T.C. Memo. 2005-207
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
DANIEL R. ALLEMEIER, JR., Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 19320-03. Filed August 31, 2005.
Daniel R. Allemeier, Jr., pro se.
Hans F. Famularo and Loren B. Mark, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
KROUPA, Judge: Respondent determined a $4,8721 deficiency
in petitioner’s Federal income tax for 2001 and a $974 accuracy-
1
All monetary amounts have been rounded to the nearest
dollar.
- 2 -
related penalty. After concessions,2 the issues for decision
are:
1. Whether petitioner may deduct expenses incurred to earn
a master’s degree in business administration (MBA). We hold that
he may deduct education-related, but not parking, expenses.
2. Whether petitioner substantiated $40 in tax preparation
fees and $2,460.86 in non-educational unreimbursed employee
business expenses. We hold that he did not.
3. Whether petitioner is liable for the section 66623
accuracy-related penalty for 2001. We hold that he is not.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The parties have stipulated some facts. The stipulation of
facts and the accompanying exhibits are incorporated by this
reference and are so found. Petitioner resided in Pacific Grove,
California, at the time he filed his petition.4
2
Petitioner conceded $833.14 of $17,500 that he claimed as
education “business expenses” on Form 2016-EZ, Unreimbursed
Employee Business Expenses. Petitioner also conceded a $1,174
State income tax refund that he did not report on his return for
2001. Sec. 111. Respondent conceded the balance of the State
income tax refund determined in the 2001 deficiency notice.
3
All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in
effect for the year in issue, and all Rule references are to the
Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, unless otherwise
indicated.
4
Petitioner has lived in Las Vegas, Nev., since August 2004.
He telecommutes to work.
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Petitioner has been a Selane Products, Inc.5 (Selane
Products) employee since 1996. Selane Products is an orthodontic
and pediatric laboratory that specializes in making removable
orthodontic appliances. It employed about 75 people at the time
of trial and is located in Chatsworth, California.
When Selane Products hired petitioner, it needed salespeople
with expertise to sell a newly manufactured mouth guard.
Petitioner, with his educational background in sports medicine,
was an ideal fit.
Initially, petitioner was hired part-time as a salesperson
to sell a single product, a protective mouthguard. His job
titles at the time were “Sports Medicine Consultant” and
“Director of Intact Mouthguards.” The following year, in 1997,
petitioner graduated from Wingate University with a bachelor’s
degree in sports medicine and began to work for Selane Products
full-time. Petitioner’s responsibilities ranged from making
sales calls by phone and managing small budgets to working
directly with dentists and athletic trainers to educate them on
the importance of properly fitted mouth guards.
5
Selane Products is composed of four divisions. First, the
Space Maintainers Laboratory fabricates custom dental appliances.
Second, the Smile Foundation provides doctors educational and
marketing opportunities. Third, Second Opinion provides
diagnostic services. Fourth, Success Essentials supplies the
dentistry products.
- 4 -
By all accounts, petitioner excelled in his duties at Selane
Products, and in a few years he became a leading salesman for the
company. Dr. Rob Veis (Dr. Veis), chief executive officer of
Selane Products and petitioner’s boss, testified that petitioner
had “incredible potential,” was a “quick learner,” and had
“excellent business skills.” As a promising young employee,
petitioner was rewarded with additional responsibilities.
While originally hired to sell a single product,
petitioner’s duties expanded to encompass other dentistry
products and services of Selane Products. For instance,
petitioner was tasked with designing marketing strategies to sell
company products, organizing informational seminars, and
traveling extensively to meet new staff, set up seminars, and
promote Selane Products in talks he delivered at dentistry-
related conventions.6 Petitioner performed these duties before
obtaining a graduate degree.
Petitioner decided to pursue an MBA about 3 years into his
employment with Selane Products. Dr. Veis7 told petitioner that
pursuing the MBA would speed his advancement within the company
and enhance his business skills. Selane Products, however, had a
6
Selane Products did not reimburse petitioner for any of the
expenses he incurred.
7
In September 2004, Dr. Veis wrote a letter stating, in
effect, that Selane Products had encouraged petitioner to pursue
the MBA because it would increase his ability to continue with
the company.
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strict policy of not reimbursing employees for education costs or
other business expenses. Nor did Selane Products require
petitioner to obtain the MBA.
Petitioner decided to pay for the MBA personally, and in
1999 he commenced studies at Pepperdine University. He finished
the degree in late 2001, the year at issue. His MBA
concentration was in business management, and his courses
included accounting for managers, statistics, managerial finance,
marketing management, quantitative methods, negotiation and
conflict resolution, organizational theory and management, and
business strategy.
Shortly after petitioner enrolled in, but before he
completed, the MBA program, he was promoted to several new
positions at Selane Products. Petitioner was promoted to
Marketing Manager, Managing Director of the Appliance Therapy
Practitioners Association, Head of the SMILE Foundation, Practice
Development Consultant, and Project Development Consultant. In
these new capacities, petitioner’s duties expanded and included
analyzing financial reports, designing action plans for sales,
and evaluating the effectiveness of marketing campaigns.8
8
An “employee profile” from Selane Products summarizes
petitioner’s work history as follows: (1) From 1996-1997,
petitioner worked in the marketing department in the position of
“Intact Sales”; (2) from 1998-2000, petitioner worked in the
marketing department in the position of “Sales/Marketing”; and
(3) from 2000 through 2003, petitioner worked in the sales
(continued...)
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Petitioner performed many of these same functions before he
earned his MBA. Petitioner remained a full-time employee of
Selane Products while in the MBA program.
Petitioner deducted his MBA-related expenses on his Schedule
A, Itemized Deductions, on Form 2016-EZ, Unreimbursed Employee
Business Expenses, which he timely filed along with his
electronic Federal income tax return for 2001. Petitioner also
incurred substantial business expenses traveling for Selane
Products that he deducted on his Schedule A.
Specifically, petitioner deducted $17,5009 of tuition
expenses and $231 of parking fees associated with his education.
In addition, petitioner deducted business-related expenses of
$104 in vehicle expenses, $1,091 in travel expenses, and $113 in
meal expenses. Petitioner also deducted $40 of tax preparation
fees on his Schedule A.
Respondent disallowed petitioner’s deductions and mailed him
a deficiency notice on October 1, 2003. In the notice,
respondent determined a $4,872 deficiency and $974 accuracy-
related penalty under section 6662(a) for 2001. Petitioner filed
a timely petition.
8
(...continued)
management department in the position of “Sales/Marketing.”
9
See infra note 15.
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OPINION
Respondent disallowed the claimed employee business expenses
and determined that petitioner was liable for an accuracy-related
penalty. Petitioner asserts that he may deduct MBA-related
expenses and other non-education business expenses, and that he
is not liable for the penalty because he acted with reasonable
cause and in good faith in taking the deductions. We address
each issue in turn. We begin with the burden of proof.
A. Burden of Proof
At trial, the Court found, and petitioner conceded, that
petitioner failed to comply with reasonable requests by
respondent for witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and
interviews.10 See Snyder v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-255
(citing H. Conf. Rept. 105-599, at 240-241 (1998), 1998-3 C.B.
747, 994-995). Accordingly, section 7491(a) does not shift the
burden of proof to respondent, and petitioner bears the burden to
10
This burden may shift to the Commissioner to disprove
entitlement to a claimed deduction if the taxpayer introduces
“credible evidence” complete with the necessary substantiation
and documentation sufficient to fulfill the sec. 7491(a)
requirements. See Snyder v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-255
(citing H. Conf. Rept. 105-599, at 240-241 (1998), 1998-3 C.B.
747, 994-995). We held at trial that petitioner did not meet his
sec. 7491(a) obligations because he missed several meetings with
respondent and failed to respond to several inquiries.
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prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he qualified for
the claimed deductions.11
B. Whether Petitioner May Deduct His MBA Educational Expenses
We first determine whether petitioner’s MBA-related expenses
qualify as deductible business expenses. A taxpayer may deduct
all ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on a trade or business. Sec. 162(a).
Educational expenses, specifically, are deductible if the
education maintains or improves skills required by the individual
in his or her employment or other trade or business or meets the
express requirements of the individual’s employer. Sec. 1.162-
5(a)(1) and (2), Income Tax Regs.
No deduction is allowed, however, if the taxpayer’s expense
is for education that enables him or her to meet the minimum
educational requirements for qualification in his or her
employment or if the education leads to qualifying the taxpayer
for a new trade or business. Sec. 1.162-5(b)(2) and (3), Income
Tax Regs.
11
The Commissioner’s determinations in a deficiency notice
are presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of
proving otherwise. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S.
111, 115 (1933). Deductions are generally a matter of
legislative grace, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving
he or she is entitled to the claimed deductions. INDOPCO, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v.
Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).
- 9 -
Because the parties agree that the MBA improved petitioner’s
skills, we focus on whether the MBA met the minimum education
requirement of Selane Products or qualified petitioner for a new
trade or business. In other words, petitioner’s MBA-related
expenses are not deductible if the MBA was a condition precedent
to his employment. Nor are the expenses deductible if the MBA
qualified petitioner for a new trade or business, regardless of
his intent to enter a new trade or business, and regardless of
whether his duties significantly changed after he obtained the
MBA. Robinson v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 550, 556-557 (1982);
Bodley v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1357, 1360 (1971); Jungreis v.
Commissioner, 55 T.C. 581, 591 (1970); Schwerm v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1986-16; sec. 1.162-5(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.
1. Whether the MBA Met Minimum Education Requirements of
Selane Products
Determining whether an employee meets the minimum education
requirement typically means that an employee must have a
particular degree before being hired or obtain the degree within
a certain period after being hired. See sec. 1.162-5(b)(2)(iii),
Examples (1), (2), and (3), Income Tax Regs. Here, respondent
argues that Selane Products had a minimum education requirement,
not for petitioner to begin employment but for petitioner to be
promoted after he was hired, and that requirement was for
petitioner to obtain an MBA. We disagree.
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We first note that the parties both stipulated on the record
that Selane Products did not expressly require that petitioner
obtain an MBA to continue employment with Selane Products.12 We
must determine, therefore, whether Selane Products conditioned
promotions, rather than employment generally, on petitioner
beginning the MBA program.
Petitioner’s boss at Selane Products strongly encouraged him
to obtain the MBA. Petitioner’s boss also speculated that
petitioner might advance faster within Selane Products with the
MBA. The record does not support respondent’s contention,
however, that petitioner’s promotions were contingent on his
beginning the MBA program. Encouraging petitioner to obtain the
MBA and speculating that he might advance faster with the MBA is
not tantamount to a requirement that petitioner obtain the MBA.
Moreover, we decline to find that a minimum education requirement
existed merely because petitioner’s promotions happened to
coincide with his enrollment in the MBA program.
We find no evidence in the record that petitioner was
required to begin the MBA program to receive the promotions at
issue. Nor do we discern that a requirement existed on the facts
12
Inexplicably, while a letter in evidence emphatically
states that “Daniel R. Allemeier, Jr. is in fact required to earn
a graduate degree in order to maintain employment with Selane
Products, Inc.,” the parties stipulated: “An MBA did not meet an
express requirement of Selane Products as a condition to
petitioner’s retention with Selane Products.”
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and circumstances, particularly where petitioner was promoted
before he completed the MBA program. We hold therefore that
neither petitioner’s enrollment in the MBA program nor his
completion of the program met a minimum education requirement of
Selane Products. The more difficult question, rather, is whether
the MBA qualified petitioner for a new trade or business.
2. Whether the MBA Qualified Petitioner for a New Trade or
Business
We must next determine whether petitioner’s MBA qualified
him to perform a trade or business that he was unqualified to
perform before he earned the MBA. Whether an education qualifies
a taxpayer for a new trade or business depends upon the tasks and
activities he or she was qualified to perform before the
education and those that he or she was qualified to perform
afterwards. See Glenn v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 270, 275 (1974);
Weiszmann v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 1106, 1110 (1969), affd. per
curiam 443 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1971). The Court has repeatedly
disallowed education expenses where the education qualifies the
taxpayer to perform “significantly” different tasks and
activities. Browne v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 723, 726 (1980)
(citing Diaz v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 1067, 1074 (1978), affd.
without published opinion 607 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1979)); Glenn v.
Commissioner, supra. The relevant inquiry is whether the
taxpayer is objectively qualified in a new trade or business.
See Robinson v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 550, 554-556 (1982); Glenn
- 12 -
v. Commissioner, supra; Weiler v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 398, 401-
402 (1970); sec. 1.162-5, Income Tax Regs.
Respondent claims that petitioner’s evolving duties and
promotions after he enrolled in the MBA program demonstrate that
petitioner was qualified for and indeed entered a new trade or
business at Selane Products once he began the MBA program.
Respondent argues that petitioner’s trade or business before the
MBA was principally sales related and involved only limited
managerial and financial duties, but that once petitioner began
the MBA program he advanced to numerous other jobs and was given
advanced managerial, marketing, and financial duties, all of
which were “significantly” different from the duties he performed
before enrolling. In sum, respondent argues that the MBA
qualified petitioner for the specific new trade or business of
“advanced marketing and finance management.”
Petitioner disagrees and argues that the MBA enhanced and
maintained skills he already used in his job, but did not qualify
him for a new trade or business or for any particular promotions.
Petitioner argues that the MBA merely capitalized on his
abilities that he had before beginning the program, giving him a
better understanding of financials, costs analyses, marketing,
and advertising. After careful consideration, we agree with
petitioner.
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Petitioner was hired by Selane Products for his experience
in sports medicine, and he was hired, at first, to sell a sports-
related product. Petitioner excelled in his duties and was
rewarded with increased responsibility, including management,
marketing, and finance-related tasks. The record establishes
that he performed these myriad tasks before he enrolled in the
MBA program. Once he enrolled, but before he finished the MBA
program, he was promoted to new positions involving more complex
tasks, but still involving the same marketing, finance, and
management duties.
Simply acquiring new titles or abilities does not
necessarily constitute the entry into a new trade or business.
See Glenn v. Commissioner, supra. The “commonsense approach”,
rather, requires that a comparison be made between the types of
activities that the taxpayer was qualified to perform before
acquiring a particular title or degree with those that he or she
was qualified to perform afterwards. Reisinger v. Commissioner,
71 T.C. 568, 574 (1979); Davis v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1014,
1019 (1976); Glenn v. Commissioner, supra; Weiszmann v.
Commissioner, supra at 1109. If the activities are significantly
different, then the educational expenses are disallowable. Glenn
v. Commissioner, supra. This is an objective test. Diaz v.
Commissioner, 70 T.C. 1067, 1073 (1978); Taubman v. Commissioner,
60 T.C. 814, 817 (1973); see sec. 1.162-5, Income Tax Regs.
- 14 -
Petitioner’s business after enrolling in the MBA program did
not significantly change. After completing the MBA program,
petitioner established with testimony that his business involved
the same general activities that he performed before enrolling in
the program, activities involving sales, marketing, and
management. While petitioner was awarded with new positions and
titles after he enrolled in the program and while the MBA may
have sped his advancement within Selane Products, the basic
nature of his duties did not significantly change. The MBA
rather improved preexisting skills that petitioner used before
enrolling in the MBA program.
We also distinguish our facts from cases involving taxpayers
embarking on a course of study that qualified them for a
professional certification or license. Courts considering those
factors have often found that the education expenses were not
deductible, even where the taxpayer performed many of the same
activities before the education. For instance, the Court denied
taxpayers’ deduction for law school expenses on four occasions
because law was a field of study that led the taxpayers to
qualify for the new trade or business of being an attorney. See
Bodley v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1357 (1971); Weiler v.
Commissioner, supra; Weiszmann v. Commissioner, supra at 1110-
1111; Galligan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-150, affd. 61
- 15 -
Fed. Appx. 314 (8th Cir. 2003).13 Petitioner’s MBA was not a
course of study leading him to qualify for a professional
certification or license.
We find two cases particularly instructive. On one
occasion, our Court considered whether an MBA degree qualified a
taxpayer for a new trade or business. See Blair v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1980-488. In that case, the taxpayer was employed as
a personnel manager while taking courses toward an MBA. We found
that the taxpayer was entitled to deduct tuition expenses because
the courses improved the taxpayer’s job skills and did not
qualify the taxpayer for a new trade or business.14 Id.
13
Courts have found similarly where the course of study led
taxpayers to qualify for professional certifications. For
instance, the Court has found that a licensed public accountant
is in a different trade or business from a certified public
accountant. See Glenn v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 270, 275 (1974).
The Court has also found that a pharmacist intern is in a
different trade or business from a registered pharmacist, even
where they each perform many of the same tasks and activities.
See Antzoulatos v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1975-327.
14
We denied deductions for MBA expenses in two other cases
on the basis that the taxpayer had not already been established
in a trade or business. See Link v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 460,
463-464 (1988), affd. 869 F.2d 1491 (6th Cir. 1989); Schneider v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1983-753; cf. Sherman v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1977-301. This is distinguishable from our case where
petitioner had worked for Selane Products prior to and throughout
the MBA program. In addition, our facts are distinguishable from
a case in which we denied MBA expense deductions where the
taxpayer’s duties were technical before enrolling in the MBA
program and managerial afterwards. See McIlvoy v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1979-248; see also Hudgens v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1997-33 (managing assets in a trust company differs significantly
from researching tax issues and preparing tax returns for an
(continued...)
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Similarly, in another case before our Court, we held that a
taxpayer was allowed to deduct the educational expenses
associated with a master of science degree in administration
where the studies provided the taxpayer with a broad general
background in management and business administration, activities
that were already components of the taxpayer’s work activities.
See Beatty v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1980-196. As in Blair and
Beatty, petitioner’s MBA courses provided him with a general
background to perform tasks and activities that he had performed
previously at Selane Products.
We also decline to find as an objective matter that the MBA
qualified petitioner in a “new” trade or business, where
petitioner had substantial work experience directly related to
his MBA coursework. See Robinson v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 550,
554-556 (1982); Glenn v. Commissioner, supra at 275; Weiler v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 398, 401-402 (1970); sec. 1.162-5, Income
Tax Regs. The MBA qualified petitioner to perform the same
general duties he performed before enrolling in the MBA program.
Accordingly, we find that petitioner’s MBA did not meet a
minimum education requirement of Selane Products. Nor do we find
that the MBA qualified petitioner to perform a new trade or
14
(...continued)
accounting firm).
- 17 -
business. Petitioner therefore may deduct the amount of MBA
tuition expenses that he substantiated.15
C. Whether Petitioner Adequately Substantiated Tax Preparation
Fees and Unreimbursed Employee Business Expenses
We next address whether petitioner may deduct non-education
expenses and tax preparation fees. Taxpayers do not have an
inherent right to take deductions. Deductions are a matter of
legislative grace, and taxpayers must establish their right to
take them. Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940); New
Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).
Taxpayers must substantiate any deductions and bear the burden of
substantiation. Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 89-90
(1975), affd. per curiam 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976).
In addition to the substantiation requirements for ordinary
and necessary business expenses, taxpayers are subject to more
stringent substantiation requirements for certain expenses. See
secs. 162(a), 274(d). For instance, taxpayers must strictly
substantiate the nature and amount of the meal, travel, and
vehicle expenses. See sec. 274(d). For these expenses, a
taxpayer must maintain adequate records or produce sufficient
evidence to corroborate his or her statements to substantiate the
15
Our finding pertains only to $15,745 in tuition-related
expenses and not $231 in parking fees petitioner associates with
his education, which he failed to substantiate. Petitioner
originally deducted $17,500 in tuition expenses, which respondent
later reduced to $15,745, without objection.
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amount, time and place, and business purpose of the expense, as
well as the business relationship to the taxpayer of the persons
involved in the claimed expenses. Id. (flush language).
Adequate records require the taxpayer to maintain a diary, a log,
or a similar record, and documentary evidence that, in
combination, are sufficient to establish each element of each
expenditure or use. Sec. 1.274-5T(c)(2)(i), Temporary Income Tax
Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46017 (Nov. 6, 1985). A record must
generally be written contemporaneously with the expenditure.
Sec. 1.274-5T(c)(2)(ii)(A), Temporary Income Tax Regs., supra.
Against this background, we now analyze whether petitioner
satisfied substantiation requirements for his claimed deductions.
Overall, petitioner claimed $17,500 in business expenses of
which he conceded $833. Of the remaining $16,667, $15,745 was
attributable to the tuition expenses that petitioner
substantiated, for which we granted a deduction. The remaining
amounts are $922 in miscellaneous business expenses, $40 in tax
preparation fees, $104 in vehicle expenses, $1,091 in travel
expenses, and $113 in meal expenses.
Petitioner contends that he lost records supporting expense
deductions for the tax preparation fees and miscellaneous
business expenses. He has failed to reconstruct adequately those
records or otherwise corroborate those items. These expenses are
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therefore unsubstantiated and disallowed.16 See secs. 162(a),
212(1); Hradesky v. Commissioner, supra at 89-90.
As for the meal, travel, and vehicle expenses that require
strict substantiation, respondent contends that petitioner failed
to substantiate strictly $1,091 in travel expenses and $113 in
meal expenses. Respondent argues that while petitioner
documented his payment of some of the amounts charged, he
substantiated neither the “business purpose” of the expenses nor
the “business relationship” to him of any persons entertained.
We agree that petitioner has not strictly substantiated these
expenses.
Petitioner frequently traveled on business and incurred meal
and travel expenses, which his employer did not reimburse.17 Yet
petitioner substantiated only the time and amount of certain of
these expenses, and of those amounts he did not adequately
establish the business relationship between the expenses and his
business for Selane Products. See sec. 274(d) (flush language).
Petitioner substantiated certain expenses with credit card
receipts and a personal calendar. While some of those expenses
coincided with business functions, petitioner did not explain the
16
Petitioner gave us no basis to apply the Cohan rule to
estimate his expenses. See Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540,
543-544 (2d Cir. 1930).
17
Petitioner incurred the vehicle expenses for travel
between two Selane Products buildings.
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business relationship between the charges and the trade or
business of Selane Products.18 For example, petitioner’s credit
card statement listed a charge for “Tavern on the Green” on
November 29, which coincided with a calendar notation for
“greater New York Dental Meeting.” We do not know with whom
petitioner dined, whether the dinner had a business purpose, or
the nature of the relationship, if any, between the person
entertained and petitioner’s work for Selane Products.
Petitioner’s credit card statement also listed a charge for
“Monterey Plaza Hotel” on October 29, which coincided with a
calendar notation for “Monterey Meeting.” We are left to
speculate as to the nature and business purpose of the Monterey
Plaza charge.
For these charges, petitioner was subject to stricter
substantiation requirements than for his general business
expenses. We find that petitioner has failed to satisfy those
requirements. Accordingly, we sustain respondent’s
determinations regarding petitioner’s unreimbursed business
expenses.
18
Credit card receipts reflect that petitioner paid $671.87,
$231.40, and $100.50 for a hotel, rental car, and airline fare,
which coincided with a business convention. Petitioner similarly
substantiated that he paid $130.33 and $116.66 in restaurant
charges during another business convention.
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D. Whether Petitioner Is Liable for Accuracy-Related
Penalties Under Section 6662(a)
Respondent determined that petitioner is liable for an
accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) with respect to
the underpayment attributable to petitioner’s claimed business
expenses. We disagree.
Respondent has the burden of production under section
7491(c) and must come forward with sufficient evidence that it is
appropriate to impose the penalty. See sec. 7491(c); Higbee v.
Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446-447 (2001). The accuracy-related
penalty under section 6662(a) does not apply to any portion of an
underpayment, however, if it is shown that there was reasonable
cause for, and that the taxpayer acted in good faith with respect
to, that portion. Sec. 6664(c)(1); sec. 1.6664-4(b), Income Tax
Regs. The determination of whether the taxpayer acted with
reasonable cause and in good faith depends on the pertinent facts
and circumstances, including the taxpayer’s efforts to assess his
or her proper tax liability and the knowledge and experience of
the taxpayer. Sec. 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.
We do not find petitioner liable for a penalty on the
underpayment attributable to the business expenses. Petitioner
prevailed on the tuition expenses he substantiated. As for the
remaining expenses, petitioner established at trial that he
incurred substantial business expenses for which he was not
reimbursed. Were it not for a loss of records in moves
- 22 -
petitioner made in the years leading up to trial, we believe that
petitioner could have substantiated many of the deductions.
Moreover, petitioner contemporaneously recorded the time and
amount of several business expenses. Though the records were
insufficient to meet the strict substantiation requirements, we
find that he acted with reasonable cause and in good faith in
taking the deductions. Secs. 162(a), 274(d). Accordingly, we
decline to impose a penalty upon petitioner.
In reaching our holding, we have considered all arguments
made, and, to the extent not mentioned, we conclude that they are
moot, irrelevant, or without merit. To reflect the foregoing and
the concessions of the parties,
Decision will be entered
under Rule 155.