T.C. Memo. 2003-288
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
ALFRED J. MARTIN, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 13419-02L. Filed October 8, 2003.
Patricia Tucker, for petitioner.
Anne W. Durning and James E. Cannon, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
MARVEL, Judge: Pursuant to section 6330(d), petitioner
seeks review of respondent’s determination to proceed with the
collection of petitioner’s 1980 Federal income tax liability.1
1
All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in
effect at all relevant times, and all Rule references are to the
Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
- 2 -
Background
The parties submitted this case fully stipulated pursuant to
Rule 122. The stipulation of facts and accompanying exhibits are
incorporated herein by this reference.2 Petitioner resided in
Santa Fe, New Mexico, when he filed the petition.
During 1980, petitioner was married to Amilu Stewart
(formerly Amilu Martin, formerly Amilu Rothhammer, and referred
to herein as Amilu).3 On April 15, 1981, petitioner and Amilu
filed a joint Federal income tax return for 1980 (the 1980 joint
return). Subsequently, respondent audited the 1980 joint return
in connection with respondent’s investigation of individuals
involved in the Elektra Hemisphere tax shelters.4
On December 6, 1983, during respondent’s examination of the
1980 joint return, petitioner signed Form 872-A, Special Consent
to Extend the Time to Assess Tax. On June 7, 1988, respondent
2
In the stipulation of facts, petitioner objected to the
relevancy and materiality of certain stipulations drawn from the
findings of fact in a related case involving petitioner, Martin
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-187 (Martin I), affd. on other
grounds 38 Fed. Appx. 980 (4th Cir. 2002). We overrule
petitioner’s objections with respect to those stipulations
incorporated herein, because we conclude that those stipulations
are relevant to our discussion of the limitations issue.
3
Petitioner and Amilu divorced in 1981.
4
Before 1980, petitioner and Amilu purchased a limited
partnership interest in Winchester Oil, one of the Manhattan
group partnerships, which were the subject of the Elektra
Hemisphere tax shelter litigation in this Court. See Krause v.
Commissioner, 99 T.C. 132 (1992), affd. sub nom. Hildebrand v.
Commissioner, 28 F.3d 1024 (10th Cir. 1994).
- 3 -
issued notices of deficiency to petitioner at his last known
address in Suffolk, Virginia (the notice), and to Amilu at her
address in Colorado Springs, Colorado (Amilu’s notice). The U.S.
Postal Service later returned the notice sent to petitioner in
Suffolk, Virginia, marked “undeliverable as addressed, no
forwarding order on file”. Petitioner did not receive a copy of
the notice.5
On September 6, 1988, Jeffrey Berg, an attorney representing
limited partners in the Elektra Hemisphere tax shelter
litigation, filed a petition with this Court on behalf of
petitioner and Amilu seeking a redetermination of their 1980
deficiency.6 Mr. Berg attached to the petition a copy of Amilu’s
notice. In Martin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-187 (Martin
I), affd. on other grounds 38 Fed. Appx. 980 (4th Cir. 2002), we
granted petitioner’s request to dismiss him from the 1980
deficiency case for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that
petitioner did not file, authorize the filing of, or ratify the
filing of the petition Mr. Berg signed and submitted. The
5
Although petitioner did not receive the notice, Arthur
Robb, petitioner’s authorized representative pursuant to Form
2848, Power of Attorney and Declaration of Representative,
received a copy. Respondent does not contend in this case that
receipt of the notice by Mr. Robb qualified as receipt by
petitioner for purposes of sec. 6330(c)(2)(B).
6
On Aug. 4, 1986, at petitioner’s request, Mr. Berg had
filed a petition for redetermination of petitioner’s 1981 and
1982 income tax deficiencies.
- 4 -
dismissal order was not appealed and became final on September
25, 2000.
On November 20, 2000, respondent assessed income tax of
$56,771 and interest of $456,023.09 and sent petitioner a notice
of balance due.7 On November 29, 2001, respondent issued a Final
Notice--Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a
Hearing. On December 14, 2001, petitioner timely submitted Form
12153, Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing, requesting a
hearing under section 6330 (the hearing).
On July 10, 2002, petitioner’s counsel attended the hearing
conducted by Appeals Officer Joann Mares. At the hearing,
petitioner’s counsel argued that the statutory limitations period
for assessment (the limitations period) had expired before
respondent assessed petitioner’s 1980 income tax liability.
Petitioner’s counsel raised no other issues at the hearing. With
respect to alternative collection methods, petitioner’s counsel
expressed interest in discussing an installment agreement at a
later date if Appeals Officer Mares determined that the
limitations period had not expired before respondent’s
assessment. Petitioner’s counsel did not provide any financial
information at the hearing or propose an actual installment
agreement to Appeals Officer Mares.
7
The amount of the assessment was reduced by payments and
credits totaling $140,944.67 to arrive at the balance due.
- 5 -
On July 22, 2002, the Appeals Office issued a Notice of
Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320
and/or 6330 (notice of determination) in which it determined the
following:
1. All legal and procedural requirements for the issuance
of the Notice of Intent to Levy had been met.
2. The limitations period had not expired prior to
respondent’s assessment of petitioner’s 1980 income tax
liability.
3. Petitioner did not offer collection alternatives; he
refused to provide financial information or otherwise explore
alternative collection methods at the hearing.
4. The proposed levy action balanced the need for efficient
collection of taxes with the legitimate concern of the taxpayer
that the collection action be no more intrusive than necessary
and was appropriate under the circumstances.
On August 20, 2002, petitioner filed a timely petition with
this Court appealing respondent’s determination. In his
petition, petitioner alleged that the limitations period had
expired before respondent assessed petitioner’s 1980 income tax
liability. Specifically, petitioner claimed:
The Petition filed in [Martin I] was not a Petition “in
respect to the deficiency” for 1980 of Petitioner
because he did not authorize or ratify the filing of
the Petition on his behalf and because the Petition as
filed, and as amended within the jurisdictional period,
did not attach a copy of the Statutory Notice of
- 6 -
Deficiency issued to him individually at his last known
address.
In the alternative, if we conclude that the limitations period
did not expire, petitioner contends that we should remand the
case to Appeals for the discussion of collection alternatives.8
Discussion
Section 6330(a) provides that no levy may be made on any
property or right to property of any person unless the Secretary
has notified such person in writing of the right to a hearing
before the levy is made. If the person makes a timely request
for a hearing, a hearing shall be held by the Internal Revenue
Service Office of Appeals. Sec. 6330(b)(1). At the hearing, a
taxpayer may contest the existence and amount of the underlying
tax liability if the taxpayer did not receive a notice of
deficiency for the tax in question or did not otherwise have an
opportunity to dispute the tax liability. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B);
see also Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 609 (2000).
Following a hearing, the Appeals Office must make a
determination whether the proposed levy action may proceed. In
so doing, the Appeals Office is required to take into
consideration the verification presented by the Secretary, the
issues raised by the taxpayer, and whether the proposed
collection action appropriately balances the need for efficient
8
Petitioner raised this contention for the first time on
brief.
- 7 -
collection of taxes with a taxpayer’s concerns regarding the
intrusiveness of the proposed collection action. Sec.
6330(c)(3). The taxpayer may petition the Tax Court or, in
limited cases, a Federal District Court for judicial review of
the Appeals Office’s determination. Sec. 6330(d).
If the taxpayer files a timely petition for judicial review,
the applicable standard of review depends on whether the
underlying tax liability is at issue. Where the underlying tax
liability is properly at issue, the Court reviews any
determination regarding the underlying tax liability de novo.
Sego v. Commissioner, supra at 610. The Court reviews any other
administrative determination regarding the proposed levy action
for abuse of discretion. Id. In the instant case, we need not
decide which standard of review applies to the limitations period
determination, for our holding would be the same regardless of
whether we review respondent’s determination de novo or for abuse
of discretion.
I. The Limitations Issue9
Section 6501(a) generally requires that the Commissioner
assess income tax within 3 years after the taxpayer filed the
return. The mailing of a notice of deficiency to the taxpayer,
pursuant to section 6212, suspends the limitations period--
9
Respondent does not contend that sec. 6330(c)(2)(B)
precludes us from considering this issue. Cf. Rodriguez v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-153.
- 8 -
for the period during which the Secretary is prohibited
from making the assessment[10] * * * (and in any event,
if a proceeding in respect of the deficiency is placed
on the docket of the Tax Court, until the decision of
the Tax Court becomes final), and for 60 days
thereafter.
Sec. 6503(a)(1).
Petitioner contends that the petition Mr. Berg filed and we
dismissed in Martin I (hereinafter referred to as the petition)
was an “erroneous filing”, which did not place “a proceeding in
respect of a deficiency” on our docket. Petitioner alleges two
specific “filing errors” with respect to the petition: (1)
Petitioner lacked knowledge of the filing and did not consent to
it, and (2) the petition, although purportedly filed on both
petitioner and Amilu’s behalf, contained only a copy of Amilu’s
notice. According to petitioner, these “filing errors” rendered
the petition a “nullity” or “materially defective”, and,
therefore, the filing of the petition did not suspend the
limitations period.
A. The Effect of an Unauthorized Petition on the
Limitations Period
Petitioner contends that a petition filed without the
taxpayer’s authorization or ratification, and later dismissed,
has “no effect on” the limitations period. According to
petitioner, Mr. Berg was a “mere interloper” and, therefore, did
10
The prohibited assessment period referred to in sec.
6503(a)(1) includes the time during which the taxpayer may file a
petition with this Court. See sec. 6213(a).
- 9 -
not have the authority to bind petitioner to what was, in effect,
an agreement to extend the limitations period. In so arguing,
petitioner compares the petition to a written agreement, such as
a Form 872-A, that purports to extend the limitations period but,
in fact, is signed by an unauthorized party.11 We disagree with
petitioner’s characterization of both the petition and Mr. Berg
for the reasons discussed below.
Congress originally enacted the predecessor to section
6503(a)(1) as section 277 of the Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, 45
Stat. 791, which became section 277 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1939. In the legislative history of section 277, Congress
addressed the effect of a defective petition on the limitations
period:
The decision dismissing the appeal may not be made
until months after the proceeding was begun and there
is some question whether in such cases the statute of
limitations on assessment is actually suspended during
the pendency of the proceeding. It is specifically
provided in section 277 that the limitation period
shall be suspended, if any proceeding is placed on the
docket of the Board, until the decision of the Board in
respect thereof becomes final and for 60 days
thereafter.[12]
11
Sec. 6501(c)(4) authorizes extension agreements between
the Secretary and the taxpayer. Pursuant to sec. 6903, the
taxpayer may authorize a third party to act as his representative
and enter an agreement to extend the limitations period. See
Balkissoon v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-223, affd. 995 F.2d
525 (4th Cir. 1993).
12
References to the “Board” are to the Board of Tax Appeals,
the predecessor of this Court.
- 10 -
H. Rept. 2, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1927), 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2)
384, 399-400; see also S. Rept. 960, 70th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1928), 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 409, 431.
In Eversole v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 56 (1966), the
taxpayers contended that the petition, which an improper party
had filed on the estate’s behalf and this Court had dismissed as
to the estate, failed to suspend the limitations period. Relying
on the legislative history of section 277 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939, a predecessor of section 6503(a)(1) (quoted supra),
as well as statutory language and relevant case law,13 we held
that the petition suspended the limitations period. Id. at 64-
65. In reaching our conclusion, we found it significant that the
language of section 277 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939
required suspension of the limitations period when a proceeding
“is placed” on the docket rather than when “the taxpayer places”
a proceeding on the docket. Id. at 64.
Petitioner attempts to distinguish Eversole from the instant
case on the basis of the improper party’s relationship to the
13
One such case on which we relied was Am. Equitable
Assurance Co. v. Helvering, 68 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1933), affg. 27
B.T.A. 247 (1932). Responding to a similar challenge to the
limitations period, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
concluded that “the mere placing on the docket of the Board of a
proceeding in respect to the deficiency” suspended the
limitations period. Id. at 47. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reasoned that “Congress did not intend to have the
time a proceeding was pending before the Board counted any more
when the decision was a dismissal for want of jurisdiction than
when it was not.” Id.
- 11 -
taxpayer. In Eversole v. Commissioner, supra at 57, the improper
party was the decedent’s widow and, formerly, executrix of his
estate. In contrast, petitioner argues, Mr. Berg was nothing
more than an “interloper”. We find this distinction
unpersuasive. Not only does it ignore that Mr. Berg was
petitioner’s counsel in a related case involving his 1981 and
1982 deficiencies, but petitioner’s argument completely ignores
our discussion of the law in Eversole.
According to petitioner, we should apply instead the holding
of Kirch v. United States, 83 AFTR 2d 99-2153, 99-1 USTC par.
50,452 (S.D. Ohio 1999). In Kirch, the taxpayers, also former
Elektra Hemisphere tax shelter investors, asserted that the
petition they filed with this Court, which we had dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction, failed to suspend the limitations period.
The taxpayers had filed the petition before the Commissioner’s
issuance of a notice of deficiency. Accordingly, the District
Court concluded that because the Commissioner had not issued a
notice of deficiency, the filing of the petition with this Court
had not placed a “proceeding in respect of the deficiency” on the
docket. Id.
Unlike Kirch, in the present case respondent issued a valid
notice of deficiency before Mr. Berg filed the petition.
Although petitioner did not authorize Mr. Berg to file the
petition, the petition nevertheless placed a “proceeding in
- 12 -
respect of the deficiency” on our docket and suspended the
limitations period.14
B. Failure To Attach the Notice
Petitioner further contends that because Mr. Berg attached
only Amilu’s notice to the petition, the petition was not filed
with respect to petitioner’s share of the joint deficiency. As a
result, petitioner asserts, the petition did not confer
jurisdiction upon this Court and failed to suspend the
limitations period.15
14
We note that petitioner’s position on this issue is also
unacceptable from a policy perspective for several reasons.
First, the petition in Martin I was pending in this Court for
more than a decade before petitioner moved to dismiss it, by
which time, according to his theory, the assessment period had
run. Disabling the assessment and collection of tax in that
fashion is clearly not what Congress intended. See O’Neill v.
United States, 44 F.3d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1995). Second, a
strong presumption of authority is afforded to counsel when
filing a petition in this Court. See Rule 33; Gray v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 639, 646-647 (1980).
15
We have already rejected this argument as it relates to
our jurisdiction in a prior proceeding involving petitioner and
respondent that arose out of Martin I. In Rothhammer v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-46, petitioner unsuccessfully
sought litigation costs under sec. 7430. Petitioner contended
that Mr. Berg’s failure to attach the notice, as required by Rule
34(b)(8), deprived this Court of jurisdiction. Petitioner cited
cases, as he does now, in which the taxpayers’ original petitions
failed to name certain taxpayers or include all tax years for
which the Commissioner made a determination. We found that, in
contrast to the petitions filed in those cases, the petition Mr.
Berg filed named petitioner and clearly contested petitioner’s
1980 income tax deficiency. Accordingly, in Rothhammer, we
rejected petitioner’s argument.
On brief, respondent discussed our decision in Rothhammer
(continued...)
- 13 -
The two requirements for our jurisdiction in a deficiency
case are a valid notice of deficiency issued by the Commissioner
and a timely petition filed by the taxpayer. Frieling v.
Commissioner, 81 T.C. 42, 46 (1983). The content of a petition
filed in a deficiency case should conform to Rule 34(b). Rule
34(b)(8) provides that the petition shall contain: “A copy of
the notice of deficiency * * * which shall be appended to the
petition”.
This Court has consistently followed a liberal policy with
respect to treating as petitions documents timely filed by
taxpayers and intended as petitions. O’Neil v. Commissioner, 66
T.C. 105, 107 (1976). However, we cannot treat a document as a
petition without “some objective indication that the taxpayer
contests the deficiency determined by respondent against that
taxpayer.” Normac, Inc. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 142, 147-148
(1988); see also O’Neil v. Commissioner, supra. At a minimum,
for purposes of our jurisdiction, an intended petition must
contain (1) the amount of the deficiencies determined against the
taxpayer, (2) the amount the taxpayer is contesting, and (3) the
15
(...continued)
but did not specifically argue that petitioner is collaterally
estopped from raising the issue again in this proceeding. Even
if respondent intended the discussion of Rothhammer as a
collateral estoppel argument, respondent did not raise it as a
defense in the pleadings, and we therefore deem it waived. See
Rule 39; Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 226, 349
(1991).
- 14 -
years in dispute. InverWorld, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 70,
86 (1992), affd. 979 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The petition
clearly conformed to all three requirements.
Petitioner insists that a separate notice of deficiency must
be attached with respect to each taxpayer involved in a
deficiency case. In support of his position, petitioner
mistakenly relies on cases in which the petitions did not list
all of the taxpayers’ names or all of the taxable years at issue.
See Normac, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra; O’Neil v. Commissioner,
supra; Estate of DuPuy v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 918 (1967). In
this case, the petition that Mr. Berg filed listed both
petitioner and his former wife as petitioners and included, as an
attachment, a copy of the notice of deficiency issued with
respect to the 1980 joint Federal income tax return of petitioner
and his former wife.
Although this Court ultimately dismissed the petition in
Martin I for other jurisdictional reasons, Mr. Berg’s failure to
attach the notice did not invalidate the petition with respect to
petitioner and did not deprive us of jurisdiction. Consequently,
the filing of the petition placed a proceeding with respect to
petitioner’s 1980 income tax deficiency on our docket and
suspended the limitations period.
II. Installment Agreement Alternative
For the first time on brief, petitioner argues in the
- 15 -
alternative that we should remand the case to Appeals for the
discussion of collection alternatives. Specifically, petitioner
claims that he and Appeals Officer Mares made an “agreement” to
later explore the possibility of an installment agreement if we
concluded that the limitations period had not expired before
respondent’s assessment. Respondent opposes petitioner’s request
for the following reasons: (1) The issue is deemed conceded; and
(2) petitioner “is entitled to only one hearing” under section
6330. We consider each of respondent’s arguments in turn.
A. Whether Petitioner Conceded the Installment Agreement
Issue
When appealing to this Court pursuant to section 6330(d), a
taxpayer may raise in his petition any issues that he raised at
the Appeals hearing. See sec. 301.6330-1(f)(2), Q&A-F5, Proced.
& Admin. Regs. In this case, the question of an installment
agreement was raised by petitioner at the hearing in that
petitioner’s counsel expressed interest in discussing such an
agreement depending on the resolution of the limitations issue.
Respondent does not argue that the issue of an installment
agreement never came up at the hearing. Rather, respondent
argues that, because petitioner did not raise the installment
agreement issue in his petition, the issue is deemed conceded.
Respondent relies on Rule 331(b)(4), which provides that “Any
issue not raised in the assignments of error shall be deemed to
be conceded.”
- 16 -
Although petitioner did not raise the installment agreement
argument in his petition, petitioner may pursue the argument as
long as his failure to provide respondent with notice of the
argument did not prejudice respondent. See Pagel, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 91 T.C. 200, 212 (1988), affd. 905 F.2d 1190 (8th
Cir. 1990). The existence of prejudice depends on “the amount of
surprise and the need for additional evidence on behalf of the
party opposed to the new position.” Id. Upon examination of the
record,16 we find no prejudice to respondent, and we consider the
issue.
B. Whether a Remand of the Case to Appeals Is Appropriate
Taxpayers are entitled to only one section 6330 hearing for
the taxable period for which the tax is unpaid. Sec. 6330(b)(2).
After the hearing, the Appeals Office maintains jurisdiction over
16
On the basis of evidence in the record, we find it
unlikely that petitioner’s failure to raise the collection
alternatives issue in the pleadings unduly surprised respondent
or prevented respondent from submitting any necessary, additional
evidence. In the stipulation of facts, respondent stipulated
that consideration of an installment agreement “was deferred
pending the resolution of the statute of limitations issue.” On
petitioner’s Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due Process
Hearing, submitted as an exhibit, he claimed to “[retain] the
right to request collection arrangements other than collection by
levy if any liability is determined to be valid.” Additionally,
after the hearing, in the notice of determination, also submitted
as an exhibit, Appeals Officer Mares discussed petitioner’s
counsel’s refusal to consider an installment agreement at the
hearing. Appeals Officer Mares noted that petitioner’s counsel
would not discuss the installment agreement “because she
[believed] the assessment was barred by statute” and concluded
that “[petitioner] declined an offer to explore collection
alternatives to the proposed collection action.”
- 17 -
its determination with respect to the collection action and may
hold subsequent hearings with the taxpayer. Sec. 6330(d)(2);
sec. 301.6330-1(h)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs. However, any
subsequent hearing is not treated as a continuation of the
original section 6330 hearing and, therefore, is not appealable
to this Court. Sec. 301.6330-1(h)(2), Q&A-H1 and H2, Proced. &
Admin. Regs.
In Lunsford v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 183, 189 (2001), we
acknowledged that “there may be cases where taxpayers were not
given a proper opportunity for an Appeals hearing, where it will
be appropriate for this Court to require that an Appeals hearing
be held.” Accordingly, we return a case to Appeals if we
consider a rehearing “necessary or productive”.17 See id.; Moore
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-1.
Petitioner bases his request for a remand on the alleged
agreement he had with respondent to discuss an installment
agreement after resolving the limitations period issue. Without
addressing the alleged agreement, respondent asserts that the
proper context for any alternative collection method discussion
at this point is with “appropriate IRS personnel in accordance
with the normal procedures for such matters”, not at another
section 6330 hearing. We find no credible evidence of an
17
For an example of cases that we remanded to the Appeals
Office, see Keene v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. __ (2003), and
Harrell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-271.
- 18 -
agreement between the parties to hold a section 6330 hearing
after this proceeding in order to discuss an installment
agreement. Moreover, we do not find that a remand in this case
is necessary or would be productive. Respondent has expressed a
willingness to discuss an installment agreement with petitioner
pursuant to the proper procedures.18
At the hearing, Appeals Officer Mares gave petitioner’s
counsel the opportunity to discuss an installment agreement and
provide the requisite financial information. Petitioner’s
counsel declined to discuss an installment agreement at that time
and did not supply any financial information. Consequently,
respondent determined that petitioner refused to explore
collection alternatives at the hearing. We review respondent’s
determination for abuse of discretion. Black v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2002-307.
Installment agreements are based on the taxpayer’s current
financial condition. See sec. 6159; sec. 301.6159-1, Proced. &
Admin. Regs.; 2 Administration, Internal Revenue Manual (CCH),
5.19.1.5.4.1, at 18,299-50; Form 433-D, Installment Agreement.
Because petitioner failed to provide financial information for
18
We note that the legislative history of sec. 6330 provides
in part that “A taxpayer could apply for consideration of new
information, make an offer-in-compromise, request an installment
agreement, or raise other considerations at any time before,
during, or after the Notice of Intent to Levy hearing.” H. Conf.
Rept. 105-599, at 266 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. 755, 1020 (emphasis
added).
- 19 -
review at the hearing, Appeals Officer Mares could not properly
consider an installment agreement at that time. See Wells v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-234.19 Accordingly, we conclude
that respondent’s determination with respect to collection
alternatives was not an abuse of discretion.
Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the proposed levy
action is inappropriate, another collection alternative is more
appropriate, or some other relevant issue adversely affects
respondent’s proposed collection activity. We therefore conclude
that respondent’s determination to proceed by levy with the
collection of petitioner’s 1980 income tax liability was not an
abuse of discretion.
We have considered the remaining arguments of both parties
for results contrary to those expressed herein and, to the extent
not discussed above, find those arguments to be irrelevant, moot,
or without merit.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
for respondent.
19
We also note that, for purposes of this proceeding,
petitioner did not introduce into evidence any information
regarding his financial condition that would suggest a remand is
appropriate. See Wells v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-234.