T.C. Summary Opinion 2005-135
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
TRACIE YOUNG, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 6276-04S. Filed September 14, 2005.
Tracie Young, pro se.
James R. Rich, for respondent.
GOLDBERG, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant
to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in
effect at the time the petition was filed. The decision to be
entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion
should not be cited as authority. Unless otherwise indicated,
subsequent section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in
effect for the year in issue, and all Rule references are to the
Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
- 2 -
This case arises from a request for relief under section
6015 with respect to petitioner’s 1995 taxable year. Respondent
determined that petitioner was not entitled to any relief under
section 6015. Petitioner timely filed a petition under section
6015(e)(1) seeking review of respondent’s determination.
The issue for decision is whether respondent’s denial of
petitioner’s request for relief pursuant to section 6015 was an
abuse of discretion.
Background
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
The stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are
incorporated herein by this reference. Petitioner resided in
Greenville, North Carolina, on the date the petition was filed in
this case.
Petitioner and her former spouse, John E. Glaze, Jr. (Mr.
Glaze), were married in 1993. Mr. Glaze was employed as a truck
driver who was on the road for long periods of time. For the
taxable year 1995, Mr. Glaze received wage income from Melton
Truck Lines and Mayflower Transit, Inc. (Mayflower) of $12,666.01
and $36,400, respectively.
During 1995, petitioner was employed as a nurse by Scottish
Rite Children’s Medical Center (Scottish Rite). Petitioner
received wages from Scottish Rite for taxable year 1995 of
$14,715.16.
- 3 -
During 1995, petitioner and Mr. Glaze maintained a joint
checking account. Both petitioner and Mr. Glaze deposited their
respective income into the joint checking account. Petitioner
occasionally reviewed the bank statements regarding their joint
checking account and used the joint checking account to pay joint
household expenses.
Petitioner knew that Mr. Glaze drove a truck for Mayflower
and knew he was receiving wage income from Mayflower. Also,
during 1995, petitioner received gifts from Mr. Glaze, one of
which was $500 that she used as a downpayment for the purchase of
a 1984 Toyota Corolla.
On October 18, 1996, petitioner and Mr. Glaze delinquently
filed their 1995 joint Federal income tax return. On their Form
1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, petitioner and Mr. Glaze
reported wage income of $27,382.1 Petitioner and Mr. Glaze also
reported $35,831 in unreimbursed employee business expenses on
their 1995 joint income tax return. However, petitioner and Mr.
Glaze failed to report: (1) $36,400 of wage income received by
Mr. Glaze from Mayflower; and (2) $24 of interest income received
jointly by petitioner and Mr. Glaze from the U.S. Treasury.
Petitioner and Mr. Glaze’s 1995 joint income tax return
reported a refund due of $2,265. Petitioner and Mr. Glaze
1
This amount consists of petitioner’s wage income received
from Scottish Rite and Mr. Glaze’s wage income received from
Melton Truck Lines, rounded to the nearest dollar.
- 4 -
received the refund in full, and petitioner used the moneys from
the refund to pay joint household liabilities.
Petitioner and Mr. Glaze’s 1995 joint income tax return was
prepared by Jackson Hewitt Tax Service. Petitioner “took all the
information from my [petitioner’s] tax return from Scottish Rite
Hospital, and the information that he [Mr. Glaze] had given me
from his tax returns” to the Jackson Hewitt Tax Service Center.
Petitioner reviewed the 1995 joint income tax return before
filing it with the Internal Revenue Service. Both petitioner and
Mr. Glaze voluntarily signed their 1995 joint income tax return.
On November 21, 1997, respondent issued petitioner and Mr.
Glaze a notice of deficiency for taxable year 1995, in which
respondent determined that they had unreported income of $36,424
and were liable for an income tax deficiency of $8,237, an
addition to tax pursuant to section 6651(a)(1) of $1,493, and an
accuracy-related penalty pursuant to section 6662 of $1,647.
Neither petitioner nor Mr. Glaze filed a petition with this Court
with respect to the notice of deficiency. Accordingly, on or
about April 6, 1998, respondent assessed the tax liability,
addition to tax, and the accuracy-related penalty that were
reflected in the notice of deficiency for taxable year 1995.
Petitioner and Mr. Glaze were divorced on May 26, 1999, by a
divorce decree entered by the Circuit Court of Shelby County,
Tennessee. The divorce decree refers to a “written Marital
- 5 -
Dissolution Agreement” which provides for a settlement of
property rights of the parties. Petitioner has not provided
respondent, respondent’s counsel, or this Court with a copy of
the aforesaid agreement.
On or about April 1, 2002, respondent applied petitioner’s
2001 Federal income tax refund of $2,434 toward petitioner and
Mr. Glaze’s 1995 income tax liability.
On June 3, 2002, petitioner filed a Form 8857, Request for
Innocent Spouse Relief, with respondent, requesting innocent
spouse relief with respect to the 1995 taxable year. On February
25, 2003, respondent issued petitioner a letter advising her of
the preliminary determination denying relief from liability on
the 1995 joint return. On March 29, 2004, respondent sent
petitioner a letter advising her of the final determination
denying her relief from liability for the deficiency, addition to
tax, and penalty for the 1995 taxable year. On April 12, 2004,
petitioner filed a petition with this Court for review of
respondent’s determination denying her request for relief from
joint and several liability with respect to the 1995 tax year.
Discussion
In general, taxpayers filing a joint Federal income tax
return are each responsible for the accuracy of their return and
are jointly and severally liable for the entire tax liability due
for that year. Sec. 6013(d)(3); Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C.
- 6 -
276, 282 (2000). In certain circumstances, however, a spouse may
obtain relief from joint and several liability by satisfying the
requirements of section 6015.
Section 6015 applies to tax liabilities arising after July
22, 1998, and to tax liabilities arising on or before July 22,
1998, that remain unpaid as of such date. Internal Revenue
Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206,
sec. 3201(g), 112 Stat. 740. In the present case, petitioner and
Mr. Glaze’s tax liabilities arose during taxable year 1995.
However, these liabilities remained unpaid as of July 22, 1998;
therefore, section 6015 applies to the case at bar. See
Washington v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 137, 155 (2003).
Section 6015(a)(1) provides that a spouse who has made a
joint return may elect to seek relief from joint and several
liability under section 6015(b) (dealing with relief from
liability for an understatement of tax on a joint return).
Section 6015(a)(2) provides that a spouse who is eligible to do
so may elect to limit that spouse’s liability for any deficiency
with respect to a joint return under section 6015(c). Relief
from joint and several liability under section 6015(b) or (c) is
available only with respect to a deficiency for the year for
which relief is sought. Sec. 6015(b)(1)(D) and (c)(1); see H.
Conf. Rept. 105-599, at 252-254 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. 747, 1006-
1008. If relief is not available under either section 6015(b) or
- 7 -
(c), an individual may seek equitable relief under section
6015(f), which may be granted by the Commissioner in his
discretion.
In this case, petitioner contends that she is entitled to
full relief from liability under section 6015.2 Our jurisdiction
to review petitioner’s request for relief is conferred by section
6015(e), which allows a spouse who has requested relief from
joint and several liability to contest the Commissioner’s denial
of relief by filing a timely petition in this Court. We address
petitioner’s request for relief under subsections (b), (c), and
(f) of section 6015 in turn.
A. Section 6015(b)
Section 6015(b)(1) authorizes the Commissioner to grant
relief from joint and several liability if the taxpayer satisfies
each requirement of subparagraphs (A) through (E). Section
6015(b)(1) provides:
2
Presumably, petitioner’s claim for relief includes a refund
of her 2001 overpayment of $2,434 which the Commissioner applied
toward petitioner and Mr. Glaze’s 1995 income tax liability.
Sec. 6015(g) governs the allowance of credits and refunds in
cases where the taxpayer is granted relief under sec. 6015.
Except as provided otherwise in sec. 6015(g) and in secs. 6511,
6512(b), 7121, and 7122, a credit or refund is allowed or made to
the extent attributable to the application of sec. 6015. Sec.
6015(g)(1). A tax credit or refund is allowed only if petitioner
qualifies for innocent spouse relief under sec. 6015(b) or if the
Internal Revenue Service exercises its authority to provide
equitable relief pursuant to sec. 6015(f). No credit or refund
is allowed where a taxpayer obtains relief after making a
separate liability election. See sec. 6015(g)(3).
- 8 -
SEC. 6015(b). Procedures for Relief From Liability
Applicable to All Joint Filers.--
(1) In general.--Under procedures prescribed by
the Secretary, if--
(A) a joint return has been made for a
taxable year;
(B) on such return there is an understatement
of tax attributable to erroneous items of one
individual filing the joint return;
(C) the other individual filing the joint
return establishes that in signing the return
he or she did not know, and had no reason to
know, that there was such understatement;
(D) taking into account all the facts and
circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the other
individual liable for the deficiency in tax for
such taxable year attributable to such
understatement; and
(E) the other individual elects (in such form
as the Secretary may prescribe) the benefits of
this subsection not later than the date which is 2
years after the date the Secretary has begun
collection activities with respect to the
individual making the election,
then the other individual shall be relieved of
liability for tax (including interest, penalties, and
other amounts) for such taxable year to the extent such
liability is attributable to such understatement.
The requirements of section 6015(b)(1) are stated in the
conjunctive. Therefore, if the requesting spouse fails to meet
any one of them, she does not qualify for relief. Alt v.
Commissioner, 119 T.C. 306, 313 (2002), affd. 101 Fed. Appx. 34
(6th Cir. 2004). Except as provided by section 6015, the
requesting spouse bears the burden of proving that she satisfies
- 9 -
each requirement of section 6015(b)(1). See Rule 142(a). We
find that petitioner fails to meet the requirement of section
6015(b)(1)(C); therefore, we need not, and do not, decide whether
petitioner satisfies the other requirements of section
6015(b)(1).
Pursuant to section 6015(b)(1)(C), petitioner must
establish that she did not know and further had no reason to know
of the understatement in tax on the joint return which she filed
with her husband. This Court has held that “where a spouse
seeking relief has actual knowledge of the underlying transaction
that produced the omitted income, innocent spouse relief is
denied.” Cheshire v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 183, 192-193 (2000),
affd. 282 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2002).
In the present case, petitioner and Mr. Glaze maintained a
joint checking account. Both petitioner and Mr. Glaze deposited
their respective wage income into said joint checking account.
Petitioner occasionally reviewed the bank statements regarding
their joint checking account, and she personally used moneys from
the joint checking account to pay joint household expenses.
Further, petitioner knew that Mr. Glaze drove trucks for
Mayflower and knew he was receiving wages from Mayflower.
Petitioner also reviewed the 1995 joint income tax return before
filing it with the Internal Revenue Service.
- 10 -
Upon the basis of the facts of the present case, we find
that petitioner was well aware of the income received by Mr.
Glaze from Mayflower for his services, and that such income was
not reported as gross income on their 1995 joint Federal income
tax return. Therefore, we conclude that petitioner may not claim
that she did not have knowledge of the income received by Mr.
Glaze.
Further, petitioner had actual knowledge of the interest
income received from the U.S. Treasury of $24, because such
income was jointly received in the names of both petitioner and
Mr. Glaze. Accordingly, we hold that petitioner is not entitled
to relief under section 6015(b).
B. Section 6015(c)
Section 6015(c) grants relief from joint and several tax
liability for electing individuals who filed a joint return and
are no longer married, are legally separated, or are living
apart. Generally, this type of relief treats spouses, for
purposes of determining tax liability, as if separate returns had
been filed. Sec. 6015(d)(3)(A); Grossman v. Commissioner, 182
F.3d 275, 278 (4th Cir. 1999), affg. T.C. Memo. 1996-452;
Charlton v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 333, 342 (2000); Rowe v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-325. The allocation, however, is
not permitted if the Secretary shows by a preponderance of the
evidence that the electing individual had “actual knowledge, at
- 11 -
the time such individual signed the return, of any item giving
rise to a deficiency (or portion thereof) which is not allocable
to such individual”. Sec. 6015(c)(3)(C); Culver v. Commissioner,
116 T.C. 189, 194-195 (2001); Cheshire v. Commissioner, supra at
193-194.
Respondent argues that petitioner had actual knowledge of
the unreported income because: (1) She had access to the
proceeds of Mr. Glaze’s wage income from Mayflower in the joint
checking account; (2) she occasionally reviewed the bank
statements regarding their joint checking account; (3) she used
moneys from Mr. Glaze’s wage income to pay joint household
expenses; and (4) the interest income received from the U.S.
Treasury was received jointly by petitioner and Mr. Glaze.
In the present case, “the knowledge standard for purposes of
section 6015(c)(3)(C) is an actual and clear awareness * * * of
the existence of an item which gives rise to the deficiency”.
Cheshire v. Commissioner, supra at 195.
Petitioner is not entitled to relief from joint and several
liability under section 6015(c). As discussed above, petitioner
had actual knowledge of the $24 of interest income. Also, as
discussed above, petitioner was fully aware of all the underlying
factual circumstances concerning the wage income received by Mr.
Glaze from Mayflower. See Cheshire v. Commissioner, supra.
Consequently, petitioner had actual knowledge of the factual
- 12 -
basis for the unreported income, and she cannot rely on ignorance
of the law for relief from liability. Mitchell v. Commissioner,
292 F.3d 800, 805 (D.C. Cir. 2002), affg. T.C. Memo. 2000-332.
C. Section 6015(f)
Therefore, the only remaining opportunity for relief
available to petitioner is section 6015(f). Section 6015(f)
provides as follows:
SEC. 6015(f). Equitable Relief.--Under procedures
prescribed by the Secretary, if-–
(1) taking into account all the facts and
circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the
individual liable for any unpaid tax or any
deficiency (or any portion of either); and
(2) relief is not available to such individual
under subsection (b) or (c),
the Secretary may relieve such individual of such liability.
As directed by section 6015(f), the Commissioner has
prescribed guidelines in Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447,3 to
be considered in determining whether an individual qualifies for
relief under section 6015(f). Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01,
2000-1 C.B. at 448, lists threshold conditions which must be
3
This revenue procedure was superseded by Rev. Proc. 2003-
61, 2003-2 C.B. 296. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296, is
effective either for requests for relief filed on or after Nov.
1, 2003, or for requests for which no preliminary determination
letter was issued as of Nov. 1, 2003. In the present case, the
request for relief was filed on June 3, 2002, and the preliminary
determination letter was issued on Feb. 25, 2003; therefore, Rev.
Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447 is applicable in the present
situation.
- 13 -
satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for
relief under section 6015(f). Respondent concedes that
petitioner meets these threshold conditions for equitable
innocent spouse relief.
Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03, 2000-1 C.B. at 448, lists
nonexclusive factors that the Commissioner will consider in
determining whether, taking into account all the facts and
circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the requesting spouse
liable for all or part of the unpaid income tax liability
or deficiency, and full or partial equitable relief under section
6015(f) should be granted. Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03(1),
provides that the following factors weigh in favor of the
Commissioner’s granting equitable relief: (1) Marital status,
(2) economic hardship, (3) abuse, (4) no knowledge or reason to
know, (5) nonrequesting spouse’s legal obligation, and (6)
attributable to nonrequesting spouse. Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec.
4.03(2), 2000-1 C.B. at 449, provides that the following factors
weigh against the Commissioner’s granting equitable relief: (1)
Attributable to requesting spouse, (2) knowledge, or reason to
know, (3) significant benefit, (4) lack of economic hardship, (5)
noncompliance with Federal income tax laws, and (6) requesting
spouse’s legal obligation. Further, Rev. Proc. 2000-15, supra,
provides that no single factor will be determinative, but that
- 14 -
all relevant factors, regardless of whether the factor is listed
in Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03, will be considered and weighed.
To prevail under section 6015(f), petitioner must show that
respondent’s denial of equitable relief from joint liability
under section 6015(f) was an abuse of discretion. See Washington
v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. at 146; Jonson v. Commissioner, 118
T.C. 106, 125 (2002) (citing Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. at
292), affd. 353 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir. 2003). Action constitutes
an abuse of discretion under this standard where it is arbitrary,
capricious, or without sound basis in fact or law. Woodral v.
Commissioner, 112 T.C. 19, 23 (1999). The question of whether
respondent’s determination was arbitrary, capricious, or without
sound basis in fact is a question of fact. Cheshire v.
Commissioner, 115 T.C. at 198. In deciding whether respondent’s
determination that petitioner is not entitled to relief under
section 6015(f) was an abuse of discretion, we consider evidence
relating to all the facts and circumstances.
Respondent contends: (1) Petitioner voluntarily signed the
1995 joint Federal income tax return which reported gross income
of $27,382; (2) the proceeds of Mr. Glaze’s wage income from
Mayflower were put into a joint checking account to which
petitioner had access; (3) petitioner obtained benefits due to
Mr. Glaze’s wage income received from Mayflower through the use
of those moneys to pay off household expenses; (4) petitioner
- 15 -
would not suffer economic hardship if the Service did not grant
relief from the income tax liability; (5) petitioner had actual
knowledge that in 1995, Mr. Glaze worked for and received income
from Mayflower; and (6) petitioner had actual knowledge of the
$24 of interest income received jointly by petitioner and Mr.
Glaze from the United States Treasury. Respondent asserts that
these factors weigh against granting relief to petitioner. We
now address each of the factors of Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03,
separately.
1. Marital Status
During 1995, petitioner and Mr. Glaze were married and
resided in the same household; however, Mr. Glaze was frequently
away from home driving a truck for Melton Truck Lines and
Mayflower. Petitioner and Mr. Glaze were divorced on May 26,
1999. This factor weighs in favor of granting relief to
petitioner.
2. Economic Hardship
Respondent contends that petitioner offered no evidence that
she would suffer economic hardship if relief were denied.
Pursuant to section 301.6343-1(b)(4)(ii), Proced. & Admin. Regs.,
economic hardship exists if a levy will cause a taxpayer to be
unable to pay his/her reasonable basic living expenses.
Respondent maintains that respondent’s collection activity would
- 16 -
not leave petitioner unable to pay her basic living expenses.4 In
addition, respondent asserts that petitioner provided no
documentation to contradict these contentions or to demonstrate
an economic hardship.
It appears from the record that petitioner earns sufficient
income and has assets such that she would not experience economic
4
Sec. 301.6343-1(b)(4)(ii), Proced. & Admin. Regs.,
provides:
(ii) Information from taxpayer. In determining a reasonable
amount for basic living expenses the director will consider
any information provided by the taxpayer including–-
(A) The taxpayer’s age, employment status and history,
ability to earn, number of dependents, and status as a
dependent of someone else;
(B) The amount reasonably necessary for food, clothing,
housing, (including utilities, home-owner insurance,
home-owner dues, and the like), medical expenses
(including health insurance), transportation, current
tax payments (including federal, state, and local),
alimony, child support, or other court-ordered
payments, and expenses necessary to the taxpayer’s
production of income (such as dues for a trade union or
professional organization, or child care payments which
allow the taxpayer to be gainfully employed);
(C) The cost of living in the geographic area in which
the taxpayer resides;
(D) The amount of property exempt from levy which is
available to pay the taxpayer’s expenses;
(E) Any extraordinary circumstances such as special
education expenses, a medical catastrophe, or natural
disaster; and
(F) Any other factor that the taxpayer claims bears on
economic hardship and brings to the attention of the
director.
- 17 -
hardship if required to pay some or all of the tax deficiency.
Petitioner has not entered into evidence any documentation or
testimony to contradict the above claims or the determination of
respondent; therefore, we find that petitioner will not suffer
economic hardship if relief is not granted. This factor favors
denying relief.
3. Abuse
There is no evidence in the record that petitioner was
abused by Mr. Glaze. Spousal abuse is a factor listed in Rev.
Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03(1), that will weigh in favor of
equitable relief if found but will not weigh against equitable
relief if not present in a case. Therefore, this factor is
neutral.
4. Knowledge or Reason To Know
In the case of an income tax liability that arose from a
deficiency, the fact that the requesting spouse did not know and
had no reason to know of the item giving rise to the deficiency
is a factor in favor of granting relief. Rev. Proc. 2000-15,
sec. 4.03(1)(d). By contrast, the fact that the requesting
spouse knew or had reason to know of the item giving rise to the
deficiency is a factor weighing against relief. Rev. Proc. 2000-
15, sec. 4.03(2)(b).
- 18 -
Petitioner contends that she did not know and had no reason
to know that Mr. Glaze did not report his wage income received
from Mayflower.
However, as previously stated, petitioner voluntarily signed
the 1995 joint return and admitted that she did review the joint
return before filing. Petitioner and Mr. Glaze maintained a
joint checking account. Both petitioner and Mr. Glaze deposited
their respective income into said joint checking account.
Petitioner occasionally reviewed the bank statements regarding
their joint checking account. Petitioner personally used moneys
from the joint checking account to pay household expenses.
Further, petitioner knew that Mr. Glaze drove a truck for
Mayflower and knew he was receiving wage income from Mayflower.
Also, the interest income from the U.S. Treasury was received in
both petitioner’s and Mr. Glaze’s names. Thus, petitioner knew
or had reason to know of the unreported income which gave rise to
the taxable year 1995 deficiency, addition to tax pursuant to
section 6651(a)(1), and the accuracy-related penalty pursuant to
section 6662. This factor favors denying relief to petitioner.
5. Nonrequesting Spouse’s Legal Obligation
As previously noted, petitioner and Mr. Glaze were divorced
on May 26, 1999, and a divorce decree was entered by the Circuit
Court of Shelby County, Tennessee. The divorce decree refers to
a “written Marital Dissolution Agreement” which provides for a
- 19 -
settlement of property rights of the parties. However,
petitioner has not provided respondent’s counsel or this Court
with a copy of the aforesaid agreement.
Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03(1)(e), indicates that if Mr.
Glaze had a legal obligation under the judgment for dissolution
of marriage to pay the tax liabilities, then that fact would
weigh in favor of granting relief to petitioner. Likewise, if
the judgment for dissolution of marriage had placed the
obligation to pay the taxes on petitioner, then that fact would
weigh against granting relief to her as indicated in Rev. Proc.
2000-15, sec. 4.03(2)(f). In the present case, the divorce
decree has not been offered into evidence. Thus, this is a
neutral factor.
6. Attributable to Nonrequesting Spouse
As previously stated, $36,400 of petitioner’s and Mr.
Glaze’s unreported income for taxable year 1995 is attributable
to wages earned through Mr. Glaze’s employment with Mayflower.
The additional $24 of interest income was received by petitioner
and Mr. Glaze in both their names and is therefore attributable
to both petitioner and Mr. Glaze. As to the $36,400 of
petitioner’s and Mr. Glaze’s unreported income for taxable year
1995, this factor favors granting petitioner equitable relief.
- 20 -
7. Significant Benefit
Respondent contends that petitioner received benefits from
the proceeds of Mr. Glaze’s wage income received from Mayflower
in the form of payment of joint household expenses.
Petitioner admitted at trial that she and Mr. Glaze were
personally liable for the household expenses which were paid by
the moneys received by Mr. Glaze as wage income from Mayflower.
Petitioner also testified at trial that during 1995 she received
gifts from Mr. Glaze, one of which was $500 that she used as a
downpayment for the purchase of a 1984 Toyota Corolla.
Therefore, we find that petitioner did benefit from the
unreported wage income received by Mr. Glaze from Mayflower.
8. Noncompliance With Federal Income Tax Laws
There is no evidence in the record as to this factor.
Therefore, we consider this factor neutral.
9. Conclusion
The factors that weigh against granting relief to petitioner
outweigh those factors favoring relief. Therefore, under these
facts and circumstances, we hold that respondent did not abuse
his discretion in denying equitable relief to petitioner under
section 6015(f).
- 21 -
Reviewed and adopted as the report of the Small Tax Case
Division.
Decision will be entered
for respondent.