T.C. Memo. 2003-149
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
DAVID J. EDWARDS, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent*
Docket No. 7010-00. Filed May 22, 2003.
Noel W. Spaid, for petitioner.
Dale A. Zusi, for respondent.
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OPINION
BEGHE, Judge: This case has remained before the Court to
consider the amount of the penalty under section 6673(a)(1)1
*
This Supplemental Memorandum Opinion supplements Edwards
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-169.
1
All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in
effect for the years in issue, and all Rule references are to the
Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
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that petitioner must pay respondent and the amount of
respondent’s costs under section 6673(a)(2) that petitioner’s
counsel, Noel W. Spaid, must pay respondent.
Background
This case was tried in 2001 over 2 days separated by more
than 5 months. In Edwards v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-169,
we held petitioner had failed to report income in 1996, was not
entitled to various deductions claimed for 1996 and 1997, and was
liable for accuracy-related penalties under section 6662(a). We
also found petitioner had unreasonably failed to pursue
administrative remedies and had taken frivolous and groundless
positions and would be liable for a penalty under section
6673(a)(1) in an amount to be determined; we also found Ms. Spaid
had recklessly and knowingly made frivolous arguments on
petitioner’s behalf and that she would be required to pay, under
section 6673(a)(2), respondent’s excess costs, expenses, and
attorney’s fees. We deferred setting the penalty under section
6673(a)(1) and Ms. Spaid’s liability under section 6673(a)(2)
until the parties responded to our inquiries into respondent’s
excess costs attributable to the misconduct of petitioner and Ms.
Spaid. We ordered respondent to submit an affidavit of costs,
expenses, and attorney’s fees that could appropriately be taken
into account in determining the penalty on petitioner under
section 6673(a)(1) and Ms. Spaid’s liability to respondent under
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section 6673(a)(2). We also permitted petitioner and his counsel
to file objections to respondent’s affidavit.
As an aid to understanding our findings and discussion, we
briefly recap the relevant findings in Edwards v. Commissioner,
supra.
Petitioner is a medical doctor who has been practicing
preventive medicine since 1961. Petitioner also acts as a
registered medical examiner for the Federal Aviation
Administration.
In 1995, on the advice of Estate Preservation Services
(EPS), operated by Robert L. Henkell,2 petitioner transferred
ownership of his medical practice, his movie and sound equipment,
his airplane and other vehicles, his residence, and other assets
to seven separate trusts. Petitioner’s revocable trust held
complete ownership of the “focus trust”, which held complete
ownership of the remaining trusts. Petitioner retained direct or
indirect beneficial ownership of all trust assets and continued
to exercise control over the trust assets after the transfers.
Although petitioner did not report any gain when he
transferred his assets to the trusts, the trusts claimed
2
In October 1998, at the Commissioner’s behest, the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of California issued a
preliminary injunction enjoining EPS and Henkell from rendering
tax shelter advice. See United States v. Estate Pres. Servs., 38
F. Supp. 2d 846 (E.D. Cal. 1998), affd. 202 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir.
2000).
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depreciation deductions on the transferred assets on the basis of
their alleged fair market values at the time of transfer to the
trusts, rather than on original cost or depreciated basis in
petitioner’s hands.
Petitioner filed a Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax
Return, reporting $10,613 in taxable income for 1996 and $13,380
in taxable income for 1997. These returns reported Federal
income tax liabilities of $2,465 for 1996 and $4,497 for 1997.
Each of the trusts filed Forms 1041, U.S. Income Tax Return for
Estates and Trusts, for tax years 1996 and 1997 reporting
negative taxable income.
Respondent commenced an examination of petitioner’s 1996 and
1997 tax returns after July 22, 1998. In connection with the
examination, respondent sent petitioner a letter requesting that
he produce his records for examination. On January 21, 1999,
respondent’s revenue agent met petitioner and his adviser, Ilena
Hamilton, at respondent’s office.
Petitioner began the meeting by declaring he would not
provide any information concerning the trusts because he was
under some unspecified duty not to disclose trust information.
Petitioner told respondent’s revenue agent to obtain the trust
information from the trustees. Petitioner refused to identify
the trustees or to disclose how respondent could obtain the
information.
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Respondent’s revenue agent then asked whether petitioner had
brought any personal records to support his return. In response,
petitioner read a lengthy prepared statement objecting that it
was improper for respondent to audit more than 1 year’s return at
a time. He declared he would not provide any records until
respondent, in writing, answered certain questions, and even then
he would produce only those documents that would not “violate my
fourth amendment rights which guarantee the right to privacy of
one’s house, papers, effects and my fifth amendment right which
guaranties that one cannot be compelled to be a witness against
oneself”. Petitioner failed to specify how any of these
privileges would apply to the financial records that formed the
basis for his returns.
Petitioner demanded written answers to his questions before
he would consider cooperating with respondent’s examination.
Petitioner demanded answers in writing to the following
questions: (1) The basis for respondent’s examiner’s authority
to conduct the examination; (2) the statutory authority for the
examination; (3) “you have to show us where 7006 gets its
implementing implant, excuse me, implementing authority and if
that implementing authority on 7602 is all inclusive to the
outside of the definition”; and (4) whether respondent could
establish that petitioner had income from one of the sources
identified in section 1.861-8(f), Income Tax Regs.
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At the meeting, respondent’s examiner displayed her badge to
establish her authority to conduct the examination and cited
section 7602 to establish the statutory authority for the
examination. Respondent’s examiner advised petitioner both at
the meeting and in a letter dated February 10, 1999, that: (1)
Statutes are enforceable even if there are no regulations
interpreting them, and (2) section 1.861-8(f), Income Tax Regs.,
is irrelevant to petitioner’s returns and to the examination.
Petitioner did not produce his records in response to
respondent’s letter of February 10, 1999. Petitioner’s conduct
constituted refusal to cooperate with respondent’s examination.
On April 24, 1999, respondent issued a formal summons for
petitioner’s records. On June 3, 1999, petitioner sent a letter
to respondent making frivolous tax protester arguments by
selectively citing portions of statutes and court decisions out
of context. Petitioner signed his letter “Without prejudice UCC
10207”. The letter evidences and confirms petitioner’s continued
refusal to cooperate with respondent’s examination.
On June 12, 1999, petitioner attended a meeting with
respondent’s examining agents. Petitioner again failed to
produce records in response to the summons and continued to make
frivolous demands.
Because petitioner did not produce records to support his
return positions, respondent elected to use an indirect method to
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determine petitioner’s tax liability. On March 31, 2000,
respondent issued a notice of deficiency to petitioner.
Respondent did not send a 30-day letter before issuing the notice
of deficiency. The period of limitations for making an
assessment of petitioner’s 1996 tax liability would have
otherwise expired on April 15, 2000.
In the notice of deficiency, respondent determined that the
trusts petitioner created were shams and should be disregarded,
or were grantor trusts all of whose income is taxable to
petitioner. Respondent determined that petitioner’s reported
gross income should be increased by the gross income reported by
the trusts ($560,184 for 1996 and $495,048 for 1997) and by
unexplained deposits made to petitioner’s bank account ($170,619
for 1996 and $131,190 for 1997) and to one of petitioner’s trust
bank accounts ($2,900 for 1996). Respondent disallowed all
deductions claimed by petitioner and the trusts, because
petitioner failed to provide substantiation for the deductions
claimed on the returns ($574,430 for 1996 and $619,094 for 1997).
Respondent made other computational adjustments to petitioner’s
returns resulting from the additional income respondent
determined (such as determining that petitioner underreported
self-employment taxes by $42,103 for 1996 and $39,443 for 1997).
As a result of these adjustments, respondent determined that
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petitioner had Federal income tax deficiencies of $540,192 for
1996 and $511,866 for 1997.
Respondent also determined that petitioner is liable for 20-
percent accuracy-related penalties under section 6662(a) because
petitioner was negligent or disregarded rules and regulations in
understating his taxable income, made substantial understatements
of income tax, and had not shown reasonable cause for the
understatements. Applying the 20-percent rate to the
deficiencies, respondent determined penalties of $108,038 for
1996 and $102,373 for 1997.
Petitioner timely filed an original petition and an amended
petition with this Court. In his amended petition, petitioner
argued that all adjustments respondent made were erroneous.
Petitioner claimed his trusts were valid, and that the grantor
trust rules do not apply because he held neither legal nor
equitable title to the trust assets. Petitioner in his amended
petition also asserted the “Delpit” issue: that the Tax Court
lacks jurisdiction over his petition because respondent made the
determination without sending him a 30-day letter, without
advising him of his administrative rights, and without giving him
an opportunity for adequate administrative review. According to
petitioner’s counsel: “This denial has cost Petitioner undue
burden of Tax Court litigation that could have been resolved
administratively.”
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The trial of this case occurred over 2 days, separated by
more than 5 months. The delay in completing the trial was caused
in large part by the failure of petitioner’s counsel to organize
the exhibits she wished to include in the second of three
stipulations of fact. The first and third stipulations of fact,
prepared primarily by respondent, were filed with the Court at
the beginning of the first day of trial; the second stipulation
of fact was prepared by Ms. Spaid with substantial assistance
from respondent’s trial counsel, Dale A. Zusi, which was required
by Ms. Spaid’s disorganization. The second stipulation of fact
was subject to respondent’s numerous objections to many exhibits
on relevance, hearsay, authentication, or lack of foundation
grounds and was filed almost 4 months after the first day of
trial.
Before trial, in petitioner’s trial memorandum, and during
the first day of trial, Ms. Spaid made two additional claims on
petitioner’s behalf: That the statutory notice of deficiency was
invalid because the wholesale disallowance of deductions amounted
to a lack of determination, the “Scar” issue; and that the
Internal Revenue Service is not an agency of the U.S. Government,
the “Agency” issue.
At the beginning of the second day of trial, petitioner,
through Ms. Spaid, made two oral motions: (1) To shift the
burden of proof to respondent under section 7491(a), claiming
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that petitioner had cooperated at all levels; and (2) for
imposition of a penalty on respondent under section 6673(a)(1),
on the ground that respondent, by not offering petitioner an
Appeals Office conference before issuing the statutory notice,
had deprived petitioner of administrative remedies.
During both trial days, petitioner continued to claim that
the trusts were valid for Federal income tax purposes. The first
day of trial dealt primarily with the validity of the trusts and
events occurring during the audit. These subjects were also
covered during the second day of trial in the cross-examination
of the revenue agent who had examined petitioner’s returns and in
the direct testimony of petitioner. The second day of trial also
covered petitioner’s attempts to prove additional deductions
using amended returns for petitioner and the trusts.
More than 3 months after the second day of trial, and
shortly before posttrial briefs were originally due, respondent
and petitioner entered into a superseding stipulation of settled
issues that resolved many of the issues previously in dispute
between the parties. The parties stipulated that the trusts were
invalid for Federal income tax purposes, and that all the trust
income and deductions would be allocated to petitioner. In
addition, both petitioner and respondent made substantial
concessions regarding the deficiencies, including deductions
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and cost of goods sold claimed on Schedule C, Profit or Loss From
Business.
The parties also stipulated that petitioner failed to report
income of $62,061 in 1997, and that petitioner is entitled to
deductions on Schedule A, Itemized Deductions, of $21,929 for
1996 and $21,061 for 1997, subject to any statutory limitations
based on petitioner’s adjusted gross income. The parties
stipulated that petitioner is subject to self-employment tax and
is entitled to a deduction for one-half of the self-employment
tax and that the exemption and taxability of petitioner’s Social
Security receipts are computational and depend on petitioner’s
adjusted gross income.
Finally, the parties agreed that the only issues remaining
in dispute were petitioner’s failure to report $170,619 of income
in 1996;3 petitioner’s right to Schedule C deductions and cost of
goods sold in 1996, airplane expenses, and a home office
deduction; and accuracy-related penalties under section 6662(a).
In addition to those five issues, respondent requested in his
posttrial brief that we impose penalties against petitioner under
section 6673(a)(1). Petitioner objected to the imposition of
section 6673(a)(1) penalties, contending that his arguments were
3
On brief, respondent conceded that petitioner’s unreported
income for 1996 was $54,516, rather than $170,619; our opinion
sustained respondent’s concession to this effect, as well as
respondent’s other adjustments that remained in issue.
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correct and requesting that we specifically address the “Delpit”,
“Scar”, and “Agency” issues.
In our opinion in Edwards v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-
169, we addressed the “Delpit”, “Scar”, and “Agency” issues,
demonstrating the frivolity of petitioner’s arguments on these
issues. We need not repeat the exercise here. We also concluded
that petitioner was not entitled to rely on the misrepresen-
tations of the promoter whose abusive trust package petitioner
had purchased. We suggested, however, that petitioner had
somewhat redeemed himself by conceding the abusive trust issue
before the parties’ briefs were due and that we would take
petitioner’s belated concession into account in determining
sanctions under section 6673(a).
In our opinion in Edwards, we found many of the positions
taken by petitioner when he instituted this proceeding, and
maintained throughout this proceeding, were frivolous and
groundless, and that petitioner unreasonably failed to pursue
administrative remedies. Accordingly, we agreed with respondent
that petitioner should be penalized under section 6673(a)(1).
We also opined that Ms. Spaid would be liable under section
6673(a)(2) for respondent’s costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees
incurred because of the frivolous arguments she had advanced. In
so holding, we found that Ms. Spaid had knowingly and recklessly
made frivolous arguments in pretrial memoranda, at trial, and in
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posttrial briefs. The consequence of Ms. Spaid’s knowing and
reckless behavior was to multiply the proceedings unreasonably
and vexatiously. We found that Ms. Spaid had continued to
advance the “Delpit”, “Scar”, and “Agency” issues long after we
warned her they were frivolous.
We recognized that petitioner originally appeared in this
case by filing his petition pro se, and that some of the
frivolous arguments were originally contained in the petition.
In this regard, we observed that Ms. Spaid was liable only for
the consequences of her own misconduct, including advancing
frivolous arguments initially developed by petitioner, but not
for actions taken by petitioner before Ms. Spaid’s appearance.
Respondent was ordered to submit an affidavit of the excess
costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees incurred as a result of Ms.
Spaid’s unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of the
proceedings.
Respondent’s trial attorney, Ms. Zusi, filed the affidavit
as ordered. Ms. Zusi reviewed respondent’s internal timekeeping
records, the legal files associated with the case, and the
various letters and motions pertaining to the case. These
documents show that Ms. Zusi and her supervisor, Debra K. Moe,
spent 495.5 hours and 67.5 hours, respectively, working on the
case. Ms. Zusi estimated that, out of these totals, she and Ms.
Moe spent 167 and 34 hours, respectively, on frivolous issues
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raised or maintained by Ms. Spaid that vexatiously multiplied the
proceedings. On the basis of Ms. Zusi’s and Ms. Moe’s years of
experience and the location of their office, respondent requested
a rate of $200 per hour for Ms. Zusi and Ms. Moe. Applying this
multiplier, respondent requested a total of $40,200 in attorney’s
fees.
Ms. Spaid filed an “Opposition to Affidavit in Support of
Attorney’s Fees for Sanctions”. Ms. Spaid’s submission objects
to the imposition of section 6673(a)(2) costs against her but
does not object to the imposition of a penalty against petitioner
under section 6673(a)(1). Ms. Spaid contends the “Agency”,
“Delpit”, and “Scar” issues were appropriate lines of inquiry.
With respect to the abusive trust issue, Ms. Spaid contends the
abusive trusts are not a sanctionable area. Ms. Spaid also takes
issue with respondent’s itemization of time spent on each
particular frivolous issue. Although Ms. Spaid did not file a
motion for reconsideration, the objection concludes with a
request for the Court to reconsider our position with respect to
section 6673(a)(2).
Petitioner filed an “Affidavit in Appellant’s Response to
Sanctioned Pursual” (sic). Petitioner’s submission repeats many
of the arguments we found to be frivolous in our opinion in
Edwards v. Commissioner, supra, and also repeats Ms. Spaid’s
prior request that the Court impose sanctions on respondent.
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Discussion
Section 6673(a)(1) Liability of Petitioner
Section 6673(a)(1) allows the Tax Court to impose a penalty
of up to $25,000, payable to the United States, when (A) a
taxpayer institutes or maintains a proceeding in the Tax Court
primarily for delay, (B) the taxpayer’s position in the
proceeding is frivolous or groundless, or (C) the taxpayer
unreasonably failed to pursue available administrative remedies.
In the case at hand, we hold that petitioner is subject to a
penalty under section 6673(a)(1) because he has taken frivolous
and groundless positions and unreasonably failed to pursue
available administrative remedies. Many of the positions
petitioner maintained throughout the Court proceedings were
frivolous or groundless. Petitioner’s “Delpit”, “Scar”, and
“Agency” arguments were entirely without merit. Petitioner’s
insistence, during most of the case, on the validity of the
trusts in the face of overwhelming contrary legal authority was
unjustified. At the administrative level, petitioner’s failure
to pursue available administrative remedies was unreasonable:
Petitioner refused to provide trust information to respondent’s
examiner, refused to produce records to support his return,
demanded written answers to irrelevant questions before he would
consider cooperating with respondent, made frivolous arguments in
response to a formal summons and failed to produce the records
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requested in the summons, and then cried foul when respondent did
not issue a 30-day letter, claiming he was not afforded an
opportunity for administrative review by respondent’s Appeals
Office.
In response to respondent’s affidavit, petitioner filed an
“Affidavit in Appellant’s Response to Sanctioned Pursual”. As if
to put himself in the worst possible light, petitioner chose to
respond to respondent’s affidavit of attorney’s fees by
advancing, to the extent the submission is coherent, the same
frivolous arguments we described as tax protester arguments
justifying imposition of sanctions under section 6673(a)(1). We
will not address these frivolous arguments again.
In our opinion in Edwards v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-
169, we suggested that petitioner’s belated attempts to cooperate
with respondent at trial and posttrial by entering into a partial
stipulation of settled issues finally conceding the abusive trust
issue were mitigating factors that would be taken into account in
imposing a penalty. However, the penalty must be substantial for
it to have a deterrent effect. Takaba v. Commissioner, 119 T.C.
285, 295 (2002) (citing Coleman v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68, 71
(7th Cir. 1986)). The purpose of section 6673(a)(1) is to compel
taxpayers who litigate in our Court to conform their conduct to
well-settled rules. Id. In setting the penalty, we have
considered respondent’s affidavit of attorney’s fees, discussed
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below, in which respondent sets forth the considerable resources
expended in the case at hand. Additionally, we have taken into
account petitioner’s conduct throughout the administrative
proceedings, in which petitioner was uncooperative and
unreasonable. Petitioner’s “Affidavit in Appellant’s Response to
Sanctioned Pursual”, in which petitioner again succumbed to the
temptation to make frivolous arguments, confirms the necessity of
a substantial penalty. Therefore, on the basis of petitioner’s
misconduct in the administrative and Court proceedings, we shall
impose a penalty of $24,000 under section 6673(a)(1).
Section 6673(a)(2) Liability of Ms. Spaid
Section 6673(a)(2) authorizes the Court to impose costs on
an attorney who has unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the
proceedings. Section 6673(a)(2) is modeled after section 1927 of
the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. sec. 1927 (2000), and the Court has
relied on cases arising under 28 U.S.C. section 1927 to ascertain
the level of misconduct justifying sanctions under section
6673(a)(2). See Takaba v. Commissioner, supra; Harper v.
Commissioner, 99 T.C. 533, 545 (1992).
In Takaba v. Commissioner, supra, we recently observed that
the venue for appeal of sanctions under section 6673(a)(2) may be
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. See
id. at 297 (citing section 7482(b)(1)). We found that the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had adopted a
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standard of recklessness for imposing sanctions under 28 U.S.C.
section 1927. Id. (citing Reliance Ins. Co. v. Sweeney Corp.,
792 F.2d 1137, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). We observed that if the
venue for appeal was not the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, it would likely be the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
had applied a bad faith standard in cases arising under 28 U.S.C.
section 1927. Id. Since the taxpayer’s counsel’s conduct
amounted to bad faith as defined by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, a higher standard than recklessness, and we were
uncertain of appropriate venue, we applied a bad faith standard
for purposes of that case. See id.
In our opinion in Edwards v. Commissioner, supra, we
observed that in the view of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, bad faith is present when an attorney knowingly or
recklessly raises a frivolous argument. Id. (citing In re Keegan
Mgmt. Co., Sec. Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 436 (9th Cir. 1996)). We
found that Ms. Spaid knowingly and recklessly made frivolous
arguments in pretrial memoranda, at trial, and in posttrial
briefs. In making these arguments, Ms. Spaid cited no relevant
supporting authority, and she either failed to perform the basic
research to discover or failed to disclose the substantial bodies
of authority specifically rejecting her arguments as frivolous.
Accordingly, we found the standard for bad faith used by the
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had been satisfied. We
observe that Ms. Spaid’s conduct also satisfies the recklessness
standard for imposing sanctions under 28 U.S.C. section 1927 in
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See Takaba v.
Commissioner, supra at 297.
“Attorney’s fees awarded under section 6673(a)(2) are to be
computed by multiplying the number of excess hours reasonably
expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. The
product is known as the ‘lodestar’ amount.” Harper v.
Commissioner, supra at 549. Pursuant to the Court’s order,
respondent’s attorney of record, Ms. Zusi, submitted an affidavit
setting forth the costs incurred by respondent as a result of the
sanctionable behavior of Ms. Spaid. The affidavit contains a
detailed itemization of the time Ms. Zusi and Ms. Moe spent on
each instance of misconduct. Attached to the affidavit is a copy
of respondent’s records of time spent by Ms. Zusi and Ms. Moe.
Respondent requests reimbursement for 167 hours of Ms.
Zusi’s time at $200 an hour. Ms. Zusi is the abusive trust
coordinating attorney for the San Jose, California, area
counsel’s Small Business/Self-Employed Division of the Office of
Chief Counsel. She has been practicing law for 17 years, 14 of
which have been with respondent. Ms. Zusi detailed the time she
spent on the case, beginning with Ms. Spaid’s entry of appearance
on December 1, 2000, which included legal research, trial
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preparation, appearing at the calendar call and trial as counsel,
and preparing both respondent’s opening and reply briefs.
Respondent also asks for reimbursement of 34 hours of Ms.
Moe’s time at $200 an hour. Ms. Moe is an associate area counsel
in respondent’s San Jose, California, Office of Chief Counsel and
is Ms. Zusi’s supervisor. Ms. Moe has been with the Office of
Chief Counsel since 1984. The total attorney’s fees requested by
respondent for Ms. Zusi and Ms. Moe amount to $40,200.
On October 24, 2002, Ms. Spaid filed an “Opposition to
Affidavit in Support of Attorney’s Fees for Sanctions”. Ms.
Spaid’s submission objects to the imposition of section
6673(a)(2) costs against her but does not object to imposition of
the section 6673(a)(1) penalty against petitioner. Ms. Spaid
contends the “Agency”, “Delpit”, and “Scar” issues were
appropriate lines of inquiry. With respect to the “Delpit”
issue, Ms. Spaid’s objection declares she “felt it was time for
the court to look at the purpose of the administrative procedures
* * * thus changing the law in favor of the taxpayer.” The
objection states that the “Agency” issue was raised only in
“paperwork” and was never responded to by respondent. The
objection says that the “Scar” issue was raised because the
notice of deficiency had not allowed any deductions for
petitioner and that seemed “unfair on the face of it”. With
respect to the abusive trust issue, Ms. Spaid claims the abusive
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trust issue is not a sanctionable area. Ms. Spaid also takes
issue with respondent’s itemization of time spent on each
particular frivolous issue. She concludes with a request that we
reconsider our declared intention to impose sanctions under
section 6673(a)(2).
We will not reconsider our position under section
6673(a)(2). The “Delpit”, “Scar”, and “Agency” arguments have
been rejected by this and other courts as frivolous. See Edwards
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-169. Ms. Spaid, contrary to her
assertions, did not advance any good-faith arguments for changes
in existing law. Instead, she cobbled together a few out-of-
context quotes from cases that do not stand for the propositions
for which she cites them, and she never acknowledged the
existence of the substantial bodies of law contrary to her
frivolous positions.
Ms. Spaid’s assertion that the abusive trust issue is not a
“sanctionable area” again illustrates her penchant for practicing
law without reading cases. In our opinion in Edwards, we stated
clearly that the abusive trust issue was a frivolous issue and
observed that respondent had provided petitioner with copious
citations of our prior cases holding trusts like his to be
invalid abusive trusts. Notwithstanding the parties settled the
abusive trust issue in respondent’s favor, that happened only
shortly before posttrial briefs were originally due; Ms. Spaid is
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responsible for respondent’s costs reasonably incurred as a
result of having to prepare to defend against all her frivolous
arguments. However, we will not include any of the time spent
by respondent in considering Ms. Spaid’s frivolous arguments in
preparing respondent’s posttrial briefs, which properly made no
more than a passing reference to the lack of content of those
arguments. The time spent appears excessive and did not result
in any legal work product that was helpful to the Court.
In our opinion in Edwards v. Commissioner, supra, we decided
we would award respondent costs under section 6673(a)(2) for Ms.
Spaid’s knowing and reckless advocacy of frivolous issues. In
addition to her sanctionable conduct, Ms. Spaid exhibited a large
measure of disorganization and negligence in performing routine
litigation matters. We will not award respondent’s costs for the
time spent by Ms. Zusi and Ms. Moe that was directly attributable
to responding to Ms. Spaid’s disorganization and negligence. We
will reduce the fees requested by respondent to an amount that we
estimate is more commensurate with the time spent by Ms. Zusi and
Ms. Moe in responding to the frivolous arguments without regard
to the disorganized and negligent fashion in which Ms. Spaid
prepared for trial, including the time spent on discovery and
preparation of the second stipulation of facts, which was
primarily designed to provide support for Ms. Spaid’s frivolous
arguments. After considering respondent’s affidavit and Ms.
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Spaid’s response, we will order Ms. Spaid to reimburse respondent
for 54 hours of Ms. Zusi’s time and 11.25 of Ms. Moe’s time. See
appendix.
We find that the $200 hourly rate requested by respondent is
reasonable. See Nis Family Trust v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 523,
552 (2000) (holding that $200 an hour was a reasonable rate for
both Ms. Zusi and Ms. Moe). Accordingly, the lodestar amount is
$10,800 for Ms. Zusi’s time and $2,250 for Ms. Moe’s time.
Respondent has not itemized costs for travel expenses,
photocopying, or supplies used in preparing the case, nor for the
time spent in preparing respondent’s affidavit. Respondent
limits his request for costs to the lodestar amount. We shall
require Ms. Spaid to pay $13,050 in respondent’s excess costs
reflecting the total lodestar amount.
Conclusion
In the case at hand, petitioner took frivolous and
groundless positions and unreasonably failed to pursue available
administrative remedies. We believe $24,000 is a substantial but
appropriate penalty for petitioner to pay the United States under
section 6673(a)(1). Therefore, the decision to be entered
against petitioner, in addition to determining the deficiencies
and section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalties, will require
petitioner to pay a penalty of $24,000 to the United States
pursuant to section 6673(a)(1).
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Ms. Spaid persisted in making frivolous arguments after
being repeatedly warned by respondent and the Court that those
arguments were frivolous. We find that $13,050 is a reasonable
amount for respondent’s excess attorney’s fees in preparing for
and responding to those arguments. Therefore, we shall order Ms.
Spaid personally to pay respondent $13,050 pursuant to section
6673(a)(2). Issuance of the Court’s order in this regard will be
postponed pending entry of the Court’s decision under Rule 155.
To reflect the foregoing,
An appropriate order will
be issued, and an order and
decision will be entered under
Rule 155.
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APPENDIX
On January 5, 2001, Ms. Zusi spent 2 hours reviewing an
informal discovery request from Ms. Spaid. Of the 33 items
requested, 18 were already in Ms. Spaid’s possession, 11 were
related to frivolous arguments, 3 were related to the trusts, and
1 was incomprehensible. We order Ms. Spaid to reimburse
respondent for 1 hour of Ms. Zusi’s time, the amount we estimate
was the result of Ms. Spaid’s knowing and reckless advocacy of
frivolous issues.
On January 10, 2001, Ms. Zusi spent 3.5 hours preparing for
a conference with Ms. Spaid and petitioner. Ms. Zusi had
received documents indicating Ms. Spaid would be asserting
frivolous issues relating to the abusive trusts and prepared
information packets for Ms. Spaid and petitioner. Ms. Zusi also
had to respond to Ms. Spaid’s motion for continuance. Ms. Spaid
admitted she filed the motion because she had missed the
discovery deadline. Since the motion for continuance was the
result of Ms. Spaid’s negligence, we reduce the number of
reimbursable hours by 1 hour. We order Ms. Spaid to reimburse
respondent for 2.5 hours of Ms. Zusi’s time.
On January 11, Ms. Zusi and Ms. Moe met petitioner, Ms.
Spaid, and some of petitioner’s “witnesses”. During the meeting,
the parties held a conference call with the Court in which Ms.
Spaid raised the “Delpit” and “Scar” issues, and the Court warned
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Ms. Spaid that these issues were frivolous. Ms. Zusi spent 3.5
hours dealing with frivolous issues, and Ms. Moe spent .75 hours
dealing with frivolous issues. We order Ms. Spaid to reimburse
respondent for 3.5 hours of Ms. Zusi’s time and .75 hour of Ms.
Moe’s time.
On January 17 and 19, 2001, Ms. Zusi spent 8 hours preparing
and mailing her response to Ms. Spaid’s informal discovery
request. Since, as we have stated, approximately one-half the
items in Ms. Spaid’s informal discovery request were requested
because of Ms. Spaid’s negligence, we order Ms. Spaid to
reimburse respondent for 4 hours of Ms. Zusi’s time.
On January 24, 2001, Ms. Zusi spent 3 hours on the “Delpit”,
“Scar”, and “Agency” issues. Ms. Zusi also shepardized a case
dealing with abusive trusts that Ms. Spaid claimed had been
overruled. We give Ms. Spaid the benefit of the doubt and
characterize her failure to verify the accuracy of her assertion
as negligence. We order Ms. Spaid to reimburse respondent for
2.5 hours of Ms. Zusi’s time.
On February 9, 2001, Ms. Zusi and Ms. Moe spent 3 and 0.5
hours, respectively, responding to and reviewing Ms. Spaid’s
supplement to her motion to continue. The motion to continue was
filed because Ms. Spaid missed the discovery deadline and is thus
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the product of Ms. Spaid’s negligence. We do not require Ms.
Spaid to reimburse respondent for the time spent on the
supplement to the motion to continue.
On February 12, 2001, Ms. Spaid faxed respondent copies of
proposed exhibits. Ms. Zusi spent approximately 3 hours
reviewing documents relating to frivolous issues. Ms. Moe spent
1 hour discussing the documents with Ms. Zusi. We order Ms.
Spaid to reimburse respondent for 3 hours of Ms. Zusi’s time and
none of Ms. Moe’s time because we believe any time Ms. Moe spent
on the frivolous issues was negligible.
On February 13-15, 2001, Ms. Zusi spent 6 hours preparing
respondent’s trial memorandum. Two of the six hours were related
to frivolous issues. Ms. Moe spent 2 hours reviewing the trial
memorandum. We order Ms. Spaid to reimburse respondent for 2
hours of Ms. Zusi’s time and none of Ms. Moe’s time because we
believe any time Ms. Moe spent on the frivolous issues was
negligible.
On February 28, 2001, Ms. Zusi and Ms. Moe prepared for and
participated in a conference call with Ms. Spaid and the Court in
which Ms. Spaid raised frivolous issues. Ms. Zusi spent
approximately 1.5 hours and Ms. Moe spent approximately 0.5 hours
dealing with the frivolous issues. We order Ms. Spaid to
reimburse respondent for 1.5 hours of Ms. Zusi’s time and 0.5
hour of Ms. Moe’s time.
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On March 14, 2001, Ms. Spaid faxed respondent 140 pages of
additional proposed exhibits to be incorporated into the second
stipulation of facts. All the documents related to frivolous
issues. Ms. Zusi spent 10 hours reviewing the documents and
preparing her objections. We order Ms. Spaid to reimburse
respondent for 10 hours of Ms. Zusi’s time.
On March 15, 2001, Ms. Zusi and Ms. Moe participated in a
conference call with the Court and Ms. Spaid regarding the second
stipulation of facts. Ms. Spaid faxed the proposed second
stipulation of facts to Ms. Zusi. Upon Ms. Zusi’s review, she
noted that none of her objections were shown on the proposed
stipulation. Ms. Zusi spent 10 hours reviewing and revising the
proposed second stipulation of facts. Ms. Moe spent .5 hour
reviewing Ms. Zusi’s revisions. While the entire second
stipulation of facts is frivolous, we believe that the lack of
objections and other organizational defects that Ms. Zusi
corrected were due to Ms. Spaid’s negligence. We therefore
order Ms. Spaid to reimburse respondent for 5 hours of Ms. Zusi’s
time. We do not order Ms. Spaid to reimburse any of Ms. Moe’s
time because we believe any time she spent on the frivolous
issues was negligible.
March 16, 2001, was the first day of trial; both Ms. Zusi
and Ms. Moe represented respondent. Approximately 5 of the 10
hours of the first day of trial were spent dealing with frivolous
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issues. We order Ms. Spaid to reimburse respondent for 5 hours
of Ms. Zusi’s time and 5 hours of Ms. Moe’s time.
On March 26, 2001, Ms. Spaid faxed Ms. Zusi copies of
various documents purporting to substantiate the validity of the
trusts. Ms. Zusi spent 2 hours on March 30 and April 6, 2001,
reviewing documents relating to frivolous issues and preparing to
rebut them. We order Ms. Spaid to reimburse respondent for 2
hours of Ms. Zusi’s time.
On June 20, 2001, Ms. Zusi and Ms. Moe participated in a
conference call with Ms. Spaid and the Court. The Court
expressed its displeasure with the format of the second
stipulation of facts prepared by Ms. Spaid. Pursuant to the
Court’s request, respondent’s counsel recompiled the second
stipulation of facts. Ms. Zusi and Ms. Moe spent 5 and 4 hours,
respectively, recompiling the second stipulation of facts.
We do not believe it is unreasonable for respondent to
request to be reimbursed for attorney’s fees for recompiling the
second stipulation of facts, which dealt entirely with frivolous
issues. However, we believe that respondent incurred the
attorney’s fees relating to the recompilation of the second
stipulation of facts as a result of Ms. Spaid’s negligent lack of
organization and do not order Ms. Spaid to pay respondent’s
attorney’s fees.
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On June 21, 2001, Ms. Zusi and Ms. Moe participated in a
conference call with Ms. Spaid and the Court. The purpose of the
conference call was to admonish Ms. Spaid that evidence of
deductions needed to be included in the record and explain to Ms.
Spaid that a gratuitous transfer of assets to a trust does not
result in a stepped-up basis for the assets. Respondent requests
reimbursement for 4.5 hours of Ms. Zusi’s time and 1 hour of Ms.
Moe’s time. We do not order Ms. Spaid to reimburse respondent
for any of the time Ms. Zusi and Ms. Moe spent preparing for and
participating in the conference call because the call dealt
almost entirely with issues that arose because of Ms. Spaid’s
negligence.
From July 2 to 6, 2001, Ms. Zusi spent 25.5 hours revising
the second stipulation of facts and preparing the accompanying
exhibits. Ms. Zusi’s affidavit states: “This time would not
have been necessary if Ms. Spaid had complied with the Court’s
directives and with the Tax Court Rules”. We believe the time
Ms. Zusi spent revising the second stipulation of facts was
caused by Ms. Spaid’s negligence, not her knowing and reckless
conduct. Accordingly, we do not order Ms. Spaid to reimburse
respondent for any of the time Ms. Zusi spent revising the second
stipulation of facts.
On July 17, 2001, Ms. Zusi and Ms. Moe spent 2 hours each
preparing for and participating in a conference call with Ms.
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Spaid and the Court. The conference call dealt solely with
frivolous issues raised by Ms. Spaid. We order Ms. Spaid to
reimburse respondent for 2 hours of Ms. Zusi’s time. We do not
order Ms. Spaid to reimburse respondent for Ms. Moe’s time.
On August 1, 2001, Ms. Zusi and Ms. Moe participated in a
conference call with the Court and Ms. Spaid. The conference
call concerned the second stipulation of facts and the
accompanying exhibits. Respondent requests reimbursement for 4
hours of Ms. Zusi’s time and 2 hours of Ms. Moe’s time. We do
not order Ms. Spaid to reimburse respondent for any of the time
spent by Ms. Zusi and Ms. Moe preparing for and participating in
the conference call because it was required by Ms. Spaid’s
negligence.
On August 16, 2001, Ms. Spaid faxed Ms. Zusi a warning that
Ms. Spaid would move for sanctions against the IRS under section
6673(a)(1), which does not provide for sanctions against the IRS.
Ms. Zusi spent 5 hours researching and preparing a defense to the
threatened sanctions. We order Ms. Spaid to reimburse respondent
for 5 hours of Ms. Zusi’s time.
On August 21, 2001, the trial was concluded. Approximately
5 hours of the trial were devoted to frivolous issues, including
the sham trusts and the “Delpit” and “Scar” issues. Ms. Zusi and
Ms. Moe both appeared on behalf of respondent. We order Ms.
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Spaid to reimburse respondent for 5 hours of Ms. Zusi’s time and
5 hours of Ms. Moe’s time.
On August 23 through November 9, 2001, November 13-28, 2001,
and January 18-29, 2002, Ms. Zusi prepared respondent’s original
posttrial brief and reply brief, which were reviewed by Ms. Moe.
Ms. Zusi alleges she spent 62 hours on frivolous issues, and that
Ms. Moe spent 5.75 hours reviewing and conferring with Ms. Zusi
on the frivolous issues. We do not order Ms. Spaid to reimburse
respondent for any of the time spent by Ms. Zusi and Ms. Moe in
preparing respondent’s posttrial and reply briefs. By this time,
the “Delpit”, “Scar”, and “Agency” arguments had clearly been
established as frivolous, petitioner had conceded the sham trust
issue, respondent’s briefs make only a passing reference to the
frivolous arguments, and, in any event, the time alleged to have
been spent on the frivolous arguments appears to be excessive.