
spousal defenses, the appropriateness of the Commissioner's
intended collection action, and possible alternative means of
collection. Section 6330(c)(2)(B) provides that the existence
and amount of the underlying tax liability can be contested at an
Appeals Office hearing only if the person did not receive a
notice of deficiency for the tax in question or did not otherwise
have an earlier opportunity to dispute the tax liability. See
Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 609 (2000); Goza v.
Commissioner, supra. Section 6330(d) provides for judicial
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review of the administrative determination in the Tax Court or a
Federal District Court, as may be appropriate.
A. Summary Judgment
Petitioner challenges the assessment made against him on the
ground that the notice of deficiency dated December 8, 1999, is
invalid. However, the record conclusively shows that petitioner
received the notice of deficiency and disregarded the opportunity
to file a petition for redetermination with this Court. See sec.
6213(a). It follows that section 6330(c)(2)(B) bars petitioner
from challenging the existence or amount of his underlying tax
liabilities in this collection review proceeding. See Nestor v.
Commissioner, 118 T.C. 162, 165-166 (2002).
Even if petitioner were permitted to challenge the validity
of the notice of deficiency, petitioner’s argument that the
notice is invalid because respondent’s District Director is not
properly authorized to issue notices of deficiency is frivolous
and groundless. See id.; Goza v. Commissioner, supra; see also
Kellogg v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 167, 172 (1987), and the
statutory, regulatory, and case citations therein regarding a
District Director’s authority to issue notices of deficiency;
Lillis v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1983-142 (same), affd. without
published opinion 740 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1984). Further, as the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has remarked: "We perceive
no need to refute these arguments with somber reasoning and
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copious citation of precedent; to do so might suggest that these
arguments have some colorable merit." Crain v. Commissioner, 737
F.2d 1417, 1417 (5th Cir. 1984); see Tolotti v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2002-86. Suffice it to say:
(1) Petitioner is a taxpayer subject to the Federal income
tax, see secs. 1(c), 7701(a)(1), (14);
(2) compensation for labor or services rendered constitutes
income subject to the Federal income tax, sec. 61(a)(1); United
States v. Romero, 640 F.2d 1014, 1016 (9th Cir. 1981); see also
sec. 61(a)(4);
(3) petitioner is required to file an income tax return,
sec. 6012(a)(1); and
(4) the Commissioner and his agents are authorized to
enforce the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, see I.R.C.
chs. 78, 80.
We likewise reject petitioner’s argument that the Appeals
officer failed to obtain verification from the Secretary that the
requirements of all applicable laws and administrative procedures
were met as required by section 6330(c)(1). The record shows
that prior to the administrative hearing on July 30, 2001, the
Appeals officer obtained and reviewed computerized transcripts of
account for petitioner’s taxable years 1997 and 1998.
Federal tax assessments are formally recorded on a record of
assessment. Sec. 6203. “The summary record, through supporting
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records, shall provide identification of the taxpayer, the
character of the liability assessed, the taxable period, if
applicable, and the amount of the assessment.” Sec. 301.6203-1,
Proced. & Admin. Regs.
Section 6330(c)(1) does not require the Commissioner to rely
on a particular document to satisfy the verification requirement
imposed therein. Roberts v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 365, 371 n.10
(2002); Weishan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-88; Lindsey v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-87; Tolotti v. Commissioner, supra;
Duffield v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-53; Kuglin v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-51. In this regard, we observe
that the computerized transcripts of account on which the Appeals
officer relied contained all the information prescribed in
section 301.6203-1, Proced. & Admin. Regs. See Weishan v.
Commissioner, supra; Lindsey v. Commissioner, supra; Tolotti v.
Commissioner, supra; Duffield v. Commissioner, supra; Kuglin v.
Commissioner, supra.6
6
To the extent that petitioner may still be arguing that
the Appeals officer failed to provide him with a copy of the
verification, we note that sec. 6330(c)(1) does not require that
the Appeals officer provide the taxpayer with a copy of the
verification at the administrative hearing. Nestor v.
Commissioner, 118 T.C. 162, 166 (2002). In any event, the
Appeals officer provided petitioner with copies of literal
transcripts of account for the taxable years 1997 and 1998.
Indeed, petitioner attached copies of these transcripts as
exhibits to his petition. Moreover, respondent’s counsel
provided petitioner with copies of Forms 4340 for the taxable
years 1997 and 1998, and petitioner attached copies of these
(continued...)
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Petitioner has not alleged any irregularity in the
assessment procedure that would raise a question about the
validity of the assessment or the information contained in the
computerized transcripts of account. See Davis v. Commissioner,
115 T.C. at 41; Mann v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-48.
Accordingly, we hold that the Appeals officer satisfied the
verification requirement of section 6330(c)(1). Cf. Nicklaus v.
Commissioner, 117 T.C. 117, 120-121 (2001).
Petitioner also contends that he never received a notice and
demand for payment of his tax liabilities for 1997 and 1998. The
requirement that the Secretary issue a notice and demand for
payment is set forth in section 6303(a), which provides in
pertinent part:
SEC. 6303(a). General Rule.-–Where it is not
otherwise provided by this title, the Secretary shall,
as soon as practicable, and within 60 days, after the
making of an assessment of a tax pursuant to section
6203, give notice to each person liable for the unpaid
tax, stating the amount and demanding payment thereof.
* * *
In particular, the computerized transcripts of account on which
the Appeals officer relied during the administrative process, as
well as the Forms 4340, show that respondent sent petitioner
notices of balance due on the same date that respondent made
assessments against petitioner for the tax, addition to tax, and
6
(...continued)
forms to his Amended Objection to respondent’s motion.
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accuracy-related penalty determined in the notice of deficiency.
A notice of balance due constitutes a notice and demand for
payment within the meaning of section 6303(a). See, e.g., Hughes
v. United States, 953 F.2d 531, 536 (9th Cir. 1992); Newman v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-135; Weishan v. Commissioner,
supra; see also Hansen v. United States, 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th
Cir. 1993). Notably, petitioner attached copies of the notices
of balance due dated May 8, 2000, as exhibits to his Amended
Objection to respondent’s motion.7
Petitioner has failed to raise a spousal defense, make a
valid challenge to the appropriateness of respondent’s intended
collection action, or offer alternative means of collection.8
These issues are now deemed conceded. Rule 331(b)(4). In the
absence of a valid issue for review, we conclude that respondent
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law sustaining the notice
of determination dated September 21, 2001.
7
We also reject petitioner’s argument that notice and
demand for payment was not in accord with a Treasury decision
issued in 1914 that required a Form 17 to be used for such
purpose. See Tapio v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-141.
8
Petitioner stated to the Appeals officer at the
administrative hearing on July 30, 2001, that he would pay in
full his outstanding liabilities if the Appeals officer “would
just point out the statute and regulation that requires me to pay
the tax at issue.” The statutory citations sought by petitioner
are identified supra on p. 16 of this opinion.
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B. Imposition of a Penalty Under Section 6673
We turn now to that part of respondent’s motion that moves
for the imposition of a penalty on petitioner under section 6673.
As relevant herein, section 6673(a)(1) authorizes the Tax
Court to require a taxpayer to pay to the United States a penalty
not in excess of $25,000 whenever it appears that proceedings
have been instituted or maintained by the taxpayer primarily for
delay or that the taxpayer's position in such proceeding is
frivolous or groundless. The Court has indicated its willingness
to impose such penalty in lien and levy cases, Pierson v.
Commissioner, 115 T.C. 576, 580-581 (2000), and has in fact
imposed a penalty in a number of such cases.9
We are convinced that petitioner instituted the present
proceeding primarily for delay. In this regard, it is clear that
9
E.g., Roberts v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 365 (2002)
(imposing a penalty in the amount of $10,000); Schmith v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-252 (imposing a penalty in the
amount of $1,000); Schroeder v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-190
(imposing sua sponte a penalty in the amount of $1,000); Wagner
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-180 (imposing a penalty in the
amount of $4,000); Perry v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-165
(imposing a penalty in the amount of $2,500); Crow v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-149 (imposing a penalty in the
amount of $1,500); Smeton v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-140
(imposing a penalty in the amount of $1,000); Newman v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-135 (imposing a penalty in the
amount of $1,000); Williams v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-111
(imposing sua sponte a penalty in the amount of $1,000); Yacksyzn
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-99 (imposing a penalty in the
amount of $1,000); Watson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-213
(imposing a penalty in the amount of $1,500); Davis v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-87 (imposing a penalty in the
amount of $4,000).
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petitioner regards this proceeding as nothing but a vehicle to
protest the tax laws of this country and to espouse his own
misguided views, which we regard as frivolous and groundless.
E.g., Tolotti v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-86. In short,
having to deal with this matter wasted the Court's time, as well
as respondent's, and taxpayers with genuine controversies may
have been delayed.
Also relevant is the fact that the petitioner was made aware
of the fact that he could be subject to a penalty for instituting
or maintaining a lien or levy action primarily for delay or for
advancing frivolous or groundless arguments in such an action.
In this regard, the Appeals officer’s letter dated May 30, 2001,
expressly advised petitioner of Pierson v. Commissioner, supra,
and Davis v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-87.
Under the circumstances, we shall grant that part of
respondent’s motion that moves for the imposition of a penalty in
that we shall impose a penalty on petitioner pursuant to section
6673(a)(1) in the amount of $5,000.
In order to give effect to the foregoing,
An appropriate order granting
respondent's motion, as
supplemented, and decision for
respondent will be entered.