T.C. Memo. 2009-171
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
ROBERT M. BATTLE, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 5016-08L. Filed July 20, 2009.
Robert M. Battle, pro se.
Gordon P. Sanz, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
HAINES, Judge: This matter is before the Court on
respondent’s motion for summary judgment and to impose a penalty
under section 6673 and petitioner’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings. Respondent made the determination to proceed to
collect by lien petitioner’s outstanding income tax liabilities
for 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005 (years at
issue). Respondent also made the decision to collect by levy
- 2 -
petitioner’s outstanding income tax liabilities for 2003, 2004,
and 2005. Petitioner, under section 6330, seeks review of
respondent’s determinations.1
The parties’ controversy poses the following issues for our
consideration: (1) Whether respondent abused his discretion in
determining to proceed with collection; and (2) whether
petitioner is liable for the penalty under section 6673.
Background
Petitioner is a licensed physician. At the time he filed
the petition, he resided in Texas.
On July 7, 2005, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued
summonses to petitioner individually and as trustee of HSH
Investments, KTW Group, KTW Investments, and KTW Consultants.2
Two of the summonses were issued because of petitioner’s failure
to file his individual income tax returns for the years 1999,
2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004. Upon petitioner’s failure to
comply, the U.S. filed a petition to enforce the IRS summonses in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas,
Houston Division (District Court). United States v. Battle, No.
4:05-MC-00520 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2006) (order to enforce
1
All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice
and Procedure, and all section references are to the Internal
Revenue Code. Amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar.
2
KTW Consultants and HSH Investments were parties previously
before this Court and petitioner acted as trustee in KTW
Consultants Trust, v. Commissioner, docket No. 19493-06 (May 2,
2007).
- 3 -
summonses), affd. 213 Fed. Appx. 307 (5th Cir. 2007). After the
court issued an order of coercive contempt ordering petitioner to
be held in the marshal’s custody until he disclosed the documents
sought by the summonses, petitioner released the requested data
and subsequently filed a notice of appeal. Petitioner then filed
an opening brief for appellant in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, raising many of the same issues he raised
later at the section 6330 hearing and now asks this Court to
consider. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of
the District Court. United States v. Battle, 213 Fed. Appx. 307
(5th Cir. 2007).
In 2006 petitioner filed Forms 1040, U.S. Individual Income
Tax Return, for all the years at issue but did not pay the
reported tax. The amounts reported on petitioner’s delinquent
returns were assessed along with additions to tax and interest.
On March 27, 2006, respondent sent petitioner a statutory notice
of balance due for 2003 and 2004. On April 3, 2006, respondent
sent petitioner a statutory notice of balance due for 1999, 2000,
2001, and 2002. On December 11, 2006, respondent sent petitioner
a statutory notice of balance due for 2005.
On May 18, 2007, respondent sent petitioner a Letter 1058,
Final Notice - Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right
to a Hearing (notice of intent to levy), with respect to
petitioner’s unpaid 2003, 2004, and 2005 tax liabilities. On May
25, 2007, respondent sent petitioner a Letter 3172, Notice of
- 4 -
Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under Section
6320 (notice of Federal tax lien), with respect to petitioner’s
unpaid tax liabilities for all the years at issue.
On June 13, 2007, in response to the notice of intent to
levy, petitioner mailed a request for a hearing with respect to
the years 2003, 2004, and 2005. On June 19, 2007, in response to
the notice of Federal tax lien filing, petitioner mailed a
request for a hearing with respect to all the years at issue. On
August 8, 2007, respondent’s Appeals Office informed petitioner
it had received the request for a hearing and provided
information relating to the collection due process procedure.
On September 7, 2007, Appeals Officer Bart A. Hill (Mr.
Hill) informed petitioner of the hearing procedures and
encouraged petitioner to visit the IRS Web Site “The Truth About
Frivolous Tax Arguments” and to review the list of frivolous and
groundless arguments. Mr. Hill requested that petitioner, within
14 days, describe the legitimate issues he wanted to discuss and
scheduled a telephone conference for October 29, 2007, at 10 a.m.
Mr. Hill referred petitioner to Pierson v. Commissioner, 115 T.C.
576 (2000), and mailed petitioner copies of the following
documents: Form 433-A, Collection Information Statement for Wage
Earners and Self-Employed Individuals; Form 433-B, Collection
Information Statement for Businesses; transcripts for the years
at issue; Publication 2105, Why Do I Have to Pay Taxes?; and
Publication 4165, Introduction to Collection Due Process
- 5 -
Hearings. Petitioner responded on November 13, 2007, by stating
his objections and requesting Form 4340, Certificate of
Assessments, Payments, and Other Specified Matters, which Mr.
Hill sent to petitioner on January 8, 2008.
Mr. Hill conducted the hearing with petitioner on November
14, 2007. Petitioner failed to submit a completed Form 433-A or
Form 433-B, or to discuss any collection alternative during the
hearing. Consequently, on January 31, 2008, respondent’s Appeals
Office issued a Notice of Determination Concerning Collection
Action(s) under Section 6320 and/or 6330 (notice of
determination) which stated:
The IRS followed proper procedures in filing the
tax lien. The lien filing was necessary to protect the
government’s interest in the taxpayer’s assets.
The taxpayer would not abandon his frivolous
theories of taxation during this appeal. The
taxpayer’s failure to furnish a financial statement
bars Appeals from exploring whether a less intrusive
collection alternative, such as an installment
agreement or offer in compromise, might have been
appropriate. The proposed levy action, although
intrusive, is necessary to collect the valid, unpaid
tax liability. It is the determination of Appeals that
the proposed levy action balances the need for
efficient collection of taxes with the taxpayer’s
legitimate concern the action is no more intrusive than
necessary.
On February 27, 2008, petitioner filed a petition with the
Court. On February 2, 2009, respondent filed a motion for
summary judgment seeking a decision that collection can proceed
and to impose a penalty pursuant to section 6673. On February
10, 2009, petitioner filed a motion for judgment on the
- 6 -
pleadings, and on February 17, 2009, filed a response to
respondent’s motion for summary judgment.
Discussion
A decision granting summary judgment may be rendered if the
pleadings and other materials in the record show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that a decision may be
rendered as a matter of law. Rule 121(b); Sundstrand Corp. &
Subs. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), affd. 17 F.3d 965
(7th Cir. 1994). We have considered the pleadings and other
materials in the record and conclude that there is no genuine
issue of any material fact and that a decision may be rendered as
a matter of law.
I. The Collection Action
Section 6321(a) provides that if any person liable to pay
any tax neglects or refuses to pay after demand, the Secretary
can collect such tax by placing a lien on the person’s property
or rights to property. Section 6331(a) provides that, if any
person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to do so within
10 days after notice and demand, the Secretary can collect such
tax by levy upon property belonging to such person. However, the
Secretary is required to give the taxpayer written notice of his
intent to file a lien or to levy and must describe the
administrative review available to the taxpayer before
proceeding. Secs. 6320(a), 6330(a).
- 7 -
Section 6330(b) describes the administrative review process,
providing that a taxpayer can request a hearing with the Appeals
office with regard to a levy notice. At the hearing the taxpayer
may raise certain matters set forth in section 6330(c)(2), which
include appropriate spousal defenses, challenges to the
appropriateness of collection actions, and offers of collection
alternatives. Further, a taxpayer may dispute the underlying tax
liability for any tax period if the taxpayer did not receive a
notice of deficiency for the tax liability or did not otherwise
have an opportunity to dispute the tax liability. Sec.
6330(c)(2)(B). Frivolous arguments, however, are not relevant
issues in a hearing. Pierson v. Commissioner, supra. “A
taxpayer's position is frivolous or groundless if it is contrary
to established law and unsupported by a reasoned, colorable
argument for change in the law.” Smith v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2000-290.
Following a hearing, the Appeals Office must make a
determination whether the proposed lien or levy action may
proceed. In so doing, the Appeals office is required to take
into consideration the verification presented by the Secretary
that the requirements of applicable law and administrative
procedure have been met, the issues raised by the taxpayer, and
whether the proposed levy action appropriately balances the need
for efficient collection of taxes with a taxpayer’s concerns
regarding the intrusiveness of the proposed collection action.
- 8 -
Sec. 6330(c)(3). In complying with section 6330, an Appeals
officer may rely on a computer transcript or Form 4340 to verify
that a valid assessment was made and that a notice and demand for
payment was sent to the taxpayer in accordance with section 6303.
Nestor v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 162, 166 (2002). Absent a
showing of irregularity, a transcript that shows such information
is sufficient to establish that the procedural requirements of
section 6330 have been met. Id. at 166-167.
Pursuant to section 6330(d)(1), within 30 days of the
issuance of the notice of determination, the taxpayer may appeal
that determination to this Court. Although section 6330 does not
prescribe the standard of review that we are to apply in
reviewing the Commissioner’s administrative determinations, we
have stated that, where the validity of the underlying tax
liability is properly at issue, we will review the matter de
novo. Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000); Goza v.
Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 181-182 (2000). Where the validity
of the underlying tax liability is not properly at issue,
however, we will review the Commissioner’s administrative
determination for abuse of discretion. Sego v. Commissioner,
supra at 610; Goza v. Commissioner, supra at 182.
Petitioner, during his hearing, asserted the same groundless
and frivolous arguments as he did in his later petition and
failed to raise any issues relating to the underlying liability.
By not raising any issues with respect to the amount of the
- 9 -
underlying liabilities with Appeals, petitioner waived his right
to challenge the underlying liability in this proceeding. See
Giamelli v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 107 (2007); Magana v.
Commissioner, 118 T.C. 488 (2002). Consequently, the validity of
the underlying tax liabilities is not at issue. See, e.g.,
Hathaway v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-15; Horton v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-197; Kemper v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2003-195; Widner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-114.
The undisputed facts set forth in respondent’s motion,
declarations in support of the motion, and attached exhibits
establish that respondent has satisfied the requirements of
section 6330. Mr. Hill, who had no prior involvement with
respect to the unpaid taxes before the section 6330 hearing and
thus met the requirement of section 6330(b)(3), verified that
proper assessments were made as reflected on computer transcripts
attached to the motion for summary judgment and in the notice of
determination and that the requisite notices had been sent to
petitioner. Mr. Hill also considered petitioner’s arguments and
rejected them as frivolous and irrelevant. Following the
hearing, Mr. Hill upheld the lien and levy actions, concluding
that they appropriately balanced the need for efficient
collection of taxes with petitioner’s concerns regarding the
intrusiveness of those actions. See sec. 6330(c)(3).
Upon receiving Mr. Hill’s decision, petitioner filed a
petition asserting the following arguments in support of his
- 10 -
contention that respondent’s determinations were erroneous: (1)
A “legal and proper” notice of deficiency was not issued to
petitioner for the years at issue; (2) respondent failed to
legally and properly assess the income tax of petitioner; (3)
respondent did not timely assess the taxes; (4) respondent failed
to prepare and execute a Form 4340 during the 3-year period
following the filing of petitioner’s returns; (5) respondent did
not provide a legal and proper 60-day notice that petitioner was
liable for any tax assessments; (6) the District Court’s order on
January 23, 2006, enforced only two of eight summonses; (7) the
subpoena issued by the District Court was improper because of a
lack of jurisdiction; and (8) the Special Assistant U.S. Attorney
Scott Shieldes, who represented the Government in petitioner’s
summons case, refused to receive a duress and protest notice and
receipt.
A. Notice of Deficiency, Assessment, and Statute of
Limitations
Petitioner contends in his first two arguments that the IRS
cannot assess the tax shown on the Forms 1040 he submitted
without first issuing a notice of deficiency. With respect to
the third argument, it is unclear whether petitioner refers to
the statute of limitations regarding assessment or the statute of
limitations regarding collection, both of which are addressed
below.
Following a summons enforcement proceeding, petitioner
submitted signed Forms 1040 for the years at issue but failed to
- 11 -
date them. However, the Forms 1040 from 1999 through 2004 were
signed by petitioner's return preparer and dated February 9,
2006. The 2005 Form 1040 was signed and dated by petitioner's
return preparer on October 16, 2006.
Section 6201 authorizes the Secretary to assess all taxes
reported by a taxpayer on his return. Richmond v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2005-238. “A deficiency notice is not required to
assess taxes where there is no deficiency. For example, the
Secretary may assess without a deficiency notice the amount of
tax shown due on a return.” Manko v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 195,
200 n.2 (2006). Petitioner submitted Forms 1040 for the years at
issue reflecting the tax due. There is no statutory provision
under section 6201 which requires the Commissioner to issue a
notice of deficiency with respect to a return before assessing
the amount reported on that return.
In regard to the statute of limitations on assessment,
section 6501 generally requires that the Commissioner assess
income tax within 3 years after the taxpayer files a return.
Wagenknecht v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-179; Martin v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-288, affd. 436 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir.
2006). Petitioner filed all returns in 2006, and the Forms 4340
reflect that the IRS assessed the amounts petitioner reported on
the Forms 1040 within the same year, thus meeting the 3-year
statute of limitations. In regard to collection of assessed
Federal income tax, the period of limitations begins on the date
- 12 -
taxes are assessed and ends 10 years thereafter. See sec.
6502(a)(1); Severo v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 160, 168 (2007).
The taxes for the years at issue were assessed during 2006, and
the collection notices were sent to petitioner in 2007, well
within the 10-year period of limitations found in section 6502.
B. Forms 4340
Federal tax assessments are formally recorded on a record of
assessment. Sec. 6203. The summary record of assessment must
“provide identification of the taxpayer, the character of the
liability assessed, the taxable period, if applicable, and the
amount of the assessment.” Sec. 301.6203-1, Proced. & Admin.
Regs. Mr. Hill reviewed respondent’s transcripts of account and
determined that respondent had properly assessed petitioner’s tax
liabilities.
In response to a taxpayer’s request under section 6203 and
the regulation for “a copy of the record of assessment,” the
Commissioner is not required to provide any particular form or
document and may choose among documents so long as the form used
identifies the taxpayer, states the character of the liabilities
assessed, the tax period giving rise to the assessment, the
amount of the assessment, and the date of assessment. Sec.
301.6203-1, Proced. & Admin. Regs; see also Roberts v.
Commissioner, 329 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 2003), affg. 118
T.C. 365 (2002). Furthermore, section 6330(c)(1) does not
mandate that the Appeals officer rely on a particular document in
- 13 -
satisfying the verification requirement or that the Appeals
officer actually give the taxpayer a copy of the verification
upon which he or she relied. Craig v. Commissioner, 119 T.C.
252, 262 (2002); Nestor v. Commissioner, 118 at 166.
Mr. Hill provided petitioner with Forms 4340 for the years
at issue. We have specifically held in Nestor v. Commissioner,
supra at 166, that it is not an abuse of discretion for an
Appeals officer, in complying with section 6330(c)(1), to rely on
Form 4340 or a computer transcript of account. Schroeder v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-190; Mann v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2002-48. Furthermore, a Form 4340 constitutes presumptive
evidence that a tax has been validly assessed pursuant to section
6203. Davis v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 35, 40 (2000). Because
petitioner failed to show some irregularity in the assessment
procedure that would raise a question regarding its validity, we
conclude that the Forms 4340 reflecting that tax liabilities were
assessed and remain unpaid are sufficient to support a collection
action under sections 6320 and 6330. Davis v. Commissioner,
supra at 40-41.
Petitioner also argues that a Form 4340 must be prepared
within 3 years from the filing of a tax return. However, a Form
4340 is simply a literal transcript, generated on a specific
date, containing tax data from an IRS master file associated with
a particular taxpayer. Hazel v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-
134; Bowman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-114, affd. 285 Fed.
- 14 -
Appx. 309 (8th Cir. 2008); see also Armstrong v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2002-224. There is no rule requiring that a Form 4340
be prepared within 3 years from the filing of a return.
C. Notice and Demand
Petitioner’s fifth claim is that the IRS failed to give him
“legal and proper” 60-day notice that he was liable for the
unpaid tax for the tax years at issue. Section 6303(a) requires
that petitioner be given notice and demand for payment within 60
days of the making of an assessment. A Form 4340, which
petitioner received, is presumptive evidence that a tax has been
validly assessed. Davis v. Commissioner, supra at 40.
Furthermore, the Forms 4340 for the years at issue show that the
IRS sent petitioner a notice of balance due, which constitutes a
notice and demand for payment as required by section 6303, for
each of the years involved. Craig v. Commissioner, supra at 262-
263; Coleman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-132. Proof that
notice and demand was issued to petitioner’s last known address
is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 6303, and
there is no requirement that respondent prove receipt of such
notice. United States v. Chila, 871 F.2d 1015, 1019 (11th Cir.
1989); Pursifull v. United States, 849 F. Supp. 597, 601 (S.D.
Ohio 1993), affd. 19 F.3d 19 (6th Cir. 1994). As petitioner has
failed to present any evidence that the notice and demand was not
issued as reflected on the Forms 4340 and has failed to show
error or irregularity in the Forms 4340 with respect to the
- 15 -
issuance of a statutory notice of balance due, we hold that
proper notice was received and this argument is without merit.
D. Summonses, Subpoena, and Duress and Protest Notice
The issues raised relate to the IRS summonses, a subpoena,
and an alleged refusal by the special assistant U.S. attorney to
accept a “Duress and Protest Notice and Receipt.” The first two
issues were raised in and addressed by the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit. See United States v. Battle, 213 Fed. Appx.
307 (5th Cir. 2007). Under section 6330(c)(2), a taxpayer may
raise any “relevant” issue which relates to the unpaid tax.
However, frivolous arguments are not relevant issues in a section
6330 hearing. Pierson v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 576 (2000). The
issues regarding the summonses, subpoena, and “duress and protest
notice” are immaterial and do not relate to this hearing, nor are
they relevant issues which may be raised under section
6330(c)(2).
In addition, petitioner is precluded, pursuant to section
6330(c)(4), from raising the first two of these issues before the
Appeals officer and this Court. Section 6330(c)(4) expressly
provides that taxpayers, at collection hearings before the
Commissioner’s Appeals office, may not raise issues that were
previously raised by taxpayers and considered in any other
administrative or judicial proceeding in which the taxpayers
meaningfully participated. See secs. 301.6320-1(e)(1), 301.6330-
1(e)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs.; Magana v. Commissioner, 118 T.C.
- 16 -
488 (2002); Richmond v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-59; Wooten
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-113. These statutory and
regulatory prohibitions are directly applicable to the summons
and subpoena issues that petitioner previously litigated in
United States v. Battle, supra. Accordingly, we conclude that
petitioner is precluded from raising these issues in this
proceeding.
The last issue petitioner raises is the alleged refusal by
the special assistant U.S. attorney of accepting a “Duress and
Protest Notice and Receipt.” We are unaware of any statute which
requires that a special assistant U.S. attorney accept such a
document or any statute authorizing such a document.
E. Abuse of Discretion and Verification
Where the validity of the underlying tax liability is not at
issue, the Court will review the determination of the Appeals
officer for abuse of discretion. Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C.
at 610; Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. at 181-182. Nonliability
determinations include Appeals’ determination of the
appropriateness of the collection action as well as a
determination as to matters involving collection alternatives
such as an installment agreement or offer-in-compromise. See
sec. 6330(c)(2)(A). Under an abuse of discretion standard, the
Court must determine whether the Appeal officer’s exercise of
discretion was arbitrary, capricious, or without sound basis in
- 17 -
law or fact. Woodral v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 19, 23 (1999)
(citing Mailman v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 1079, 1084 (1988)).
Pursuant to section 6330(c)(3), the determination of an
Appeals officer as to a proposed collection action must take into
consideration: (1) The verification that the requirements of
applicable law and administrative procedures have been met; (2)
the issues raised by the taxpayer; and (3) “whether any proposed
collection action balances the need for the efficient collection
of taxes with the legitimate concern of the [taxpayer] that any
collection action be no more intrusive than necessary.” As
stated in the notice of determination, and as shown by the
record, Mr. Hill considered all three of these matters.
As part of the hearing process, the Appeals officer must
“obtain verification from the Secretary that the requirements of
any applicable law or administrative procedure have been met.”
Sec. 6330(c)(1). Nonetheless, the Code does not require the
Appeals officer in a hearing to rely on a particular document or
to provide the taxpayer copies of the documents the Appeals
officer obtained or reviewed to verify that the requirements of
any applicable law or administrative procedure were met. The
notice of determination and the record demonstrate that Mr. Hill
complied with section 6330(c)(3) by reviewing the administrative
files and account transcripts and verifying that all legal and
procedural requirements had been met. Furthermore, Mr. Hill
addressed the relevant issues raised by petitioner and did not
- 18 -
abuse his discretion. See Craig v. Commissioner, 119 at 261-262;
Nestor v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. at 166.
II. Penalty Pursuant to Section 6673
Section 6673(a)(1) authorizes this Court to require a
taxpayer to pay a penalty, not to exceed $25,000, if it appears
that the taxpayer has instituted or maintained a proceeding
primarily for delay, or that the taxpayer’s position is frivolous
or groundless. Section 6673(a)(1) applies to proceedings under
section 6330. Pierson v. Commissioner, supra at 581. In
proceedings under section 6330, we have imposed the penalty on
taxpayers who have raised frivolous and groundless arguments with
respect to the legality of the Federal tax laws. See, e.g.,
Roberts v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. at 372-373; Eiselstein v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-22; Yacksyzn v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2002-99.
The record clearly establishes that the only arguments
petitioner made during the administrative processing of this case
were frivolous and/or groundless. Moreover, petitioner is aware
of the frivolity of his arguments, as evidenced by a letter
petitioner provided to Special Assistant U.S. Attorney Shieldes
on February 7, 2006, which explains that petitioner was misled by
various tax patriot or protest groups that openly challenge the
income tax system.
- 19 -
Furthermore, petitioner raised these same frivolous
arguments in a prior action before this Court.3 In our order and
decision entered May 2, 2007 in that action, we “[concluded] that
imposition of the [section 6673] penalty [was] not appropriate,
but we [cautioned] petitioners against raising frivolous
contentions in the future.” Petitioner received from the Appeals
officer Publication 2105 and was warned that any further pursuit
of these arguments could result in penalties under section 6673.
In spite of these warnings, petitioner has continued to raise
issues which the Court has found to be frivolous, groundless, or
lacking in merit.
Petitioner’s conduct demonstrates that this proceeding was
instituted and maintained primarily for delay. Moreover, every
argument made by petitioner during the administrative appeal and
in this Court was frivolous and/or groundless. Consequently, we
find that a penalty under section 6673(a)(1) is warranted. On
the basis of the above, we shall impose a penalty on petitioner
pursuant to section 6673(a)(1) of $20,000.
3
Petitioner presented many of the same arguments in KTW
Consultants Trust v. Commissioner, docket No. 19493-06.
- 20 -
In reaching our holdings herein, we have considered all
arguments made, and, to the extent not mentioned above, we
conclude they are moot, irrelevant, or without merit.
To reflect the foregoing,
An appropriate order and
decision will be entered
granting respondent’s motion
for summary judgment and for a
penalty and denying
petitioner’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings.