T.C. Memo. 2005-153
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
RANDY S. QUIGLEY, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 7752-04L. Filed June 23, 2005
Randy S. Quigley, pro se.
Russell K. Stewart, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
CHIECHI, Judge: This case is before the Court on respon-
dent’s motion for summary judgment and to impose a penalty under
section 66731 (respondent’s motion). We shall grant respondent’s
motion.
1
All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in
effect at all relevant times. All Rule references are to the Tax
Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
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Background
The record establishes and/or the parties do not dispute the
following.
Petitioner resided in Harleysville, Pennsylvania, at the
time he filed the petition in this case.
On or about April 11, 2000, petitioner filed a Federal
income tax (tax) return for his taxable year 1999 (1999 return).
In his 1999 return, petitioner reported total income of $0 and
total tax of $0 and claimed a refund of $4,168.99 of tax with-
held.2 Petitioner attached to his 1999 return Form W-2, Wage and
Tax Statement, reporting wages, tips, and other compensation of
$58,436.12. Petitioner also attached a document to his 1999
return (petitioner’s attachment to his 1999 return) that con-
tained statements, contentions, arguments, and requests that the
Court finds to be frivolous and/or groundless.3
On July 29, 2002, respondent issued to petitioner a notice
2
Respondent treated petitioner’s 1999 return as a “math
error” return under sec. 6213(b)(2)(A) and issued a “math error”
letter to petitioner. Thereafter, although respondent had not
issued a notice of deficiency to petitioner with respect to his
taxable year 1999, respondent assessed a tax of $11,038 for that
year. An officer with respondent’s Appeals Office determined
that respondent improperly assessed the tax of $11,038 for
petitioner’s taxable year 1999, and respondent abated that tax.
3
Petitioner’s attachment to his 1999 return is very similar
to the documents that certain other taxpayers with cases in the
Court attached to their respective returns. See, e.g., Copeland
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-46; Smith v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2003-45.
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of deficiency (notice of deficiency) with respect to his taxable
year 1999, which he received. In that notice, respondent deter-
mined a deficiency in, and an accuracy-related penalty under
section 6662(a) on, petitioner’s tax for his taxable year 1999 in
the respective amounts of $11,038 and $2,207.60.4
Petitioner did not file a petition in the Court with respect
to the notice of deficiency relating to his taxable year 1999.
Instead, on October 22, 2002, in response to the notice of
deficiency, petitioner sent a letter (petitioner’s October 22,
2002 letter) to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) that contained
statements, contentions, arguments, and requests that the Court
finds to be frivolous and/or groundless.5
On February 3, 2003, respondent assessed petitioner’s tax
for his taxable year 1999.6 (We shall refer to that unpaid
assessed amount, as well as interest as provided by law, as
petitioner’s unpaid liability for 1999.)
Respondent issued to petitioner the notice and demand for
payment required by section 6303(a) with respect to petitioner’s
4
Thereafter, respondent conceded that petitioner is not
liable for the accuracy-related penalty under sec. 6662(a).
5
Petitioner’s October 22, 2002 letter is very similar to the
types of letters that certain other taxpayers with cases in the
Court sent to the IRS in response to the respective notices of
deficiency that respondent issued to them. See, e.g., Copeland
v. Commissioner, supra; Smith v. Commissioner, supra.
6
See supra note 4.
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unpaid liability for 1999.
On or about July 4, 2003, respondent issued to petitioner a
final notice of intent to levy and notice of your right to a
hearing (notice of intent to levy) with respect to petitioner’s
taxable year 1999. On or about July 25, 2003, in response to the
notice of intent to levy, petitioner filed Form 12153, Request
for a Collection Due Process Hearing (Form 12153), and requested
a hearing with respondent’s Appeals Office (Appeals Office) with
respect to his taxable year 1999. Petitioner attached a document
to his Form 12153 (petitioner’s attachment to Form 12153) that
contained statements, contentions, arguments, and requests that
the Court finds to be frivolous and/or groundless.7
In response to petitioner’s Form 12153 and petitioner’s
attachment to Form 12153, an Appeals officer with the Appeals
Office (Appeals officer) sent a letter to petitioner on January
5, 2004 (Appeals officer’s January 5, 2004 letter), which stated
in pertinent part:
Please note that during my preliminary review of your
“Request for a Due Process Hearing” and other documents
written by you, it was observed that you are raising
points that are frivolous and without merit.
7
Petitioner’s attachment to Form 12153 contained statements,
contentions, arguments, and requests that are similar to the
statements, contentions, arguments, and requests contained in the
attachments to respective Forms 12153 filed with the IRS by
certain other taxpayers who commenced proceedings in the Court.
See, e.g., Flathers v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-60; Copeland
v. Commissioner, supra.
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Please be advised the courts have consistently and
repeatedly rejected the arguments expressed in your
letters and in many cases have imposed sanctions. In
Pierson v. Commissioner [Dec. 54, 152], * * * [115 T.C.
576 (2000)], the Court issued fair warning of penalties
under section 6673 to all those taxpayers who, in the
future, institute or maintain a lien or levy action
primarily for delay or whose position in such a pro-
ceeding is frivolous or groundless and has in fact
imposed a penalty in a number of such cases. (Please
see enclosed Exhibit A) [list of cases showing imposi-
tion of section 6673]
Pursuant to Sections 6320 and 6330 of the Internal
Revenue Code, Section 6320(c) discusses matters consid-
ered at the hearing. Section 6330(c)(2)(B) precludes
any challenge to the underlying liability, at the
hearing, for any period, if the person received a
statutory notice of deficiency or otherwise had an
opportunity to dispute the liabilities.
The Appeals officer enclosed with the Appeals officer’s January
5, 2004 letter a copy of a TXMODA transcript with respect to
petitioner’s taxable year 1999.
On February 4, 2004, petitioner sent a letter (petitioner’s
February 4, 2004 letter) to respondent’s Appeals Office, which
stated in pertinent part:
In my numerous responses to the IRS I have re-
quested to have a hearing, as provided for in proce-
dures and Regulations (601.105(b)(1) thru
601.105(d)(2)(i)) but as of yet I have been offered
none. Now for exact purpose that the ‘Restructuring
and Reform Act of 1998' was enacted into law, I am
again being denied.
A hearing as called for in IRC Sec 6330(b)(1) “if
the person requests a hearing under subsection
(a)(3)(B), such hearing shall be held by the Internal
Revenue Service Office of Appeals.”. Further more in
the US District Court Case of ‘MESA OIL, INC., Plain-
tiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant. Civil
Action No. 00-B-851', Nov. 21, 2000 wherein I quote
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“Tax Law: Federal Tax Administration & Procedure: Tax
Liabilities & Credits: Levy & Distraint (IRC secs.
6331-6344, 7429) With respect to a hearing concerning
the proposed levy of a taxpayer’s property, the tax-
payer is to have a meaningful hearing, followed by
judicial review. IRC Sec 6330(d)(1)(B).”. A hearing
where I can present evidence, ask questions and view
the verification documents called for in the law.
[Reproduced literally.]
In response to petitioner’s February 4, 2004 letter and a
prior telephone call that petitioner made on a date not disclosed
by the record, the Appeals officer sent a letter to petitioner on
February 6, 2004 (Appeals officer’s February 6, 2004 letter),
which stated in pertinent part:
I’ve received your call and letter requesting a face-
to-face Hearing. The items that you mention in your
CDP request are items that:
• Courts have determined are frivolous or
groundless, or
• Appeals does not consider. These are moral,
religious, political, constitutional, consci-
entious, or similar grounds.
Examples of arguments that are considered frivolous or
groundless are provided in “The Truth About Frivolous
Tax Arguments” on the IRS Internet website at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/friv tax.pdf. It is not
a complete list of frivolous and groundless arguments.
I previously provided a list of cases in the Collection
Due Process forum in which the arguments you are rais-
ing were considered frivolous and irrelevant.
Appeals does not provide a face-to-face conference if
the only items you wish to discuss are those mentioned
above. You may, however, have a telephone conference
or discuss with us by correspondence any relevant
challenges to the filing of the notice of federal tax
lien or the proposed levy.
If you are still interested in receiving a face-to-face
conference, you must be prepared to discuss issues
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relevant to paying your tax liability. These include,
for example, offering other ways to pay the taxes you
owe, such as an installment agreement or offer in
compromise. The Internal Revenue Manual determines
whether Appeals can accept your proposal. If you wish
to have a face-to-face conference, please write me
within 15 days from the date of this letter or February
23, 2004 and describe the legitimate issues you will
discuss.
Petitioner did not respond to the Appeals officer’s February 6,
2004 letter.
On April 8, 2004, the Appeals Office issued to petitioner a
notice of determination concerning collection action(s) under
section 6320 and/or 6330 (notice of determination). The notice
of determination stated in pertinent part:
Summary of Determination
• A review of the administrative file
indicated that all statutory and admin-
istrative requirements that needed to be
met with respect to the Notice of Intent
to Levy being issued were in fact met in
your case.
• All relevant issues raised by you were
addressed.
• You suggested no collection alterna-
tives.
• IRC Sections 6320 and 6330 require that
the Appeals Officer consider whether any
collection action balance the need for
efficient tax collection with the legit-
imate concern that any collection action
be no more intrusive than necessary.
The proposed levy action appears appro-
priate in that your liabilities are
based on your non-compliance with the
tax laws and that you continue attempt-
ing to circumvent the tax system with
various time worn frivolous arguments.
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An attachment to the notice of determination stated in
pertinent part:
Legal and Procedural Requirements
* * * * * * *
This Appeals Officer has had no prior involvement with
respect to these liabilities; all relevant legal and
procedural requirements were reviewed and verified as
being met also no spousal issues are applicable.
Validity of the Assessment
The assessments for all tax years and liabilities
therein are valid. Various transcripts were reviewed
and all assessments were appropriate. For the Income
Tax liability for tax year 1999 you were issued a
Notice of Deficiency on 7/29/2003 [sic]. You did not
petition the Tax Court for re-determination and the tax
was appropriately assessed by default procedures.
Based on the above[,] Section 6330(c)(2)(B) precludes
any challenge to the underlying liability, at the
hearing, for any period, if the person received a
statutory notice of deficiency or otherwise had an
opportunity to dispute the liabilities. For the income
tax liability you received the Notice of Deficiency.
* * * * * * *
Challenges to the Appropriateness of the Collection
Actions
Your only challenge to the appropriateness of the
collection actions is documented in your request for
the hearing and other documents received by the Ser-
vice. Those challenges are submitted below in perti-
nent part:
• Quotations form [sic] Senator Roth’s
book “The Power to Destroy” specifically
page 73;
• Disputes the validity of the “Final
Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of
your Right to a Hearing” pursuant to IRC
6330, because no one signed it.
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• Verification from the Secretary that the
requirements of any applicable law or
administrative procedure have been met.
Transcripts of any kind are not accept-
able. And any claims that the court
have held that an unsigned, computer
printout satisfies the legal require-
ments will no [sic] be acceptable. That
an Appeals Officer “shall hew to the
law”, in accordance with Reg. 601.106(f)
that there is no Treasury Regulation
that state [sic] the appeals officers
“shall hew to court decisions”;
• Proof of Notice and Demand and proof
that it is a statutory notice and demand
via a Treasury Decision or Regulation;
• There is no underlying liability -- That
“The index of the IR Code lists some 60
taxes under the caption “Liability for
tax”; however he can find no entry for
“income taxes”;
• One (nonsensical) excuse the appeals
officer might offer is that the underly-
ing liability is not at issue due to the
fact that the taxpayer received a Notice
of Deficiency. The notice is invalid
since it was prepared and sent by a
Service Center Employee and it must be
sent and determined by the Secretary
unless there is a delegation authority
to do so IRC Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B) does not
apply;
• Citation from Federal Crop Insurance v.
Merrill, 332 U.S. 380;
• Disputes the existence of an Income Tax
Liability -- The Tax Court not being a
court of law -- has no jurisdiction to
consider such a question;
• There is no statute requiring him to pay
the income taxes;
* * * * * * *
None of the above arguments are relevant for purposes
of the hearing.
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Collection Alternatives Considered
You have not suggested any viable alternatives. On
January 5, 2004 (note: typo error on letter has 2003)
you were sent a contact letter informing you that the
hearing was being conducted by correspondence and
telephone, you were advised that your irrelevant,
frivolous, meritless arguments were not acceptable and
that the hearing was being limited to discussions of
alternatives to the proposed levy. You were further
notified that you were not in compliance with the
filing of your 2000, 2001, and 2002 tax returns. You
were directed to forward completed returns for these
years along with financial statements.
In response you wrote a letter dated February 4, 2004
insisting upon a “hearing where I can present evidence,
ask questions and view the verification documents
called for in the law. Awaiting your response for the
date and time of such in person hearing.”
On February 6, 2004 this Appeals Officer responded to
your correspondence informing you of the conditions
under which you would be given an in person hearing,
otherwise we would continue with correspondence or by
telephone. You did not respond to this letter.
Balancing Efficient Collection and Intrusiveness
IRC Sec. 6330 requires that the Appeals Officer con-
sider whether any collection action balance the need
for efficient tax collection with the legitimate con-
cern that any collection action be no more intrusive
than necessary. The levy action is appropriate in that
you have only made time worn arguments against the tax
laws to evade the payment of tax nor are you in compli-
ance with the filing of your returns. It is inappro-
priate to allow you to ignore his [sic] tax obligations
any longer.
Petitioner filed a petition with the Court with respect to
the notice of determination relating to petitioner’s unpaid
liability for 1999. The petition contained statements, conten-
tions, arguments, and requests that the Court finds to be frivo-
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lous and/or groundless.8
Discussion
The Court may grant summary judgment where there is no
genuine issue of material fact and a decision may be rendered as
a matter of law. Rule 121(b); Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner,
98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), affd. 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994). We
conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact
regarding the questions raised in respondent’s motion.
Petitioner did not file a petition with the Court with
respect to the notice of deficiency that respondent issued to him
relating to his taxable year 1999. Where, as is the case here,
the validity of the underlying tax liability is not properly
placed at issue, the Court will review the determination of the
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue for abuse of discretion.
Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000); Goza v. Commis-
sioner, 114 T.C. 176, 182 (2000).
As was true of, inter alia, petitioner’s 1999 return,
petitioner’s attachment to his 1999 return, petitioner’s attach-
ment to Form 12153, and the petition, petitioner’s position in
petitioner’s response to respondent’s motion (petitioner’s
8
The frivolous and/or groundless statements, contentions,
arguments, and requests in petitioner’s petition are similar to
the frivolous and/or groundless statements, contentions, argu-
ments, and requests in respective petitions filed by certain
other taxpayers with cases in the Court. See, e.g., Copeland v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-46.
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response) is frivolous and/or groundless.9
Based upon our examination of the entire record before us,
we find that respondent did not abuse respondent’s discretion in
determining to proceed with the collection action as determined
in the notice of determination with respect to petitioner’s
unpaid liability for 1999.
In respondent’s motion, respondent requests that the Court
require petitioner to pay a penalty to the United States pursuant
to section 6673(a)(1). Section 6673(a)(1) authorizes the Court
to require a taxpayer to pay to the United States a penalty in an
amount not to exceed $25,000 whenever it appears to the Court,
inter alia, that a proceeding before it was instituted or main-
tained primarily for delay, sec. 6673(a)(1)(A), or that the
taxpayer’s position in such a proceeding is frivolous or ground-
less, sec. 6673(a)(1)(B).
In Pierson v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 576 (2000), we issued
an unequivocal warning to taxpayers concerning the imposition of
a penalty under section 6673(a)(1) on those taxpayers who abuse
the protections afforded by sections 6320 and 6330 by instituting
9
The statements, contentions, arguments, and requests set
forth in petitioner’s response are similar to the statements,
contentions, arguments, and requests set forth in the respective
responses by certain other taxpayers with cases in the Court to
the motions for summary judgment and to impose a penalty under
sec. 6673 filed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in such
other cases. See, e.g., Smith v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-
45.
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or maintaining actions under those sections primarily for delay
or by taking frivolous or groundless positions in such actions.
In the Appeals officer’s January 5, 2004 letter, the Appeals
officer advised petitioner that “the courts have consistently and
repeatedly rejected the arguments expressed in your letters and
in many cases have imposed sanctions.” In that letter, the
Appeals officer also advised petitioner of the holding in Pierson
v. Commissioner, supra, and provided petitioner with a list of
other cases in which a penalty under section 6673(a)(1) had been
imposed. Nonetheless, in the instant case, petitioner alleged in
the petition and advances in petitioner’s response, we believe
primarily for delay, frivolous and/or groundless statements,
contentions, arguments, and requests, thereby causing the Court
to waste its limited resources. We shall impose a penalty on
petitioner pursuant to section 6673(a)(1) in the amount of
$1,000.
We have considered all of petitioner’s statements, conten-
tions, arguments, and requests that are not discussed herein, and
we find them to be without merit and/or irrelevant.10
10
We shall, however, address one of petitioner’s contentions
in petitioner’s response. Petitioner contends in petitioner’s
response that the Appeals officer refused “to afford petitioner
the CDP hearing". On the record before us, we disagree. In the
Appeals officer’s February 6, 2004 letter, the Appeals officer
informed petitioner that “If you wish to have a face-to-face
conference, please write me within 15 days from the date of this
letter * * * and describe the legitimate issues you will dis-
(continued...)
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On the record before us, we shall grant respondent’s motion.
To reflect the foregoing,
An order granting respondent’s
motion and decision for respondent
will be entered.
10
(...continued)
cuss.” Petitioner did not respond to that letter. Even if
respondent’s Appeals officer had not offered petitioner an
Appeals Office hearing, on the instant record we would hold that
(1) it is not necessary and will not be productive to remand this
case to the Appeals Office for a hearing under sec. 6330(b), see
Lunsford v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 183, 189 (2001), and (2) it is
not necessary or appropriate to reject respondent’s determination
to proceed with the collection action as determined in the notice
of determination with respect to petitioner’s unpaid liability
for 1999, see id.