United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT June 22, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-11447
Summary Calendar
BOBBY CHARLES JONES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JAY PILLOW; et al.,
Defendants,
JAY PILLOW; DAMON JAMES; ROBERT NELSON; CITY OF WAXAHACHIE,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(3:02-CV-1825)
Before BARKSDALE, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
For this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the City of
Waxahachie, Texas, and three of its police officers, arising from
Bobby Charles Jones’ arrest on a domestic abuse charge, Jones
contests the summary judgment awarded defendants on his several
claims discussed below, including for excessive force.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Jones asserts that, by failing to view the evidence in the
requisite light most favorable to him, the summary judgment
standard was incorrectly applied in determining probable cause
existed for: the warrantless entry; the search of his home; and
his warrantless arrest. The district court concluded that his
entry and search claims were time-barred. Jones does not dispute
that ruling. See Summers v. Dretke, 431 F.3d 861, 881 n.12 (5th
Cir. 2005) (claims not briefed on appeal are abandoned). For the
arrest claim, Jones fails to cite any evidence that refutes
defendants’ probable-cause evidence. See Malacara v. Garber, 353
F.3d 393, 405 (5th Cir. 2003). Thus, he has not shown a genuine
issue of material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986); United States v. Carrillo-Morales, 27 F.3d
1054, 1062 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1178 (1995).
Next Jones asserts the defendant officers were not entitled to
qualified immunity for the entry, search, and arrest claims.
Because Jones abandoned the warrantless entry and search claims, we
need not address whether the officers were entitled to immunity for
them. See Than v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. at Houston, 188 F.3d
633, 635 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1160 (2000).
Likewise, we need not consider whether the officers have qualified
immunity for the arrest claim because Jones has failed to show
summary judgment was improper on the merits of that claim. Id.
2
Jones also claims the City is liable because the defendant
officers were ignorant of basic Fourth Amendment principles,
proving the City failed to adequately train and supervise them. He
does not present evidence concerning the substance of the training
or supervision. As discussed supra and infra, he fails to show an
underlying constitutional violation. Furthermore, he offers no
evidence that the City’s official policy makers were actually or
constructively aware of a policy against adequately training and
supervising, such that they were deliberately indifferent towards
the constitutional rights of persons who came into contact with the
police. Accordingly, Jones has failed to establish a genuine issue
of fact material to his claim for municipal liability. See
Meadowbriar Home for Children, Inc. v. Gunn, 81 F.3d 521, 532-33
(5th Cir. 1996); see also Michaels v. Avitech, Inc., 202 F.3d 746,
754-55 (5th Cir.)(conclusory allegations and a mere scintilla of
evidence are insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion),
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 926 (2000).
Finally, Jones claims the district court erred in determining
that the statute of limitations on his excessive-force claim ran
from date of his injury, and that his claim was time barred as a
result. He maintains the claim did not accrue until he was
acquitted. This contention was rejected in Price v. City of San
Antonio, Tex., 431 F.3d 890, 892, 894 n.8 (5th Cir. 2005).
AFFIRMED
3