T.C. Memo. 2007-86
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
DIANE C. LINCIR, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 10138-04. Filed April 11, 2007.
P and her former spouse were parties to earlier
litigation in this Court in which P stipulated she was
not entitled to relief under former sec. 6013(e),
I.R.C. 1986. After this stipulation was filed and
before this Court issued its first opinion in the
earlier litigation, the Congress enacted sec. 6015(b)
and (c), I.R.C. 1986, which provides avenues of relief
that were not available under the former statute. The
Congress also enacted sec. 6015(g)(2), I.R.C. 1986,
which provides that a final court decision “shall be
conclusive” except as to qualification for relief under
sec. 6015(b) or (c), but that the exception applies
only if both of the following apply: (1) The relief
was not an issue in the proceeding that resulted in the
final court decision and (2) the court does not
determine that “the individual participated
meaningfully” in the proceeding that resulted in the
final court decision.
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The earlier litigation resulted in a decision that
became final. Lincir v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-
98, supplemented 115 T.C. 293 (2000), affd. 32 Fed.
Appx. 278 (9th Cir. 2002). P filed the instant case
for innocent spouse relief under sec. 6015, I.R.C.
1986. P moves for partial summary judgment that she is
not barred from claiming innocent spouse relief even
though, for purposes of the instant motion only, P
concedes her meaningful participation in the earlier
proceeding, “within the meaning of I.R.C.
§6015(g)(2)”.
Held: P’s stipulated concession precludes her
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and so P’s
partial summary judgment motion is denied.
Michael D. Savage, for petitioner.
Michael R. Skutley, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
CHABOT, Judge: This matter is before us on petitioner’s
motion under Rule 1211 for partial summary judgment that
petitioner is permitted to claim relief under section 60152 for
1978 through 1982, because relief under that section was not
available to her when she litigated income tax deficiencies for
the same years in a prior case in this Court.
1
Unless indicated otherwise, all Rule references are to the
Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
2
Unless indicated otherwise, all section references are to
sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as in effect for
proceedings commenced at the time the petition in the instant
case was filed.
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The instant case is a claim for “innocent spouse” relief
under subsection (b) or (c) of section 6015. See Rules 320-325;
sec. 6015(e). The prior case is docket No. 22934-89, hereinafter
sometimes referred to as the 1989 case.
The issue for decision is whether to grant petitioner’s
motion for partial summary judgment that she is not barred by the
doctrine of res judicata from innocent spouse relief under
section 6015, even if she meaningfully participated in the 1989
case.3
Our statements as to the facts are based entirely on the
parties’ stipulations of facts and exhibits, those matters that
are admitted in the pleadings, those matters that are admitted in
the motion papers, those matters set forth in affidavits
submitted by the parties, and the opinions issued by this Court
in the 1989 case.
3
Petitioner’s motion does not use the term “res judicata”,
or the term “claim preclusion”. However, we conclude from the
parties’ legal memoranda that the instant motion is intended to
deal solely with the application of res judicata and, even in
that limited setting, is based on petitioner’s limited concession
as to meaningful participation in the 1989 case. See infra note
4. So, for example, petitioner’s motion does not deal with the
collateral estoppel defenses raised in respondent’s answer. See
Rule 39.
Also, we note that respondent did not file a cross-motion on
this issue. See Elect. Arts, Inc. v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 226,
238, 278 (2002).
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Background
When the petition was filed in the instant case, petitioner
resided in San Pedro, California. Petitioner filed joint income
tax returns with her then-husband, Tom I. Lincir (hereinafter
sometimes referred to as Lincir), for each of the years 1978
through 1982. These years were the subject of litigation in the
1989 case, in which respondent determined deficiencies in, and
additions to, petitioner’s and Lincir’s Federal income tax for
1978 through 1982 aggregating more than $600,000; respondent also
determined that petitioner and Lincir were liable for increased
interest on underpayments attributable to a tax-motivated
transaction under section 6621(c). Issues in the 1989 case were
addressed in Lincir v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-98, and
Lincir v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 293 (2000), affd. 32 Fed. Appx.
278 (9th Cir. 2002). We summarize the factual and procedural
background briefly here and make additional findings helpful in
ruling on the instant motion.
The setting of the 1989 case is described as follows in
Lincir v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-98:
The deficiencies in this case result from
respondent’s disallowance of certain losses. The
losses include those attributable to petitioners’
[i.e., petitioner’s and Lincir’s] participation in the
“Arbitrage and Carry” gold trading promoted by Futures
Trading, Inc. (FTI). The losses also include those
attributable to petitioners’ participation in the
Treasury bill (T-bill) option and stock forward
transactions promoted by Merit Securities, Inc.
(Merit), a company that is related to FTI.
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On September 18, 1989, Louis Samuel filed the petition for
petitioner and Lincir in the 1989 case. On January 21, 1992,
Michael D. Savage (petitioner’s counsel in the instant case)
entered his appearance in the 1989 case. On April 9, 1992, the
petition in the 1989 case was amended to claim innocent spouse
treatment for petitioner under section 6013(e) as it then
existed. On July 1, 1992, the parties in the 1989 case entered
into a stipulated settlement of certain of the tax shelter
issues. The 1989 case was set for trial in Los Angeles and then
continued generally. There followed numerous orders, reports,
and a stipulation of facts, and the 1989 case was set for trial
in San Francisco. The 1989 case was again continued and again
set for trial in San Francisco. The 1989 case was then
consolidated with numerous other dockets, then some of those
dockets were severed from the consolidated group, then the trial
for the remaining dockets in the consolidated group (including
the 1989 case) was again continued, and again set to take place
in San Francisco. On August 1, 1996, petitioner and Lincir
entered into a stipulation of settled issues relating to certain
tax shelter issues, agreeing to be bound by the determinations as
to those issues in certain designated lead cases. On August 15,
1996, the 1989 case was severed from consolidation. On January
30, 1997, there was a 1-day trial in the 1989 case. At the
conclusion of the trial in the 1989 case, the parties thereto
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stipulated orally that petitioner “conceded the innocent spouse
issue under section 6013(e)”. See Lincir v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1999-98 n.3. This concession was embodied in a written
stipulation of settled issues in the 1989 case, filed on March
17, 1997.
Petitioner meaningfully participated in the 1989 case within
the meaning of section 6015(g)(2).4
On January 28, 1999, this Court decided in favor of the
Commissioner the issues decided in the lead cases; none of the
taxpayers in the lead cases appealed this Court’s decision. This
Court’s opinion in the 1989 case was filed thereafter on March
29, 1999. Lincir v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-98. A dispute
arose regarding the computations under Rule 155 in the 1989 case;
this was resolved in favor of respondent. Lincir v.
Commissioner, 115 T.C. 293 (2000). Decision was entered October
2, 2000. Petitioner and Lincir appealed. This Court’s
determinations were affirmed. Lincir v. Commissioner, 32 Fed.
Appx. 278 (9th Cir. 2002).
After the trial and before this Court filed the first
opinion in the 1989 case, the Congress enacted the Internal
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L.
105-206, 112 Stat. 685, hereinafter sometimes referred to as the
4
So stipulated. The parties further stipulate that this
stipulation “is made solely for purposes of the petitioner’s
motion for partial summary judgment and for no other purpose.”
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1998 Act. Section 3201(e)(1) of the 1998 Act repealed section
6013(e), the innocent spouse provisions which had been in effect
at the time of the trial in the 1989 case (112 Stat. 740);
section 3201(a) of the 1998 Act enacted section 6015 (112 Stat.
734). Section 3201(g)(1) of the 1998 Act provided in pertinent
part that both the section 6013(e) repeal and the section 6015
enactment “shall apply to * * * any liability for tax arising on
or before such date [the date of the enactment of the Act, July
22, 1998] but remaining unpaid as of such date.” 112 Stat. 740.
After petitioner and Lincir filed their notice of appeal
from our decision in the 1989 case and before that decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the Congress enacted the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, which included the
Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-554, 114
Stat. 2763, 2763A-587, hereinafter sometimes referred to as the
2000 Act. The 2000 Act made several changes to section 6015,
including the enactment of the present texts of section
6015(g)(2) and section 6015(e)(1)(A). Pars. (2) and (3)(B) of
sec. 313(a) of Appendix G of Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. at 2763A-
640, 2763A-641. The 2000 Act provided in pertinent part (sec.
313(f) of Appendix G of Pub. L. 106-554) that these changes
“shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.
[Dec. 21, 2000].” 114 Stat. at 2763A-643.
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On November 21, 2001, while the 1989 case was still before
the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed with respondent a Form
8857, Request for Innocent Spouse Relief. At that time,
respondent had not yet begun collection activities against
petitioner, within the meaning of section 6015(c)(3)(B). On
April 14, 2004, respondent issued a Notice of Determination
denying the requested innocent spouse relief.
Discussion
I. The Setting
The matter before us in petitioner’s motion for partial
summary judgment is quite limited.
In the instant case’s answer, respondent relies on (1) the
doctrine of res judicata to bar any relief under section 6015,
(2) the doctrine of collateral estoppel to bar relitigation of
whether petitioner knew or had reason to know of substantial
understatements of tax for the years in the 1989 case, and (3)
the doctrine of collateral estoppel to bar relitigation of
whether it would be inequitable to hold petitioner jointly liable
for the deficiencies for the years in the 1989 case.
Thus the effect of our ruling on petitioner’s motion is to
set the parameters for further litigation on whether petitioner
is precluded from making claims under section 6015. The actual
claims under section 6015 have not yet been presented.
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II. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is a device used to expedite litigation; it
is intended to avoid unnecessary and expensive trials. However,
it is not a substitute for trial; it should not be used to
resolve genuine disputes over material factual issues. Cox v.
American Fidelity & Casualty Co., 249 F.2d 616, 618 (9th Cir.
1957); Vallone v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 794, 801 (1987). A
decision will be rendered on a motion for summary judgment if the
pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, admissions,
and other acceptable materials, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is not any genuine issue as to any material
fact and that a decision may be rendered as a matter of law.
Rule 121(b). A partial summary adjudication may be made which
does not dispose of all the issues in the case. Id.
Because the effect of granting a motion for summary judgment
is to decide the case against a party without allowing that party
an opportunity for a trial, the motion should be “cautiously
invoked” and granted only after a careful consideration of the
case. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 6 (1945);
Cox v. American Fidelity & Casualty Co., 249 F.2d at 618; Kroh v.
Commissioner, 98 T.C. 383, 390 (1992).
Petitioner, as the moving party, has the burden of showing
the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. For
these purposes, the party opposing the motion is to be afforded
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the benefit of all reasonable doubt, and the material submitted
by both sides must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
opposing party; that is, all doubts as to the existence of an
issue of material fact must be resolved against the movant.
E.g., Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Dreher v.
Sielaff, 636 F.2d 1141, 1143 n.4 (7th Cir. 1980); Kroh v.
Commissioner, 98 T.C. at 390.
In the instant case, respondent has not filed any cross-
motion for partial summary judgment. Where, as in the instant
case, only one side has moved for summary judgment, there is
implicit in the movant’s obligations as to material facts that
the movant has to persuade the Court that she has correctly
identified what facts are material. Elect. Arts, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 118 T.C. 226, 238 (2002).
Respondent “strongly agrees with the material facts
surrounding the narrow issue that petitioner presents in her
motion.”
We proceed to consider whether partial summary judgment for
petitioner may be rendered as a matter of law. Our understanding
of what are the material facts affects our conclusions as to how
the law applies.
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III. Res Judicata
A. In General
The Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591,
597 (1948), summarized res judicata, also known as claim
preclusion, as follows:
The rule provides that when a court of competent
jurisdiction has entered a final judgment on the merits
of a cause of action, the parties to the suit and their
privies are thereafter bound “not only as to every
matter which was offered and received to sustain or
defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other
admissible matter which might have been offered for
that purpose.” Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351,
352. The judgment puts an end to the cause of action,
which cannot again be brought into litigation between
the parties upon any ground whatever, absent fraud or
some other factor invalidating the judgment. * * *
As to the application of the doctrine in the context of
income tax litigation the Court stated in Sunnen:
Income taxes are levied on an annual basis. Each year
is the origin of a new liability and of a separate
cause of action. Thus if a claim of liability or non-
liability relating to a particular tax year is
litigated, a judgment on the merits is res judicata as
to any subsequent proceeding involving the same claim
and the same tax year. * * * [Id. at 598.]
As a general rule, where the Tax Court has entered a
decision for a taxable year, both the taxpayer and the
Commissioner (with certain exceptions) are barred from reopening
that year. Burke v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 41, 47 (1995);
Hemmings v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 221, 233 (1995). It has also
been held that “the Tax Court’s jurisdiction, once it attaches,
extends to the entire subject of the correct tax for the
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particular year.” Erickson v. United States, 159 Ct. Cl. 202,
309 F.2d 760, 767 (1962); see Naftel v. Commissioner, 85 T.C.
527, 533 (1985).
An agreed or stipulated judgment is a judgment on the merits
for purposes of res judicata. Baker v. IRS, 74 F.3d 906, 910
(9th Cir. 1996), and cases there cited. It follows that, for res
judicata purposes, the decision incorporates those elements that
the parties have settled by stipulation as well as those that
have been redetermined by the Court.
Res judicata is essentially a court-created rule.
Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. at 597. Although the general
outlines of the rule are relatively straightforward, the details
applicable in certain cases may be quite intricate. See, e.g.,
the discussion in Hemmings v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. at 230-235.
In addition, the Congress sometimes enacts legislation that
overrides or modifies res judicata. See, e.g., Burke v.
Commissioner, 105 T.C. at 47 (opinion of the Court), 52 (Chabot,
J., concurring), 62-63 (Swift, J., concurring in the result
only).
B. Innocent Spouse
Under the law before the 1998 Act, the cause of action in
the 1989 case included the possibility of innocent spouse relief.
Thus, but for the 1998 Act, the resolution of the 1989 case by
entry of decision which became final would have precluded
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reopening the “claim of liability or non-liability relating to a
particular tax year”, in the instant case, 1978 through 1982.
Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. at 598; Vetrano v. Commissioner,
116 T.C. 272, 280 (2001). In particular, for these purposes it
would not matter that the innocent spouse claim in the 1989 case
was resolved by the parties’ stipulation rather than by the
Court’s holding on the merits.
The 1998 Act revised the innocent spouse rules to provide
avenues for relief that were not available under the former
statute, provided for elections to claim certain kinds of relief,
gave jurisdiction to this Court “to determine the appropriate
relief available to the individual under this section” (sec.
6015(e)(1)(A)), and repealed former section 6013(e). Newly
enacted section 6015(e)(3) provided as follows:
(3) Applicable rules.--
(A) Allowance of credit or refund.-–Except as
provided in subparagraph (B), notwithstanding any other
law or rule of law (other than section 6512(b), 7121,
or 7122), credit or refund shall be allowed or made to
the extent attributable to the application of this
section.
(B) Res judicata.–-In the case of any election
under subsection (b) or (c), if a decision of the Tax
Court in any prior proceeding for the same taxable year
has become final, such decision shall be conclusive
except with respect to the qualification of the
individual for relief which was not an issue in such
proceeding. The exception contained in the preceding
sentence shall not apply if the Tax Court determines
that the individual participated meaningfully in such
prior proceeding.
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(C) Limitation on Tax Court jurisdiction.–-If a
suit for refund is begun by either individual filing
the joint return pursuant to section 6532--
(i) the Tax Court shall lose
jurisdiction of the individual’s action under
this section to whatever extent jurisdiction
is acquired by the district court or the
United States Court of Federal Claims over
the taxable years that are the subject of the
suit for refund; and
(ii) the court acquiring jurisdiction
shall have jurisdiction over the petition
filed under this subsection.
The 2000 Act struck out subparagraphs (A) and (B) of
original section 6015(e)(3) and enacted new section 6015(g) as
follows:
(g) Credits and Refunds.–-
(1) In general.–-Except as provided in paragraphs
(2) and (3), notwithstanding any other law or rule of
law (other than section 6511, 6512(b), 7121, or 7122),
credit or refund shall be allowed or made to the extent
attributable to the application of this section.
(2) Res judicata.–-In the case of any election
under subsection (b) or (c), if a decision of a court
in any prior proceeding for the same taxable year has
become final, such decision shall be conclusive except
with respect to the qualification of the individual for
relief which was not an issue in such proceeding. The
exception contained in the preceding sentence shall not
apply if the court determines that the individual
participated meaningfully in such prior proceeding.
(3) Credit and refund not allowed under subsection
(c).–-No credit or refund shall be allowed as a result
of an election under subsection (c).
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IV. Parties’ Contentions
Both sides treat section 6015(g)(2) as the controlling
statute; their disputes center on a Treasury regulation
interpreting this statute.
Petitioner contends that relief under section 6015 was not
available to her in the 1989 case and so, under Treasury
regulations, she is to be treated as not having meaningfully
participated in the 1989 case, whether or not she in fact
meaningfully participated. Petitioner concludes that, “as a
matter of law she is not barred by the ‘meaningful participation’
rule from asserting innocent spouse status under section 6015 in
this case.” Petitioner bases her contention that relief under
section 6015 was not available in the 1989 case on the following:
(1) When the record was closed in the 1989 case, the 1998 Act had
not yet been enacted, so section 6015 relief could not have been
claimed; (2) section 6015 as enacted by the 1998 Act required
exhaustion of administrative remedies and, even if petitioner had
applied promptly when the administrative remedies became
available, she would not have been able to petition this Court
“until July 13, 1999–-four months after the Court entered its
decision in the 1989 case”;5 (3) until January 17, 2001, when
5
The Court entered the decision on Oct. 2, 2000, after
resolution of a Rule 155 dispute. Petitioner may be referring to
the date of the Court’s initial opinion in the 1989 case.
Petitioner points out that the Court ordinarily does not permit a
(continued...)
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proposed regulations were published explaining the allocation
systems “petitioner did not even know whether * * * it would be
worth the effort (not to mention this Court’s resources), to seek
relief”; and (4) because of the 2-year election rule under
section 6015 as enacted by the 1998 Act, petitioner was not
required to seek relief under section 6015 while the 1989 case
was pending.
Respondent notes that the effective date of the regulation
on which petitioner relies precludes its application to
petitioner’s case,6 but agrees that “the reasoning behind Treas.
Reg. § 1.6015-1(e), that a taxpayer should not be barred from
raising section 6015 if the defense was unavailable because of
the effective date of section 6015, should apply with equal force
here.”7 Respondent contends that petitioner’s motion should
nevertheless be denied because the section 6015 innocent spouse
defense was available to petitioner in the 1989 case, based on
the following: (1) Reopening the record is within the discretion
5
(...continued)
new issue to be raised during the Rule 155 computation
proceedings.
6
The parties stipulated that petitioner filed her request
for innocent spouse relief on Nov. 21, 2001. The regulations
apply to requests filed on or after July 18, 2002. Sec. 1.6015-
9, Income Tax Regs.
7
To the same effect, see our discussion in Trent v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-285. See also Hopkins v.
Commissioner, 120 T.C. 451 (2003).
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of the Court and “petitioner chose to forego such opportunities
[to move the Court to reopen the record before decision was
entered in the 1989 case], and should not be allowed to set aside
her decision well after the fact”; (2) although section 6015 as
enacted by the 1998 Act provided for administrative remedies,
“nothing in section 6015 indicates that this was intended to be
the sole means to raise section 6015”; (3) res judicata effects
cannot be avoided “simply because a section 6015 claim was not
economically worth her while prior to the Commissioner
promulgating his proposed regulations under the allocation
rules”; and (4) petitioner’s interpretation of the 2-year
election rule would make section 6015(g)(2) into “irrational
surplusage”, because under that interpretation the res judicata
rule could always be avoided.
The parties dispute the significance of our opinions in
Noons v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-243, and Butler v.
Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276 (2000). Petitioner states: “this
court may wish to consider whether Noons (like Butler) is
correctly decided.”
We agree with respondent’s conclusion that petitioner is not
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
V. Conclusions
The Congress chose to provide a statutory rule as to res
judicata in section 6015(e)(3)(B) (under the 1998 Act) and then
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in section 6015(g)(2) (under the 2000 Act).8 The statutory
language provides that “if a decision of a court * * * has become
final, such decision shall be conclusive”. Sec. 6015(g)(2)
(emphasis supplied). An exception is provided, but the statute
states that exception “shall not apply if the court determines
that the individual participated meaningfully in such prior
proceeding.” Id. (emphasis supplied).
Both sides focus on the following sentence in sec. 1.6015-
1(e), Income Tax Regs.: “A requesting spouse has not meaningfully
participated in a prior proceeding if, due to the effective date
of section 6015, relief under section 6015 was not available in
that proceeding.” See supra text at notes 6 and 7.
The regulation provides a partial definition of the
statutory language. Petitioner contends this partial definition
helps her cause and she qualifies for its benefits. Respondent
does not dispute the effectiveness of this partial definition to
help some innocent spouse claimants but contends that this
petitioner does not satisfy the requirements. Cf. Rauenhorst v.
Commissioner, 119 T.C. 157, 167-173 (2002); Automated Packaging
Systems, Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 214, 225 (1978) (Chabot,
J., concurring).
8
So that “he that runs may read”, the Congress headed this
provision “Res judicata” in both the 1998 Act and the 2000 Act.
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The parties agree that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact (Rule 121(b)), but their dispute as to the meaning
of the regulation implies in the instant case a disagreement as
to what are the material facts. However, we are spared the
necessity in the instant case of exploring the nuances of the
regulation and determining which are the material facts and their
consequences.
Whatever may be the precise meaning of the regulation
sentence the parties focus on, that sentence is an interpretation
of the meaningful participation language of section 6015(g)(2).
The parties have stipulated for purposes of this motion as
follows:
11. Petitioner meaningfully participated in the 1989
case within the meaning of I.R.C. § 6015(g)(2).
We understand this stipulation to be an agreement that, whatever
facts are necessary to a conclusion of meaningful participation
under section 6015(g)(2),9 those are the facts in the instant
case. (See supra note 4.) Neither side has asked to be relieved
from the effects of this stipulation. See Rule 91(e) (second
sentence). This stipulation is not plainly in conflict with the
undisputed evidence in the record. Cf. McLaulin v. Commissioner,
9
See, e.g., discussion in Huynh v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2006-180, and cases cited therein.
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115 T.C. 255, 257 n.2 (2000), affd. 276 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir.
2001); Jasionowski v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 312, 318 (1976).
Petitioner was advised by counsel in the 1989 case and is advised
by counsel in the instant case. We do not see any special
circumstances that would warrant us, sua sponte, to relieve any
party in the instant case from the effects of the “meaningfully
participated” stipulation.
Thus, however we resolve the legal questions, the effect of
the stipulation is that petitioner “participated meaningfully” in
the 1989 case, within the meaning of section 6015(g)(2), the
controlling statute.
In Vetrano v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. at 278, we described
the effect of section 6015(g)(2)’s general rule as follows:
The above provision prescribes the effect that a final
court decision for a particular taxable year will have
on a subsequent election by the taxpayer under
subsection (b) or (c) of section 6015 for the same
taxable year. By its terms, an individual cannot make
an election under section 6015(b) or (c) for any
taxable year that is the subject of a final court
decision, unless the individual’s qualification for
relief under section 6015(b) or (c) was not an issue in
the prior court proceeding and the individual did not
participate meaningfully in the prior proceeding. See
sec. 6015(g)(2). Stated differently, an individual who
participated meaningfully in a court proceeding is
precluded from electing relief under section 6015(b) or
(c) for the same taxable year after the decision of the
court becomes final, whether or not the individual’s
qualification for relief under section 6015(b) or (c)
was an issue in the prior proceeding. See sec.
6015(g)(2).
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It follows that the parties’ stipulation forecloses
petitioner from showing (within the confines of her motion) that
she is entitled to the benefit of the statutory exception; it
then follows that petitioner is not entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on her partial summary judgment motion.
An appropriate order will
be issued denying petitioner’s
motion for partial summary
judgment.