T.C. Summary Opinion 2005-126
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
CAROLYN A. GLENN, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 9199-04S. Filed August 16, 2005.
Saul R. Sodos, for petitioner.
Tom D. Yang, for respondent.
GOLDBERG, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant
to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in
effect at the time the petition was filed. The decision to be
entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion
should not be cited as authority. Unless otherwise indicated,
subsequent section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in
effect for the year in issue, and all Rule references are to the
Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
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Respondent determined a deficiency of $16,584 in the joint
Federal income tax of petitioner and petitioner’s former spouse,
Timothy J. Glenn (Mr. Glenn),1 and an accuracy-related penalty of
$3,317 pursuant to section 6662(a) for the taxable year 2001.
After concessions, the issue for decision is whether
respondent abused his discretion in denying petitioner relief
from joint and several liability for the tax deficiency and
accuracy-related penalty pursuant to section 6015.2
Background
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
The stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are
incorporated herein by this reference. Petitioner resided in
Hoffman Estates, Illinois, on the date the petition was filed in
this case.
1
Timothy J. Glenn’s case at docket No. 7249-04S was tried
consecutively with petitioner’s case on this Court’s Chicago,
Illinois, session beginning Nov. 29, 2004. These cases were not
consolidated because of an objection by petitioner.
2
A joint notice of deficiency was mailed to petitioner and
Mr. Glenn on Feb. 25, 2004. Mr. Glenn filed a timely petition
with this Court on Apr. 26, 2004, at docket No. 7249-04S seeking
a redetermination of the deficiency relating to the additional
tax under sec. 72(t) and the accuracy-related penalty pursuant to
sec. 6662(a). Petitioner filed her petition on June 3, 2004.
This Court has no jurisdiction to redetermine the deficiency
related to the additional tax under sec. 72(t) nor the accuracy-
related penalty pursuant to sec. 6662(a) as to petitioner’s
petition because the petition for such redetermination would be
untimely.
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Petitioner and Mr. Glenn were married on July 8, 1989. For
taxable year 2001, petitioner and Mr. Glenn filed a timely joint
Federal income tax return. During the year in issue, petitioner
and Mr. Glenn were married and resided in the same household;
however, they occupied separate rooms in the household. Their
2001 Federal income tax return was signed and dated by both of
them on April 10, 2002. Petitioner and Mr. Glenn executed the
2001 return voluntarily. Petitioner had filed for divorce from
Mr. Glenn in October of 2001. They were divorced on November 13,
2002. Their judgment for dissolution of marriage provided:
That each party shall be responsible for the payment of all
credit card bills and all other debts in his or her name
alone. Each shall hold the other harmless and indemnify the
other from the respective indebtedness.
However, the judgment for dissolution of marriage did not address
payment of joint liabilities.
On their jointly filed 2001 tax return, petitioner and Mr.
Glenn reported wage income of $157,301, interest income of $350,
and total pension and annuity income of $165,838.3 Petitioner
and Mr. Glenn reported adjusted gross income of $323,489 and
claimed deductions of $31,811 on Schedule A, Itemized Deductions.
Their 2001 income tax return reported a total tax of $86,293 and
a net amount owed of $21,438 after reducing their total tax by
the amount of income tax withheld.
3
This amount is rounded to the nearest dollar.
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During the taxable year 2001, Mr. Glenn earned wages from
two sources: $58,502.61 from Ceridian Corp. from which
$11,122.24 of Federal income tax was withheld; and $74,219.76
from Kronos, Inc., from which $14,984.69 of Federal income tax
was withheld.
During the taxable year 2001, petitioner earned wages of
$24,577.99 from Community Unit School District #220, and Federal
income tax of $1,704.43 was withheld. Also during the tax year
2001, petitioner and Mr. Glenn received pension and annuity
income of $165,838 from Mr. Glenn’s section 401(k) plan account
held by Fidelity Investments from which $33,167.58 of Federal
income tax was withheld.
The $165,838 petitioner and Mr. Glenn reported as pension
and annuity income during the taxable year 2001 was a
distribution from Mr. Glenn’s section 401(k) plan maintained by
his employer, Kronos, Inc., through T. Rowe Price. Mr. Glenn had
been employed at Kronos, Inc., since 1988. This distribution was
made approximately in June of 2001. Mr. Glenn’s reasons for
requesting the distribution were that he was leaving Kronos,
Inc., and he and petitioner were considering divorce and wanted
to pay off outstanding bills to make their divorce “as simple as
possible”.
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Mr. Glenn received a check from Fidelity Investments in the
amount of $132,670.30.4 In August of 2001, Mr. Glenn deposited
$123,700 into his and petitioner’s joint checking account with
Harris Trust & Savings Bank.5 Mr. Glenn could not recall why the
whole amount of $132,670.30 was not deposited in the joint
checking account. Petitioner and Mr. Glenn had opened this joint
checking account before 1990. Mr. Glenn also deposited his
paychecks in the joint checking account. However, petitioner did
not deposit her paychecks into the joint checking account;
instead, she had a separate personal checking account where she
deposited her paychecks.
During the period from July 27 through December 31, 2001,
Mr. Glenn wrote checks totaling $66,082.07 drawn on the Harris
Trust & Savings Bank joint checking account as follows:
4
This amount represents the total sec. 401(k) distribution
of $165,838, less Federal income tax withheld of $33,167.58.
5
Mr. Glenn transferred $100,000 from the joint checking
account into a joint savings account which was also held with
Harris Trust & Savings Bank. Mr. Glenn transferred money from
the savings account to the checking account, as needed, to cover
checks written on and withdrawals from the checking account. Mr.
Glenn used the savings account to earn interest while the large
sum of money was not being used.
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Date Check No. Description Amount
7/27/2001 136 Payable to: Discover $2,700.00
8/1/2001 137 Payable to: Citibank 3,450.55
8/21/2001 147 Payable to: First USA 23,000.00
9/5/2001 164 Payable to: Citibank 6,938.63
9/5/2001 165 Payable to: Union Federal 27,701.51
9/29/2001 185 Payable to: First USA 1,215.40
10/24/2001 204 Payable to: First USA 1,075.98
Total 66,082.07
Both petitioner’s and Mr. Glenn’s names were on their credit
cards financed through Discover, Citibank, and First USA, and
both of their names were on the home mortgage note they received
from Union Federal. Therefore, petitioner and Mr. Glenn were
jointly liable for the credit card debts and home mortgage which
were paid by the above checks.
From the record, the remaining $57,617.93, which was
deposited into the joint savings and checking accounts, was not
readily traceable. However, on November 28, 2001, the balance in
the joint savings account was $57,878.32.
As stated previously, petitioner and Mr. Glenn reported
pension and annuity income of $165,838 on their joint Federal
income tax return for taxable year 2001. However, they did not
report on their 2001 joint Federal income tax return the 10-
percent additional tax imposed by section 72(t) on early
withdrawals from qualified retirement plans. Accordingly, on
February 25, 2004, respondent issued petitioner and Mr. Glenn a
notice of deficiency for taxable year 2001. In the notice of
deficiency, as previously stated, respondent determined that
petitioner and Mr. Glenn were liable for a tax deficiency of
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$16,584 because of their failure to report and pay the 10-percent
additional tax imposed by section 72(t) and that they were liable
for an accuracy related penalty pursuant to section 6662(a) of
$3,317.
Petitioner concedes that the total amount of $165,838 of
pension and annuity income reported on the return is subject to
the 10-percent additional tax under section 72(t) on early
withdrawals. After the date of the notice of deficiency, Mr.
Glenn tendered to respondent payment of $8,267, approximately
one-half of the amount of the 10-percent additional tax.
On August 31, 2003, petitioner filed a Form 8857, Request
for Innocent Spouse Relief, with respondent, requesting innocent
spouse relief with respect to the 2001 tax liability incurred as
a result of the 10-percent additional tax under section 72(t).
On December 18, 2003, respondent made a preliminary determination
that petitioner did not qualify for innocent spouse relief under
section 6015. On June 3, 2004, petitioner filed with the Court a
petition for determination of relief from joint and several
liability on a joint return with regard to her tax liability
incurred as a result of the 10-percent additional tax for the
taxable year 2001.
Petitioner contends that she is not liable for the unpaid
additional tax liability remaining from the early withdrawal and
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the accuracy-related penalty.6 According to petitioner, it was
Mr. Glenn’s sole responsibility to maintain their household
finances; she had no knowledge or control of their household
finances during tax year 2001 or prior years; she had no
knowledge of the existence of Mr. Glenn’s section 401(k) plan
maintained by his employer, Kronos, Inc., through T. Rowe Price;
she did not know that the proceeds were withdrawn by Mr. Glenn
during tax year 2001 and placed into their joint accounts with
Harris Trust & Savings Bank; and she had no control of the
proceeds which were placed in the joint accounts with Harris
Trust & Savings Bank. On these grounds, petitioner contends that
pursuant to section 6015(f) she is eligible for relief from joint
liability on the unpaid additional tax liability remaining from
the early withdrawal.
Discussion
Except as otherwise provided in section 6015, petitioner
bears the burden of proof. See Rule 142(a); Alt v. Commissioner,
6
In Glenn v. Commissioner, at docket No. 7249-04S, we found
that Mr. Glenn acted with reasonable cause and good faith as to
the underpayment attributable to the unreported 10-percent
additional tax under sec. 72(t). Accordingly, we held that Mr.
Glenn is not liable for the accuracy-related penalty pursuant to
sec. 6662(a). Because we held that Mr. Glenn was not liable for
the accuracy-related penalty, we would assume that respondent
would not collect the accuracy-related penalty from petitioner,
even though she is unable in the present proceeding to challenge
the underlying liability of her and Mr. Glenn’s tax deficiency
for taxable year 2001.
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119 T.C. 306, 311 (2002), affd. 101 Fed. Appx. 34 (6th Cir.
2004).
As a general rule, married taxpayers may elect to file a
joint Federal income tax return. Sec. 6013(a). After making the
election, each spouse generally is jointly and severally liable
for the entire tax due for that taxable year. Sec. 6013(d)(3).
In certain situations, however, a joint return filer can avoid
such joint and several liability by qualifying for relief
therefrom under section 6015.7
Section 6015 provides three avenues for obtaining relief to
a taxpayer who has filed a joint return: (1) Section 6015(b)
provides full or apportioned relief with respect to
understatements of tax attributable to certain erroneous items on
the return; (2) section 6015(c) provides relief for a portion of
an understatement of tax for taxpayers who are separated or
divorced; and (3) section 6015(f) (potentially the broadest of
the three avenues) confers upon the Secretary discretion to grant
equitable relief for taxpayers who otherwise do not qualify for
relief under section 6015(b) or (c).
Petitioner requested relief pursuant to section 6015(f) from
liability for the unpaid amount of additional tax liability
7
Sec. 6015 was enacted as part of the Internal Revenue
Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206,
sec. 3201, 112 Stat. 734. Before the enactment of sec. 6015,
relief from the imposition of joint and several liability for
spouses filing joint returns was available under sec. 6013(e).
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remaining from the 10-percent additional tax imposed by section
72(t) and the accuracy-related penalty imposed under section
6662(a). Respondent determined that petitioner was not entitled
to the requested relief.
If a taxpayer’s request for relief under section 6015 is
denied, the taxpayer may petition this Court, pursuant to section
6015(e)(1), for a review of the determination. Section
6015(e)(1)(A)8 provides that a taxpayer against whom a deficiency
has been determined and who elects to have section 6015(b) or (c)
apply may petition this Court “to determine the appropriate
relief available to the individual” under section 6015, including
relief under section 6015(f). Fernandez v. Commissioner, 114
T.C. 324, 330-331 (2000).
In the present case, petitioner does not seek relief under
section 6015(b) or (c). Petitioner has conceded that she is not
eligible for relief under these subsections. Therefore, the only
opportunity for relief available to petitioner is section
6015(f). Section 6015(f) provides as follows:
8
SEC. 6015(e). Petition for Review by Tax Court.--
(1) In general.--In the case of an individual
against whom a deficiency has been asserted and who
elects to have subsection (b) or (c) apply–-
(A) In general.--In addition to any other
remedy provided by law, the individual may
petition the Tax Court (and the Tax Court shall
have jurisdiction) to determine the appropriate
relief available to the individual under this
section if such petition is filed--
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SEC. 6015(f). Equitable Relief.--Under procedures
prescribed by the Secretary, if-–
(1) taking into account all the facts and
circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the
individual liable for any unpaid tax or any
deficiency (or any portion of either); and
(2) relief is not available to such individual
under subsection (b) or (c),
the Secretary may relieve such individual of such liability.
As directed by section 6015(f), the Commissioner has
prescribed guidelines in Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296,9 to
be considered in determining whether an individual qualifies for
relief under section 6015(f). Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01,
2003-2 C.B. at 297, lists seven conditions which must be
satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for
relief under section 6015(f).
Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03(2), 2003-2 C.B. at 298, lists
nonexclusive factors that the Commissioner will consider in
determining whether, taking into account all the facts and
circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the requesting spouse
liable for all or part of the unpaid income tax liability
9
This revenue procedure superseded Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-
1 C.B. 447, and is effective either for requests for relief filed
on or after Nov. 1, 2003, or for requests for which no
preliminary determination letter was issued as of Nov. 1, 2003.
In the present case, the request for relief was still pending as
of Nov. 1, 2003, and the preliminary determination letter was
issued on Dec. 19, 2003; therefore, Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2
C.B. 296, is applicable in the present situation.
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or deficiency, and full or partial equitable relief under section
6015(f) should be granted. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03, 2003-2
C.B. at 298, provides that the following factors are relevant to
whether the Commissioner will grant equitable relief: (1)
Marital status, (2) economic hardship, (3) knowledge or reason to
know, (4) the nonrequesting spouse’s legal obligation, (5)
significant benefit, (6) compliance with income tax laws, (7)
abuse, and (8) mental or physical health. Further, Rev. Proc.
2003-61, supra, provides that no single factor will be
determinative, but that all relevant factors, regardless of
whether the factor is listed in Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03,
will be considered and weighed.
To prevail under section 6015(f), petitioner must show that
respondent’s denial of equitable relief from joint liability
under section 6015(f) was an abuse of discretion. See Washington
v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 137 (2003); Jonson v. Commissioner, 118
T.C. 106, 125 (2002) (citing Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C.
276, 292 (2000)), affd. 353 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir. 2003). Action
constitutes an abuse of discretion under this standard where it
is arbitrary, capricious, or without sound basis in fact or law.
Woodral v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 19, 23 (1999). The question of
whether respondent’s determination was arbitrary, capricious, or
without sound basis in fact is a question of fact. Cheshire v.
Commissioner, 115 T.C. 183, 198 (2000), affd. 282 F.3d 326 (5th
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Cir. 2002). In deciding whether respondent’s determination that
petitioner is not entitled to relief under section 6015(f) was an
abuse of discretion, we consider evidence relating to all the
facts and circumstances.
Respondent contends: (1) Petitioner voluntarily signed the
2001 joint Federal income tax return which reported the section
401(k) distribution of $165,838; (2) the proceeds of the section
401(k) plan were put into joint savings and checking accounts to
which petitioner had access; (3) petitioner obtained benefits
from the section 401(k) distribution proceeds through the use of
those proceeds to pay off petitioner’s and Mr. Glenn’s joint
liabilities; (4) petitioner would not suffer economic hardship if
the Service did not grant relief from the income tax liability;
and (5) petitioner has not demonstrated that she made a good
faith effort to comply with Federal income tax laws. Respondent
asserts that these factors weigh against granting relief to
petitioner. We now address each of the factors of Rev. Proc.
2003-61, sec. 403, separately.
1. Marital Status
During 2001, petitioner and Mr. Glenn were married and
resided in the same household; however, they occupied separate
rooms in the household and considered themselves separated.
Petitioner filed for divorce in October of 2001. Petitioner and
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Mr. Glenn were divorced on November 13, 2002. This factor weighs
in favor of granting relief to petitioner.
2. Economic Hardship
Respondent contends that petitioner offered no evidence that
she would suffer economic hardship if relief were denied.
Pursuant to section 301.6343-1(b)(4)(ii), Proced. & Admin. Regs.,
economic hardship exists if a levy will cause a taxpayer to be
unable to pay his/her reasonable basic living expenses.
Respondent maintains that respondent’s collection activity would
not leave petitioner unable to pay her basic living expenses.10
10
Sec. 301.6343-1(b)(4)(ii), Proced. & Admin. Regs.,
provides:
(ii) Information from taxpayer. In determining a reasonable
amount for basic living expenses the director will consider
any information provided by the taxpayer including–-
(A) The taxpayer’s age, employment status and history,
ability to earn, number of dependents, and status as a
dependent of someone else;
(B) The amount reasonably necessary for food, clothing,
housing, (including utilities, home-owner insurance,
home-owner dues, and the like), medical expenses
(including health insurance), transportation, current
tax payments (including federal, state, and local),
alimony, child support, or other court-ordered
payments, and expenses necessary to the taxpayer’s
production of income (such as dues for a trade union or
professional organization, or child care payments which
allow the taxpayer to be gainfully employed);
(C) The cost of living in the geographic area in which
the taxpayer resides;
(D) The amount of property exempt from levy which is
available to pay the taxpayer’s expenses;
(continued...)
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In addition, respondent asserts that petitioner provided no
documentation to contradict these contentions or to demonstrate
an economic hardship.
On Form 12510, Questionnaire for Requesting Spouse,
petitioner stated her necessary monthly living expenses as
approximately $3,136 per month. Also on Form 12510, petitioner
stated her total monthly income as approximately $3,500,
consisting of her earned wages of $2,400 per month and child
support of $1,100 received per month. On the basis of these
facts, respondent determined that petitioner would not suffer
economic hardship if relief was not granted. Petitioner did not
supply any evidence at trial to contradict the above facts or the
determination of respondent; therefore, we find that petitioner
will not suffer economic hardship if relief is not granted. This
factor favors denying relief.
3. Knowledge or Reason To Know
In the case of an income tax liability that arose from a
deficiency, the fact that the requesting spouse did not know and
had no reason to know of the item giving rise to the deficiency
10
(...continued)
(E) Any extraordinary circumstances such as special
education expenses, a medical catastrophe, or natural
disaster; and
(F) Any other factor that the taxpayer claims bears on
economic hardship and brings to the attention of the
director.
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is a factor in favor of granting relief. Rev. Proc. 2003-61,
sec. 4.03(2)(a)(iii)(B). By contrast, the fact that the
requesting spouse knew or had reason to know of the item giving
rise to the deficiency is a factor weighing against relief. Id.
Petitioner contends that she did not know and had no reason
to know of the distribution from Mr. Glenn’s section 401(k) plan
which gave rise to: (1) The deficiency resulting from the 10-
percent early withdrawal additional tax, and (2) the accuracy-
related penalty imposed under section 6662(a). Petitioner
testified: (1) It was Mr. Glenn’s sole responsibility to
maintain their household finances; (2) she had no knowledge or
control of their household finances during tax year 2001 or prior
years; (3) she had no knowledge of the existence of Mr. Glenn’s
section 401(k) plan maintained by his employer, Kronos, Inc.,
through T. Rowe Price, nor did she know that the proceeds were
withdrawn by Mr. Glenn during tax year 2001 and placed into their
joint accounts with Harris Trust & Savings Bank; and (4) she had
no control of the proceeds which were placed into the joint
accounts with Harris Trust & Savings Bank.
However, petitioner voluntarily signed the 2001 joint return
and admitted that she did not review the joint return before
filing. The distribution from Mr. Glenn’s section 401(k) plan
maintained by his employer, Kronos, Inc., through T. Rowe Price,
was reported on petitioner and Mr. Glenn’s 2001 joint return.
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Also, petitioner had access to the joint accounts where the
proceeds of the distribution were deposited. Thus, petitioner
knew or had reason to know of the item which gave rise to the
taxable year 2001 deficiency and the accuracy-related penalty.
This factor favors denying relief to petitioner.
4. Nonrequesting Spouse’s Legal Obligation
As previously noted, petitioner and Mr. Glenn’s judgment for
dissolution of marriage provided:
That each party shall be responsible for the payment of all
credit card bills and all other debts in his or her name
alone. Each shall hold the other harmless and indemnify the
other from the respective indebtedness.
However, the judgment for dissolution of marriage did not address
payment of joint liabilities.
Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03(2)(a)(iv), indicates that if
Mr. Glenn had a legal obligation under the judgment for
dissolution of marriage to pay the tax liabilities, then that
fact would weigh in favor of granting relief to petitioner.
Likewise, if the judgment for dissolution of marriage had placed
the obligation to pay the taxes on petitioner, then that fact
would weigh against granting relief to her as indicated in Rev.
Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03(2)(a)(iv). In the present case, the
judgment for dissolution of marriage is silent as to each party’s
obligation to pay taxes. Therefore, we will assume each party is
liable for 50 percent of the liabilities. Thus, this is a
neutral factor.
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5. Significant Benefit
Respondent contends that petitioner received benefits from
the proceeds of the section 401(k) distribution in the form of:
(1) Payment of joint credit card liabilities; (2) payment of the
second mortgage held by Union Federal; (3) payment of petitioner
and Mr. Glenn’s 2001 joint tax liability; and (4) payment of
attorney’s fees relating to petitioner and Mr. Glenn’s divorce.
However, petitioner contends that she did not accumulate the
credit card debts; therefore, the payment of those liabilities
should not be considered a benefit to her. Petitioner further
contends that the other referenced payment benefits to her were
paid by Mr. Glenn’s salary and not the proceeds from the section
401(k) distribution.
Petitioner admitted at trial that her name was on the credit
card accounts and that she used one of the credit cards to make
purchases. Petitioner also admitted at trial that her name was
on the mortgage note. While it is not totally clear from the
record where all of the proceeds from the section 401(k) plan can
be traced, it seems logical to the Court that the large amounts
of the credit card liabilities, the second mortgage, and the 2001
joint tax liability were satisfied because of the distribution
from Mr. Glenn’s section 401(k) plan. Therefore, we find that
petitioner did benefit from the proceeds of the section 401(k)
distribution.
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6. Compliance With Income Tax Laws
In his pretrial memorandum, respondent contends that
“petitioner has not demonstrated that she made a good faith
effort to comply with federal income tax laws.”
To the contrary, in her pretrial memorandum, petitioner
contends that she has complied with the income tax laws.
Respondent did not produce any evidence that supported his
contention. Therefore, we consider this factor neutral.
7. Abuse
Petitioner conceded that she was not abused by Mr. Glenn and
that she was not coerced into executing the 2001 joint Federal
income tax return. Lack of spousal abuse is a factor listed in
Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03(2)(b)(i), that will weigh in favor
of equitable relief if found but will not weigh against equitable
relief if not present in a case. Therefore, this factor is
neutral.
Conclusion
The factors that weigh against granting relief to petitioner
outweigh those factors favoring relief. Therefore, under these
facts and circumstances, we hold that respondent did not abuse
his discretion in denying equitable relief to petitioner under
section 6015(f).
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Reviewed and adopted as the report of the Small Tax Case
Division.
An appropriate decision
will be entered for respondent.