T.C. Memo. 2007-293
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
ESTATE OF CHARLES A. LIPPITZ, DECEASED, MICHAEL LIPPITZ,
ADMINISTRATOR AND RHITA S. LIPPITZ, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket Nos. 35775-84, 45694-85, Filed September 25, 2007.
360-87, 37518-87,
32365-88, 27448-89.
P-Wife moved to amend the petitions to assert a
claim for innocent spouse relief under sec. 6015(c) and
(f), I.R.C. Subsequently, P-Wife moved for summary
judgment, and R conceded. P-Wife now seeks litigation
costs under sec. 7430, I.R.C., on the basis that she
was the prevailing party and R’s position was not
substantially justified and because she submitted a
qualified offer to R and P-Wife’s liability was
determined to be less than if R had accepted her offer.
Held: While P-Wife was the prevailing party, R
was substantially justified in opposing P-Wife’s motion
to amend the petitions to assert a claim for innocent
spouse relief.
Held, further, R was not substantially justified
in continuing to oppose P-Wife’s claim for relief after
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receiving a recommendation that P-Wife be granted
relief from R’s office that specializes in sec. 6015,
I.R.C., cases.
Held, further, P-Wife submitted a qualified offer
under sec. 7430(c)(4)(E) and (g), I.R.C., during the
qualified offer period, and P-Wife’s liability was
determined to be less than if R had accepted the
qualified offer.
Held, further, R’s concession was not a settlement
for purposes of sec. 7430(c)(4)(E)(ii), I.R.C.
Karen L. Hawkins, for petitioner Rhita S. Lippitz.
Paul E. Shick, for the Estate of Charles Lippitz.
James M. Klein, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GOEKE, Judge: This matter is currently before the Court on
petitioner Rhita Lippitz’s motion for the recovery of litigation
costs. In relevant part petitioner1 alleged, and respondent
ultimately conceded, that she is entitled to relief under section
6015(c)2 from any additional joint liability determined for her
and her late husband Charles Lippitz for taxable years 1980
through 1985. Petitioner moves for the recovery of litigation
1
For convenience, references to petitioner in the singular
are to Rhita Lippitz.
2
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and all Rule references
are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
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costs under section 7430 on the grounds that she is the
prevailing party and because the judgment in this matter is less
than the liability would have been had respondent accepted
petitioner’s qualified offer.3 Because we find that respondent
was substantially justified initially in opposing petitioner’s
claim for innocent spouse relief, we rule in part for respondent.
However, because it took too long for respondent to concede the
issue and because petitioner’s liability pursuant to this Court’s
judgment was less than her qualified offer and respondent’s
concession was not a settlement, we also rule in part for
petitioner.
Background
These cases involve taxable years 1980 through 1985 and
relate to deficiencies determined by respondent that petitioner
and her late husband, Charles Lippitz, assigned income taxable to
them to various trusts formed by Mr. Lippitz while he was a
practicing attorney. A separate petition was filed for each tax
year.4 Petitioners resided in Evanston, Illinois, at the time
the petitions were filed. The cases were ultimately consolidated
3
The parties agree no hearing on petitioner’s motion is
necessary.
4
Docket No. 35775-84 relates to tax year 1980; docket No.
45694-85 relates to tax year 1981; docket No. 360-87 relates to
tax year 1982; docket No. 37518-87 relates to tax year 1983;
docket No. 32365-88 relates to tax year 1984; and docket No.
27448-89 relates to tax year 1985.
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on July 22, 2003. For all but taxable year 1985, these cases
were calendared for trial on February 12, 1990. The cases were
then continued. Petitioners’ case for taxable year 1985 was
first set for trial on December 5, 1994.
Mr. Lippitz and respondent reached an “Agreement For
Resolving Remaining Issues” in April 2003. According to
respondent, the only items that remained after this agreement was
signed were computations, and then completion of a final
stipulation of settled issues and decision documents. The
stipulation of settled issues and decision documents were not,
however, filed with the Court until November 1, 2006.
It was sometime in 2003 when petitioner alleges she first
became aware that respondent had asserted deficiencies in tax
against her and Mr. Lippitz for tax years 1980 through 1985, and
that petitions on her behalf had been filed relating to the 1980
through 1985 tax years. According to petitioner, prior to 2003,
the petitions filed on her behalf had been handled entirely by
Mr. Lippitz, and at various points as many as 10 different
lawyers who had entered appearances for petitioner.
After Mr. Lippitz passed away in July 2004, petitioner hired
Karen Hawkins to represent her in September 2004. Ms. Hawkins
entered her appearance as counsel for petitioner in November
2004. On January 14, 2005, petitioner filed a motion to amend
the petitions to assert a claim for relief under section 6015(c)
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and (f). Respondent opposed petitioner’s motion on grounds that
all issues had been settled in April 2003 and that it was too
late to assert such a claim.
On July 1, 2005, petitioner sent to respondent a separate
letter for each of the docketed cases indicating that she was
making a qualified settlement offer pursuant to section
7430(c)(4)(E) and (g). Petitioner offered to settle each case
for relief from any additional joint liability under section
6015(c). In addition, petitioner offered to make a payment of
$100 against any additional joint liability determined by
respondent for each of the tax years at issue. Respondent did
not respond to these offers.
On August 4, 2005, the Court granted petitioner’s motion for
leave to amend, and petitioner’s amended petitions were filed in
each docketed case. Respondent forwarded petitioner’s file to
the Internal Revenue Service Cincinnati Centralized Innocent
Spouse Operation (CCISO) for evaluation of her claim. Petitioner
submitted a completed questionnaire to CCISO, and on November 10,
2005, CCISO determined that petitioner was entitled to complete
relief from any deficiencies asserted in the docketed cases. On
December 5, 2005, respondent filed his answer denying
petitioner’s claim for relief under section 6015.
CCISO’s determination letter was eventually disclosed to
petitioner on April 3, 2006. On May 2, 2006, petitioner sent
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respondent another settlement offer, this time offering to settle
for full relief under section 6015(c) from any additional joint
liability. In the same letter petitioner indicated to respondent
that she intended to file a motion for summary judgment if
respondent did not agree to the settlement. Respondent did not
agree to the settlement, and on May 24, 2006, petitioner filed a
motion for summary judgment.
On July 14, 2006, respondent moved for additional time to
respond to petitioner’s motion and indicated an intention to
concede petitioner’s entitlement to the relief recommended from
CCISO. Respondent sought additional time in order to pursue a
stipulation of settled issues reflective of his concession. At
this point, petitioner refused to enter into a stipulation of
settled issues. In a subsequent filing related to respondent’s
motion to extend time, respondent indicated to the Court that he
in fact conceded the innocent spouse issue.
On September 21, 2006, this Court determined that
petitioner’s motion for summary judgment was moot because
respondent conceded. Petitioner now moves for the recovery of
litigation costs. Petitioner argues that for the period of July
28, 2004, to the present, she is entitled to an award of
litigation fees because she is the prevailing party and
respondent was not substantially justified. For the period July
2, 2005, to the present, petitioner argues that she is entitled
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to litigation fees because she is the prevailing party within the
meaning of section 7430(c)(4)(E)(i), because the judgment is less
than her qualified offer.
Discussion
A. Prevailing Party Generally
Section 7430(a) authorizes the award of reasonable
litigation costs paid or incurred in a court proceeding which is
brought by or against the United States in connection with the
determination, collection, or refund of any tax, interest, or
penalty under the Internal Revenue Code. The taxpayer must
establish that she: (1) Is the prevailing party; (2) has
exhausted the available administrative remedies; (3) has not
unreasonably protracted the court proceedings; and (4) has
claimed litigation costs that are reasonable. Sec. 7430(a) and
(b)(1), (3). The taxpayer bears the burden of proving that these
requirements are met. Rule 232(e). A taxpayer is generally the
prevailing party if the taxpayer substantially prevailed with
respect to either the amount in controversy or the most
significant issue or set of issues. Sec. 7430(c)(4)(A). Under
section 7430(c)(4)(B), even if the taxpayer meets the
requirements of a prevailing party under section 7430(c)(4)(A),
the taxpayer will not be treated as a prevailing party if the
Commissioner’s position in the proceeding was substantially
justified.
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In general, the Commissioner’s position is substantially
justified if, based on all of the facts and circumstances and the
legal precedents relating to the case, the Commissioner acted
reasonably. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988); Sher v.
Commissioner, 89 T.C. 79, 84 (1987), affd. 861 F.2d 131 (5th Cir.
1988). In other words, to be substantially justified, the
Commissioner’s position must have a reasonable basis in both law
and fact. Pierce v. Underwood, supra; Rickel v. Commissioner,
900 F.2d 655, 665 (3d Cir. 1990), affg. in part and revg. in part
on other grounds 92 T.C. 510 (1989). A position is substantially
justified if the position is “justified to a degree that could
satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood, supra at 565
(construing similar language in the Equal Access to Justice Act).
Thus, the Commissioner’s position may be incorrect but
nevertheless be substantially justified “‘if a reasonable person
could think it correct’”. Maggie Mgmt. Co. v. Commissioner, 108
T.C. 430, 443 (1997) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, supra at 566
n.2).
The relevant inquiry is whether the Commissioner’s position
was reasonable given the available facts and circumstances at the
time that the Commissioner took his position, as well as any
applicable legal precedents. Id. at 443; DeVenney v.
Commissioner, 85 T.C. 927, 930 (1985). The fact that the
Commissioner eventually concedes or loses a case does not
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establish that his position was unreasonable. Estate of Perry v.
Commissioner, 931 F.2d 1044, 1046 (5th Cir. 1991); Sokol v.
Commissioner, 92 T.C. 760, 767 (1989). However, the
Commissioner’s concession is a factor to be considered. Powers
v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 457, 471 (1993), affd. in part, revd.
in part and remanded on another issue 43 F.3d 172 (5th Cir.
1995).
Respondent argues that petitioner should not be treated as
the prevailing party because respondent’s position was
substantially justified. The first opportunity respondent had to
take a position with respect to petitioner’s claim for innocent
spouse relief was in response to petitioner’s motion to amend the
petitions. Respondent opposed petitioner’s motion on the grounds
that the matter had been litigated for almost 20 years and that
all the issues in the matter had been resolved by agreement of
the parties in April 2003. Respondent argued that petitioner
should be bound by that agreement. After we allowed petitioner
the opportunity to amend her petitions to assert innocent spouse
relief, respondent denied petitioner’s new allegations.5
We find respondent’s initial position with respect to
petitioner’s claim for innocent spouse relief in opposing the
motion to amend to have been substantially justified. Reason
5
Respondent denied petitioner’s new factual allegations for
lack of information and denied petitioner’s legal conclusions
generally.
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suggests that it would have been difficult for Mr. Lippitz to
litigate a joint personal tax liability for nearly 20 years and
not, at some point, have alerted petitioner to the fact that such
a litigation was ongoing. Moreover, after learning of the
outstanding litigation, petitioner took at least a year to seek
leave to amend her petitions. Finally, respondent believed he
had resolved all of the issues in the matter by an agreement
reached in April of 2003.6 Thus, we find respondent’s position
opposing petitioner’s motion to amend to have been reasonable.
While respondent’s position was reasonable at the start, it
does not necessarily follow that respondent’s position continued
to be reasonable, especially when additional facts came to light.
On November 10, 2005, CCISO issued a determination letter
recommending that petitioner be granted innocent spouse relief.
Despite CCISO’s determination, respondent persisted in his denial
of petitioner’s claim and filed his answer to this effect.
Respondent does not point to any substance, such as an error in
CCISO’s determination or other legal or factual basis, upon which
he maintained his denial of relief. Pierce v. Underwood, supra
at 565. Instead, respondent simply maintains that he needed to
develop more fully the facts related to petitioner’s claim.
6
We note that while petitioner denied being bound by the
April 2003 agreement, she did not deny her knowledge of the
litigation or the agreement at the time it was reached. Instead
petitioner has averred, vaguely, that she did not learn of the
litigation until “sometime in 2003”.
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Respondent was free to do so; however in the absence of any legal
or factual basis to make his position reasonable, he did so at
his peril. We find that respondent was not substantially
justified in denying petitioner’s claim for relief after
receiving CCISO’s recommendation for relief and filing his answer
to petitioner’s amended petitions.
B. Qualified Offer
Under section 7430(c)(4)(E) a party shall also be treated as
the prevailing party if “the liability of the taxpayer pursuant
to the judgment in the proceeding (determined without regard to
interest) is equal to or less than the liability of the taxpayer
which would have been so determined if the United States had
accepted a qualified offer of the party under subsection (g).”
The qualified offer provision of section 7430(c)(4)(E) applies
without regard to whether respondent’s position in the matter is
substantially justified.7 See Haas & Associates Accountancy
Corp. v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 48, 59 (2001), affd. 55 Fed.
Appx. 476 (9th Cir. 2003); McGowan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2005-80.
7
Sec. 7430(c)(4)(E)(iv) provides that the qualified offer
subparagraph “shall not apply to a party which is a prevailing
party under any other provision of this paragraph.” For the
period prior to respondent’s answer to the amended petitions,
petitioner was not a prevailing party with respect to any of the
docketed cases. Thus, it is necessary to determine whether
petitioner was a prevailing party based on having submitted a
qualified offer during the period prior to respondent’s answer.
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A qualified offer is defined in section 7430(g)(1) as a
written offer which:
(A) is made by the taxpayer to the United States
during the qualified offer period;
(B) specifies the offered amount of the taxpayer’s
liability (determined without regard to interest);
(C) is designated at the time it is made as a
qualified offer for purposes of this section; and
(D) remains open during the period beginning on
the date it is made and ending on the earliest of the
date the offer is rejected, the date the trial begins,
or the 90th day after the date the offer is made.
Respondent argues that petitioner’s offers were not qualified
offers because they were not made during the qualified offer
period and because they do not specify the amount of petitioner’s
liability.8
1. Qualified Offer Period
Respondent argues that petitioner’s offers could not be a
qualified offer because they were not made within the qualified
offer period. The qualified offer period begins on the date
respondent informs the taxpayer of a proposed deficiency and
“ending on the date which is 30 days before the date the case is
first set for trial.” Sec. 7430(g). Respondent interprets this
8
Respondent does not argue, and thus we do not consider,
that petitioner’s offer not be considered a qualified offer
because petitioner failed to provide respondent with the
substantiation and legal and factual arguments necessary for
informed consideration of petitioner’s claim for relief as
required by sec. 301.7430-7(c)(4), Proced. & Admin. Regs.
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provision to mean that if a case is not removed from the trial
calendar more than 30 days before the case is set for trial, then
a continuance will not serve to extend the qualified offer
period. Sec. 301.7430-7(c), (e), Example (13), Proced. & Admin.
Regs. Respondent thus concludes, pursuant to section 301.7430-
7(e), Proced. & Admin. Regs., that because all but one of
petitioner’s docketed cases were not removed from the trial
calendar more than 30 days before the date set for trial, the
qualified offer period for those cases expired before
petitioner’s offers.
Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that it is possible to
interpret the qualified offer period to mean 30 days before the
case is first set for trial after the effective date of the
enactment of section 7430(c)(4)(E) and (g). Thus, according to
petitioner, the relevant question is whether Congress intended
taxpayers such as petitioner to enjoy the benefit of the
qualified offer provision when their case had been calendared for
trial and then continued long before the Code was amended to add
the qualified offer rule.
Congress defined the qualified offer period as “ending on
the date which is 30 days before the date the case is first set
for trial.” Sec. 7430(g)(2). Further, Congress made section
7430(c)(4)(E) effective for costs incurred more than 180 days
after enactment (July 22, 1998). Internal Revenue Service
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Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec.
3101(g), 112 Stat. 685, 729. It is apparent Congress understood
the qualified offer provision would apply to cases already
pending before the Court. However, if Congress intended the
qualified offer period to extend to the first time a case was set
for trial after enactment, it did not say as much. We strictly
construe in favor of the Government the waiver of sovereign
immunity in section 7430. Simpson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1995-194; see Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 137 (1991).
Accordingly, the qualified offer period had expired at the
time petitioner submitted her qualified offer with respect to
taxable years 1980 through 1984. However, respondent concedes
that petitioner submitted an offer within the qualified offer
period with respect to taxable year 1985.
2. Whether the Offer Clearly States the Amount Offered
Respondent next argues that petitioner’s alleged qualified
offer fails because petitioner did not clearly specify the amount
being offered.9 Section 301.7430-7(c)(3), Proced. & Admin.
9
Respondent did not argue that petitioner’s offer was in bad
faith or lacked a reasonable relationship to the amount in issue.
See August v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 600 F.2d 699, 702 (7th Cir.
1979), affd. on other grounds 450 U.S. 346, 355 (1981) (“The
plain language of * * * [Fed. R. Civ. P. 68] makes it unnecessary
to read a reasonableness requirement into the Rule.”). Although
the plain language of sec. 7430 does not include any requirement
that a taxpayer’s qualified offer be made in good faith or with a
reasonable relationship to the amount in controversy, respondent
did not raise the issue, and we do not consider it here.
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Regs., provides that a qualified offer “specifies the offered
amount if it clearly specifies the amount for the liability of
the taxpayer * * *. The offer may be a specific dollar amount of
the total liability or a percentage of the adjustments at issue
in the proceeding at the time the offer is made.” The specified
amount “must be an amount, the acceptance of which by the United
States will fully resolve the taxpayer's liability, and only that
liability * * * for the type or types of tax and the taxable year
or years at issue in the proceeding.” Id.
Petitioner sent respondent a letter for each of the years at
issue offering to settle the case. Petitioner’s offers included
the following terms of settlement for each year:
1. Any adjustment the Service proposes to make
with respect to the [1985] joint tax return filed by
taxpayer and her husband shall not be made with respect
to Rhita S. Lippitz.
2. The taxpayer shall be granted relief from any
additional joint liability, in its entirety, pursuant
to IRC § 6015(c).
3. Solely for purposes of this qualified offer,
Rhita S. Lippitz shall make a payment of $100.00
against any final adjustment determined by Decision or
Stipulation with respect to the joint tax return for
the [1985] tax year.
4. No other adjustments shall be made in
connection with the [1985] income tax return as it
relates to Rhita S. Lippitz.
We find petitioner’s offer to clearly state the amount offered.
Petitioner offered to settle each docketed case for relief from
any additional joint liability pursuant to section 6015(c). In
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addition, petitioner offered to make a payment of $100 against
any final adjustment determined with respect to the joint tax
return for each of the years at issue. Thus, we find clear that
petitioner was offering to settle the petitions by paying $100
for each tax year and being relieved of any additional joint
liability under section 6015(c).
3. Whether Respondent’s Concession Is a Settlement
Finally, with respect to petitioner’s qualified offer,
respondent argues that petitioner cannot be a prevailing party
under section 7430(c)(4)(E) because this matter was resolved by a
settlement. Section 7430(c)(4)(E)(ii) provides that the
qualified offer rule shall not apply to “any judgment issued
pursuant to a settlement”. After petitioner filed a motion for
partial summary judgment, respondent indicated to the Court that
he was conceding petitioner’s entitlement to innocent spouse
relief under section 6015(c).10 Respondent argues that his
concession means that judgment was entered pursuant to a
settlement.
Respondent interprets section 7430(c)(4)(E)(ii) to mean that
the qualified offer provision does not apply where a taxpayer’s
liability “is determined exclusively pursuant to a settlement”.
Sec. 301.7430-7(a), Proced. & Admin. Regs. Previously, in
Gladden v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 446 (2003), we addressed
10
Petitioner’s motion was then denied as moot.
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whether a settlement following several legal determinations
precluded the recovery of litigation fees pursuant to section
7430(c)(4)(E). In Gladden, only after the parties litigated, and
this Court and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
decided, legal issues integral to the adjustments at issues were
the parties able to enter into a settlement agreement. We found
that judgment was not entered “exclusively” pursuant to the
settlement. We have not, however, previously had the opportunity
to address facts such as those before us to decide whether
respondent’s concession of an issue constitutes a settlement for
purposes of section 7430(c)(4)(E)(ii).
We apply the ordinary meaning of the term “settlement” as
used in section 7430 and find that respondent’s concession in
this case was not a settlement. See Med. Transp. Mgmt. Corp. v.
Commissioner, 127 T.C. 96, 101 (2006); Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v.
Brunswick Associates Ltd. Pship., 507 U.S. 380, 388 (1993)
(“Courts properly assume, absent sufficient indication to the
contrary, that Congress intends the words in its enactments to
carry ‘their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning’.” (quoting
Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979))).
On the facts before us, we find respondent’s concession was
not a settlement. Petitioner first submitted her qualified offer
to respondent on July 1, 2005. This offer would have resolved
the asserted deficiencies against petitioner for an increase in
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her liability of $100 for each of the taxable years at issue.
Respondent did not respond to petitioner’s offer. Later, after
receiving the recommendation of respondent’s CCISO office that
she was entitled to innocent spouse relief, petitioner again
submitted a settlement offer to respondent. This time,
petitioner offered to settle the case for full relief from the
asserted liabilities under section 6015(c). In the same letter,
petitioner informed respondent that in the absence of an
agreement resolving the matter, she intended to move for summary
judgment. Respondent did not accept petitioner’s offer.
Instead, respondent offered to settle the matter if the agreement
included a statement by petitioner that she had no interest in
the assets of the trusts.
True to her word, in the absence of respondent’s accepting
her offer, petitioner filed a motion for partial summary
judgment. On the day after respondent was to file a response to
petitioner’s motion, respondent instead filed a motion for
additional time in which he expressed his intent to concede. In
the light of petitioner’s multiple offers to settle and eventual
dispositive motion, we find respondent’s concession occurred too
late to be treated as a settlement.
This is not to say that in all cases a concession could not
be a settlement. We can imagine scenarios where a concession
would be difficult to differentiate from an agreement to settle.
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However, that is not the case here. It was not until after
petitioner actively litigated the issue––by filing a motion for
summary judgment––that respondent conceded she was entitled to
innocent spouse relief. We find this akin to a concession after
trial.
We do not believe Congress intended to grant respondent the
latitude to wait until just before the resolution of a
dispositive motion, or the end of a trial to concede a matter and
still benefit from the settlement exclusion of section
7430(c)(4)(E). Section 7430 was designed to emulate Rule 68 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and encourage settlement by
imposing litigation costs on the party unwilling to settle.
Gladden v. Commissioner, supra at 450. Respondent was unwilling
to settle this case on the terms and at the times offered by
petitioner. Respondent cannot sidestep the consequences of such
refusal by conceding the issues after petitioner had effectively
presented the case for disposition by the Court.
C. Net Worth Requirements
Respondent also argues that petitioner has not established
that she meets the net worth requirements required to claim
litigation fees. To qualify for an award of litigation costs,
the prevailing taxpayer cannot have a net worth that exceeded $2
million at the time the petition was filed. Sec.
7430(c)(4)(A)(ii); 28 U.S.C. sec. 2412(d)(2)(B) (2000).
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Petitioner has filed affidavits averring that her net worth was
less than $2 million at the time her amended petitions were filed
as well as when the original petitions were filed. We find
petitioner’s submissions to be credible, and respondent has
offered no evidence to contradict petitioner’s statements.
Accordingly, we are satisfied that petitioner meets the net worth
requirements.
D. Whether Petitioner Protracted the Proceedings
Respondent argues that petitioner is not entitled to an
award of litigation costs because she unreasonably protracted the
proceedings. Sec. 7430(b)(3) (“No award for reasonable * * *
costs may be made * * * with respect to any portion of the * * *
court proceeding during which the prevailing party has
unreasonably protracted such proceeding.”). Respondent faults
petitioner for not complying with a summons originally dated
October 5, 1987. Respondent attempted to resurrect the summons
in January 2006, in a letter to petitioner.
According to respondent’s records, the summons issued to
petitioner was served by leaving a copy at the abode of Mr.
Lippitz. The other evidence before the Court suggests that
before 2003, petitioner was not in a position to play an active
role in responding to the summons in question. Accordingly, we
cannot find fault in petitioner’s failure to comply with the 20
year old summons where there is no evidence that petitioner even
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knew of the summons until January 2006. We find that petitioner
has not unreasonably protracted the proceedings.
E. Reasonable Litigation Costs
Finally, respondent argues that the fees claimed by Ms.
Hawkins are unreasonable. We agree with respondent that no
departure from the statutory rates is called for in this case.
The award of attorney’s fees under section 7430 is generally
limited to the statutory rate11 “unless the court determines that
* * * a special factor, such as the limited availability of
qualified attorneys for such proceeding, the difficulty of the
issues presented in the case, or the local availability of tax
expertise, justifies a higher rate.” Sec. 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii).
Ms. Hawkins claims that an upward departure to her billing
rate of $350 an hour is warranted because of her extensive
experience dealing with innocent spouse relief and because the 10
lawyers who had previously represented petitioner were unable to
obtain such relief. While we do not question that Ms. Hawkins
has a wealth of experience that in some case might justify an
upward departure from the statutory rate, this is not such a
case.
We find nothing particularly complex about the law or the
11
An award for fees incurred in 2004 and 2005 is limited to
$150 per hour. Rev. Proc. 2003-85, sec. 3.33, 2003-2 C.B. 1184,
1190; Rev. Proc. 2004-71, sec. 3.35, 2004-2 C.B. 970, 976. An
award of fees incurred in 2006 is limited to $160 an hour. Rev.
Proc. 2005-70, sec. 3.36, 2005-2 C.B. 979, 985.
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facts of petitioner’s claim. Ms. Hawkins moved to amend the
petitions and asserted a claim for innocent spouse relief under
section 6015(c). Ms. Hawkins, on behalf of petitioner, sent
respondent two offers to settle the case and asked that
petitioner’s claim be evaluated by CCISO. Upon respondent’s
failure to settle the case and upon receipt of CCISO’s
determination, Ms. Hawkins drafted and filed a motion for partial
summary judgment arguing that, in accordance with CCISO’s
determination, there was no evidence to suggest that petitioner
had any actual knowledge of the erroneous items. Respondent was
ultimately unable to discover facts supportive of his position
that petitioner did have knowledge of the items giving rise to
the deficiency. Thus, while Ms. Hawkins achieved a successful
result for her client, there is nothing that convinces this Court
that a similar result would not also have been achieved by an
attorney with a more limited knowledge of the Internal Revenue
Code, generally, and section 6015, specifically. Accordingly, we
find no reason to depart from the statutory rate.
Further, as respondent points out, it appears Ms. Hawkins
billed her client for associate time at $125 an hour but seeks
recovery of fees for her associate at $150 an hour. We find that
petitioner is only entitled to recover fees for the amount
actually incurred for the associate’s time.
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F. Conclusion
We find that petitioner is entitled to an award of
litigation costs for all of the docketed cases from the date
respondent filed his answer to the amended petitions, as
petitioner was the prevailing party, and respondent was not
substantially justified. Petitioner is also entitled to an award
of litigation costs for the period before respondent filed his
answer, on the basis that petitioner submitted a qualified offer
for taxable year 1985, and petitioner’s liability for 1985 was
found by this Court to be less than if respondent had accepted
this offer. We note, however, that the record is insufficient to
distinguish petitioner’s litigation costs related to the 1985 tax
year from those related to the 1980 through 1984 tax years.
Petitioner will bear the burden of demonstrating which costs
incurred between the qualified offer and respondent’s answer
should be allocated to the 1985 tax year. Additionally,
petitioner is entitled to an award of the costs associated with
the current motion. See Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154,
161-162 (1990).
To reflect the foregoing,
An appropriate order will be
issued.