T.C. Memo. 2009-120
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
JEAN MATHIA AND ESTATE OF DOYLE V. MATHIA, DECEASED, JEAN MATHIA,
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 16483-05L. Filed May 27, 2009.
Mark W. Curnutte, for petitioners.
Ann L. Darnold, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
MARVEL, Judge: Pursuant to section 6330(d),1 petitioners
seek review of respondent’s determination to proceed with the
collection of petitioners’ 1982, 1983, and 1984 Federal income
1
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code, and all Rule references are to the Tax
Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
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tax liabilities. Petitioners also seek review under section
6404(h) of respondent’s determination to deny petitioners’
request for abatement of interest under section 6404(e).
Background
The parties submitted this case fully stipulated under Rule
122. The stipulation of facts is incorporated herein by this
reference.
Jean Mathia (Mrs. Mathia) resided in Oklahoma when she
petitioned this Court on her own behalf and as personal
representative of the Estate of Doyle V. Mathia, her deceased
husband. Doyle V. Mathia (Mr. Mathia) and Mrs. Mathia2 were
married and filed joint Federal income tax returns for all
relevant years. Mr. Mathia died on February 19, 2000.
Mr. Mathia was a limited partner in Greenwich Associates
(Greenwich), a New York limited partnership subject to the
unified audit and litigation procedures of the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. 97-248, sec.
402(a), 96 Stat. 648, for the relevant tax years. Greenwich was
one of approximately 50 partnerships and joint ventures
participating in coal programs sponsored by the Swanton
Corp., a Delaware corporation (collectively referred to as the
Swanton partnerships).
2
We use the term “petitioners” throughout this opinion to
refer to Mr. Mathia or his estate and Mrs. Mathia.
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Thirty of the Swanton partnerships were formed before the
enactment of TEFRA. The remaining 20 Swanton partnerships,
including Greenwich, were formed after the enactment of TEFRA and
are subject to the TEFRA unified audit and litigation provisions
applicable to partnerships (Swanton TEFRA partnerships).
Mr. Mathia owned an 8.484-percent limited partnership
interest in Greenwich at all relevant times.3 Mr. Mathia was
neither a section 6223(a) notice partner nor a member of a notice
group described under section 6223(b)(2).4
Kevin Smith (Mr. Smith) served as the general partner and
tax matters partner (TMP) of Greenwich. Neither Mr. Mathia nor
Mrs. Mathia notified respondent that Mr. Smith did not have
authority to enter into a settlement agreement on their behalf.
3
Mrs. Mathia, individually, was never a partner in
Greenwich.
4
Under sec. 6223(a), a partner is not entitled to notice
unless the Secretary receives sufficient information to determine
whether the partner is entitled to the notice and to enable the
Secretary to provide the notice to the partner. Under sec.
6223(b)(2), if a partnership has more than 100 partners, a group
of partners having a 5-percent or more interest in the profits of
the partnership can request that one of their members receive the
notice. The parties stipulated that Mr. Mathia was neither a
notice partner nor a member of a notice group and that the
Greenwich tax matters partner (TMP) had authority to bind all of
Greenwich’s partners to the stipulation of settlement.
Respondent subsequently moved for relief from the designated
stipulations, alleging that they were in error. In a Memorandum
Opinion filed as T.C. Memo. 2007-4, we concluded that respondent
was not entitled to relief from the stipulations.
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Respondent determined that the only purpose of the Swanton
partnerships was to generate tax deductions. On or before
March 16, 1987, Greenwich received a notice of the beginning of
an administrative proceeding (NBAP) for tax years 1982, 1983, and
1984.5 On August 3, 1990, respondent issued to Greenwich a
notice of final partnership administrative adjustment (FPAA) for
1982, 1983, and 1984. Mr. Smith timely filed a petition for
review in this Court under section 6226 (the Greenwich
litigation).
In the Greenwich litigation Greenwich was represented by
Henry G. Zapruder (Mr. Zapruder) and Matthew Lerner (Mr. Lerner)
of Zapruder & Odell, a law firm that served as counsel for most
of the Swanton TEFRA partnerships.6 In or about September 1991
respondent’s attorneys and Zapruder & Odell reached an agreement
in principle regarding the parameters of a settlement with
respect to 19 of the 20 Swanton TEFRA partnerships, including
Greenwich (1991 agreement). The 1991 agreement was reflected in
an exchange of letters between Zapruder & Odell on behalf of the
partnerships and respondent’s attorneys, Robert Marino and Moira
5
The record does not indicate the precise date on which
respondent issued Greenwich the NBAP.
6
In the attachment to notices of determination dated Aug. 5,
2005, issued by the Appeals Office with respect to the lien and
proposed levy, the Appeals Office states that Mr. Lerner did not
represent Greenwich. We find to the contrary on the basis of the
stipulations of the parties.
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Sullivan (Ms. Sullivan). Included in the 1991 agreement was a
requirement that the TMP for each partnership sign a Rule 248(a)
decision document.7
After respondent’s attorneys and Zapruder & Odell reached
the 1991 agreement, they continued to negotiate aspects of the
proposed settlement. They also began the process of applying the
general terms to each partnership and partner. That process
included gathering and exchanging information to enable
respondent to calculate partnership-level adjustments and each
partner’s distributive share adjustment, preparing reports
showing the calculations, and preparing and executing decision
documents that memorialized the terms of the proposed settlement
with respect to each Swanton partnership as well as closing
agreements as appropriate.
By letter dated January 10, 1992, Zapruder & Odell requested
that respondent “designate someone * * * to administer the
settlement of the Swanton cases.” By letter dated January 15,
1992, respondent’s counsel advised Zapruder & Odell that
respondent had assigned another attorney, Frances Chan, “to
immediately effectuate the settlement of the Swanton
Partnerships.” Respondent’s counsel also requested verification
7
Rule 248(a) states that “A stipulation consenting to entry
of decision executed by the tax matters partner and filed with
the Court shall bind all parties.” Under Rule 248(a) the TMP’s
signature certifies that no party objects to entry of decision.
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of each partner’s investment in the 19 Swanton TEFRA partnerships
that agreed to move forward with the settlement.
In July 1995 respondent sent to Mr. Lerner and Mr. Smith
letters enclosing the following documents with respect to the
Greenwich litigation: (1) The decision document reflecting
adjustments to partnership items for each of the years 1982,
1983, and 1984; (2) the computations on which the decision
document was based; (3) closing agreements for some of the
Greenwich limited partners;8 and (4) Forms 886Z(C), Partner’s or
S Corporation Shareholders’ Shares of Income. Respondent
informed Mr. Lerner9 and Mr. Smith that limited partners in
Greenwich seeking treatment deviating from the adjustments in the
decision document needed to sign individual closing agreements
before the decision document could be filed with the Court. The
letter also stated the following:
8
By letter dated sometime in July 1995, Ms. Sullivan sent to
Mr. Lerner a revised closing agreement for one of the Greenwich
limited partners. On that same date, Ms. Sullivan mailed copies
of all amended closing agreements to Mr. Smith so that Mr. Smith
could arrange for execution of the agreements by the affected
partners.
9
Although Mr. Lerner remained one of Greenwich’s counsel of
record until November 1999, he apparently left Zapruder & Odell
in May 1996. Mr. Lerner withdrew from the Greenwich litigation
in 1999.
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Please understand that your signing each
partnerships’ [sic] Decision Documents constitutes the
offer to settle that particular partnership with the
Internal Revenue Service and the countersignature of
the documents constitutes the Internal Revenue
Service’s acceptance of that offer. No settlement of
any partnership will be final until these documents are
countersigned by the Internal Revenue Service.
On September 11, 1996, Mr. Smith signed the decision document.
On September 25, 1996, Mr. Lerner signed the decision document
and returned it to respondent’s attorneys that same day.
By letters dated July 17 and November 7, 1996, Greenwich’s
counsel mailed executed closing agreements with respect to
Greenwich to Ms. Sullivan. Although none of the letters in the
record disclosed how many of the Greenwich limited partners were
required to sign closing agreements, the attachment to the
notices of determination stated that seven partners were required
to execute closing agreements before the Greenwich decision
document could be signed by respondent. Mr. Mathia was not one
of them.10 The attachment also stated that the closing
agreements were dated from November 12, 1999, to November 27,
2000, but did not identify the date to which it referred (e.g.
date of receipt, date executed by taxpayer, date executed by
respondent’s agent, effective date).11 The stipulated record
10
Mr. Mathia did not execute a closing agreement, and his
wife did not execute one on his behalf.
11
The attachment further states that “The most significant
delays encountered with this partnership were both in contacting
(continued...)
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does not explain why the closing agreements were dated in 1999
and 2000 when they were mailed to respondent in 1996.12
By letter dated February 27, 2001, Ms. Sullivan sent another
decision document with respect to the Greenwich litigation and
the computations on which the decision document was based to Mr.
Zapruder. The decision document was identical to the one mailed
to Greenwich in 1995. In the letter Ms. Sullivan asked Mr.
Zapruder to sign the document, to have Mr. Smith sign the
document, and to return the signed decision document to her. Ms.
Sullivan represented that as soon as respondent’s counsel
received the signed decision document, they would get it
countersigned and file it immediately with the Court. Ms.
Sullivan also described what would happen after the decision was
entered by the Court, and she warned Mr. Zapruder that his
signature on the decision document “constitutes the offer to
settle” and that the countersignature “constitutes the Internal
Revenue Service’s acceptance of that offer.” The stipulated
11
(...continued)
the tax matters partner, Smith, and receiving his signed 906’s.”
However, we can find no evidence in the record other than the
conclusory statement in the attachment to support a finding that
the delay in executing the closing agreements was attributable to
either Greenwich’s TMP or its counsel.
12
In 2004 Appeals Officer Troy Talbott attempted to find out
the date by which the Internal Revenue Service had received all
of the Forms 906, Closing Agreement on Final Determination
Covering Specific Matters, for Greenwich, but he was apparently
unable to do so.
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record does not contain any explanation as to why a second
decision document was mailed to Greenwich’s counsel after they
had already delivered the executed original of the first decision
document to Ms. Sullivan on September 25, 1996.
On August 30, 2001, respondent countersigned the decision
document and submitted it to this Court. The Court filed the
decision document on August 31, 2001, as a stipulation of
settlement (Greenwich stipulation). On September 7, 2001, this
Court issued an order to show cause, directing Mr. Smith to file
a written response showing cause as to why the Court should not
enter a decision in accordance with the terms of the Greenwich
stipulation. Mr. Smith did not file a response, and on January
17, 2002, this Court entered an order and decision resolving the
Greenwich litigation. On April 17, 2002, the decision became
final.
On September 27, 2002, respondent mailed petitioners a Form
4549A-CG, Income Tax Examination Changes, notifying them of a
computational adjustment13 to their 1983 income tax liability as
a result of the resolution of the Greenwich litigation. On
January 8, 2003, respondent notified petitioners of adjustments
to their 1982 and 1984 income tax liabilities. Petitioners did
13
A computational adjustment changes the tax liability of a
partner to properly reflect the treatment of a partnership item.
Sec. 301.6231(a)(6)-1T, Temporary Proced. & Admin. Regs., 52 Fed.
Reg. 6790 (Mar. 5, 1987), amended 64 Fed. Reg. 3840 (Jan 26,
1999).
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not agree to waive or extend any period of limitations for the
assessment of their 1982, 1983, or 1984 tax liability. On
January 27, 2003, respondent assessed against petitioners the
income tax deficiencies and interest for 1982, 1983, and 1984
attributable to the computational adjustments. On October 27,
2003, petitioners paid all of the tax, but not the interest, that
respondent had assessed.14
On February 6, 2004, petitioners submitted Forms 843, Claim
for Refund and Request for Abatement, requesting an abatement of
the interest accrued on their 1982, 1983, and 1984 income tax
liabilities under section 6404.
On February 10, 2004, respondent issued to petitioners a
Final Notice–-Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right
to a Hearing for 1982, 1983, and 1984, and petitioners timely
requested a section 6330 hearing. On April 2, 2004, respondent
issued to petitioners a Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and
Your Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320, for 1983 and 1984, and
petitioners timely requested a section 6320 hearing.
On April 7, 2004, respondent denied petitioners’ interest
abatement claim. On May 5, 2004, petitioners submitted a request
to respondent’s Appeals Office to review the denial of their
interest abatement claim.
14
Petitioners paid $149,360, $4,015, and $2,331,
respectively, towards their 1982, 1983, and 1984 tax liabilities.
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On October 15, 2004, Mrs. Mathia, acting individually, filed
a Form 8857, Request for Innocent Spouse Relief, wherein she
sought relief under section 6015 from joint and several liability
for all tax liabilities attributable to Greenwich for 1982, 1983,
and 1984. On July 8, 2005, respondent granted Mrs. Mathia’s
request for relief.
On August 5, 2005, respondent issued to petitioners a notice
of determination with respect to the notice of intent to levy and
a second notice of determination with respect to the notice of
Federal tax lien filing. On August 18, 2005, respondent issued a
final determination letter to petitioners denying petitioners’
request for abatement of interest under section 6404. The final
determination did not set forth any facts to explain the 5-year
delay between the execution of the decision by the Greenwich TMP
and counsel and the execution of the decision on behalf of
respondent. The final determination simply stated that “We do
not find any errors or delays on our part that merit the
abatement of interest in our review of available records and
other information.”
On September 6, 2005, petitioners timely filed a petition
contesting each of respondent’s determinations. Petitioners
contend that under section 6229(f), the period for assessment
expired before respondent assessed petitioners’ 1982, 1983, and
1984 tax liabilities. Alternatively, petitioners argue that
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respondent improperly denied their interest abatement claims
under sections 6404 and 6621(d).
Discussion
I. Determination To Proceed With Lien and Levy
A. Section 6330(d) Review
Under section 6320(a) the Secretary15 is required to notify
the taxpayer in writing of the filing of a Federal tax lien and
inform the taxpayer of his right to a hearing. Section 6330(a)
similarly provides that no levy may be made on a taxpayer’s
property or right to property unless the Secretary notifies the
taxpayer in writing of his right to a hearing before the levy is
made. If the taxpayer requests a hearing under either section
6320 or 6330, a hearing shall be held before an impartial officer
or employee of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Office of
Appeals.16 Secs. 6320(b)(1), (3), 6330(b)(1), (3). At the
hearing a taxpayer may raise any relevant issue, including
appropriate spousal defenses, challenges to the appropriateness
15
The term “Secretary” means “the Secretary of the Treasury
or his delegate”, sec. 7701(a)(11)(B), and the term “or his
delegate” means “any officer, employee, or agency of the Treasury
Department duly authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury
directly, or indirectly by one or more redelegations of
authority, to perform the function mentioned or described in the
context”, sec. 7701(a)(12)(A).
16
Sec. 6320(b)(4) provides that to the extent practicable, a
hearing under sec. 6320 should be held in conjunction with a sec.
6330 hearing, and sec. 6320(c) provides that sec. 6330(c), (d)
(other than par. (2)(B)), and (e) applies for purposes of the
sec. 6320 hearing.
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of the collection action, and collection alternatives. Sec.
6330(c)(2)(A). A taxpayer is precluded from contesting the
existence or amount of the underlying tax liability unless the
taxpayer did not receive a notice of deficiency for the tax in
question or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute the
tax liability. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B); see also Sego v.
Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 609 (2000).
Following a hearing the Appeals Office must determine
whether the Secretary may proceed with the proposed collection
action. In so doing, the Appeals Office is required to consider:
(1) The verification presented by the Secretary that the
requirements of applicable law and administrative procedures have
been met; (2) the relevant issues raised by the taxpayer; and (3)
whether the proposed collection action appropriately balances the
need for efficient collection of taxes with a taxpayer’s concerns
regarding the intrusiveness of the proposed collection action.
Sec. 6330(c)(3).
Section 6330(d)(1) grants the Court jurisdiction to review
the determination made by the Appeals Office. Where the
underlying tax liability is not in dispute, the Court will review
that determination for abuse of discretion. Lunsford v.
Commissioner, 117 T.C. 183, 185 (2001); Sego v. Commissioner,
supra at 610; Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 182 (2000).
Where the underlying tax liability is properly at issue, the
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Court reviews any determination regarding the underlying tax
liability de novo. Sego v. Commissioner, supra at 610.
Petitioners’ primary argument–-that the applicable period of
limitations expired before respondent’s assessment–-constitutes a
challenge to petitioners’ underlying tax liability. See Boyd v.
Commissioner, 117 T.C. 127, 130 (2001). Respondent concedes that
petitioners did not have a prior opportunity to dispute whether
the assessment following the completion of the Greenwich
litigation was timely, and he does not question our jurisdiction
to consider the issue. Accordingly, we review respondent’s
determination regarding the period of limitations de novo.
B. Burden of Proof
In Amesbury Apartments, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 227,
240-241 (1990), we addressed as follows the taxpayer’s argument
that the section 6229(a) assessment period had expired:
The expiration of the period of limitation on
assessment is an affirmative defense, and the party
raising it must specifically plead it and carry the
burden of proving its applicability. Rules 39, 142(a).
To establish this defense, the taxpayer must make a
prima facie case establishing the filing of the
partnership return, the expiration of the statutory
period, and receipt or mailing of the notice after the
running of the period. Miami Purchasing Service Corp.
v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 818, 823 (1981); Robinson v.
Commissioner, 57 T.C. 735, 737 (1972). Where the party
pleading the defense makes such a showing, the burden
of going forward with the evidence shifts to
respondent who must then introduce evidence to show
that the bar of the statute is not applicable. Adler
v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 535, 540 (1985). Where
respondent makes such a showing, the burden of going
forward then shifts back to the party pleading the
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affirmative defense to show that the alleged exception
to the expiration of the period is invalid or otherwise
inapplicable. Adler v. Commissioner, supra at 540.
The burden of proof, i.e., the burden of ultimate
persuasion, however, never shifts from the party who
pleads the bar of the statute of limitations. Adler v.
Commissioner, supra at 540.
Accordingly, if petitioners present a prima facie case that
respondent failed to timely assess tax and interest under section
6229, the burden of production shifts to respondent to show that
the period of limitations had not expired before the assessments.
The burden of proof, however, remains with petitioners at all
times.17 See Rule 142(a).
C. Period of Limitations for Making Assessments
Under the TEFRA partnership provisions, the income tax
treatment of partnership items ordinarily is determined through a
proceeding conducted at the partnership level. Sec. 6221.
Section 6231(a)(3) defines a partnership item as any item to be
taken into account for the partnership’s taxable year to the
17
Petitioners filed a motion to shift the burden of proof
under sec. 7491(a). Sec. 7491 shifts the burden of proof to the
Secretary if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with
respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the
liability of the taxpayer. However, sec. 7491 applies only to
court proceedings arising in connection with examinations
commencing after the date of its enactment, July 22, 1998.
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998
(RRA 1998), Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3001, 112 Stat. 726. Because
the examination of Greenwich and its partners commenced well
before the enactment of sec. 7491, and because the computational
adjustments to petitioners’ 1982, 1983, and 1984 returns were
made in accordance with the result of the Greenwich examination,
sec. 7491(a) is inapplicable. Consequently, we denied
petitioners’ motion.
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extent regulations provide that the item is more appropriately
determined at the partnership level than at the partner level.18
The regulations contain an extensive list of matters that fall
within the definition of partnership item. See sec.
301.6231(a)(3)-1, Proced. & Admin. Regs.
To commence a partnership-level proceeding, the Commissioner
must issue an NBAP to the TMP19 and to all other partners
entitled to notice under section 6223. See supra note 4. At the
conclusion of the partnership-level examination, the Commissioner
must send the TMP and all notice partners an FPAA detailing any
adjustments made to the Form 1065, U.S. Return of Partnership
Income. Sec. 6223(a)(2). Within 90 days of the date the FPAA is
mailed to the TMP, the TMP may contest the FPAA by filing a
petition in the Tax Court, the District Court for the district in
which the partnership’s principal place of business is located,
or the Court of Federal Claims. Sec. 6226(a). The court in
which jurisdiction is established has jurisdiction to review all
partnership items for the partnership year to which the FPAA
18
A nonpartnership item is defined as an item which is not a
partnership item. Sec. 6231(a)(4). Administrative and judicial
proceedings regarding nonpartnership items are not conducted at
the partnership level. See secs. 6221, 6230(a).
19
Under TEFRA a partnership must have a TMP who is either
appointed by the partnership or determined in accordance with
statutory and regulatory requirements. Sec. 6231(a)(7).
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relates and to review the allocation of such items among the
partners. Sec. 6226(f).
The Commissioner is prohibited from assessing a deficiency
attributable to the adjustment of a partnership item until the
partnership-level proceeding is completed. Sec. 6225. If the
TMP does not file a petition in the Tax Court, the Commissioner
cannot assess any deficiency attributable to the adjustment of a
partnership item until 150 days after the mailing of the FPAA to
the TMP. Sec. 6225(a)(1). If the TMP files a petition in the
Tax Court within the 150-day period, the Commissioner is
prohibited from assessing any deficiency attributable to
partnership item adjustments until the decision of the Tax Court
becomes final. Sec. 6225(a)(2).20
Section 6229(a) sets forth the period within which the
Commissioner may assess any deficiency that is attributable to
the adjustment of a partnership item. It provides that the
period for assessment shall not expire sooner than 3 years after
(1) the date the partnership tax return was filed or (2) the due
date of the partnership tax return (determined without regard to
extensions), whichever is later. See also Rhone-Poulenc
Surfactants and Specialties, L.P. v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 533,
542 (2000). Under section 6229(d) the 3-year period described in
20
The finality of a Tax Court decision is determined under
sec. 7481.
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section 6229(a) is suspended for the 90-day period during which
an action may be brought under section 6226. Additionally, if a
petition is filed challenging the FPAA under section 6226, the
period within which an assessment may be made is suspended until
the decision of the court becomes final, plus 1 year. Sec.
6229(d).
The period for assessment mentioned above continues to apply
as long as an item remains a partnership item. See sec.
6229(f)(1). Section 6231(b), however, lists several ways in
which a partnership item may be converted into a nonpartnership
item during a partnership-level proceeding. Most relevant to
this case, a partnership item converts into a nonpartnership item
as of the date the Secretary or the Attorney General (or his
delegate) “enters into a settlement agreement with the partner
with respect to such items”. Sec. 6231(b)(1)(C). If a
partnership item converts into a nonpartnership item under
section 6231(b)(1)(C), section 6229(f) provides that the period
for assessing tax with respect to the converted item expires no
sooner than 1 year after the date the item becomes a
nonpartnership item.21
Respondent contends that petitioners did not execute a
settlement agreement under section 6231(b)(1)(C) and that
21
The period under sec. 6229(f) can be extended by
agreement. Sec. 6229(f)(1).
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petitioners remained a party to the Greenwich litigation under
section 6226(c) until the Tax Court rendered its final decision.
Thus, respondent argues, he was prohibited by section 6225(a)(2)
from assessing petitioners’ tax liability until the date the
Court’s order and decision became final. Respondent contends
that he timely assessed petitioners’ tax liability within the
period allowed by section 6229(a) and (d) after the Court’s
decision became final.
Petitioners assert that the relevant partnership items
converted to nonpartnership items under section 6231(b)(1)(C) by
means of a settlement agreement between Mr. Mathia and
respondent. Petitioners argue that Mr. Mathia reached a
settlement agreement with respondent on or about September 30,
1991, through correspondence exchanged between Mr. Lerner,
Greenwich’s counsel, and respondent. Alternatively, petitioners
argue that Mr. Mathia and respondent entered into a settlement
agreement when respondent’s attorney signed the Greenwich
stipulation on August 30, 2001. A finding that respondent
reached a section 6231(b)(1)(C) settlement agreement with Mr.
Mathia in either circumstance would trigger the application of
the provision contained in section 6229(f) and make respondent’s
assessments untimely. Accordingly, we must determine what
constitutes a settlement agreement for purposes of section
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6231(b)(1)(C), and we must then decide whether Mr. Mathia and
respondent entered into such an agreement.
D. Settlement Agreements Under Section 6231(b)(1)(C)
A controversy before this Court may be settled by agreement
between the parties. Dorchester Indus. Inc. v. Commissioner, 108
T.C. 320, 329 (1997), affd. without published opinion 208 F.3d
205 (3d Cir. 2000). The term “settlement agreement”, however, is
not defined in the Internal Revenue Code, and section
6231(b)(1)(C) does not provide any detail as to what constitutes
a settlement agreement for purposes of converting a partnership
item into a nonpartnership item. Because a settlement is a
contract, however, courts generally apply principles of contract
law to determine whether a settlement has been reached. See
Dorchester Indus. Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 330; Robbins
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 420, 435-436,
supplemented by 53 T.C. 275 (1969).
A settlement agreement can be reached through offer and
acceptance made by letter, or even in the absence of a writing.
Dorchester Indus. Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 330. Settlement
of an issue before the Court does not require the execution of a
closing agreement under section 7121, or any other particular
method or form. Id. Settlement agreements are effective and
binding once there has been an offer and an acceptance; filing
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the agreement with the Court as a stipulation is not required for
the agreement to be effective and binding. Id. at 338.
Under TEFRA, a settlement agreement entered into by the TMP
will generally bind a nonnotice partner if the settlement
agreement states that the agreement is binding on the nonnotice
partner. Sec. 6224(c)(3)(A). If a partner wants to ensure that
a settlement agreement entered into by the TMP will not be
binding on him, the partner can file a statement with the
Secretary providing that the TMP does not have the authority to
enter into a settlement agreement on that partner’s behalf. Sec.
6224(c)(3)(B).
As we discussed above, petitioners argue that Mr. Mathia
entered into a section 6231(b)(1)(C) settlement agreement with
respondent on two separate occasions. We shall examine the
evidence and circumstances surrounding each occasion to decide
whether Mr. Mathia entered into a section 6231(b)(1)(C)
settlement agreement with respondent as petitioners contend.
1. Correspondence Between Parties
Petitioners argue that Mr. Mathia entered into a section
6231(b)(1)(C) settlement agreement with respondent in September
1991. According to petitioners, respondent extended an offer to
settle in September 1991, which Mr. Smith, Greenwich’s TMP,
accepted on or about September 30, 1991. Petitioners rely upon a
series of letters from Mr. Lerner to all of the partners
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in the Swanton Partnerships as proof that the settlement
agreement existed:
(1) A September 19, 1991, letter advising all partners in
the Swanton Partnerships to “accept the Government’s settlement
offer which was communicated to us this week”;
(2) a November 8, 1991, letter indicating that the offer
communicated in the September 19, 1991, letter had been accepted
by 19 of the 20 Swanton TEFRA partnerships (including Greenwich).
The letter stated that the cases had been settled, and that only
the preparation of decision documents and closing agreements
memorializing the terms of the settlement remained outstanding;
(3) a January 10, 1992, letter from Mr. Lerner to respondent
inquiring about respondent’s progress in implementing the
settlement; and
(4) a March 13, 1992, letter referencing the settlement that
occurred in 1991 and informing the partners that the settlement
was being finalized.
As further proof that Mr. Mathia and respondent entered into
a settlement agreement in September 1991, petitioners rely on a
series of letters from respondent:
(1) A letter dated January 14, 1992, in which respondent’s
attorney informed Mr. Lerner that he was appointing an attorney
to effect the settlement of the Swanton TEFRA Partnerships;
- 23 -
(2) a letter dated in October 1992 that was received by
Zapruder & Odell on October 26, 1992, in which respondent’s
attorney stated that “we agreed to enter into the settlement
agreement” on the basis that the TMP for each partnership was
settling the case on behalf of all partners;
(3) a letter dated April 9, 1993, in which respondent’s
attorney listed the “terms on which we agreed on September 30,
1991”;
(4) a letter dated June 11, 1993, that discussed “terms of
settlement” and other “computational issues” affecting the
settlement process; and
(5) a letter dated September 3, 1993, again discussing the
“terms of the settlement” and other various issues pertaining to
the settlement.
Although the above-described correspondence confirms that
Greenwich and respondent reached an agreement in 1991 to enter
into a settlement of the partnership-level proceeding, we remain
unconvinced that the agreement was sufficiently fleshed out in
1991 to constitute a binding settlement agreement at that time.
The agreement in principle that was reached in 1991 set forth the
parameters of a settlement, but the correspondence described
above reflects that negotiations continued between respondent and
the attorney representing the Swanton TEFRA partnerships to at
least September 3, 1993. Moreover, the correspondence indicates
- 24 -
that the execution of a decision document resolving the
partnership litigation depended upon the fulfillment of certain
conditions such as the TMP’s ability to represent that all
partners consented to the settlement.22 Implementing and
finalizing the proposed settlement required the collection and
analysis of detailed information, the preparation of calculations
and agreements, and in some cases, the execution of closing
agreements by individual partners.
Even if we assume, however, that respondent and the
Greenwich TMP entered into a binding settlement agreement to
resolve the partnership litigation in 1991, we would still
conclude that agreement did not qualify as a settlement agreement
between a partner and the Secretary within the meaning of section
6231(b)(1)(C). The basis for our conclusion is set forth below.
Section 6231(b)(1)(C) refers only to settlement agreements
reached between the Secretary or the Attorney General (or his
delegate) and a partner. Section 6231(b)(1)(C) does not contain
any reference to an agreement between the Secretary and a TMP
with respect to a partnership-level proceeding. The wording of
22
Among other things, the settlement of the partnership-
level proceeding was conditioned upon the TMP’s executing a
stipulation consenting to the entry of decision under Rule
248(a), which, when filed with the Court, would be binding on all
parties, including individual partners. Under Rule 248(a), the
TMP’s signature on the stipulation “constitutes a certificate by
the tax matters partner that no party objects to entry of
decision.”
- 25 -
section 6231(b)(1)(C) presents us with the real issue at hand:
does a settlement agreement between the Secretary and a TMP
resolving a partnership-level proceeding under sections 6221-6231
constitute a settlement agreement with a partner with respect to
the partnership items of the partner under section 6231(b)(1)(C)?
In Crnkovich v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 168 (1998), affd.
per curiam 202 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000), which also involved
Swanton TEFRA partnerships, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims
examined two agreements reached in two separate actions.23 In
the first action, the court held that the taxpayer-partners
entered into a section 6231(b)(1)(C) settlement agreement when
they executed a Form 906, Closing Agreement on Final
Determination Covering Specific Matters. Id. at 175. In the
second action, the court held that a stipulation of settlement
entered into between individual taxpayer-partners and the
Commissioner constituted a settlement agreement under section
6231(b)(1)(C). Id. at 178. In reaching both conclusions, the
court focused on the intent of the parties to enter into a
binding, conclusive agreement governing the settlement of
disputed partnership items. Id. at 173, 179. The court also
examined the role that a section 6231(b)(1)(C) settlement
23
Two of a total of five consolidated actions were before
the court on cross-motions for summary judgment. Crnkovich v.
United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 168, 169 (1998), affd. per curiam 202
F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
- 26 -
agreement is intended to serve under the TEFRA partnership
provisions:
At the time the IRS entered the Form 906 agreement, it
faced competing incentives in determining how best to
handle the partnership tax issues presented for the
* * * [taxpayers’] post-1982 tax years. On the one
hand, as reflected by the TEFRA partnership provisions,
it ordinarily is efficient for the IRS to make the
determination as to the tax treatment of partnership
items at the partnership level. On the other hand,
because the IRS was in the process of negotiating with
the * * * [taxpayers] on an individual partner level
with respect to pre-TEFRA tax years, there were
potential efficiencies in also dealing with the * * *
[taxpayers] individually with respect to post-TEFRA tax
years. In the Form 906 agreement, the IRS resolved
these competing incentives by deciding to deal with the
* * * [taxpayers] individually and apart from any
partnership-level determinations. For certain tax
issues, the bilateral agreement establishes the terms
that control the * * * [taxpayers’] personal tax
liability without providing an exception in the event
of a contrary resolution of the same tax issues at the
partnership level. Hence, in entering the Form 906
agreement, the IRS chose to forego the advantages of
making its determinations at the partnership level and
opted instead to deal with the * * * [taxpayers]
individually with respect to the tax issues addressed
in the Form 906 agreement. Entering into a “settlement
agreement” under I.R.C. § 6231(b)(1)(C) is a statutory
method of exercising such a choice. [Id. at 174-175;
emphasis added.]
The court’s analysis in Crnkovich illustrates an important
distinction between a settlement agreement reached at the
partnership level by a partnership’s TMP and a settlement
agreement reached directly with an individual partner. When a
partner enters into a settlement agreement individually, as each
taxpayer did in Crnkovich v. United States, supra, he removes
himself from the partnership proceeding and allows the
- 27 -
Commissioner to resolve his tax liability on an individual basis.
In such a case the disputed partnership items are no longer more
appropriately determined at the partnership level, and section
6231(b)(1)(C) operates to convert the partner’s partnership items
to nonpartnership items. This conversion allows the Commissioner
to proceed with assessment and collection against the individual
partner under section 6229(f) in accordance with the terms of the
settlement, free of the TEFRA-imposed restrictions on assessment
mentioned above. See sec. 6225.
The 1991 agreement reached by respondent and Mr. Lerner on
behalf of the Swanton TEFRA partnerships outlined in principle
the terms that would govern a settlement of the partnership
litigation involving 19 of 20 Swanton TEFRA partnerships. It did
not reflect an agreement to settle any individual partner’s
liability resulting from adjustments to partnership items outside
of the partnership-level proceeding. Consequently, the agreement
did not operate to remove Mr. Mathia or any other partner from
the partnership-level proceeding. Instead, the agreement started
a process that culminated with the filing of the Greenwich
stipulation and the Court’s entry of decision. After the
decision resolving the partnership litigation became final,
respondent adjusted petitioners’ tax liability in accordance with
the decision resolving the partnership litigation as required and
permitted by sections 6221-6231.
- 28 -
We conclude on the record before us that the agreement
reached between respondent and Mr. Lerner was an agreement
relating to the TEFRA partnership proceeding on behalf of the
Swanton TEFRA partnerships (including Greenwich) and was not an
agreement between respondent and Mr. Mathia that operated to
convert Mr. Mathia’s partnership items into nonpartnership items
as contemplated by section 6231(b)(1)(C).
2. Greenwich Stipulation
Petitioners also argue that Mr. Mathia entered into a
section 6231(b)(1)(C) settlement agreement on August 30, 2001,
when respondent countersigned the Greenwich stipulation.
Respondent disagrees, arguing that the Greenwich stipulation is
not a settlement agreement of the type described in section
6231(b)(1)(C). According to respondent, the Greenwich
stipulation offered by petitioners does not use the phrase “terms
of settlement”, addresses issues solely at the partnership level,
and functions only to settle the partnership-level proceeding.
We agree with respondent. As with the 1991 agreement, the
adjustments to partnership items in the Greenwich stipulation
were adjustments to be made at the partnership level. Under Rule
248(a), Mr. Smith agreed to the adjustments to the disputed
partnership items on behalf of Greenwich partners (including Mr.
Mathia) who did not enter individual closing agreements. The
adjustments agreed upon were made to items reported on
- 29 -
Greenwich’s partnership return, and the stipulation made no
reference to the individual liability of Greenwich partners.
Thus, while the stipulation was executed by Mr. Smith in his
capacity as the TMP who possessed the necessary authority to bind
Mr. Mathia and/or his estate, the stipulation reflected an
agreement regarding the treatment of partnership items that was
reached by and with the partnership. The stipulation did not
qualify as “a settlement agreement with the partner” with respect
to partnership items within the meaning of section 6231(b)(1)(C).
A settlement agreement under section 6231(b)(1)(C) operates to
convert a partner’s distributive share of partnership items to
nonpartnership items and enables the Commissioner to assess that
partner’s deficiency without regard to the restriction on
assessment set forth in section 6225(a)(2). Respondent was
prohibited by section 6225(a)(2) from assessing deficiencies
attributable to the Greenwich partnership items until this Court
had entered a decision in the partnership proceeding and that
decision had become final under section 7481.
We conclude that neither Mr. Mathia nor his estate entered
into a settlement agreement with respondent that qualified as a
settlement agreement with a partner within the meaning of section
6231(b)(1)(C). Accordingly, the disputed partnership items were
not converted to nonpartnership items, and the period for
assessment under section 6229(d) remained open for the
- 30 -
assessments at issue here. Under section 6225(a)(2), respondent
was restricted from assessing deficiencies attributable to the
partnership item adjustments set forth in the Greenwich
stipulation until April 17, 2002, the day the Court’s decision
became final.24 Under section 6229(d), respondent’s January 27,
2003, assessment is timely because it occurred within 1 year of
the decision’s becoming final. We hold, therefore, that
respondent is not barred by section 6229(f)(1) from assessing and
collecting petitioners’ unpaid tax liability.
II. Abatement of Interest
Section 6601(a) provides, in general, that if any amount of
tax imposed by the Code is not paid on or before the last date
prescribed for payment, interest on such amount must be paid for
the period from such last date to the date paid at the
underpayment rate established under section 6621. Section
6611(a) similarly provides that interest must be allowed and paid
on any overpayment in respect of any internal revenue tax at the
overpayment rate established under section 6621. Section 6621(d)
provides for the elimination of interest on overlapping periods
24
Under sec. 7481 decisions of the Court shall become final
upon the expiration of the time allowed for filing a notice of
appeal if no such notice has been duly filed within such time.
Under sec. 7483 a taxpayer has 90 days to file a notice of appeal
after the decision of the Court is entered.
- 31 -
of tax overpayments and underpayments.25 To the extent that for
any period interest is payable and allowable on equivalent
underpayments and overpayments by the same taxpayer, the net rate
of interest under section 6621 on such amounts is zero for such
period. Sec. 6621(d).
Section 6404(e), as it applies to this case,26 provides in
pertinent part:
SEC. 6404(e). Assessments of Interest
Attributable to Errors and Delays by Internal Revenue
Service.--
(1) In general.–-In the case of any
assessment of interest on–-
(A) any deficiency attributable in whole
or in part to any error or delay by an
officer or employee of the Internal Revenue
Service (acting in his official capacity) in
performing a ministerial act * * *
* * * * * * *
the Secretary may abate the assessment of all or
any part of such interest for any period. * * *
25
However, sec. 6621(d) generally is effective with respect
to interest for periods beginning after July 22, 1998. RRA 1998
sec. 3301, 112 Stat. 741.
26
In 1996 Congress amended sec. 6404(e)(1) to permit
abatement of interest for unreasonable error or delay in
performing a ministerial or managerial act. Taxpayer Bill of
Rights 2, Pub. L. 104-168, sec. 301, 110 Stat. 1457 (1996). The
amendments to sec. 6404(e)(1), however, apply only to interest
accruing with respect to deficiencies or payments for tax years
beginning after July 30, 1996. Id. Accordingly, the amendments
do not apply in this case.
- 32 -
A ministerial act is a procedural or mechanical act that does not
involve the exercise of judgment or discretion and that occurs
during the processing of a taxpayer’s case after all
prerequisites to the act, such as conferences and reviews by
supervisors, have taken place. Sec. 301.6404-2T(b)(1), Temporary
Proced. & Admin. Regs., 52 Fed. Reg. 30163 (Aug. 13, 1987).27 A
decision concerning the proper application of Federal tax law is
not a ministerial act. Id. The Secretary will not grant an
abatement of interest if a significant aspect of the delay is
attributable to the taxpayer. Sec. 6404(e)(1).
When Congress enacted section 6404(e), it did not intend the
provision to be used routinely to avoid payment of interest.
Rather, Congress intended abatement of interest only where
failure to do so “would be widely perceived as grossly unfair.”
H. Rept. 99-426, at 844 (1985), 1986-3 C.B. (Vol. 2) 1, 844; S.
Rept. 99-313, at 208 (1986), 1986-3 C.B. (Vol. 3) 1, 208. Under
section 6404(h)(1), we have jurisdiction to determine whether the
Commissioner abused his discretion in denying a taxpayer’s
request for abatement of interest. Because the Commissioner’s
abatement authority involves the exercise of discretion, however,
we must give due deference to the Commissioner’s determination.
27
Because the taxes in question are for years before 1996,
the temporary regulations (rather than the final ones) are
applicable, though the same in substance insofar as relevant
here.
- 33 -
Woodral v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 19, 23 (1999); Mailman v.
Commissioner, 91 T.C. 1079, 1082 (1988). In order to prevail, a
taxpayer must prove that the Commissioner abused his discretion
by exercising it arbitrarily, capriciously, or without sound
basis in fact or law. Woodral v. Commissioner, supra at 23;
Mailman v. Commissioner, supra at 1084; see also sec. 6404(h)(1);
Rule 142(a).
Petitioners contend that they are entitled to an abatement
of interest for three periods beginning on December 27, 1984,
when petitioners allege respondent issued the first Greenwich
NBAP, to August 25, 2003.28 Our analysis of each period is set
forth below.
A. Period From December 27, 1984, to August 3, 1990
Petitioners assert that respondent issued NBAP’s with
respect to Greenwich’s 1983 and 1984 tax years which Greenwich
received on December 27, 1984, and March 16, 1987, respectively,
and that respondent took an unreasonable amount of time by not
providing a further response until August 3, 1990, when
respondent issued to Greenwich the FPAA for tax years 1982, 1983,
and 1984. Petitioners allege that the interest that accrued
during this period was attributable to delays resulting
28
Petitioners erroneously contend that Aug. 25, 2003, was
the date respondent issued the notice of intention to levy to
Greenwich.
- 34 -
from the uncoordinated involvement of multiple IRS districts and
that the lack of coordination was a ministerial act.
Petitioners’ argument is not supported by the record. In
Beagles v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-67, a case also
involving the tax liability of a partner in a Swanton
partnership, we set forth some of the history behind the Swanton
partnership litigation, and we held that the Commissioner was not
erroneous or dilatory in performing a ministerial act between
April 15, 1984, and May 8, 1992. During this period the
Department of Justice conducted a criminal investigation of
Norman Swanton (Mr. Swanton), the individual behind the formation
and promotion of the Swanton coal programs. Id. During the
investigation civil proceedings were suspended in accordance with
established IRS policy.29 After the period of limitations for
prosecution expired, the criminal investigation of Mr. Swanton
terminated. In 1988 litigation involving the pre-TEFRA Swanton
partnerships commenced in this Court. That litigation continued
until approximately September 1993.30 Id. During the pendency
29
The delay of a civil matter until the resolution of a
related criminal matter is a longstanding policy of the IRS.
Taylor v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 206, 212 (1999) (citing
Badaracco v. Commissioner, 693 F.2d 298, 302 (3d Cir. 1982),
revg. T.C. Memo. 1981-404, affd. 464 U.S. 386 (1984)), affd. 9
Fed. Appx. 700 (9th Cir. 2001).
30
Several test cases were tried in 1992, and an opinion was
filed in 1993 in Kelley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-495
(taxpayers not entitled to deductions claimed in relation to
(continued...)
- 35 -
of the pre-TEFRA partnership litigation, respondent made a
managerial decision to suspend proceedings involving the Swanton
TEFRA partnerships.
The mere passage of time during the litigation phase of a
dispute does not establish an error or delay by the Commissioner
in performing a ministerial act because decisions about how to
proceed in the litigation phase of a case necessarily involve
discretion. Lee v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 145, 150-151 (1999).
In the context of the Swanton partnership litigation, we have
uniformly held that decisions made by the IRS regarding the
management of the Swanton project were not ministerial acts.
See, e.g., Jaffe v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-122, affd. 175
Fed. Appx. 853 (9th Cir. 2006); Dadian v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2004-121; Deverna v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-80;
Beagles v. Commissioner, supra.
30
(...continued)
Swanton coal programs). As we stated in Beagles v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2003-67:
The Court’s practice of selecting test cases and
holding other cases in abeyance pending the resolution
of the test cases was among the management tools
adopted to deal with the large number of cases. It was
not feasible to litigate simultaneously hundreds of
cases involving substantially similar issues. Here,
respondent’s counsel turned to the group of TEFRA
cases, including petitioner’s partnership, as soon as
the trial of the Swanton test cases concluded in 1992.
Prior to that time, the delays are explained by the
complexities and burdens of managing the cases.
- 36 -
Respondent’s decisions and actions during this period were
managerial and involved the exercise of discretion. We conclude
that respondent did not abuse his discretion by denying
petitioners’ request for abatement of interest for the period
from December 27, 1984, to August 3, 1990.
B. November 8, 1991, to August 30, 2001
During this period, petitioners claim, respondent was
dilatory in processing the closing agreements and Rule 248(a)
decision document necessary to consummate a settlement of the
Greenwich partnership litigation after the parties reached an
agreement in principle in or around November 1991. Petitioners
argue that respondent took an unreasonable amount of time (nearly
4 years) to issue the decision document to Greenwich on July 3,
1995, and an even more unreasonable amount of time (nearly 5
years) to countersign the decision document on August 30, 2001,
after Mr. Lerner had executed it on behalf of the partnership and
returned it to respondent in September 1996. Petitioners argue
that the processing of these documents was a ministerial act and
that respondent’s delay in finalizing the Greenwich settlement
entitles petitioners to an abatement of interest that accrued
during this period.
The record with which we are presented confirms that the
1991 agreement presented a challenge that involved the collection
of information and the preparation of documents for 19 Swanton
- 37 -
TEFRA partnerships and each of the partners. Nevertheless, we
must examine the record for evidence pertaining to the manner in
which respondent implemented and finalized the Greenwich
settlement.
The notice of determination denying petitioners’ abatement
request contains no explanation of what transpired from
November 8, 1991, to August 30, 2001. It simply states that
respondent did not find any errors or delays that merit the
abatement of interest. Consequently we review the record
stipulated by the parties for what it tells us about the
Greenwich settlement process from November 8, 1991, to August 30,
2001.
The record reveals the following. In approximately
September 1991 respondent’s attorney and Greenwich’s attorney
reached an agreement in principle to settle the TEFRA partnership
litigation pending in this Court. On July 3, 1995, respondent’s
attorney mailed to Greenwich’s counsel the decision document and
the closing agreements for execution by counsel, Greenwich’s TMP,
and the partners named in the closing agreements. On
September 25, 1996, Greenwich delivered the decision document
signed by the TMP and Greenwich’s counsel to respondent. On July
17 and November 7, 1996, closing agreements were mailed to
respondent’s counsel, Ms. Sullivan. On February 27, 2001, Ms.
Sullivan sent another decision document to Greenwich’s counsel
- 38 -
and requested that it be executed. On August 30, 2001, a
representative of respondent countersigned the decision document
and submitted it to this Court.
The stipulated record reveals the following gaps in the
processing of the Greenwich paperwork: (1) An approximately 4-
year gap between the 1991 agreement and July 3, 1995, when the
decision document and the closing agreements were mailed to
Greenwich, (2) an approximately 1-year gap between July 3, 1995,
and November 7, 1996, the last date that the stipulated record
shows closing agreements were mailed to respondent’s counsel, and
(3) an approximately 5-year gap between November 8, 1996, and
August 30, 2001, when the decision document was countersigned by
respondent. We examine each of the gaps to decide whether
respondent abused his discretion regarding the abatement of
interest. In making the examination, we assume that the
stipulated record includes the administrative file that was
available to respondent when he made his decision not to abate
interest.
With respect to the first gap, the stipulated record
establishes that after the 1991 agreement was reached, the
parties to the Greenwich partnership litigation gathered and
exchanged information necessary to identify the Greenwich
partners who were required to execute closing agreements, and
respondent prepared necessary computations as well as the
- 39 -
Greenwich decision document and closing agreements. That process
was complicated and took time. Although the approximately 4-year
gap was substantial, we see nothing in the stipulated record that
supports a conclusion that the first gap was the result of
unreasonable delay by respondent in performing a ministerial act.
Rather, the stipulated record reflects that the process of
implementing the settlements of the Swanton TEFRA partnerships
was a managerial nightmare requiring cooperation over an extended
period to prepare necessary calculations and paperwork and to
ensure that the TMPs could satisfy respondent’s requirement that
they certify no partner objected to the settlement of the
partnership actions. Petitioners’ complaint here is grounded in
a concern about the management of the settlement process, but
section 6404(e) as then in effect does not permit us to abate
interest for managerial decisions.
With respect to the second gap, the stipulated record
indicates that respondent mailed the decision document and the
closing agreements to Greenwich, and Greenwich took approximately
1 year to return the executed decision document and the closing
agreements to respondent. We see nothing in the stipulated
record that supports a conclusion that the second gap was the
result of any unreasonable delay by respondent in performing a
ministerial act.
- 40 -
The third gap of approximately 5 years requires a different
conclusion, however. The stipulated record is substantial and
includes paperwork generated by respondent as well as
correspondence between respondent and Greenwich. The stipulated
record reflects that Greenwich delivered an executed decision
document to respondent’s counsel on September 25, 1996, and that
Greenwich also mailed signed closing agreements to respondent on
July 17 and November 7, 1996. Although the stipulated record
does not clearly reflect that all of the Greenwich closing
agreements were included in the two mailings, there is no
correspondence in the administrative record to suggest that any
of the required closing agreements were missing or that
Greenwich’s TMP and attorneys were dilatory in any way.
Consequently, we infer from the documents that no later than
November 1996 Greenwich had returned the necessary documents to
respondent’s counsel and that the only steps necessary to
consummate the Greenwich settlement were the ministerial acts of
countersigning the decision document and the closing agreements
and filing the decision document with the Court.
The stipulated record, however, contains no credible
explanation of the 5-year gap between the delivery of closing
agreements on November 7, 1996, and the countersigning on August
30, 2001, of the decision document, which was filed with the
Court as a stipulation of settlement on August 31, 2001. In
- 41 -
addition, the stipulated record reflects that on February 27,
2001, respondent’s counsel sent a second decision document to
Greenwich’s counsel that was identical to the first decision
document executed by Greenwich in 1996, a development that
suggests that respondent may have lost the original executed
decision document.
In Jacobs v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-123, we addressed
a situation where the basis for the Commissioner’s determination
not to abate interest had not been clearly explained either in
the final determination or at trial. We noted that an agency
must cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a
given manner, see Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the
United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48-
49 (1983), and that an agency’s exercise of discretion that is
not adequately explained is an abuse of discretion because it is
without rational explanation, see Estate of Gardner v.
Commissioner, 82 T.C. 989, 1000 (1984). In Jacobs v.
Commissioner, supra, we also stated the following:
The Commissioner is in the best position to know
what actions were taken by IRS officers and employees
during the period for which petitioners’ abatement
request was made and during any subsequent inquiry
based upon that request. If we were to uphold the
Commissioner’s determination not to abate interest
where the Commissioner has not clearly explained the
basis for the exercise of that discretion, we would be
condoning a review framework that would encourage the
Commissioner to provide as little information as
possible about the handling of cases during the period
- 42 -
of the abatement request and about the inquiry in
response to the request. * * *
We have a similar dilemma in this case. The notice of
determination contains no explanation of how respondent exercised
his discretion and does not recite any facts in support of the
exercise of that discretion. Although the stipulated record
provides many of the relevant facts, it fails to provide critical
information that only respondent would have. For example, the
stipulated record does not establish the date when all of the
closing agreements were received by respondent’s attorneys or
indicate what respondent did with the closing agreements he
received in 1996. The only credible evidence in the record31
regarding respondent’s receipt of closing agreements establishes
that closing agreements were sent to respondent in July and
November 1996. In the absence of contrary evidence, we infer
that respondent had the closing agreements no later than November
1996. The stipulated record does not explain the delay on the
part of respondent in countersigning and filing the Greenwich
decision document.
31
Although the notices of determination issued under secs.
6320 and 6330 contain a conclusory statement to the effect that
the delay was attributable to Greenwich, we conclude that the
statement is not credible because there is nothing in the
stipulated record other than this statement to support a finding
that any part of the delay was attributable to Greenwich. In
fact the credible evidence in the record is to the contrary.
Greenwich requested prompt processing of the proposed settlement
and promptly returned the executed decision document and the
closing agreements.
- 43 -
In Dadian v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-121, also a
Swanton TEFRA partnership case, we found that the Commissioner’s
task of countersigning the closing agreement was a ministerial
act and that because the Commissioner took an unreasonable amount
of time to countersign, the taxpayer was entitled to abatement of
interest.
The present case, like the Dadian case, involved the
ministerial act of countersigning the relevant settlement
document. Although Mr. Mathia did not execute an individual
closing agreement as the taxpayer did in Dadian, the processing
of the Greenwich settlement as to Mr. Mathia and other Greenwich
partners depended upon the execution of closing agreements by
limited partners and by respondent, and upon the execution of a
decision document by Greenwich and respondent. The record
reflects that respondent prepared and mailed out the relevant
decision document and closing agreements in 1995 and received the
signed documents in 1996. However, the Greenwich decision
document was not countersigned and filed with this Court until
2001. The delay in performing this ministerial act is not
explained in the record.
Because the delay in countersigning the decision document is
not explained by credible evidence in the stipulated record, we
conclude that respondent abused his discretion in refusing to
- 44 -
abate interest for the period from November 8, 1996, to
August 30, 2001.
C. August 30, 2001, to August 25, 2003
Petitioners argue that they are entitled to abatement of
interest accrued from August 30, 2001, the date the Greenwich
stipulation was signed, to August 25, 2003, the date they allege
respondent issued the notice of intent to levy.32 Petitioners
assert that the issuance of the notice is a ministerial act which
respondent was dilatory in performing.
Respondent could not assess income tax liabilities of
individual partners bound by the decision entered in the
Greenwich partnership litigation until the decision became final.
See sec. 6229. The Court’s order and decision in the Greenwich
litigation became final on April 17, 2002. Under section
6229(d)(2), respondent had 1 year to assess the tax resulting
from adjustments in the Greenwich stipulation. Respondent
assessed petitioners’ liabilities for 1982, 1983, and 1984 on
January 27, 2003, less than 1 year after the decision became
final.33 The stipulated record does not reveal any unreasonable
32
We have found that respondent issued the notice of intent
to levy on Feb. 10, 2004.
33
In several of the Swanton TEFRA partnership cases that we
have decided, we found that some of the Internal Revenue
Service’s files were destroyed as a result of the destruction of
the World Trade Center on Sept. 11, 2001. See, e.g., Dadian v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-121; Beagles v. Commissioner, T.C.
(continued...)
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or unexplained delay in performing a ministerial act for this
part of the period.
For the remaining period, January 28, 2003, through February
10, 2004, the stipulated record shows that respondent mailed
required notices of the assessments to petitioners, conducted an
investigation to identify levy sources and evaluate whether a
levy was appropriate, issued a notice and demand for payment to
petitioners, and made an administrative decision to issue a
notice of intent to levy. The process used by the IRS to decide
whether to proceed with collection by levy requires managerial
evaluation and the exercise of judgment and does not consist
solely of ministerial acts. That process was followed in this
case. Because we cannot identify any unreasonable delay in
performing a ministerial act during this period, we sustain
respondent’s determination as to the entirety of this period.
We conclude that respondent did not abuse his discretion by
denying petitioners’ request for interest abatement for the
period from August 30, 2001, to August 25, 2003.
D. Section 6621(d)
Lastly, petitioners request abatement of interest resulting
from application of the “global netting” concept of section
33
(...continued)
Memo. 2003-67. The stipulated record, however, does not
establish whether any of the Greenwich partnership litigation
files were also destroyed on Sept. 11, 2001.
- 46 -
6621(d). Petitioners assert that the termination of the
Greenwich partnership in 1987 released Mr. Mathia from his share
of certain partnership debt, resulting in $234,975 of income
being reported on petitioners’ 1987 income tax return. According
to petitioners, this figure represents the amount by which Mr.
Mathia’s cumulative deductions with respect to Greenwich in 1982,
1983, and 1984 exceeded his cash outlay for his interest in
Greenwich. Petitioners argue that they should be allowed, for
interest abatement purposes only, to reverse the income reported
in 1987 in connection with the disallowance of the related
deductions in 1982, 1983, and 1984. Petitioners further allege
that reversal of the 1987 income results in an overpayment of
$20,233 for that year and that interest on this overpayment
should be allowed to offset and “zero out” the interest accruing
on the 1982, 1983, and 1984 deficiencies.
Petitioners’ argument is without merit for several reasons.
First, section 6621(d) generally is effective for interest for
periods beginning after July 22, 1998. Internal Revenue Service
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3301,
112 Stat. 741. Second, although a special rule was enacted that
mitigates the effective date provision described above for
periods beginning before July 22, 1998, petitioners do not appear
to satisfy its requirements. Id. sec. 3301(c)(2), 112 Stat. 741,
as amended by Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental
- 47 -
Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. 105-277, sec. 4002(d), 112
Stat. 2681-906 (1998). Finally, even if section 6621(d) were to
apply to the periods at issue, for there to be a netting of
overpayment and underpayment interest under section 6621(d) there
must be an overpayment generating interest owed to the taxpayer.
An overpayment begins to accrue interest on the date of payment
of the first amount which is in excess of the tax liability.
Sec. 301.6611-1(b), Proced. & Admin. Regs. Petitioners never
made an overpayment with regard to their 1987 tax liability.34
Petitioners’ 1987 income tax return reported a tax liability of
$19,473, and respondent assessed additional tax of $23,698 on
May 3, 1993. Petitioners paid the full amount of the tax
assessed, plus accrued interest and penalties, and petitioners’
1987 tax account balance is zero. Because there is no
overpayment, there is no overpayment interest payable to
petitioners. Respondent properly denied petitioners’ claim for
interest netting.
III. Respondent’s Collection Actions
The only issues raised with respect to respondent’s
collection actions were the limitations issue and the interest
abatement issue. We conclude that the requirements of sections
34
According to the 1991 agreement, any partner who reported
any debt forgiveness income in 1987 was entitled to file a claim
for refund for the tax paid on that income. Petitioners did not
file a claim for refund with respect to any 1987 debt forgiveness
income.
- 48 -
6320 and 6330 have been satisfied and that respondent may proceed
with collection except to the extent set forth in this opinion.
IV. Conclusion
We have considered all the other arguments made by
petitioners, and, to the extent not discussed above, conclude
those arguments are irrelevant, moot, or without merit.
Because we conclude that petitioners are entitled to
interest abatement for the period from November 8, 1996, to and
including August 30, 2001, petitioners’ unpaid liability for
purposes of sections 6320 and 6330 must be recalculated to
reflect our holding. We shall enter a decision authorizing
respondent to proceed with collection once respondent has abated
interest in accordance with this opinion and has so advised the
Court and petitioners.
To reflect the foregoing,
An appropriate decision will
be entered.