T.C. Memo. 2005-286
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
ROBERT E. CRANDALL, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 7599-03L. Filed December 15, 2005.
P filed a petition for judicial review pursuant to
sec. 6330, I.R.C., in response to a determination by R
that levy action was appropriate.
Held: Because P has advanced groundless
complaints in dispute of the notice of intent to levy,
R’s determination to proceed with collection action is
sustained.
Held, further, a penalty under sec. 6673, I.R.C.,
is due from P and is awarded to the United States in
the amount of $3,000.
Robert E. Crandall, pro se.
Rollin G. Thorley, for respondent.
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MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
WHERRY, Judge: This case arises from a petition for
judicial review filed in response to a Notice of Determination
Concerning Collection Action Under Section 6330.1 The issues for
decision are: (1) Whether respondent may proceed with collection
action as so determined, and (2) whether the Court, sua sponte,
should impose a penalty under section 6673.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
The stipulations of the parties, with accompanying exhibits, are
incorporated herein by this reference.
This case involves petitioner’s 1998 and 1999 income tax
liabilities. With respect to 1998, petitioner initially filed a
Federal income tax return reporting a balance due and not
accompanied by full payment. On July 19, 1999, respondent
assessed the reported tax, as well as statutory additions and
interest. Notices of balance due for 1998 were also promptly
sent to petitioner. Petitioner subsequently submitted an amended
return, received by respondent on September 21, 2000, reflecting
no income or tax liability and requesting a refund of
withholdings. By letter dated December 26, 2001, the Internal
1
Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and Rule references
are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
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Revenue Service (IRS) notified petitioner of disallowance of the
refund claim and of his right to contest the denial by filing a
lawsuit in the U.S. District Court or U.S. Court of Federal
Claims.
With respect to 1999, the IRS examined petitioner’s filed
return and issued a statutory notice of deficiency. Petitioner
did not file a petition with this Court in response to the notice
of deficiency, and respondent assessed the tax, an addition to
tax, and interest for 1999 on November 19, 2001. Notices of
balance due were promptly sent to petitioner with respect 1999.
Thereafter, on August 5, 2002, respondent issued to
petitioner a Final Notice of Intent To Levy and Notice of Your
Right To a Hearing regarding his unpaid liabilities for 1998 and
1999. Petitioner timely submitted to respondent a Form 12153,
Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing, setting forth his
disagreement with the levy, as follows: “NOT LIABLE, MORE
DETAILS TO FOLLOW”.
By a letter dated February 20, 2003, Julieanne M. Petersen,
the Appeals officer to whom petitioner’s case had been assigned,
scheduled a hearing for March 20, 2003, in Las Vegas, Nevada.2
The letter briefly outlined the hearing process, advised that
audio or stenographic recording of hearings was not allowed, and
2
The explanation attached to the Apr. 23, 2003, notice of
determination apparently refers in error to Mar. 28, 2003, as the
date initially scheduled for the requested hearing.
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explained the opportunity to present and discuss “non-frivolous”
material. The letter also warned petitioner as follows: “THE
COURTS HAVE DEEMED THE ARGUMENTS THAT ARE CONTAINED IN YOUR
PREVIOUS CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
FIRVOLOUS [sic]. THEY WILL NOT HEAR THEM AND NEITHER WILL THEY
BE ADDRESSED AT YOUR COLLECTION DUE PROCESS HEARING.” The
hearing was subsequently rescheduled for April 10, 2003, at
petitioner’s request.
By identical letters dated March 1 and 21, 2003, petitioner
requested that enumerated documents be provided at the upcoming
hearing “before I am persuaded that I am legally obligated to pay
the taxes and penalty at issue.” The letters also advised that
petitioner would be recording the hearing.
Petitioner appeared for the scheduled hearing on April 10,
2003, but the hearing did not proceed when the Appeals officer
refused to permit petitioner to record the meeting. On April 23,
2003, respondent issued to petitioner the aforementioned Notice
of Determination Concerning Collection Action Under Section 6330,
sustaining the proposed levy action. An attachment to the notice
addressed the verification of legal and procedural requirements,
the issues raised by the taxpayer, and the balancing of efficient
collection and intrusiveness. The attachment noted that the
issues raised by petitioner in his correspondence were “frivolous
and without merit” and that petitioner had been provided with
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copies of Pierson v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 576 (2000), and other
cases highlighting the invalidity of his arguments.
Petitioner’s petition disputing the notice of determination
was filed with the Court on May 20, 2003, and reflected an
address in Las Vegas, Nevada.3 Petitioner’s complaints with
respect to the administrative proceedings included the following:
No legitimate hearing under section 6330 ever took place;
petitioner was not permitted to record the scheduled hearing;
petitioner was denied the opportunity to raise issues he deemed
“relevant” (e.g., the “existence” of the underlying tax
liability); and requested documentation had not been produced
(e.g., record of the assessments, statutory notice and demand for
payment, and verification from the Secretary that all applicable
requirements were met). Petitioner’s prayer asked this Court to
declare invalid the April 23, 2003, determination; order the IRS
to suspend enforcement activity until a hearing is held; order
the IRS to hold a hearing and to produce all requested
3
The record also contains a copy of a letter dated June 20,
2003, and addressed to the Appeals officer, disputing the notice
of determination. The letter is from a Milton H. Baxley II
alleging to hold a power of attorney to act on behalf of
petitioner. The letter focuses in particular on claimed
violations of the verification requirements of sec. 6330 and
contains a so-called offer to pay in full the amount of any tax
“upon presentment of a verified bill signed under penalty of
perjury by a person who has first hand knowledge of the facts,
and that the alleged amount is due and owing by my client, and
that the amount is true, correct, complete and not misleading.”
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documentation; and order the Government to reimburse petitioner
for all costs incurred in submitting the instant petition.4
On September 20, 2004, respondent filed a motion for summary
judgment. Petitioner filed a timely response in opposition to
respondent’s motion on October 12, 2004. The response
essentially reprised petitioner’s demands for a recorded hearing
and documentation. The Court on November 17, 2004, issued an
order denying the motion for summary judgment, ruling as set
forth below:
As respondent correctly notes in the motion for
summary judgment, issues raised by petitioner during
the administrative process and before us have been
repeatedly rejected by this and other courts or are
refuted by the documentary record. Moreover, the Court
observes that maintenance of similar arguments has
served as grounds for imposition of penalties under
section 6673. However, the case in its current posture
presents a procedural shortcoming.
On July 8, 2003, this Court issued Keene v.
Commissioner, 121 T.C. 8, 19 (2003), in which it was
held that taxpayers are entitled, pursuant to section
7521(a)(1), to audio record section 6330 hearings. The
taxpayer in that case had refused to proceed when
denied the opportunity to record, and we remanded the
case to allow a recorded Appeals hearing. Id. In
contrast, we have distinguished, and declined to
remand, cases where the taxpayer had participated in an
Appeals Office hearing, albeit unrecorded, and where
all issues raised by the taxpayer could be properly
decided from the existing record. E.g., id. at 19, 20;
Frey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-87; Durrenberger
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-44; Brashear v.
4
The Court notes that to the extent that the petition seeks
reasonable administrative and/or litigation costs pursuant to
sec. 7430, any such claim is premature and will not be further
addressed. See Rule 231.
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Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-196; Kemper v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-195.
The circumstances of the instant case are
analogous to those in Keene v. Commissioner, supra, and
diverge from those where it was determined that remand
was not necessary and would not be productive.
Critically, because the conference was terminated when
petitioner refused to turn off his recorder, no hearing
was ever held. Hence, there still exists a possibility
that petitioner might have raised one or more
nonfrivolous issues if the meeting had proceeded.
In this situation, the Court declines to
characterize the failure to allow recording as harmless
error. Hence, the Court will deny respondent’s motion
for summary judgment at this time. As in Keene v.
Commissioner, supra at 19, however, we admonish
petitioner that if he persists in making frivolous and
groundless tax protester arguments in any further
proceedings with respect to this case, rather than
raising relevant issues, as specified in section
6330(c)(2), the Court may consider granting a future
motion for summary judgment. In such an instance, the
Court would also be in a position to impose a penalty
under section 6673(a)(1).
This case was called from the calendar of the trial session
of the Court in Las Vegas, Nevada, on December 6, 2004, and a
trial was held the following day. At the outset, the Court
cautioned petitioner to be cognizant of our November 17, 2004,
order, explaining:
But I have already ruled in this order that the
Appeals Officer did deny you your right to a hearing,
which you had a right to record. The Court has
addressed that matter and we have determined that the
Respondent, the Internal Revenue Service, was wrong in
not allowing you to record your hearing.
However, we have also determined that if you don’t
have--if taxpayers, and not you, but if a taxpayer who
wants to record a hearing has only frivolous issues
which have no merit, and which this court and other
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courts have continuously rejected, that there is no
reason for remanding your case to appeals to hold a
face to face hearing and waste your time, Appeals’
time, and the taxpayers’ money to simply allow you to
document on a tape all of your frivolous arguments.
So the question is as I noted in the * * *
[order], do you have any issues which I have authority
to consider, and which Appeals had authority to
consider at your hearing which you want to raise, and
presumably would have raised at the hearing had you
been given a chance to have the hearing.
An that’s why I denied the government’s motion,
because they did deny you your rights, and we don’t
know whether--I don’t know whether you have any
legitimate issue to raise or not. So that is what you
have to address here.
Petitioner responded with: “Well, my position is that the
hearing was denied, and that I was not able to bring up the
issues that I outlined in a letter when requesting my letter for
certain documents, and et cetera, to be available, and for the
government to have at the hearing. Those were issues that I
wanted to discuss with them.” The Court again reiterated that
such contentions had been ruled meritless, and warned petitioner:
“Making those arguments, and continuing to make those arguments,
and costing the taxpayers a lot of money for me to deal with
them, may result in the application of additional penalties under
Section 6673.” Petitioner’s remaining comments failed to
identify any specific colorable issues for remand and consisted
principally of vague recitations or paraphrases of the statutory
language.
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Petitioner subsequently filed a posttrial brief. He therein
recapitulated the position taken throughout these proceedings and
at trial, focusing once again on lack of a recorded hearing and
of sufficient verification and documentation of procedural
requisites. Respondent elected not to file a brief.
OPINION
I. Collection Actions
A. General Rules
Section 6331(a) authorizes the Commissioner to levy upon all
property and rights to property of a taxpayer where there exists
a failure to pay any tax liability within 10 days after notice
and demand for payment. Sections 6331(d) and 6330 then set forth
procedures generally applicable to afford protections for
taxpayers in such levy situations. Section 6331(d) establishes
the requirement that a person be provided with at least 30 days’
prior written notice of the Commissioner’s intent to levy before
collection may proceed. Section 6331(d) also indicates that this
notification should include a statement of available
administrative appeals. Section 6330(a) expands in several
respects upon the premise of section 6331(d), forbidding
collection by levy until the taxpayer has received notice of the
opportunity for administrative review of the matter in the form
of a hearing before the IRS Office of Appeals. Section 6330(b)
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grants a taxpayer who so requests the right to a fair hearing
before an impartial Appeals officer.
Section 6330(c) addresses the matters to be considered at
the hearing:
SEC. 6330(c). Matters Considered at Hearing.--In
the case of any hearing conducted under this section--
(1) Requirement of investigation.--The
appeals officer shall at the hearing obtain
verification from the Secretary that the
requirements of any applicable law or
administrative procedure have been met.
(2) Issues at hearing.--
(A) In general.--The person may raise at
the hearing any relevant issue relating to
the unpaid tax or the proposed levy,
including--
(i) appropriate spousal defenses;
(ii) challenges to the
appropriateness of collection actions;
and
(iii) offers of collection
alternatives, which may include the
posting of a bond, the substitution of
other assets, an installment agreement,
or an offer-in-compromise.
(B) Underlying liability.--The person
may also raise at the hearing challenges to
the existence or amount of the underlying tax
liability for any tax period if the person
did not receive any statutory notice of
deficiency for such tax liability or did not
otherwise have an opportunity to dispute such
tax liability.
Once the Appeals officer has issued a determination
regarding the disputed collection action, section 6330(d) allows
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the taxpayer to seek judicial review in the Tax Court or a U.S.
District Court, depending upon the type of tax. In considering
whether taxpayers are entitled to any relief from the
Commissioner’s determination, this Court has established the
following standard of review:
where the validity of the underlying tax liability is
properly at issue, the Court will review the matter on
a de novo basis. However, where the validity of the
underlying tax liability is not properly at issue, the
Court will review the Commissioner’s administrative
determination for abuse of discretion. [Sego v.
Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000).]
B. Analysis
1. Appeals Hearing
Hearings conducted under section 6330 are informal
proceedings, not formal adjudications. Katz v. Commissioner, 115
T.C. 329, 337 (2000); Davis v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 35, 41
(2000). There exists no right to subpoena witnesses or documents
in connection with section 6330 hearings. Roberts v.
Commissioner, 118 T.C. 365, 372 (2002), affd. 329 F.3d 1224 (11th
Cir. 2003); Nestor v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 162, 166-167 (2002);
Davis v. Commissioner, supra at 41-42. Taxpayers are entitled to
be offered a face-to-face hearing at the Appeals Office nearest
their residence. Where the taxpayer declines to participate in a
proffered face-to-face hearing, hearings may also be conducted by
telephone or correspondence. Katz v. Commissioner, supra at 337-
338; Dorra v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-16; sec. 301.6330-
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1(d)(2), Q&A-D6 and D7, Proced. & Admin. Regs. Furthermore, once
a taxpayer has been given a reasonable opportunity for a hearing
but has failed to avail himself or herself of that opportunity,
we have approved the making of a determination to proceed with
collection based on the Appeals officer’s review of the case
file. See, e.g., Taylor v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-25,
affd. 130 Fed. Appx. 934 (9th Cir. 2005); Leineweber v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-17; Armstrong v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2002-224; Gougler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-185;
Mann v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-48. Thus, a face-to-face
meeting is not invariably required.
Regulations promulgated under section 6330 likewise
incorporate many of the foregoing concepts, as follows:
Q-D6. How are CDP hearings conducted?
A-D6. * * * CDP hearings * * * are informal in
nature and do not require the Appeals officer or
employee and the taxpayer, or the taxpayer’s
representative, to hold a face-to-face meeting. A CDP
hearing may, but is not required to, consist of a face-
to-face meeting, one or more written or oral
communications between an Appeals officer or employee
and the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s representative, or
some combination thereof. * * *
Q-D7. If a taxpayer wants a face-to-face CDP
hearing, where will it be held?
A-D7. The taxpayer must be offered an opportunity
for a hearing at the Appeals office closest to
taxpayer’s residence or, in the case of a business
taxpayer, the taxpayer’s principal place of business.
If that is not satisfactory to the taxpayer, the
taxpayer will be given an opportunity for a hearing by
correspondence or by telephone. If that is not
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satisfactory to the taxpayer, the Appeals officer or
employee will review the taxpayer’s request for a CDP
hearing, the case file, any other written
communications from the taxpayer (including written
communications, if any, submitted in connection with
the CDP hearing), and any notes of any oral
communications with the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s
representative. Under such circumstances, review of
those documents will constitute the CDP hearing for the
purposes of section 6330(b). [Sec. 301.6330-1(d)(2),
Q&A-D6 and D7, Proced. & Admin. Regs.]
This Court has cited the above regulatory provisions, and
corresponding promulgations under section 6320, with approval.
See, e.g., Taylor v. Commissioner, supra; Leineweber v.
Commissioner, supra; Dorra v. Commissioner, supra; Gougler v.
Commissioner, supra.
With respect to the instant matter, the record reflects that
petitioner was provided with an opportunity for a face-to-face
hearing on April 10, 2003. The hearing did not proceed when
petitioner was not permitted to record the meeting. As explained
in our previous order in this case, in Keene v. Commissioner, 121
T.C. 8, 19 (2003), this Court held that taxpayers are entitled,
pursuant to section 7521(a)(1), to audio record section 6330
hearings. The taxpayer in that case had refused to proceed when
denied the opportunity to record, and we remanded the case to
allow a recorded Appeals hearing. Id.
In contrast, again as noted in our November 17, 2004, order,
we have distinguished, and declined to remand, cases where the
taxpayer had participated in an Appeals Office hearing, albeit
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unrecorded, and where all issues raised by the taxpayer could be
properly decided from the existing record. E.g., id. at 19-20;
Frey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-87; Durrenberger v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-44; Brashear v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2003-196; Kemper v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-195.
Stated otherwise, cases will not be remanded to Appeals, nor
determinations otherwise invalidated, merely on account of the
lack of a recording when to do so is not necessary and would not
be productive. See, e.g., Frey v. Commissioner, supra;
Durrenberger v. Commissioner, supra; Brashear v. Commissioner,
supra; Kemper v. Commissioner, supra; see also Lunsford v.
Commissioner, 117 T.C. 183, 189 (2001). A principal scenario
falling short of the necessary or productive standard exists
where the taxpayers rely on frivolous or groundless arguments
consistently rejected by this and other courts. See, e.g., Frey
v. Commissioner, supra; Brashear v. Commissioner, supra; Kemper
v. Commissioner, supra.
Because no hearing had been conducted at all in petitioner’s
case, we declined to grant respondent’s motion for summary
judgment. The record as it then existed did not foreclose the
possibility that petitioner might have raised valid arguments had
a hearing been held. Accordingly, we provided petitioner an
opportunity before the Court at the trial session in Las Vegas to
identify any legitimate issues he wished to raise that could
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warrant further consideration of the merits of his case by the
Appeals Office or this Court. Petitioner, however, merely
continued to focus on the denial of a recorded hearing and
offered no substantive issues of merit.
Hence, despite repeated warnings and opportunities, the only
contentions other than the recorded hearing advanced by
petitioner are, as will be further discussed below, of a nature
previously rejected by this and other courts. The record
therefore does not indicate that any purpose would be served by
remand or additional proceedings. The Court concludes that all
pertinent issues relating to the propriety of the collection
determination can be decided through review of the materials
before it.
2. Review of Underlying Liabilities
With respect to 1999, a statutory notice of deficiency was
issued to petitioner, and he has at no time alleged that he did
not receive the notice. He did not timely petition this Court
for redetermination when he had the opportunity to do so.
Accordingly, petitioner is precluded under section 6330(c)(2)(B)
from disputing his underlying liability for 1999 in this
proceeding.
With respect to 1998, because the assessments were based on
petitioner’s filed return, no notice of deficiency was issued.
However, to the extent that petitioner might be entitled to
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challenge his underlying liability under the rationale of
Montgomery v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 1, 9 (2004),5 he has at no
time offered even a scintilla of evidence that would show error
in respondent’s determinations. Since he did not address
computation of his 1998 tax liability either at trial or on
brief, even a de novo review would not avail petitioner.
Moreover, he has now forfeited his chance to suggest any
meritorious issues worthy of remand.
3. Review for Abuse of Discretion
Petitioner has also made various arguments relating to
aspects of the assessment and collection procedures that we
review for abuse of discretion. Action constitutes an abuse of
discretion under this standard where arbitrary, capricious, or
without sound basis in fact or law. Woodral v. Commissioner, 112
T.C. 19, 23 (1999).
Federal tax assessments are formally recorded on a record of
assessment in accordance with section 6203. The Commissioner is
not required to use Form 23C in making an assessment. Roberts v.
Commissioner, 118 T.C. at 369-371. Furthermore, section
6330(c)(1) mandates neither that the Appeals officer rely on a
particular document in satisfying the verification requirement
nor that the Appeals officer actually give the taxpayer a copy of
the verification upon which he or she relied. Craig v.
5
Cf. Farley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-168.
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Commissioner, 119 T.C. 252, 262 (2002); Nestor v. Commissioner,
118 T.C. at 166.
A Form 4340, Certificate of Assessments, Payments and Other
Specified Matters, for instance, constitutes presumptive evidence
that a tax has been validly assessed pursuant to section 6203.
Davis v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. at 40 (and cases cited thereat).
Consequently, absent a showing by the taxpayer of some
irregularity in the assessment procedure that would raise a
question about the validity of the assessments, a Form 4340
reflecting that tax liabilities were assessed and remain unpaid
is sufficient to support collection action under section 6330.
Id. at 40-41. We have specifically held that it is not an abuse
of discretion for an Appeals officer to rely on Form 4340, Nestor
v. Commissioner, supra at 166; Davis v. Commissioner, supra at
41, or a computer transcript of account, Schroeder v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-190; Mann v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2002-48, to comply with section 6330(c)(1).
Here, the record contains Forms 4340 for 1998 and 1999,
indicating that assessments were made for each of these years and
that taxes remain unpaid. Petitioner has cited no irregularities
that would cast doubt on the information recorded thereon.
In addition to the specific dictates of section 6330, the
Secretary, upon request, is directed to furnish to the taxpayer a
copy of pertinent parts of the record of assessment setting forth
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the taxpayer’s name, the date of assessment, the character of the
liability assessed, the taxable period, if applicable, and the
amounts assessed. Sec. 6203; sec. 301.6203-1, Proced. & Admin.
Regs. A taxpayer receiving a copy of Form 4340 has been provided
with all the documentation to which he or she is entitled under
section 6203 and section 301.6203-1, Proced. & Admin. Regs.
Roberts v. Commissioner, supra at 370 n.7. This Court likewise
has upheld collection actions where taxpayers were provided with
literal transcripts of account (so-called MFTRAX). See, e.g.,
Frank v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-88; Swann v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2003-70. The February 20, 2003, letter to petitioner
from the Appeals officer stated that copies of “transcripts
showing the contested assessments” would be available for
petitioner. The Court concludes that petitioner’s complaints
regarding the assessments and verification are meritless.
Petitioner has denied receiving the notice and demand for
payment that section 6303(a) establishes should be given within
60 days of the making of an assessment. However, a notice of
balance due constitutes a notice and demand for payment within
the meaning of section 6303(a). Craig v. Commissioner, supra at
262-263. The Forms 4340 indicate that petitioner was sent
notices of balance due for each of the tax years involved.
Thus, with respect to those issues enumerated in section
6330(c)(2)(A) and subject to review in collection proceedings for
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abuse of discretion, petitioner has not raised any spousal
defenses, valid challenges to the appropriateness of the
collection action, or collection alternatives. As this Court has
noted in earlier cases, Rule 331(b)(4) states that a petition for
review of a collection action shall contain clear and concise
assignments of each and every error alleged to have been
committed in the notice of determination and that any issue not
raised in the assignments of error shall be deemed conceded. See
Lunsford v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. at 185-186; Goza v.
Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 183 (2000). For completeness, we
have addressed various points advanced by petitioner during the
administrative process and this litigation, but the items listed
in section 6330(c)(2)(A) were not pursued in any proceedings.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that respondent’s determination
to proceed with collection of petitioner’s tax liabilities was
not an abuse of discretion.
II. Section 6673 Penalty
Section 6673(a)(1) authorizes the Court to require the
taxpayer to pay a penalty not in excess of $25,000 when it
appears to the Court that, inter alia, proceedings have been
instituted or maintained by the taxpayer primarily for delay or
that the taxpayer’s position in such proceeding is frivolous or
groundless. In Pierson v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. at 581, we
warned that taxpayers abusing the protections afforded by
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sections 6320 and 6330 through the bringing of dilatory or
frivolous lien or levy actions will face sanctions under section
6673. We have since repeatedly disposed of cases premised on
arguments akin to those raised herein summarily and with
imposition of the section 6673 penalty. See, e.g., Craig v.
Commissioner, supra at 264-265 (and cases cited thereat).
With respect to the instant matter, we are convinced that
petitioner instituted this proceeding primarily for delay.
Throughout the administrative and pretrial process, petitioner
advanced contentions and demands previously and consistently
rejected by this and other courts. He submitted communications
quoting, citing, using out of context, and otherwise misapplying
portions of the Internal Revenue Code, regulations, Supreme Court
decisions, and other authorities. While his procedural stance
concerning recording was correct, he ignored the Court’s explicit
warning that any further proceedings would be justified only in
the face of relevant and nonfrivolous issues.
Moreover, petitioner was, on multiple occasions, expressly
alerted to the potential use of sanctions in his case. Yet he
appeared at the trial session in Las Vegas without any legitimate
evidence or argument in support of his position. He instead
continued to espouse those positions that had been explicitly
addressed and rejected in this Court’s order of November 17,
2004, or in other cases previously decided by the Court. The
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Court sua sponte concludes that a penalty of $3,000 should be
awarded to the United States in this case. To reflect the
foregoing,
An appropriate decision
will be entered.